

THE
AMERICAN
CATHOLIC QUARTERLY
REVIEW.

BC

Bonum est homini ut eum veritas vincat volentem, quia malum est homini ut eum veritas vincat invitum. Nam ipsa vincat necesse est, sive negantem sive confitentem.

S. AUG. EPIST. ccxxxviii. AD PASCENT.

VOLUME XXI.

FROM JANUARY TO OCTOBER, 1896.

BOSTON COLLEGE LIBRARY
CHESTNUT HILL, MASS.

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THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW

VOL. XXI.—JANUARY, 1896.—No. 81.

THE MORAL ASPECTS OF THE QUESTION OF ANGLICAN ORDERS.

IT is curious that, in the present controversy about Anglican orders, so little stress is being laid on the moral side of the question, while so much is being said about the historical. Let us explain what we mean by the "moral" side. In all controversies in regard to a divine origin, we naturally look for certain broad characteristics which distinguish the divine from the human. For example, as to the origin of the Reformation, we naturally inquire (1), what was the character of the persons who are said to have "reformed" the Catholic Church, its authority, its dogmas, its worship? (2) what were the means by which the reform was effected? and (3) what were the consequences of the reform? And we proceed to judge of the moral probability of the Reformation being the work of the Holy Spirit, or, conversely, of its being political, or wicked, by what we know from State papers and records as to the actors, the means, and the consequences.

So it is in regard to Anglican orders. We are now asked by the Ritualists to believe that Anglican orders are the same orders as those of the Catholic Church; that, when an Anglican bishop ordains a Bachelor in Arts, he confers the same powers, the same privileges, as would be conferred by a Roman Catholic bishop. And we naturally rejoin: Well, if this be so, let us see what are the points of similitude as to priestly or ministerial character, as to office and function and duty; as to doctrine, devotion, and practice; and we ask all such questions as distinct from historic details in regard to the legitimacy of the succession. In other words, we first take the "moral" side of the argument,

as indicating the moral probabilities; because we know that the Roman orders are divine in their origin, and therefore divine in their functions; and we proceed to search for sufficient tokens of identity in the orders of the Anglican communion. It is this moral side we are now going to consider. We will first take a glance at the whole picture, and then we will examine the details.

I.

From the time of St. Augustine, in the sixth century, to that of Archbishop Warham, in the sixteenth, there was never any doubt about form or intention in regard to the conferring of orders, nor any dispute as to legitimate succession; while as to jurisdiction—a very different question, indeed—the Holy See was always acknowledged to be its sole source or fountain, in the sense of the “plenitude of jurisdiction.” But at the time of the Reformation all this was changed. Form was changed; intention was changed; while as to spiritual jurisdiction, it was transferred from the Pope to the lay king or queen of the island. Nor was there so much as one aspect in which the essentials of priesthood, as they had always been regarded for a thousand years, were not changed in a revolutionary sense. Thus, to speak of two priestly functions only: For a thousand years every Catholic deacon had been “made a priest,” that he might offer the holy sacrifice of the Mass, and hear confessions in the sacrament of penance; but, after the Reformation, every Protestant deacon was “made a priest” that he might *not* offer the holy sacrifice of the Mass, and might *not* hear sacramental confessions. And, from the period of this great change to about the year 1850, no Anglican clergyman was ever known to “say Mass,” or to hear a “sacramental confession.” Thus, the very soul of the institution, “Catholic priesthood,” was taken out of the Protestant body, Church of England; and three centuries were devoted to reviling those priestly powers which are now claimed by the Ritualists as their heritage.

More than this, the whole “character” of the Anglican ministry became the exact opposite of what it had ever been. Instead of an unmarried priesthood, clergymen married; instead of special vocations filling the monasteries and the convents, the religious life was tabooed as superstitious; instead of the sacrifice of the Mass being the daily glory of the Church, preaching became the one grand clerical function; instead of the churches being open every day, they were closed every day except Sunday; instead of the churches being the homes of the Holy of Holies, they were turned into ugly barns full of boxes, with a pulpit which always obscured the communion table; instead of the Real Presence, there was a real absence; nor was a single token left of the ancient

faith, while every observance was strictly ordered to condemn it. And this state of things lasted for three centuries, down to the time when the Oxford movement stirred the heart of all England and roused the national alarm or indignation.

Yet we are now asked to believe that the Anglican ministry is the same priesthood as that of the Roman Church ; that a clergy which, for three centuries, has been preaching against the Mass, against confession, against Catholic significance in church-ritual, has suddenly become identical with that Roman Catholic priesthood which it has existed for the sole purpose of defaming. And we are assured that the three centuries of apostacy, of delirious antagonism to Catholicity, though deplorable as national accidents or infirmities, have not touched the validity of Anglican orders. Are we not justified, then, in retorting, " But look at the moral side of the question " ; where are the tokens of your priesthood being divine, in its origin, its doctrines, its consistency, in its spiritual harmony with the ancient Catholic priesthood, which it supplanted with bitter hatred and persecution ? Can you give us moral evidence as to identity, when we can give you moral evidence as to contrariety ? We say to you, frankly, that it is impossible, morally speaking, that the same God can have instituted Catholic orders and have instituted the orders of the Church of England. But now let us take a few details, so as to work out the moral argument to demonstration.

II.

(a) First, take the Sacrament of Baptism ; both because, morally, it is improbable that the same priesthood should teach opposite doctrines about baptism, and, historically, it is certain that a great number of Anglican clergymen have not been effectually baptized. Now, the best way to make sure as to what was the *doctrine* of baptism, from Queen Elizabeth's time to Queen Victoria's, is to make sure as to what was the *practice*. Catholic theologians have taught, from the earliest days, that, for the validity of baptism, the water must be made to " flow on the head," and that if the water only falls on the hair, or if only a few drops (which do not flow) touch the infant, the baptism, to say the least, is uncertain ; while, if the water simply falls on the clothes, the baptism is certainly invalid. Now what has been the general practice among Anglicans ? Wheatly tells us, that during the time when the " Directory " was in force (from 1645 to 1660) " a basin was brought to the minister in his reading desk, and the child being held below him, he dipped in his fingers, and so took up water enough just to let a drop or two fall on the child's face." Nor did the re-establishment of Anglicanism decrease the carelessness. Mr. Bennet,

Vicar of Frome, when writing of sixty years ago, said, "Baptism as a sacrament was well nigh lost amongst the English people. . . . It is very questionable whether the water, when used, really did touch the person of the child meant to be baptized." Dr. Lee also, in one of his books, quotes the "Reunion Magazine" as showing that Bishop Alford "openly baptized fourteen adults by once flicking his wetted fingers in the air over all of them." While, as to the form and the matter of baptism—up to the time, say, of the "Tracts for the Times"—it was not unusual for a clergyman to dip his finger in the font, and then to go round to each child in silence, touching each child on the head; in which cases the baptisms were invalid. The writer of the present paper has frequently seen Anglican clergymen—from the year 1845 to 1855—simply "spirt" a drop of water at a row of infants; thus omitting both the matter and the form. Indeed, there is no exaggeration in the statement that Anglican baptisms, before the time of the High Church movement, were purely apologetic and perfunctory; being retained as a traditional compliment to orthodoxy, but without the slightest idea of regeneration. The font itself was always hidden in some corner, so as to signify that the rite was of no importance; and grievous were the complaints of sponsors or parents if the infant's head-gear or ribbons were moistened. Compare this indifference, this doctrinal laxity, with the exquisite care of all Catholic priests in administering the sacrament of baptism; and say, is it probable that the same Catholic priesthood could both honor and dishonor the same sacrament? Apart from the fact that it is morally certain that an immense number of Anglican bishops and clergymen were never effectually baptized, and therefore could not possibly be ordained, there remains the moral improbability that Catholic priests and Anglican clergymen can both be true priests of the same religion. If they can be, then there is really no reason why "identity" in doctrine and function, in faith, and in devotional spirit, should not signify "having nothing in common."

(b) As to Confirmation, not much need be said beyond the suggestion of three terrible doubts: (1) that the bishop not being certainly consecrated; (2) the Holy Chrism being purposely wanting; and (3) the form being irregular or incomplete; there is enough doubt to create a moral improbability as to the sameness of either "bishop" or "sacrament." There is no need to press such arguments beyond the point of grave doubt; for, it is in this doubt, as compared with Catholic certainty, that the want of identity is shown.

(c) We may next take the Sacrament of Penance. To simplify the comparison, we may name five characteristics—all admittedly Roman Catholic through the centuries—not one of which is com-

mon to both "priesthoods: " (1) the *power* given to Catholic priests in their ordination to hear confessions sacramentally, and to absolve; (2) the *habit* of Catholic priests to sit regularly in the confessional, as their essential, ministerial obligation; (3) the *belief* of all Catholic laity in the obligation of confession, especially before going to Holy Communion; (4) the longing desire of all Catholics, at the hour of death, to confess before receiving the Holy Viaticum; and (5) the fact that never once, since the day of Pentecost, has it been known that a Roman Catholic priest has broken the seal of the confessional. Against these five characteristics set their Anglican opposites: (1) no power to hear confessions sacramentally is given in an Anglican ordination, but only to forgive sins (which have not been confessed) in a general and declaratory sort of way; (2) Anglican clergymen have never sat in the tribunal of penance, but have only given "ghostly counsel and advice," such as one layman might piously give to another; (3) the Anglican laity have never practiced, have never believed in (the obligation of) sacramental confession; on the contrary, they have protested against it, and their clergy have taught them to do so; (4) not even at the hour of death, have the Anglican laity desired to confess sacramentally, though, naturally, they have talked penitently to their pastors; (5) the seal of the confessional need not be spoken of in this contrast, since it lies outside Anglican practice, and has no place in Anglican theology. Yet the remark may be hazarded, that the supernatural silence, which has been the gift of Catholic priests for eighteen centuries, marks off the Catholic priesthood from the Anglican ministry by a token which is irresistibly divine. And now to conclude the argument as to confession. Is it probable, is it possible, that the two "priesthoods" can both have the same divine origin? Is it probable, is it possible, that Almighty God can have given the same orders to two priesthoods, whose teaching and whose practice as to the sacrament of penance have been, in all senses, antagonistic?

(d) We may speak now of Holy Communion. Is it probable that an Anglican ministry, which for three centuries has swept the tabernacle from the altar, can have the same orders as a priesthood which, for eighteen centuries, has bent the knee to the Adorable Presence? Is it probable that an Anglican ministry, which has always placed the consecrated bread in the hand of the unconfessed sinner, can have the same orders as the priesthood which has reverently placed the Adorable Host on the tongue of the confessed and absolved penitent? Is it probable that an Anglican ministry which has left the consecrated crumbs to be scattered on the floor around the communion rails; and has allowed the parish clerk to cast away the remnant, or the church cleaner to sweep the

remnant into her shovel, can have the same orders as a priesthood whose very care and priestly exactness have been mocked for three centuries by most Protestants? And, finally, is it probable that an Anglican ministry which has always preached against the Roman Catholic doctrine; has always warned its congregations against the soul-destroying error of the Roman Catholic dogma of Transubstantiation, can have the same orders as a priesthood whose insistence on the Catholic doctrine has exposed it to three centuries of vituperation? The contrast might be enlarged at great length. We are speaking only of the "moral probabilities"; and enough has been said for serious souls.

(e) As to the Sacrament of Extreme Unction, it has no place in Church of Englandism, so that here we have the elimination of a sacrament, contradicting an indentity of priesthood.

(f) Matrimony has been respected by all Anglicans. It has not indeed been accepted as a sacrament, but it has always been religiously regarded. But what are we to say about divorce? True, the Anglican clergy disapprove of the legislation which would admit of the remarriage of divorced persons; but no authoritative condemnation has been issued by the Anglican bishops, not even by the Archbishop of Canterbury. Here again we search in vain for some moral identity between the Anglican and the Catholic episcopate.

(g) And, finally, as to the Sacrament of Holy Order. One reflection alone shall be hazarded. Form and intention, like historical incident, may be argued from different standpoints; but let us keep closely to "moral aspects." Now perpetual controversy as to the validity of a form, like perpetual controversy as to the sufficiency of intention—or, for that matter, like perpetual controversy as to the truth or the falsehood of disputed incidents—is in itself a moral evidence of the humanness of Anglicanism, since doubt is absolutely fatal to faith. Imagine English Catholics contending through three centuries in regard to the validity of their orders, and we see at once the impossibility of reconciling doubt with the divine unity of the whole Catholic belief. The almost innumerable books which have been published in the last twenty years (and the controversy began in Queen Mary's time) to justify the Ritualist claim to Catholic orders, are in themselves so many admissions that what requires all this apology must be as uncertain as is the teaching of the Establishment. The Russian schismatics do not apologize for their orders, because they know that there is no doubt in regard to them; indeed Anglicans are the only Christians in the world who disprove their orders by always proving them. And seeing that five sacraments out of seven must depend for their validity upon the validity of the priesthood which

administers them, it follows necessarily that five-sevenths of the Anglican faith must be torments of doubt to all Anglicans. Here we touch upon a point in the moral probabilities which must be afflicting to every serious Anglican. And it is the more afflicting because High Churchmen are the only sect in the Christian world which insist on true succession but cannot be sure of it. Do we go too far in saying that it is morally impossible that Anglican orders can be valid—can be the same as Roman Catholic orders; since, in every case where valid orders exist, or have existed in schismatical bodies, there has never been apology or doubt?

III.

We have thus glanced at the seven sacraments, as indicating the moral probability of a difference in the origin of the two "orders." We will now take an equally practical test; the difference between the preaching of Catholic priests and the preaching of Anglican clergymen, in regard both to authority and to doctrines.

The first object of preaching is to teach. "Go, teach all nations," was the command and the commission which our divine Lord gave to the Apostles. Now there is no need to dwell on Catholic preaching, because it is always and everywhere the same, both in regard to authority and to doctrines. But we may dwell for a moment on that Anglican substitute which has been popular in England for three centuries. So far as "Divine Worship" is concerned, preaching has been the primary priestly function of all the Anglican clergy from the beginning. And what has been its principal characteristic? It has been to "teach" the Anglican laity that the "abominations of Rome," its "errors," its "superstitions," its "corruptions," have rendered the Holy See and the Roman priesthood the principal source of doctrinal falsehood in the world. Now we have only to ask one simple question, and we can dismiss this crucial test of Anglican preaching. How is it possible that the Anglican preachers should prove their descent from Roman preachers who for fifteen centuries have taught a "lying" rule of faith—for this is the belief of all Anglicans—and have taught it on an authority which all Anglican preachers, without perhaps so much as one exception, have repudiated as a "monstrous usurpation?" How can the *true* preachers be the heirs of the *false* preachers, who taught "Popery" from the time of St. Augustine? This is as unlikely as that the false Anglican preachers have been the heirs of the true Roman preachers. Whichever way we look at it, the moral improbability reaches a depth which seems outside Christianity.

(b) But now as to a new kind of difficulty. There are two prin-

cial churches within the Church of England, the Ritualistic and the Evangelical or "Low." The former insists on the identity of the origin of the Roman and the Anglican priesthoods, while the latter repudiates that identity. Thus, in regard to the former, Dean Farrar has told us that there are "5043 churches in the Church of England in which sacerdotalism is triumphant," and we all know that sacerdotalism implies a belief in the powers which are inherited by Apostolic Succession. But this calculation would leave ten or twelve thousand churches in which sacerdotalism is condemned, the clergy of these churches having emphatically assured us that their priesthood is "not sacrificial." We will quote two only of these clergy, a bishop and an archdeacon, as our authorities for the statement that the Low Church Anglican clergy repudiate Roman Catholic orders. Thus, the Bishop of Worcester, Dr. Perowne, when writing of "the Ordinal in the first Prayer Book of Edward VI., for making archbishops, bishops, priests and deacons," remarked as emphatically as truthfully, "There is, perhaps, no formula or document which marks more clearly the *essential difference* between the office of ministers of the Church of Rome and that of ministers of the Church of England." So, too, the Archdeacon of Warrington has recently written, "Seventeen sacrificial statements in the Sarum Missal were omitted from the 1st Book of Edward, and ten reliquiæ, or survivals of sacrificial doctrine, which were left in the 1st Book—statements capable of, though not necessarily involving, sacrificial doctrine—were expunged from the 2d Book of Edward, thus eliminating the sacrificial element in no less than 27 instances." Here, then, we have two "priesthoods" within the same Protestant establishment, a Ritualistic and an Evangelical priesthood, and the high authorities of the one priesthood—numbering, say eight thousand clergy—and the high authorities of the other priesthood—numbering, say twelve thousand clergy—are as opposite as the poles in their insistence on the identity, or in their insistence on the antagonism, of the Roman and the Anglican orders. And these two priesthoods, be it remembered, were both imparted by the same Bishops, and are both approved by the same Anglican primate. Do we not here reach a climax of improbability? That in the very same church there should be two opposing churches, insisting upon and repudiating the Roman priesthood, seems as significant a fact as that, outside the Church of England, all Christians repudiate Anglican orders.

(c) We may now speak particularly of public worship—to which, hitherto, we have but passingly alluded—because public worship is the surest possible indication of the conviction of Anglicans as to priesthood. Briefly we will picture two periods: 1. Just after

the accession of Queen Elizabeth, and 2. Just before the introduction of Ritualism.

1. As to the first period, we maintain that the new Protestant public worship proved positively a change in holy orders. Not only is there a moral probability of change, but proof absolute, irrefutable and final. Our authority shall be Mr. Pocock, the well-known Anglican writer, and we will quote only from the Anglican newspaper, the "Guardian." But first we must say one word as to the new Anglican clergy who conducted the new public worship, and who were, therefore, its authorized expositors. When we have seen what the new clergy were like, we shall be prepared better to appreciate their worship. Mr. Pocock assures us that it was so difficult to persuade persons of any respectability or character to "play at being priests" in Elizabeth's time, that "mechanics had to be employed to read the service in empty churches, with cobblers, weavers, tinkers and fiddlers," and Presbyterian and Lutheran ministers had to be invited to do the work of the "inheritors of the Apostolic Succession." Moreover, the new clergy, being an utterly ignorant class of men—"rude and unlearned ministers," as Burleigh called them, being also Calvinists or else Zwinglians—were utterly contemned by the common people, and were spoken of with disgust by their own Bishops. Thus, Scory, Bishop of Hereford, wrote to Cecil: "My cathedral is a very nursery of blasphemy, impurity, pride, superstition and ignorance." Bishop Best, of Carlisle, called his clergy "wicked imps of hell." The Vicar-General of Lincoln, among other horrid details, says, "At Aylesbury the clergy perform clandestine marriages, with gloves and masks on." We read also a variety of such testimonies as that "the churchwardens of Knotting, in Bedfordshire, were charged before the commissioners of the archdeacon with having allowed for the last three years cock-fighting to go on in the chancel of the church, the minister of the church, with his sons being present and enjoying the sport." So that we need hardly ask, after these few eloquent details, what was the character of the public worship itself which this curious new Anglican priesthood conducted? "Divine service"—familiarily spoken of as the "May Game" or the "Christmas Game"—was ridiculed by the people in every ale-house, and, if possible, still more ridiculed in the churches; Bishop Pilkington, of Durham, writing of the "walking, talking, chidings, fightings that went on inside the churches, and that especially in the time of divine service." Indeed, public worship had become a public mockery not only of the Christian faith but of all decency. But did this impiety, this profanity, last for long? Yes, right down to the time of Archbishop Laud, in whose day, as the state papers tell us, "the congregation sat, the

men wearing their hats or not, as it suited their convenience, the communion table, standing in the body of the church, being made the receptacle for such hats and clothes as were not worn, and frequently used as a seat by any one who was not accommodated with a pew." But we need not go further with the picture. Public worship throughout the period of the Reformation was the rejection not of priesthood, but of religion.

2. And, taking a leap over a hundred and fifty years, let us come down to the Victorian era. We will ask Dr. Gregory, the present Dean of St. Paul's Cathedral, to give us a picture of what public worship used to be, so late even as 1820. After telling us that, at this period, "the sick and dying were uncared for, the poor were unvisited, the children were untaught, the most solemn services of the Church were so negligently performed as to be productive of evil rather than good," the dean adds: "In some churches the squire's seat was fitted up as a parlor, with a table and chairs and a fireplace, and with curtains to hide the occupants from the view of the rest of the congregation. Nor were the services more attractive. There was no chanting; hymns were unknown. The week-day services in cathedrals were compulsorily maintained, but the choirs and clergy attended so irregularly and behaved so irreverently as effectually to keep worshippers away. There were few churches in which Holy Communion was celebrated more frequently than once a month."

If this description of public worship and of the clergy who conducted it, both in the Elizabethan and Georgian era, does not suffice to prove morally that it was totally impossible that the Roman orders should have been inherited by the new Protestant clergy, we must despair of all reasoning in which the faculty of common sense is assumed to be of any value whatever.

IV.

It will have been observed that, in the arguments which have been employed, there has been an almost keeping clear of the usual grounds of disputation, and an insisting on purely moral considerations. It would have been easy to ask a variety of questions, historical, theological, or canonical, but such questions have been discussed by many writers. We might have asked, for example (to take only three points), (1) who gave Cranmer and Ridley the authority to alter Forms of Ordination which had been in use in the English Church for a thousand years; totally ignoring the fact, as Cardinal Newman has so well expressed it, that "the Church's ritual is a concrete whole, one and indivisible, and acts *per modum unius*; and having been established by the Church, and being in possession, it cannot be cut up into bits, be docked

and twisted into essentials and non-essentials, genus and species, matter and form, at the heretical will of a Cranmer or a Ridley, or turned into a fancy ordinal by a royal commission of divines, without a sacrilege perilous to its validity." (2) We might have asked, by what law of interpretation are we to conclude that the reformers intended to make "sacrificing priests," and not, as they always called them, "Gospel Ministers," seeing that they abolished priest, altar and sacrifice, and also all sacerdotal vestments, and emphatically protested against the "Popish priesthood" as being "unscriptural, idolatrous and superstitious." Or (3) we might have asked, how comes it to pass that the eastern schismatics, without exception, have always repudiated Anglican orders; even the schismatics who fraternized with the Old Catholics at Bonn contemptuously dismissing such pretensions; and how comes it to pass—and this is more important than all—that the Roman Catholic Church has never recognized the validity of Anglican orders, the Canterbury Register testifying that certain Anglican prelates were deposed *ob nullitatem consecrationis*: and Cardinal Pole, by the authority of the Holy See, always insisting on the Catholic Form of Ordination as the condition of the validity of English orders? We might have proposed a large number of such questions. But they would hardly have touched the gist of our inquiry. What we are considering is the *moral* aspects of the question, "Can Anglican and Roman orders be the same?"

And, taking the word "moral" in scholastic sense, we say that the Anglican clergy, in their relations to their own laity, have been like cruel step-fathers to the young Anglicans, and so have proved that they were not Catholic priests. We should like now to consider "moral aspects" with special reference to the young—then to the old. We have always maintained that, in their purely natural relations, Anglican clergymen have been strikingly exemplary; but as priests, as supernatural pastors, they have done no more for their laity than their laity could do for them, because they were only laymen themselves. We alluded, at the beginning, to the sacrament of baptism; and we saw that a priesthood which had so little faith in baptism must, if possible, have still less faith in order. This want of the gift of faith has lain at the root of the whole of the priestly (not the personal) life of the Anglican clergyman. And it has made Anglican clergymen very cruel towards their laity—cruel from the cradle to the grave. Thus the cruelty which was begun towards the infant at the font was continued towards the child in the nursery; every Anglican child was robbed of its birthright in not being taught to say the Hail Mary; it was robbed of its heavenly mother; it was defrauded of all that exquisite spiritual tenderness which is the heritage of every Catholic child.

And yet we are told that this "teaching" on the part of Anglican clergymen was no evidence that Queen Elizabeth's priesthood was not identical with that of the Roman Church. We should, on the contrary, regard it as the same sort of direct evidence which King Solomon sought for on his judgment-seat: the evidence as to "whose was the child," the woman who cared, or who did not care.

But this want of priestly care and of supernatural teaching has been necessarily continued all through the life; and we will take but three more illustrations. We have already referred to the three points we shall illustrate, yet not so as to bring out clearly what we have designated the "cruelty" of the relations of Anglican clergy to their laity. In looking for moral evidence as to the essential non-identity of Catholic and Anglican orders, we cannot do better than show that the two priesthoods are as divided by what they do not do as by what they do.

1. At seven or eight years of age every Catholic child is taught to prepare for confession; not to talk piously about his sins, but to confess them in the sacrament of penance; and, having confessed them, to beg for absolution from a priest of the Roman Catholic Church. The Anglican clergy, on the contrary, have for more than three centuries warned young people against that "corrupt following of the Apostles" which is one of the seven sacraments of the Church. If the same priesthood could teach and do these two opposites, one does not see what is the use of having a priesthood at all, since the laity could be quite as human or contradictory.

2. And, having deprived three centuries of young Christians of this sympathetic and paternal divine sacrament, the Anglican clergy have gone on to teach youths and maidens that Holy Communion—which was never prepared for by confession—is nothing more than a commemorative rite, the priest having "no power to transubstantiate," and the consecrated bread remaining unchanged, a mere symbol or memento of the Last Supper. And yet we are gravely assured that this Anglican priesthood, which has thus abjured every one of the priestly powers; which has denied its own power to absolve and denied its own power to consecrate, is the very same priesthood which stands daily at the Catholic altar and sits daily in the tribunal of penance. If this be so, then why not admit the orders of all Nonconformist reverend gentlemen, since, mere forms excepted, they have taught the same doctrines and practised the same religion as the clergy of the national establishment?

3. A few years later, when the young Anglican has been to college, he may develop a wish to "take orders." Three years at

one of the English universities have been his ordinary preparation for priesthood. Until quite recently, theological colleges were unheard of as preparatory for taking holy orders. The same preparation was thought sufficient for "the church" as for the bar, or the army, or the parliament. And the knowledge of "theology" was about the same for all four, though religious tastes would naturally tone the private studies. And so the young aspirant was ordained. But to *what*, we must ask, was he ordained? To read the prayers on a Sunday to comfortable Anglicans, and then to preach to them his "views" on Christianity. Can any one assure us, with imperturbed gravity, that this is the same priesthood as that of the Roman Church; that these Anglican curates have been identical with the Catholic priests who, for twelve centuries, in this same England, have ascended the steps of the Catholic altar, saying, "*Introibo ad altare Dei*"; have consecrated and then adored the Host; and have given Holy Communion to those who have adored—adored the Host on the altar and in the tabernacle? Such a suggestion seems as foolish as it is impious. Exact contraries may, in some cases, be both innocent, but in the case of the Christian priesthood they are impossible; there cannot be contraries in divine things.

The modern Ritualists seem to plead that because, within the last forty years, they have introduced decorum into public worship, therefore the whole of the last three centuries "go for nothing," and Ritualism is the alone Church of Englandism. But even if Ritualism had been the rule from the beginning—instead of being unknown, unimagined—the contrast would be very slightly lessened. "Common Prayer" is a service addressed to a congregation, not a sacrifice offered to Almighty God. In St. Paul's Cathedral it is almost difficult to suppress a smile when the clergy turn their Oxford hoods to the gaze of the congregation and try to persuade themselves that they are priests before an altar. True, the most beautiful portion of their communion service—like their epistles, gospels, collects, and their "*Dominus vobiscum*"—have been extracted out of the Roman Catholic Missal; but where is their high altar, where their sacrifice, where their tabernacle, where their consciousness of the divine gifts of Catholic priesthood? A *mise en scène* is all that they can give us. To try to make a Protestant service look something like a Catholic Mass is as hopeless an endeavor as to try to persuade a rational being that Westminster Abbey was built for "Common Prayer."

If, inside a church, it is a quite hopeless task to try to trace the identity of the two priesthoods, it is as impossible to trace it outside in daily life, in the daily contact of priests with their people. Where is the authority, where are the dogmas, where is the unity

of the Catholic faith, where is the obedience of all clergymen to their "Canterbury?" We cannot wonder that the Anglican laity are divided, when their priesthood enthrones an arbitrary egotism. Where is the fellowship of all Anglicans ecclesiastically—may we say on earth, in purgatory, or in heaven? There is none; not ostensibly, nor as "of faith." The Church of England is not a family, not even in an ordinary earthly sense, still less in a sense that is supernatural. And so its priests are, as the laity, divided, with no union but that of church-forms and ceremonies, and no consciousness of true Catholic oneness. Are these priests, then, Roman Catholic priests? Is it possible that their orders can be identical in origin any more than in powers, in functions; in all the gifts which appertain to Catholic priesthood; seeing, that in all things—excepting personal sincerity—they are so strikingly unlike, so opposed?

But we come now to the end of life, to that most awful last moment, when the soul is to depart naked before God. How has the Anglican priesthood, which is now said to be the Roman Catholic priesthood, behaved at the last hour of life, behaved to the disturbed, dying Christian, who was yearning for supernatural aid? "Let us say the Lord's prayer," suggested the late Dean Stanley, to a venerable clergyman, who was dying. And that was *all* that the Dean of Westminster could do for him. The intention, no doubt, was thoroughly Christian; but where was the office of Catholic priesthood? A hospital nurse could have done the same thing, and could have read a comforting chapter from the Bible, and have discoursed on the merits of the Redeemer. But, say that the Anglican clergy ordinarily administer Holy Communion—and it is certain that they always do all that they can do—to a person who is dying and penitent, how shall a sinner receive Holy Communion before he has made his confession? If the Anglican communion be not a real communion, but only a pious remembrance, there is, indeed, no sacrilege in communicating; but, if the Anglican communion be—what the Ritualists now say it is—the same communion as the Roman Catholic communion, then is the unconfessed soul of the penitent simply adding sacrilege to his sins. But here again arises a dread difficulty. No Anglican clergyman can hear a confession, even supposing him to be a true priest, because he has no faculties, no jurisdiction; he might, indeed, do so, *in articulo mortis*, but then, where are his orders, where is his own preparation, his fitness, his knowledge of what to do? The most delicate, the most intricate of offices, cannot be irregularly attempted by a person who, to speak familiarly, knows nothing about it, and is himself not sacramentally confessed. For an Anglican clergyman to assume the office of con-

fessor, when even his own bishop has not authorized him, and when his whole education has been in the direction of the negation of the supernatural functions of a priest, seems, naturally speaking, to be shockingly presumptuous, and from a Catholic point of view, almost impious. Kindness or charity, good will or the best intentions, may render such a presumption not culpable; but the Sacrament of Penance is beyond kindness or charity, is above all good will, and the best intentions; it is a divine sacrament, demanding divine powers, and it cannot be administered by the incompetent. Here, then, at the last hour of life, we have a contrast between Anglican and Catholic orders which proves that they cannot be identical. "Moral aspects" seem to afford their ultimate demonstration of the non-identity of these two kinds of priesthood, when a Catholic priest stands on the one side of the bed, and a Protestant clergyman on the other, and the dying person asks, "which is the real?"


There are some truths which need no demonstration; instinct suffices to apprehend them. The nullity of Anglican orders should be one of these truths, and the sole reason why every one does not think so is that the real issues are commonly obscured. Instead of reasoning from facts which are certain, some persons reason purely from hypotheses, or instead of conducting the inquiry on broad principles, some persons love to linger upon details. You cannot get one school of reasoners away from their insistence on the certainty that Barlow was a bishop; another school will rest contentedly on the sufficiency of the Ordinal which Cranmer is believed to have approved; a third school will cling tenaciously to their views on intention, which, they say, was to hand on a true succession; or a fourth school will say, "Since Anglicans admit Roman orders, and never think of reordaining Roman priests, it follows that, so far as priesthood is concerned, Anglicans and Romans are of one mind." But we reply that all this is the obscuring of real issues; it is the turning the face away from plain truths. We must judge of holy orders by their "character," by what priests have habitually done or have not done. "By their fruits ye shall know them. Do men gather grapes of thorns or figs of thistles?" Is a sacrificing priesthood one that does not sacrifice? Is an absolving priesthood one that does not absolve? Is the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass the same worship as common prayer? Is a Catholic tabernacle the same as a communion table? Is the word Protestantism the same in significance with the compass of the whole Catholic faith? Is the Catholic "Communion of Saints" identical in spirit with that religion which has always repudiated purgatory, has always neglected, even disesteemed, the Blessed Virgin, and has treated the Invocation of

Saints as a habit and as a doctrine with which the Reformed Church could have nothing to do? Here we get at the true tests of identity. The Eastern schismatics, who have retained a true priesthood, have also retained a true doctrine in regard to all the functions of priesthood as well as almost all Catholic doctrines; whereas, all Protestant sects, having lost the succession, have also lost belief in priestly functions and in most of the specifically Catholic doctrines. This is what we may call the proof from "character." "By their fruits ye shall know them." You cannot spend three centuries in reviling Catholic priesthood, or, at the very best, in treating it as a delusion, and then, suddenly turn round and say, "We have always had the Catholic priesthood, but British prejudice has obliged us to disown it."

Common-sense is the theologian which is needed. Were we to enter a court of justice, and find that the presiding judge had no power to define law or to pass sentence, we should not make the mistake of confusing such a travesty with the real judicial tribunals of the country. Were we to go on board a large ship, and find that the ship's crew were all dictating their commands to the captain, we should not be misled into any serious inquiry as to whether the ship was a man-of-war in active service. And, in the same way, when we are considering Anglican orders, we see at once that they are radically fictitious. We see at once that the Archbishop of Canterbury, who derives his orders, parliamentarily, from Queen Elizabeth, and his jurisdiction from Queen Victoria or her minister, cannot possibly be a successor of Saint Augustine, whose episcopate was purely Catholic and canonical, and whose jurisdiction was derived from the Holy See. And we trace the same dissimilarity in every sphere. In no one single aspect do Anglican orders, in any degree, resemble Roman Catholic orders. In personal piety, in active duty, Anglican clergymen may be admirable, and so are a vast number of Nonconformists. As to identity of origin, office or function, three centuries have disproved the illusion.

"Moral aspects" are the best tests of true orders. We apprehend the truth by a moral instinct, which all the controversy in the world cannot cloud.

A. F. MARSHALL.



THE RELATIVITY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY.

THE logical filiation of the sciences corresponds in some degree to the order of their historical development. The conspicuous objects of nature, such as the heavenly bodies, first engaged the attention of the thoughtful, and the latest phenomena to receive man's scientific investigation are those which most nearly relate to himself. In the history of the sciences we find that astronomy had attained a state of comparative perfection, and its character as a science was well established before attention was paid to sociology; and we learn that in the order of the development of the sciences man has not been governed by considerations of their utility, for the latest of the sciences may be said to be the most useful.¹ The development of the sciences, however, has not proceeded at haphazard and by chance. We might expect that man would first attempt to study the laws of those phenomena which it is most useful for him to understand, but the sciences have been developed along the line of least difficulty, and not in the order of greatest utility. The progress of the sciences has been mainly determined by the nature of the phenomena, and has been from the simple to the complex. The first of the sciences deals with phenomena of a wide order of generality, and the latest sciences to be carefully studied have only a narrow and limited application. Thus some of the laws of astronomy apply throughout the known universe, and approach an absoluteness of character, whereas in complex sciences, like political economy, absoluteness is nowhere to be found, and relativity is the distinguishing feature of all its generalizations.

Now, the laws of all the sciences are true, relative only to the conditions which they describe. There is no known absolute physical law. We presume the absoluteness of such fundamental postulates of all science as the persistence of force, the immutability of nature's laws, and the presence of universal gravitation; but we have no warrant, other than analogy, for asserting that these postulates are true of all possible systems.² The general-

¹ "La plus utile et la moins avancée de toutes les connaissances humaines me paroît être celle de l'homme."—J. J. Rousseau, *Sur L'Inégalité*, p. 34. The fact that he was one of the first moderns to emphasize the significance of this fact has given an undue and exaggerated importance to the works of this superficial writer.

² "We can imagine reasoning creatures dwelling in a world where the atmosphere was a mixture of oxygen and inflammable gas like the fire-damp in coal mines. If devoid of fire, they might have lived on through long ages in complete unconscious-

izations of experience cannot be erected into laws of universal validity, and hence no law of experience can be truly absolute. But these laws are true in the sense that they are always true of those conditions which they describe, but of no other conditions. When, however, no change is ever observed in the conditions, we say that the laws are absolute or nearly so; but when the conditions are continually changing—when a law true to-day may, owing to the presence of some new condition, be found totally inapplicable to-morrow, we say that the laws of such conditions are distinguished by their relativity. In such a science as astronomy, for instance, it is not of great importance for us to remember that its laws are true only of the given conditions; for these conditions remain substantially the same throughout vast periods of time; but in a science like political economy the conditions which we investigate are never the same for two consecutive ages, and hence we are under the grave necessity of ever keeping before our minds the fact that the laws which we discover and formulate are true only of the precise conditions which we are studying.

By the relativity of the laws of a science, then, we mean that these laws are true only of specified conditions or phenomena, and when we speak of the relativity of one science being more pronounced than that of another, we mean that in one science it is more important to bear in mind the relations of laws to phenomena than it is in the other.

This relativity is more characteristic of political economy than of any other well-developed science that at this day engages the attention of learned men. On this account it has been much disputed whether political economy is anything more than a mass of empirical observations of more or less generality and value, and whether it has any valid claim to be called a science. Comte has said, that "the limits of variation are wider in regard to sociology than any other laws."¹ He always ridiculed the pretensions of political economists and derided their claims. This dispute, however, for the most part is mere logomachy. Science may be said to be the explanation of phenomena and their reduction to laws. We may take any group of closely related phenomena, and if we can truly formulate their laws we may be said to have a science of them. It is claimed that the true test of a science is the power it

ness of the tremendous forces which a single spark could call into play. In the twinkling of an eye new laws might have come into action, and the poor reasoning creatures who were so confident in their knowledge of the uniform conditions of their world, might have no time even to speculate upon the overthrow of all their theories. Can we, with our finite knowledge, be sure that such an overthrow of our theories is impossible?"—Jevons, *Principles of Science*, vol. ii., p. 439.

¹ *Positive Philosophy*, vol. ii., p. 75, edition of Miss Martineau.

gives us to forecast future events. Astronomy enables us to predict the position of some heavenly bodies for thousands of years to come; who will venture to predict the state of society in the next century? But it has been well rejoined by Cairnes that "economical prevision is not a prevision of events, but of tendencies,"¹ and while we are unable to predict any event in the social sciences with certainty, the study of these tendencies is, nevertheless, of the greatest utility to us.

The habit of forming hasty generalizations has been the bane of political economy. Adam Smith believed that he was determining the principles of the science for all time to come. Ricardo and Mill began to speak of the laws of political economy as eternal physical laws,² forgetting that they are merely explanations of men's actions in relation to external nature. Capitalists took this up as a shibboleth, and when laborers endeavored to obtain redress for intolerable evils, they were given the cold comfort of learning that they were contending against the decrees of nature as recorded in the books of political economy, until in despair they began to exclaim, "If political economy is against us then we must be against political economy." It has been a fruitful source of error and mischief in political economy to suppose that what is found to be true of present conditions was true also of the past, and will be true of the future; that what is true on the banks of the Thames must be true on the banks of the Ganges.³

Much of the error of political economy, and all the popular prejudice against it, have resulted because it was not understood that its laws are true only of certain conditions, and that these conditions are in a state of constant change; and because, moreover, economists endeavored to extend their generalizations beyond legitimate premises. John Stuart Mill, who, at one time, was partial to the abstract political economy, has very wisely observed that the economist must avoid "the error of regarding the present experience of mankind as of universal validity, mistaking temporary or local phases of human character for human nature itself; having no faith in the wonderful pliability of the human mind, deeming it impossible, in spite of the strongest evidence, that the earth can produce human beings of a different type from that which is familiar to him in his own age, or even in his own

¹ *Essays in Political Economy, Theoretical and Applied*, p. 305.

² This assumption vitiates all the sociological writings of Mr. Herbert Spencer.

³ A noted instance of this was the inability of the English conquerors in India to imagine any other system of land-holding than that of the large proprietors in England. See "Tenure of Land in India," by Sir George Campbell, in *Systems of Land Tenure*, Cobden Club. "It has been said Lord Cornwallis designed to make English landlords in Bengal, and only succeeded in making Irish landlords," p. 177. See also E. De Laveleye, *Primitive Property*, chap. iv.

country. The only security against this is a liberal mental cultivation. A person is not likely to be a good economist who is nothing else. . . . Social phenomena acting and reacting on one another, they rightly cannot be understood apart; but this by no means proves that the material and industrial phenomena of society are not themselves susceptible of useful generalizations, but only that these generalizations must necessarily be related to a given form of civilization and a given state of social advancement."¹

This relativity of the laws of political economy may be more clearly seen and appreciated by a study of the subject-matter with which the science professes to deal; by an examination of some of its fundamental postulates, with a view to ascertaining the extent of their application and validity; and by a study of history and ethnology, which will show how many and how varied are the ways in which men obtain subsistence and supply their material wants.

Political economy studies the phenomena displayed by man in gaining subsistence, and obtaining goods and services to satisfy his wants. It inquires how men, as individuals and as members of society, obtain their income and how they expend it. It is a study of man's motives, on the one hand, and a study of the relation of nature's forces to his efforts, on the other. It has, therefore, a subjective side which deals with all the phenomena of man's wants, or demand and consumption; and an objective side, which deals with the phenomena of efforts, or supply and production. The subject-matter of political economy is circumscribed by narrow limits, and it is but a subordinate branch of the general study of man. Economic actions do, indeed, constitute a large portion of the conscious acts of man, but they are not always the most important; and as man is ever gaining his subsistence in different ways, and as all the phenomena of political economy are of an extremely complex character, we must perpetually vary our conclusions to suit our conditions. In phenomena of a wide order of generality, small variations may be safely neglected, but in phenomena so intricate and complicated as that of political economy a slight change of conditions may render a law inaccurate as a description of facts. Kepler's laws are true, on the supposition that there are no perturbing forces, and those slight perturbations which do appear do not affect the truth of the general statement; but while we may generalize about the economic phenomena we observe to-day, it is altogether probable that the same facts may not exist to-morrow; and, on account of the infinite variety in

¹ *Essay on Comte.*

the conditions of the subject-matter of political economy, we must be careful not to give undue extent to our laws, and the caution to beware of theories and hypotheses is an imperative necessity.

A cursory examination of a few of the postulates of political economy will better enable us to see how limited the laws based upon them are in their application. There is no law of this science of universal validity for mankind, and none that does not admit of some important exceptions. There has never, perhaps, been a general law stated in political economy that has met with unqualified acceptance. If it was accepted by one generation, it was sure to be denied by the next, and one-half of the writings of political economy have been devoted to criticising the other half. In regard to the so-called law of supply and demand, we may say that this can hardly be called a distinctive economic law, but it is, rather, the economic statement of the general problem of equilibrium that is found in all the sciences.

The reasoning of political economy starts from the principle of self-interest, which postulates that man will always seek his own interest in so far as he knows it. This science regards man as a wealth-producing and wealth-acquiring being, and takes no account of him as a rational being, as a religious being, or as a being of other attributes except in so far as these attributes affect him as a self-seeking and wealth-acquiring being. Inasmuch as he seeks wealth because it is primarily necessary for his existence, it may be said that his wealth-seeking activities are but particular and special manifestations of the more general law of self-preservation.

Now, even this law of self-preservation needs a large amount of qualification. It is not quite true that all individual life is a struggle for individual existence. This view of human life has been emphasized by the followers of Darwin, who formed their judgment from a study of the lower orders of life; but Professor Drummond has shown that while biologists, and the sociologists who followed in their wake, have been laying stress on the struggle for individual life, they have overlooked the equally important fact in all animate nature of the struggle for the life of others. To regard the self-preserving and the wealth-acquiring activities of man as his predominant and only important characteristics is to form a precarious estimate of human nature. As a matter of fact, it is only in our day that the economic influences and self-seeking propensities can be isolated so as to form the subject of special study and investigation. There are many who are dominated by religious or æsthetic influences, and in whose lives the acquisition of wealth or the means of subsistence is only an inci-

dent. The one who lives for subsistence alone does not act up to the highest purpose of human life. In the time of Aristotle the pursuit of riches was not held in very high esteem. In the time of the Crusades man might have been defined, by a prominent characteristic, as a glory-seeking animal. A notable share of man's activities has in all ages been directed to the unproductive destruction of wealth instead of to the acquiring of it. We see how futile it is, therefore, for economists and historians to claim absoluteness or universality for a postulate which requires so much important qualification. Reasoning from this premise has given us the monstrous abstraction of political economy—the economic man. The laws of this science are true of man, then, considered only as a wealth-acquiring being.

Another premise of political economy is that men will always buy in the cheapest markets and sell in the dearest. In reality this is but a corollary of the preceding. But it must appear a strange anomaly that this dictum should have been so widely accepted as a law when we consider the prevalence of the protective policy in most countries in our industrial era. We can see the relativity of our science in the study of this law. It is never perfectly realized. Perhaps the buyer is ignorant of the cheapest market or he may have a personal prejudice against the seller. Some buyers, for instance, will not purchase from trusts even though their quotations are somewhat lower for the same goods. In fact, the desire to buy in the cheapest market is likely to be the dominant motive only for the buyer who buys to sell again, for the retailer and the wholesaler; while this desire is probably only one of the many motives which actuate the man who buys for his own use.

Much of the reasoning of political economy is based on the supposition of the permanence of perfectly free competition. This also may be only a transient phase of economic activity. There is no competition in slavery. In modern industry competition is being more and more superseded by combination and co-operation in both labor and capital. Wages are hardly ever wholly determined by competition, but for the most part are now settled by contract. All the reasoning based on this supposition does not, therefore, apply to present conditions.

All these postulates, then, are of narrow extent, and their relativity is their prominent characteristic. Nothing is more certain about them than that new conditions are likely to leave some of them true of the past and not of the present. In all laws relating to human affairs there are numerous elements to be reckoned with, and it is misleading to attempt to give these laws a universality or generality which they are not capable of receiving. Of course, it

is necessary to have some postulates to give unity and logical cohesion to the science. Were it impossible to have these, political economy would be nothing more than mere empiricism; and while we point out the relative character of these laws, it is not denied that they have validity and sufficient generality to form the basis of a true but narrow science.

The study of history and ethnology best shows us the relativity of the laws of political economy. Man seeks his subsistence in an infinite variety of ways. It would be foolhardy to imagine that the principles which explain the acquisition of the means of subsistence in our era of capitalistic production will explain anything whatever of the political economy of savage tribes, or that our political economy will prevail in all times to come. In no two ages and in no two countries does man obtain his subsistence in exactly the same way, and consequently the political economy of one age may have but little in common with that of the next. Before the advent of Christianity all industry was based on slave labor, and the study of such a system now is interesting to us only as a branch of curious learning. If Aristotle were to declare that the laws he studied would always apply to economic phenomena, his statement would be as unreasonable as if he were to declare that it would always be possible to defend the pass of Thermopylæ with three hundred men. In feudal times again we find conditions greatly modified. We have different conditions of land-holding and changed relations of the various classes to each other. Such a state of society must be studied by itself. The changes in political economy in our era have been most rapid, and it takes shorter time for a work on this subject to become antiquated than in any other science. Ricardo's work is all based on the supposition of competition, and, as we have just seen, we must now take into account combinations of both labor and capital. To formulate a set of principles in economics and think that they will explain economic phenomena in all ages, nations, and countries is fatuity. Some economists would have us think that the laws of political economy would prevail in the fixed stars. If the conditions existed, the laws would prevail; but the conditions are never the same for any two periods even on earth.¹ To apply the political economy of Athens to the industrial system of England would be much the same as to apply the laws of Lycurgus to the State of New York. The political economy of China has little in common with that of the United States, and it requires much ingenuity to see anything in common in the economic phenomena of the population of Lon-

¹ The universe itself is at no two instants exactly the same. See Sir Wm. Grove's *Essay on the Correlation of Forces*. "Nothing repeats itself, because nothing can be placed again in the same conditions; the past is irrevocable." End of chap. i.

don and the savages of South Africa. A political economy for all nations and ages is an idle dream, and we may apply to it the judicious criticism which De Maistre has passed on universal constitutions: "Une constitution qui est faite pour toutes les nations n'est faite pour aucune: c'est une pure abstraction, une œuvre scholastique, faite pour exercer l'esprit d'après une hypothèse idéale, et qu'il faut adresser à l'homme dans les espaces imaginaire où il habite."¹

In taking up any science, we should study its limitations and the bounds beyond which its generalizations will not extend. Some of the laws of chemistry, as we learn from the spectroscope, may be true of matter in the sun, but we cannot say that any of the laws of biology are true of life that may exist on the planet Mars, and the conclusions of political economy are of still more limited extent. Many English writers, and notably Ricardo, have failed to appreciate these essential facts in political economy, and were noted for their disregard of the practical application of the principles they were studying. McCulloch even assured us, that "Mr. Ricardo paid comparatively little attention to the practical application of general principles; his is not a practical work."²

These economists, taking certain premises for granted, reasoned from them, and it was a matter of indifference whether the conclusions they arrived at were true of conditions on earth or in Saturn. This gave political economy an abstract and mathematical cast. Instead of confining the laws to the conditions they studied, they endeavored to extend their generalizations, and thus gave the science a deceptive air of generality and solidity.

Of late years a new school, whose most conspicuous exponent was the late Wilhelm Roscher, has introduced the historical method into the study of economic problems. Writers of this school rightly contend that the laws of political economy are true, relative only to particular times and places; and they show how the passion for hasty generalization has tended to make political economy a thing remote from human use: "The historical method has revolutionized political economy, not by showing its laws to be false, but by proving that they are relative, for the most part, to a particular state of civilization. This destroys their character as eternal laws, and strips them of much of their force and all their sanctity. In this way the historical method has rescued us from intellectual superstition."³ Hence it is that these writers

¹ *Considerations sur La France*, chap. vi.

² Life of Ricardo, prefixed to edition of *Principles of Economy and Taxation*, p. xxv.

³ Arnold Toynbee, *Industrial Revolution in England*, p. 25.

often speak of a national economy, and they regard this science as intimately allied with the study of history.

Now, although the truths of political economy are of this relative character, and their validity is dependent on such variable conditions, we are not to suppose that the study is of small value because its truths cannot have wide range and generality. That the subject-matter is of such a nature as not to admit of precise mathematical delimitations, is the fault of the constitution of things, and the wise philosopher will take his facts as he finds them, and then formulate his theories, and not formulate his theories and then find his facts. The study of political economy is of importance owing to the grave character of the problems that come with the advent of free labor and free enterprise. It is not intimately concerned with problems of development, but it aims to solve the problem of subsistence for humanity, and it will always be of value this side of Utopia.

But political economy, on account of its relative character, should be studied only with reference to the practical application of its truths. It must be studied with reference to human happiness and well-being, for, otherwise, it will degenerate into a mere academic discipline for the edification of the erudite. When political economy is studied too much for its own sake, it becomes too abstract; we run into mathematical formulæ; we get total-benefit curves, monopoly-revenue curves, and the science is in great danger of becoming of much the same character as the learned speculations of the philosophers of Laputa. On the other hand, if we pursue the historical method, without reference to the principle of man's well-being, our science becomes little better than an undigested heap of materials and miscellaneous observations—"rudis indigestaque moles." Ethics alone gives a purpose and value to economic studies; for "it is the problem of poverty which gives to economic studies their chief and their highest interest,"¹ and the problem of poverty owes all its present importance to the growth and prevalence of ethical feeling. Our economical studies should be based upon the principles of ethics. We should study what will promote the best interests of the whole human family, and not seek out the prosperity of a single nation. With ethics as a basis, political economy will have a broader scope; and if we pursue economical studies with reference to human welfare, we shall avoid the error of speaking of these laws as eternal truths, and of applying to all states of society generalizations that are, perhaps, true of only one. This guiding principle will prevent the philosopher from drawing out the "thread of his

¹ Marshall, *Prin. of Economics*, p. 4.

verbosity finer than the staple of his argument"; it will aid the statesman to apply the rules of justice to the problems of distribution, and it will enable the philanthropist to make the best use of this knowledge in the interest of humanity. Those who take up economical studies should always have in mind the relative character of the laws they are investigating, and the fact that they are subject to the revision of the standards of ethics; and therefore, they should study political economy with reference to its practical application, and not for the mere sake of intellectual discipline and love of abstract truth.

FRANCIS W. HOWARD.

MODERN THEORIES OF SOCIETY.

THE END OF SOCIETY.

IT would be astonishing, if in an age like ours, when all creation is being reconstructed on a new basis of advanced science, human society alone were allowed to rest on its old theory. In a period of intellectual revolution, changes in the social doctrine must result from a restless tendency to set aside inherited beliefs, and still more from the close connection that exists among the several branches of human knowledge in general and between theoretical and practical philosophy in particular. Ethics embodies the ultimate consequences of metaphysics. Independence in being conditions independence in action; identity of the mind with matter implies moral and social laws not distinct from those of the physical and organic world, while the immateriality of the soul imports a free will; the immersion of all existence in God so completely fuses rational beings as even to exclude distinct personalities, whereas unity must be denied in proportion as the self-sufficiency and independence of individuals is asserted. In fact, new theories of society are daily coming forth in such number and with such boldness, that, like a hurricane, they threaten to sweep away whatever institutions preceding centuries have bequeathed to us. It looks as if they were to shatter the very foundations of society, to tear asunder all the bonds uniting it, and to disjoin its entire structure. Of course, it would be wrong for us to imagine that they were levelled at overthrowing it. No, our reformers mean

only to remodel society so as to fit it better for the pursuit of universal happiness, as in general it is their ostensible aim by the advancement of science to open new paths to enlightenment and perfection.

These are undoubtedly splendid promises. But the philosopher cannot blindly believe in a theory on account of the high sounding pretensions with which it is broached, or take its adequacy for granted, because it is boldly asserted. His proper function is to examine any given subject by inquiring into its causes, extrinsic and intrinsic, efficient, final, and constituent. Hence in the matter before us he necessarily asks: What is the nature and conception of society remodelled and transformed by modern thinkers? What is its peculiar end higher than that pursued heretofore? What is the origin from which it springs stronger and healthier than in former times? What are its component elements and its intrinsic constitution that fit it to reach its sublimer destination? The present essay will give a short answer to the first two questions. However, before starting, we have to make out the exact limits of our subject. Our discussion will not bear chiefly on society in general, nor on any special form of it that is transitory or incomplete, but on that society which, existing everywhere and at all times, is alone in the order of nature complete and independent—the State.

I.

What then, is the conception of society according to the modern theory?

There are generally two conceptions of objects known by daily experience, the one obvious and still imperfect, the other reflex and developed. As to the first there is usually no difference in the minds of men; it is the direct impression of the phenomenon, and is, for this very reason, upon the whole, unalloyed with falsehood. But as to the second, which is the product of continued observation and reflection, thinkers nearly in all cases greatly disagree. Society is, undoubtedly, for all an object of daily experience; for we were born and continually move in it, as we live and breathe in the atmosphere that surrounds us. Accordingly, history discloses the fact that however conflicting the elaborate social theories may be, still there is an obvious conception of society in which all ages and all minds concur.

The old school, down from the time of Aristotle, defined society in general as a permanent union of persons jointly pursuing a common end, and it applied this definition, taken in the strictest sense, to the State. In like manner, modern philosophers consider co-operation for a common end as the essence of society. "Co-

operation or band-work," says Professor Clifford, "is the life of it." According to A. Comte, the founder of French positivism, the principle of co-operation is predominating in it. At greater length is the idea set forth by Herbert Spencer, the chief exponent of modern sociology; to whom therefore we must listen with special attention.

The following passages taken from his "Principles of Sociology," leave nothing to desire as to clearness and exactness:

"A society, in the sociological sense, is formed only when, besides juxtaposition, there is co-operation. So long as members of the group do not combine their energies to achieve some common end or ends, there is little to keep them together. They are prevented from separation only when the wants of each are better satisfied by uniting his efforts with those of others, than they would be if he acted alone. Co-operation, then, is at once that which cannot exist without society and that for which society exists. It may be a joining of many strengths to effect something which the strength of no single man can effect, or may be an apportioning of different activities to different persons, who severally participate in the benefits of one another's activities. . . . In any case the units pass from the state of perfect independence to the state of mutual dependence, and as fast as they do this, they become united into a society properly so called."¹

It is, however, not co-operation of whatever kind that Herbert Spencer considers as the constituent of society, but such co-operation as is persistent.

"We consistently regard a society as an entity, because, though formed of discrete units, a certain concreteness in the aggregate of them is implied by the general persistence of the arrangements among them throughout the area occupied. And it is this trait which yields our ideas of society. For, withholding the name from an ever-changing cluster such as primitive men form, we apply it only where some constancy in the distribution of parts has resulted from settled life."²

Agreement is found to exist also among the philosophers of all ages, when they come to define in general terms the nature of the arrangement necessary for social co-operation. The ancients are unanimous in likening society to an organic body and in laying stress on the resemblance which the distribution of its parts and functions has to organization. And so are recent writers. Professor Clifford does not hesitate to call society the highest of all organisms. Herbert Spencer develops the reasons on which, according to the modern view, the analogy rests in a special chapter and at the end of it sums them up in the following words:

"It (*society*) undergoes continuous growth. As it grows, its parts become unlike; it exhibits increase of structure. The unlike parts simultaneously assume activities of unlike kinds. These activities are not simply different, but their differences are so related as to make one another possible. The reciprocal aid thus given causes mutual dependence of the parts. And the mutually dependent parts, living by and for one

¹ *Principles of Sociology*, § 440.

² *Ibid.*, § 212.

another, form an aggregate constituted on the same general principle as in an individual organism."¹

Society, then, has three characteristic traits; it is a permanent union of persons, a union in the pursuit of a common end, and a union analogous to an organism. The universal conception of it by these three marks, plain, intelligible, taken almost from direct experience, must be regarded as true and correct, and may safely be adopted as the test and basis of all sociological speculation.

But, however simple and uniform the obvious conception of society may be, it is greatly diversified, when developed by analysis and reflection, according as the development is carried on in different methods and from different points of view; nay, it grows into utterly irreconcilable theories, according as it is evolved by ancient or by modern thinkers, in the light of Christian, or of anti-Christian, principles. It now becomes our task to follow out the many branches of the social doctrine shooting forth from one germ. To perform it properly and methodically, we have to see to what causes society, and especially civil society, must be traced back; for philosophical analysis, as was said above, is an inquiry into causes final, efficient, and constituent; and it is by establishing them that theories and doctrinal systems are built up. Let us commence with the final cause of society, the end for which its members co-operate.

II.

It is a peculiarity of modern sociologists to conceive society as an organism in the strict sense, and to deduce from this one idea the whole social theory, even as drawn out into the remotest conclusions. The view thus made fundamental to all their discussions is obviously based on the resemblance of the social body with organic beings, which, as we have seen, is so striking that it enters as an element into the first conception of society. Having adopted this course, they quite consistently endeavor to determine the end of society from its organic nature. Yet though taking their departure from this common point, they land us, as if carried by diverse winds, in altogether different and opposite deductions.

Some of them, and their number is not small, hold that every organism, because a complete and independent system, is its own end, and that on the contrary, its several organs, having but dependent existence and activity, are only means destined to subserve it. Accordingly society, at least if complete, is considered as absolute and independent, its members as dependent in every respect; the State as an end unto itself supreme and ultimate, the

¹ *Principles of Sociology*, § 223.

life and activity of the citizen as means wholly subordinate to the preservation and development of the social body.

This is the view taken by Plato and Aristotle and made the basis of State-absolutism in ancient Greece and Rome. This is the view generally espoused by our modern pantheists; for, in their opinion, the differentiation of the universal divine being is a sort of organization, and the universe evolved by the divinity, one all-comprising organism. This is the view of Hegel, whose ethics has of late gained so many admirers. According to him the State is God Himself as the actual self-evolved and self-organized spirit; wherefore it is an end for itself to which all individual being must be sacrificed, an unlimited power to which all are unconditionally subject. This is the only view consistent with the several monistic theories of evolution. They all are more or less pantheistic, because the one universal principle inhering in the world and evolving all from itself must necessarily be conceived as self-existent and divine; they all, in order to establish universal unity, reduce the things evolved to one great organism. Hence the moral and social tenets they embody must needs be set forth in the words of Mr. J. T. Bixby.

"In the light of modern science, humanity is one vast organism, whose span of life runs back to the very dawn of animal existence upon the earth. . . . The great law of duty is to make, not one cell or nerve of the body politic flourish, but the great all-connected whole of social life progress to higher life, rational, emotional, moral, and spiritual. The ultimate standard then, for determining what is morally good and morally bad, is the tendency to help forward or impede the progress of our race toward the ideal of humanity. The supreme end of moral action is the evolution of the completest and highest soul life of humanity."¹

This is the view fundamental to utilitarianism; how else could the end of man consist in the happiness of all mankind or all sentient existence? It is the view implied in all forms of communism and socialism; for otherwise the State or the community could not be made the general producer, the universal employer and apportioner of labor, the dispenser of all goods, the owner of all land and all capital.

It is thought to be an auspicious progress of our enlightened age, that it has so determined the end of social life by means of scientific researches. Two advantages of the highest importance seem to be secured by this achievement. The members become effectively adapted to work out the well-being and development of the social body; for they are rendered completely subservient to it in perfect unity and harmony; and the end itself of society is raised in dignity and widened in extension; for it is proposed as

¹ *Crisis in Morals*, pp. 213, 214.

absolutely supreme and made to comprise the complete happiness of the whole of mankind in the enjoyment of all good and the possession of all perfection.

Undoubtedly, a greater excellence than this could not be claimed by the authors of the theory expounded. Yet what they so loudly claim, is not so generally conceded to them. They represent but one view of the question before us; another view quite opposed to this is held by modern thinkers of no less renown.

There are scientists who deny the very foundation of social centralization. On the ground also of recent researches they maintain that the units of organic bodies are not, as was formerly thought, dependent and incomplete, but rather independent and self-subsisting principles of activity, and that, consequently they are combined to a living whole not by subordination, but mere aggregation.

"Kant," said the late Professor Huxley, "defines the mode of existence of living beings by this, that all parts co-exist on account of the whole, and that the whole itself exists on account of the parts. But since Turpin and Schwann have decomposed the living body into an aggregation of almost independent cells, having each their special laws of development and of growth, the view of Kant has ceased to be tenable. Each cell lives for itself as well as for the whole organism; the cells which float in the blood live at their own expense and are organisms as independent as the *torulæ* which float in the wort of beer."¹

According to scientists holding his view, organization is not essentially different from crystallization, nor is an organism anything else than a colony or an aggregate of living beings. But a mere aggregate of independent beings, because devoid of real unity, has not an end of its own, distinct from that of its components. It is the collective end of the latter that is the end of the whole.

There are others who admit the total dependence of vital units in the organic body, but deny it in the social organism. This is the opinion espoused by Herbert Spencer in his "Principles of Sociology" and interpreted by J. Fisk in his "Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy." The cardinal difference between the individual and the social organism is thus set forth by "the Apostle of the Understanding:"

"In the one, consciousness is concentrated in a small part of the aggregate, in the other it is diffused throughout the aggregate; all the units possess the capacities for happiness and misery, if not in equal degrees, still in degrees that approximate. As, then, there is no social sensorium, the welfare of the aggregate, considered apart from that of the units, is not an end to be sought. The society exists for the benefit of its members, not its members for the benefit of the society. It has ever to be remembered that great as may be the efforts made for the prosperity of the body politic, yet the

¹ Quoted from P. Janet, *Final Causes* (translated by W. Affleck), p. 48.

claims of the body politic are nothing in themselves, and become something only in so far as they embody the claims of its component individuals.”¹

The difference between the two kinds of organism is no less forcibly asserted by Herbert Spencer's American interpreter. He affirms :

“It would be a great error to infer from this necessary coincidence in development, that a community is nothing more than a kind of organism, as Plato imagined in his ‘Republic’ and Hobbes in his ‘Leviathan,’”

“This inseparable distinction is the fact that in a community the psychical life is all in the parts, while in an organism the psychical life is all in the whole. The living units of society do not and cannot lose individual consciousness, ‘while the community as a whole has no corporate consciousness.’ The corporate life must here be subservient to the lives of the parts, instead of the lives of the parts being subservient to the corporate life. (Spencer's “Essays,” 2d series, p. 154.)”²

Still it is not meant that the social units have their independence from the very beginning of corporate life, on the contrary, they obtain it only in the higher stages of development. For, in the opinion of Herbert Spencer, as there are two kinds of organisms, the one individual, the other social, so there are also two kinds of social organization.

“Social organization,” he says, “necessary as a means to concerted action, is of two kinds. Though these two kinds generally co-exist and are more or less interfused, yet they are distinct in their origins and their natures. There is a spontaneous co-operation which grows up without thought during the pursuit of private ends ; and there is a co-operation which, consciously devised, implies distinct recognition of public ends. The ways in which the two are respectively established and carried on, present marked contrasts.”³

Organization of the first kind is more completely characterized in the following lines :

“Whenever, in a primitive group, there begins that co-operation which is effected by exchange of services—whenever individuals find their wants better satisfied by giving certain products which they can make best, in return for other products they are less skilled in making, or not so well circumstanced for making, there is initiated a kind of organization, and throughout its higher stages, results from endeavors to meet personal needs. Division of labor, to the last as at first, grows by experience of mutual facilitations of living. Each new specialization of industry arises from the effort of one who commences it to get profit ; and establishes itself by conducting in some way to the profit of others. So that there is a kind of concerted action, with an elaborate social organization developed by it, which does not originate in deliberate concert. Though within the small subdivisions of this organization, we find everywhere repeated the relation of employer and employed, of whom the one directs the actions of the other, yet this relation, spontaneously formed in aid of private ends and continued only at will, is not formed with conscious reference to achievement of public ends ; these are not thought of.”⁴

¹ *Principles of Sociology*, § 222.

² *The Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*, vol. ii., pp. 226, 227.

³ *Principles of Sociology*, § 441.

⁴ *Ibid.*

Two traits are consequently peculiar to such organization. It is industrial, being an elaborate division of labor in behalf of production and distribution, and it is free from external restraint and stimulation, because arising spontaneously and carried on unconsciously.

The second kind of organization is described in the following passage :

"When the primitive group has to defend itself against other groups, its members act together under further stimuli than those constituted by purely personal desires. Even at the outset, before any control of a chief exists, there is the control exercised by the group over its members ; each of whom is obliged by public opinion, to join in the general defence. Very soon the warrior of recognized superiority begins to exercise over each, during war, an influence additional to that exercised by the group, and when his authority becomes established, it greatly furthers combined action. From the beginning, therefore, this kind of social co-operation and a co-operation which is not wholly a matter of choice—is often at variance with private wishes. As the organization initiated by it develops, we see that in the first place, the fighting division of the society displays in the highest degree these same traits : the grades and divisions constituting an army, co-operate more and more under the regulation, consciously established, of agencies which override individual volitions—or, to speak strictly, control individuals by motives which prevent them from acting as they would spontaneously act. In the second place, we see that throughout the society as a whole there spreads a kindred form of organization—kindred in so far that, for the purpose of maintaining the militant body and the government which directs it, there are established over citizens, agencies which force them to labor more or less largely for public ends instead of private ends. And, simultaneously, there develops a further organization, still akin in its fundamental principle, which restrains individual actions in such wise that social safety shall not be endangered by the disorder consequent on unchecked pursuit of personal ends."¹

This organization, then, is military, because adapted to the waging of war, political or governmental, using coercive power to attain its purpose.

The main distinction between the two kinds of organization lies in the end to which they are severally adjusted. Industrial organization exhibits combined action "which directly seeks and subserves the welfare of individuals, and indirectly subserves the welfare of society as a whole by preserving individuals. Military and governmental organization exhibits combined action "which directly seeks and subserves the welfare of the society as a whole, and indirectly subserves the welfare of individuals by protecting the society."

Military or political organization, however, cannot be useful but within certain limits ; for it entails disadvantages, and it is quite possible that they outweigh the advantages for which it is established. Besides, its necessity disappears in proportion as individuals are peacefully united into groups, groups into states, and

¹ *Ibid.*

these into large empires. The necessary consequence is that, with the progress of civilization, it loses its force and influence, and falls into decay. Industrial organization, on the contrary, as peace and order are secured, gains in strength, until at last a period will come when it will universally predominate. This stage being reached, social organization will aim directly at individual welfare only, and will forever continue to do so.

Mr. John Fiske arrives on a like line of reasoning at the same conclusion :

"It will thus be seen that the very same process, which has resulted in the formation of social aggregates of a higher and higher order, has also resulted in the more and more complete subordination of the requirements of the aggregate to the requirements of the individual. And be it further noticed that the relative strength of the altruistic feelings, which maintain the stability of the highest social aggregation, maintains also to the fullest the independence of its individual members, while the relative strength of the egoistic feelings which in early times prevented the existence of any higher organization than the family or tribe, was also incompatible with individual freedom of action. Now this is precisely the reverse of the state of things which we find in organic evolution. In organic development, the individual life of parts is more and more submerged in the corporate life of the whole. In social development, corporate life is more and more subordinated to individual life. The highest organic life is that in which the units have the least possible freedom. The highest social life is that in which the units have the greatest possible freedom. This feature of social evolution is most conveniently described by Schelling's term *individuation*, which is employed in a kindred sense both in Mr. Spencer's and in other modern works of biology."¹

In his work on "Justice," Herbert Spencer deduces the end of the State from the profounder consideration of the conditions necessary for social life.

"Each citizen," he says, "wants to live and to live as fully as his surroundings permit. This being the desire of all, it results that all, exercising joint control, are interested in seeing that while each does not suffer from breach of the relation between acts and ends in his own person, he shall not break those relations in the persons of others. The incorporated mass of citizens has to maintain the conditions under which each may gain the fullest life compatible with the fullest lives of fellow-citizens."²

To achieve this object is not only the essential, but also the *only* duty of the State—the incorporated mass of citizens. The assertion is thus substantiated. The conditions which render it possible for each and all to gain the fullest life coincide with the two fundamental laws of justice. The first is couched in the following terms :

"Each individual ought to receive the benefits or the evils of his own nature and consequent conduct, neither being prevented from having whatever good his actions normally bring to him, nor allowed to shoulder off on other persons whatever ill is brought on him by his actions."

The second runs thus :

¹ *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*, vol ii., pp. 222, 223.

² *Justice*, § 116.

"Each individual, receiving the benefits and the injuries due to his own nature and consequent conduct, has to carry on that conduct subject to the restriction that it shall not in any large degree impede the conduct by which each other individual achieves benefits or brings on himself injuries."¹

These two laws are conditions so essential to social life, that whenever they are transgressed, society suffers injury and is bound to perish, so necessary to the progress and evolution of mankind, that their infringement, because entailing the survival of the less fitted, must always result in deterioration. The social body, then, if it is not to destroy itself, can in making laws and carrying on its policy, never go beyond the maintenance of justice,² and consequently, as the order of justice coincides with the conditions essential to the full life of each and all, can directly aim only at the individual welfare of its members.

It would seem as if Herbert Spencer had borrowed some ideas from Kant. According to the German philosopher, the object of the State consists in the external enforcement of right, the universal law of which is: "Act externally in such a manner that the free exercise of thy will may be able to coexist with the freedom of all others, according to a universal law."³ The enforcement of external freedom is likewise regarded by the English philosopher as the proper object of the State, with this only difference, that he refers freedom to a farther end, the fulness of individual life attainable by all.

The Spencerian theory is no less recommended by its advocates than the systems of State absolutism are recommended by theirs; nay, it is thought to be of decided superiority. We are told that it directly furthers the well-being of each and all citizens and at the same time makes for the welfare of the social body; for when is society in a better condition than when all its members are happy? We are assured that it secures to man that rank and dignity which else is claimed for the State, since it is the individual whom it regards as supreme and whose absolute independence it asserts. And by doing so it is said to raise the whole of mankind in all its parts to the highest elevation possible.

We see now, a gulf divides the modern sociologists, notwithstanding their starting from a common point of departure, a gulf as wide as it can possibly be, because it means a total difference in the very object and nature of society.

III.

Let the contradictions of the theories expounded be ever so radical and far-reaching in consequences, the Christian philosopher

¹ *Ibid.*, §§ 12, 14.

² *Ibid.*, § 141. See also *The Man versus The State*, ch. iv.

³ See H. Spencer on *Justice*. Appendix A.

does not feel perplexed. He recognizes in them but the opposition that must exist between error and error. For erroneous are to his mind the conclusions at which modern sociologists arrive, as well as the suppositions and principles from which they proceed.

The welfare of society is not an end supreme and absolute. The end of man in which he finds ultimate rest is the highest truth perfectly known and the highest good embraced with perfect love, which end, if fully attained, makes up the glorification of God the Creator. To this end society is bound to be subservient by the very fact that it is not self-existent, but finite and produced. Such is the imperative dictate of reason, such the necessary will of the Creator, who is infinitely wise and holy. To maintain that society itself is an absolute and ultimate end, to which its members are subordinate as means, is tantamount to placing it on the throne of the Deity, tantamount to depriving man of his true happiness, tantamount to overturning the whole moral order, of which God is the eternal foundation, as he is also the supreme law-giver, judge, and avenger. Nor can in any sense the State be considered as an end unto itself. For under such a supposition, while private well-being would be unprotected and unwarranted, and individual rights be abolished, the will of the body politic, respectively the majority of its members, while subject to no higher law, would be entitled to require unconditional submission in all things. Could there be a worse tyranny, a more complete suppression of freedom? It is inconceivable how in our days, when all former ages are being denounced for their lack of political liberties, social theories are advanced which, if carried into practice, would initiate a policy as oppressive as that of ancient Greece and Rome, as arbitrary as that of the despotic East.

No less untenable are the principles and suppositions on which these absurd deductions rest. Their immediate basis is the assumption that society is an organism in the strict sense. Undoubtedly, and the philosophers of all ages admit it, there exists an analogy between organism and society. For, like a living body, society is made up of many parts and members, of which each has its peculiar function, yet all combine their energies so as to form one whole and to pursue one end. Analogy, however, is resemblance in some respects only, and not identity. There is between society and organism a most important and essential difference. The units and organs of the living body, being unable to act independently of one another, are neither complete principles of actions, nor do they severally pursue and achieve an end of their own. On the contrary, as they constitute one agent complete and perfect, so is their individual activity directed to one end to be accomplished by their united forces. In a word, as prominent biologists say, they live and act by the whole, and for

the whole of which they are parts. Besides, their activity in the pursuit of the common end is so regulated by necessary laws that freedom is completely excluded. Hence the constant uniformity of action in all individuals of the same species, the perpetual identity of the process by which they evolve, the perfect similarity of instincts and habits which they follow. Just the contrary obtains in the members of society. Each one of them is of himself a perfect principiant, a person in the strict and proper sense. Each is consequently destined for an end of his own, an end that corresponds to his peculiar nature, an end to be obtained by his personal activity, and to be possessed and enjoyed in individual happiness. It is, moreover, an undeniable fact attested by consciousness, that each member is endowed with freedom of choice in the pursuit of his destination. The end of the individual man is supreme, because, consisting in the knowledge and love of the Infinite Good, it can never be subordinate, but is the object to which all other ends and purposes of social as well as individual life must have reference. And freedom of choice or self-determination is so universal as to extend to all acts proceeding deliberately from the will, and therefore also to social activity.

Evidently, then, the relationship in which individuals stand to the social body is essentially different from that in which the vital units stand to the living body. Consequently, society is an organism, not in reality, but in resemblance, not in a proper, but in a metaphysical sense only. We now reach a conclusion of far-reaching consequences. In the face of the truth established we cannot predicate of society all the properties which we find in an organism, nor predicate any in the same manner and in the same sense; we cannot gather from the nature of an organic being the nature, the structure, and the functions of human associations, just as little as we can infer the qualities of a brave soldier from the nature of a lion which he resembles in courage. An argumentation based on analogy, on a metaphor, as every sound logician knows, cannot beget exact conclusions, and if it is carried on beyond the limits of resemblance it must end in falsehood and sophistry.

These reflections if sincerely weighed must lead to a complete condemnation of the theory that considers the society as an end unto itself and the individual merely as means subordinate to it. But our modern philosophers are not the ones to weigh them. They deny every one of the propositions and premises we have laid down. They deny the dependence of society on a higher cause, and its subordination to a higher end, deny the personality and freedom of the individual man, deny an end proposed to him which is distinct from, and superior to, that of society, and hence

deny that society may be called an organism only in a metaphorical sense. Denials so radical are, of course, not made gratuitously, but are based on further grounds which must be looked upon as the ultimate foundation of the modern theories. What are these grounds? They are nothing else than pantheism of some kind or other, either realistic or idealistic, either cosmological or theological; pantheism, according to which God the supreme reason and the supreme being is considered as intrinsic to creation and not distinct from it, as the all-animating soul and spirit, the universal power in nature, the sole cause and principiant bringing forth all that is by perpetual self-evolution; whereas the universe is looked on as a mere manifestation of the Deity, as the sum total of all divine phenomena, as a mode of divine activity or as a phase of God's development. Doctrinal tenets of this kind do away with all individual independence, all individual ends and purposes. And quite consistently, for they merge all things into one universal being and all action into one general activity; they wipe out all distinction between the finite and the infinite, between creation and the Creator, and abolish all laws except the one which is identical with absolute necessity.

But pantheism is an absurdity, a contradiction to reason as well as to our consciousness. The foundation, then, itself of the theories spoken of is absurd and unreasonable, no less than the deductions drawn from them, namely, the suppression of personal rights and of freedom, and the entire subversion of the moral order.

The absolutistic view being disproved, are we not compelled to adopt the Spencerian theory which subordinates society to man as to its proper and ultimate end? No such inference can be legitimate. If society is not supreme and absolute, man is still less so.

If society is not its own end, its members are not such either, for the individual is no less finite, contingent and dependent than the entire social body. The logical consequences of the one view are just as absurd as those of the other. Suppose man to be supreme and absolute, and you establish atheism in full sway, you deny a higher end or destiny, you abolish all to which he could be subject, and you supersede morality by unrestrained egoism.

However, let us examine Herbert Spencer's theory from its social rather than its metaphysical aspect. First of all, it is absolutely unintelligible how society can be an organism, whether in the proper or in a metaphorical sense, if every one of its units is supreme and an end unto himself, even to the extent that the social action is directly subordinate to his well-being. In every organism the several members and organs work manifestly for the whole, adjusting their activity to its preservation and development, and they work for it exclusively, when components of a physical

body. So necessary is the subordination, that any disturbance of it brings on disease and even death. Now Herbert Spencer regards society as an organism in the strict and proper sense and admits in it no other forces than those that work in the material universe with absolute necessity in the line of the greatest attraction or least resistance. His position, therefore, is an inextricable self-contradiction.

He does not allege the opinion of the late Professor Huxley that according to modern researches the units also of a living body are independent of one another like animals living in the same coral or like torulae in the wort of beer. For he firmly maintains that in the individual organism the whole is the end of the parts. And he does so for very good reasons. No modern researches have substantiated the opposite opinion held of late by some materialists. Certainly the immediate components of living bodies, the nerves, the muscles, the glands, the bloodvessels, the digestive and respiratory apparatus, the skeleton, the organs of sensation and appetite are mutually dependent in existence as well as action. This is a fact not questioned by any biologist. The ultimate components or units, the cells, at least if perfect, are minute organisms themselves, in which division of labor and dependence of parts is observed. That also cell depends on cell is evident from the fact that when their union is dissolved, their vital activity becomes extinct. Another subordination is equally manifest. Singly as well as jointly they are in the same way as the organs subservient to the building up and evolving of the living body, their activity being wholly directed to this end and object. Were it not so, the oneness of the living being would be destroyed. A lion, a fish, a bird would not be one animal, but a multitude of animals, which considering the closeness of vital unity, is altogether impossible for us to conceive. Man himself would not be one, but millions of living beings, a thought which our consciousness repudiates.

There is, consequently, nothing that could vindicate Herbert Spencer from the charge of open self contradiction. He so characterizes the social organism that it ceases to be an organism. He goes still farther; he destroys society itself. As is universally admitted, society is a permanent union of persons jointly pursuing a common end. But there is no common end pursued, where the immediate purpose of all action is individual well-being. It cannot be meant that the associated members must directly aim at the private well-being of every individual; this is an impossibility. It must, therefore, be and is, in fact, understood by him that the object of society consists in guaranteeing to all individuals the possibility to pursue their own personal welfare, or to speak his own language, to reap the fruits of their own nature and consequent

conduct. Now what does this object presuppose and what does its realization imply? It supposes men, the units of society, independent, absolute, self-sufficient, needing for their complete development nothing but untrammelled freedom; it is, when realized, the establishment of an order, in which every one seeks his own comfort and happiness by applying his self-sufficient faculties chiefly to industrial and commercial enterprises and by restricting himself so much as is necessary not to hinder others from the same pursuit, in order not to be hindered by them himself. Could in reality such condition exist upon earth—for it is plainly a chimerical fiction—there would be no need of united efforts to achieve the great objects of life, no direct pursuit of any other end than one's own prosperity; nay, there could not even another end be aimed at consistently with the autonomy and absoluteness of individual nature. Thus society is destroyed, just when it is supposed to reach its higher stages; it ceases, just when fully developed, to have a reason for existence; it lacks its formal element, loses its basis and its very possibility.

But this is not yet the height of Mr. Spencer's self-contradiction. He also turns the attainment of individual well-being, proposed to society as its end, into an impossibility, and with such thoroughness and completeness that therein he takes unenviable precedence before other philosophers. Kant, too, as we have seen, regards the protection of right and freedom for the sake of private welfare as the proper object of the state. Yet he is at least consistent enough to guarantee the liberty of all without exception, thus to bring prosperity within the reach of every one. But such is not the purpose of Mr. Spencer; he aimed at the survival of the fittest only and dooms the less fitted to perish. In accordance with his first fundamental law of justice, "individuals of most worth," that is, "best adapted to the conditions of existence, shall have the greatest benefits and prosper best"; "inferior individuals shall have smaller benefits and suffer greater evil and thus prosper least"; "because not allowed to shoulder off on other persons whatever evil is brought on them by their actions." Under the operation of these two laws, mankind must soon divide into two hostile classes, the one highly prospering, the other, and by far the more numerous, dragging themselves along in miserable existence. The former will accumulate ever greater benefits and constantly improve and progress; the latter will fall into ever deeper distress until at last it wastes in utter wretchedness. The ever-increasing woes and final decay of the one is just as well demanded as the continuous thrift of the other; both are of equally imperative necessity for the survival of the better variety and the consequent progress of the human race. Herbert Spencer, indeed, needs not

pose as the people's friend; could he carry his view into practice, he would bring on them degradation and misfortune worse than ancient slavery.⁴

Decidedly, then, the theory that takes individual happiness for the direct end of society proves no better than that which makes social happiness an end unto itself, subordinating to it the individual member merely as a means. While the one is pantheistical, the other is atheistical, while the one uproots freedom and personal rights, the other destroys the organism, the nature, the existence of society, and destines the vast multitude of men to extinction and perdition.

The conclusions we have reached may seem legitimate, and yet raise a grave question in the reader's mind. If both the theories spoken of are erroneous, in what then, does the real object of society consist, and where do Christian philosophers place it? The answer may, at first sight, appear beset with no small difficulties, as between the two doctrines no other seems to mediate. But some reflection will spread sufficient light.

The direct and immediate end of society is unquestionably the common end for which its members co-operate, or in the pursuit of which they combine their energies. Now this common end is a common good, that is a good desired by all, because all unite for the purpose of obtaining it; and to be shared by all, because all take part in its achievement. For this reason it is also an external good; for otherwise it could not be the object of human co-operation. So far, it is true, the immediate end of society is not a private, but a public one, not individual, but public welfare. But the common good directly aimed at is not supreme and ultimate, nor is it so wide and universal as to comprise all that is necessary for happiness. The reason for saying so is plain enough. In general, men unite their energies for the purpose of obtaining goods of which they are severally in need, but which they cannot provide by their private efforts. In particular, the families, or their heads respectively, unite into civil society with the intent to co-operate for temporal prosperity by jointly procuring the external means thereof which they cannot obtain singly. The object of the State, therefore, has been correctly defined as the sum total of all the external means and conditions necessary for the perfect temporal prosperity of all citizens, yet not obtainable by private activity.²

¹ See data of *Modern Ethics Examined*, by the author, p. 304.

² *The greatest good of the greatest number* is the ultimate end of man as stated by utilitarian philosophers. They consider this end wide and general enough to deduce from it all duties of man and unlimited rights for society. It looks strange when some Christian writers and speakers express the object of the *State* in the very same terms.

Evidently the social end so described and limited is subordinate to the individual good of the members of the body politic : but it is not subordinate to the good of some only, but to the good of all ; not to such an individual good of theirs as is unreal and is not worthy of their dignity as men, but to that which harmonizes with their nature and thus lies in the direction of their ultimate end and happiness. The conclusion we now arrive at is obvious. Society aims directly at the common weal, as far as it is external and temporal, and indirectly at the true individual well-being of all its members. This idea underlies the theory of the State as advanced by all truly Christian philosophers ; it is set forth by St. Thomas Aquinas,¹ it is insisted upon by His Holiness Pope Leo XIII. in his encyclicals on the *Christian Constitution of States* and on the *Condition of the Working Classes*. According to their teaching, the various functions incumbent on those who rule civil society and direct it to its end are reduced to two obligations : First, to the duty of promoting by their administration and legislation the public welfare, and this is regarded as so essential that laws not conducive to this end are of themselves null and void ; secondly, to the duty of providing with equal concern and interest for the private welfare and prosperity of all without exception, because political power is conferred not for the benefit of those who wield it, but of those over whom it is to be exercised.

Nothing can be more consistent than this Christian theory. It proposes to social life an end in full harmony with its nature and conception ; it reconciles public with private welfare so as to further both in a most efficient manner ; it combines the liberty of each and all with perfect universal order ; it rests the whole society on a solid basis, not by rendering it supreme and absolute, which is at once absurd and immoral, but by subordinating it to the eternal Deity. It is, therefore, not possible for an unprejudiced mind to look on the discrediting of such a doctrine as an advancement of knowledge and well-being. What presents itself as truth on incontestable grounds cannot be decried as antiquated and old-fashioned. What supports order by efficient means, promotes prosperity, peace, and justice, upholds society and protects rights and freedom can never be set aside as worthless and unavailing.

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If compromise with utilitarianism is thought to be progress and enlightened liberalism, then let it not be forgotten on what anti-Christian foundation this modern theory rests, nor let it be overlooked that from the end of civil society so described powers may be inferred for ruling parties and majorities as absolute and oppressive as were ever claimed by tyrannical monarchs.

¹ *Sum Theol.*, i.-ii., qu. 90, art. 2 ; qu. 91, art. 1, 4 ; qu. 96, art. 2, 3 ; qu. 99, art. 3.

EXPLORERS IN THE MIDDLE AGE: MARCO POLO.

HE who has carefully studied the Middle Age knows that it was not the period of darkness which many suppose it to have been. He realizes that it was in this epoch that many of our most useful inventions were evolved; that many of our most prized institutions originated. Therefore he is not surprised when he learns that from the depths of the often alleged Cimmerian darkness there issued a genius, or rather an associated trio of them, who contributed more to geographical and ethnological science, than had resulted from all the voyages and conquests of the preceding thirty centuries. The children of the nineteenth century, sometimes reasonably and often preposterously complacent toward its wonders, may well exult over its geographical conquests, so brilliantly prosecuted by a Livingstone, for instance, or a De Brazza. But they seem to forget that from the day on which these explorers set forth on their expeditions, until they returned, their chief means of success were things which had originated in the Middle Age. From that needlessly pitied epoch were derived the bills of exchange which facilitated their travels until they had reached the limits of civilization. From the same source came the compass, with which they guided their course through arid desert and trackless jungle. Thence also came the gunpowder with which they were more than a match for numerically superior foes, and which enabled them to remove the otherwise insurmountable obstacles which nature had placed in their way. *Unicuique suum.* We propose, in this brief sketch, to introduce the reader to three of the most enterprising and intrepid explorers whom the world has known; and they were men of the thirteenth century. Before these heroes of science made their voyages, Europeans knew very little concerning the immense countries of eastern Asia. Many Catholic missionaries, notably the physician Philip, sent in 1177 by Pope Alexander III. to the "Priest-King" of Karait; the Dominicans sent by Pope Innocent IV. to Persia, in 1245; the Franciscans sent by the same Pontiff to the great Ghengis Khan; had furnished Europe with little information about the States which they had tried to evangelize. All remembrance of ancient geographical discoveries in the East—such as they were—had vanished from the West during that period of transition in which the Catholic Church was forming a new civilization out of the remnants of ancient Roman culture, the unpromising material exhi-

bited by our barbarian ancestors, and her own spirit. All honor, therefore, to Nicolao, Maffeo, and Marco Polo, who put an end to an ignorance of geography nearly as dense as that of Homer, for whom the Mediterranean was the greatest of seas, and the Pillars of Hercules the "thus far, and no further" of the world.

I.

Before giving any account of the travels of the three Poli, it may be as profitable as interesting to note one of the most romantic attempts of missionary enterprise, and therefore of geographical exploration, which the Christian world had hitherto seen. We allude to the matter of the Priest-King John, a personage whom some have regarded, with no good reason, as merely legendary. Until comparatively modern times, Abyssinia was supposed to have been the kingdom subject to this monarch; but now it is certain that his dominion was in Tartary, to the north of what is now known as China. From the very first days of their existence as a putrid branch, cut off from the mystic Body of Christ (year 431), the Nestorians had endeavored to propagate their tenets in the far East, despairing of any success in the West. That they succeeded, to some extent, during the seventh century, in planting the Cross in China, is evident from an inscription found in 1625 in Singan-fu.¹ In the early days of the eleventh century, these schismatics converted a king of Kerait, and ordained him to the priesthood.² This monarch then assumed the title of the "Priest-King," and his successors continued to glory in it. That the title was not merely honorific, but indicative of a real priesthood on the part of these successors, would appear from the recognition of it, given, as we shall observe, by a Roman Pontiff. In illustration of the real position of these Priest-Kings on the stage of life, we may adduce the deputation of Armenians, headed by a Syrian bishop, which waited upon Pope Eugenius III., then resident in Viterbo, in 1145. This deputation reminded the Pontiff that in the distant regions of Eastern Asia there was a powerful monarch, who was also a Christian priest. This sovereign, the bishop declared, claimed to be a descendant of one of the three Magi; and he then ruled, insisted the prelate, over the same territories which, accord-

¹ The best disquisition on this inscription is one inserted by Zaccaria in his valuable *Raccolta di Dissertazioni sulla Storia Ecclesiastica*, Rome, 1790.

² Among the missionaries sent by St. Louis of France into the East, was the Franciscan, Rubuquis, whose interesting narrative is given by Bergeron, in his *Recueil des Voyages en Asie*. This friar thought, and the Protestant Mosheim agrees with him, that the King-Priest was a Nestorian missionary who (and this remark reminds us of the Protestant so-called "missionaries" in the Sandwich Islands) seized the throne, and left the peculiar title to his descendants. But according to the legend which Rubuquis found current in the East, this supposition is ill-founded.

ing to the traditions obtaining among their peoples, had been governed by those holy first adorers of our Lord. The magnificence of the Priest-King of that day, continued the Syrian, was scarcely describable, but one could form some idea of it from the fact that milk and honey flowed freely in his dominions; that the Ten Lost Tribes of Israel were under his sway; that his palace was constructed on the model of that which the Apostle Thomas designed for King Gundafor of the Indies; that every day thirty-two bishops dined with him; that his chief butler was primate of the realm, and also a king; and that his chief cook was both abbot and king. And finally, the Pope might realize the power of the priestly sovereign from the fact that lately he had written to the Byzantine Emperor Manuel, commanding that ruler to pay him the homage of a vassal. If the reader smiles at this description, he may fear that his incredulity has been premature, when he reflects that the story made some impression upon Cardinal James de Vitry (b. 1207), a shrewd thinker, and author of one of the best historical works ever penned.¹ Writing to Pope Honorius III., his Eminence said: "Seraph, brother of King Corradin of Damascus, has retreated before an invasion by the king of the Indies. This shrewd, powerful, and victorious monarch, whom the Lord has raised up in our day to be a scourge to the Mohammedans, is David, whom the people style Priest-John. . . . He is, at present, distant from Antioch only a three days' march, and hopes to capture Jerusalem, after he has forced the sultanate of Iconium and the intermediate states to submit to the Christian law."² The great annalist, Baronius, records a letter of Pope Alexander III. to a king of Karait, who bore the title of Priest-John.³ This document was entrusted to a physician, named Philip, who had already visited Karait, and who was then ordered to return thither, as an Apostolic Legate. The Pontiff is careful to address the monarch as his "Most dear son, the illustrious and magnificent king of the Indies, and most holy of priests." His Holiness says that he has learned that the king is noted for his Christian charity, and that he desires to enter into communion with the Apostolic See, thereby professing the true faith; that he also wishes to have a church in Jerusalem devoted to the use of his subjects, so that they may be indoctrinated as to the discipline of the Holy Roman Church. Therefore, concludes the Pope, the physician Philip has been commissioned as Papal Delegate to the said Priest-King, with authority to grant all proper favors. Unfortunately, there are no documents to show what was the result of this embassy. The last of the line

¹ *Historia Occidentalis et Orientalis*, Douay, 1597.

² D'Achery, *Spicilegium*, vol. iii., p. 590.

³ At year 1177, Nos. 32 to 36.

of the Priest-Kings was conquered and killed in 1202, by Ghengis-Khan.

II.

In the year 1250, two Venetian merchants, Nicolao and Maffeo Polo, having disposed very advantageously of a cargo in Constantinople, invested the profits in jewels, and turned to the Orient to seek their fortunes. At the mouth of the Volga they were cordially welcomed by a khan named Barca, and sold their jewels for double their value. Then they travelled over deserts, finding here and there only nomadic Tartars, until they arrived at Bokhara, where they were forced to remain three years. At the end of that time there came to Bokhara an envoy of Kublai-Khan, the grandson of Ghengis-Khan, and sovereign of the Mongol Tartars. This dignitary conceived a great affection for the Latin adventurers, and invited them to accompany him to the court of his master. They assented, and after a journey of twelve months in a northeasterly direction, they found Kublai at Chemen-Fu. Intense was the joy of the Grand Khan when he embraced the sons of the Queen of the Adriatic. He displayed much anxiety to learn all about the Roman Pontiff and the organization of the Catholic Church; and when, twelve years afterward, the visitors took leave, he appointed them his ambassadors to the Holy See, charging them to procure for his veneration some of the oil from the lamp which hung before the Sepulchre of Christ. He also begged them to see that the Pope sent missionaries to his Tartar and Chinese subjects; for, he added, he could not hope to civilize them through any aid from the lethargic Eastern schismatics, and he had still less confidence in the Llamas of Thibet.¹ After three more years of travel, the Poli reached a port of lesser Armenia, called Laias; and thence they sailed to St. Jean d'Acre, the ancient Ptolemaide, from which place their further voyage was easy. When they arrived at Venice, after an absence of twenty years, they found it irksome to settle down again to the commonplaces of a cultured life, and soon yearned for more experiences of something exciting. Naturally they thought of returning to Kublai; but this they dared not do, unless they fulfilled that monarch's commissions to the Holy See. But the Papal Chair was then vacant, and the Conclave appeared to be in no haste to fill it. Therefore, these born explorers determined to depart at once, and to visit Palestine, on

¹ The reader may be surprised at the courtesy of Kublai toward his Christian guests, but all the earlier successors of Ghengis-Khan were just as favorable. This fact may be explained by the marriage of Ghengis to the daughter of the Priest-King whom he had killed; by the marriage of his son, Oktai, to another Christian; and by the conversion of his heir, Dschagotai, to Christianity, through the influence of these women.

their way, there to lay the khan's requests before the Papal Legate. But in this journey they took a companion.

On the arrival of Nicolao at his home, he had found that his wife, whom he had left with child in 1250, had borne him a fine, robust, and intelligent boy, who was called Marco. This was the youth who was destined to reveal to Europe the wonders of China, India, and Japan. It was a terrible time for a traveller in Western Asia and Northern Africa, when, in 1271, the three Poli started on the exploration which has rendered the name of Marco, at least, so famous.¹ That they carried their lives in their hands, is evident from the following letter, written in 1270 by the Mameluke sultan, Bibars, to King Bohemond of Antioch: "We entered Antioch, scimitar in hand, on the fourth day of the Ramadan. Why were you not there, to see your knights crushed under the hoofs of my horses, your palaces sacked and reduced to ashes, your treasures seized and weighed, your women sold, your temples burned, your crosses trampled under foot, your Holy of Holies profaned by your Islamite foe, your priests and monks slaughtered at the altars, your princes of the blood-royal dragged into slavery? Had you been there, you would have asked heaven to reduce you to dust." But the intrepid Venetians were not deterred by the state of affairs indicated in this ferocious communication. When they arrived in Jerusalem, they made known to Cardinal Theobald Visconti, the Papal Legate, the desires of Kublai-Khan; and while arrangements were being made to satisfy them, news came that the cardinal had been elected to the pontifical throne. Therefore it was Pope Gregory X., now venerated as Blessed, who appointed two Carmelite friars, men of artistic tastes and sound theologians, to carry the Cross into China.² Having bidden a long farewell to civilization for the second time, the two elder Poli encouraged the lad who was now making his first essay at exploration; but Marco needed but little incentive other than his own insatiable curiosity. As to courage, patience, and above all, resignation to the will of God, he proved himself even superior to his more seasoned relatives. Our adventurers passed safely through the countries subject to the savage Bibars, and May, 1275, found them at Kaiping-Fu, the summer residence of Kublai. Their four years of

¹ It is strange that Columbus never mentions, in his writings, the name of Marco Polo, especially since he often has passages which are evidently taken from that traveller's book. In the time of the great Genoese, the work of Polo had not yet become popular, for Ramusio had not yet taken it in hand. But probably Columbus learned Marco's experiences through the medium of the writings of Toscanelli, Nicola dei Conti, and Cardinal d'Ailly.

² These Carmelites soon became discouraged, and returned to Europe. In 1246, another Italian missionary, Piano Carpini, had entered China, but his narratives were very meagre.

travel had been fraught with peril of every kind ; but we are obliged to omit any account of their experience before their arrival at the court of the Grand Khan. If the reader is surprised at the length of time consumed by the journey of the Poli from Palestine to Kaiping-Fu, we can, perhaps, explain the fact by some information received at the time of our present writing, concerning a similar journey just completed. In the early part of 1891, two Calmuck Tartars, Buddhists in religion, left their homes in the Russian province of Astrakhan on the Volga, on a mission to the sacred city of Lhasa in Thibet. After incredible hardships, it took them, despite their knowledge of Mongol languages, three years to make the journey. Let us imagine, then, what the Poli had to endure before they rested at Kaiping-Fu.

The sovereign immediately invited his Christian guests to enter his service, and the offer was accepted. Kublai was especially attracted by the talents and engaging qualities of Marco ; and soon he promoted the youth, despite his inexperience in practical matters, to a seat in the Privy Council. Marco was employed, during the first few years of his service, in tabulating the statistics of the vast Celestial Empire ; and this important work entailed upon him what was to a man of his temperament the most pleasant of tasks, visits and protracted residence in the most distant provinces. He became well acquainted with Thibet ; far better, most probably, than any Caucasian of our day. He knew thoroughly the vast land of Yunnan, scarcely known at all by us. For three years he was governor of Yangchou. He witnessed and helped to procure the fall of the Chinese dynasty of the Sung ; and very much of the success of Kublai in that enterprise was due to engines manufactured by the Poli, machines which threw stone balls weighing three hundred pounds. When Kublai resolved to undertake the conquest of Japan, he relied chiefly upon the aid of his Venetian friends ; and it is very probable that he would have succeeded, had he not been forced to abandon his design because of rebellions at home and the destruction of his naval armament by a tempest. After a residence of fifteen years in China, the Poli signified to Kublai their wish to return to their beautiful Italy ; but the venerable sovereign hesitated to grant the permission. Finally, he became reconciled to what was a very reasonable wish ; and as he had just then received an embassy from the Shah of Persia, sent to ask for the hand of an imperial princess, and since the Poli had pronounced a voyage by sea to Persia to be feasible, he appointed them ambassadors to convey the lady to her new home. They bore with them two golden tablets inscribed with an imperial order that they should everywhere be treated like sovereigns ; and they also carried a letter to the Roman Pontiff, in which Kublai

said that he had learned to prefer the religion taught by Rome to his own. However, he manifested no intention of embracing the appreciated faith. Fourteen vessels, "each with four masts and twelve sails," bore the Poli, the princess, and their retinues—six hundred persons, not counting the sailors—from the port of Zaiton on the eastern coast of China. In three months they touched the coast of Java. Then they sailed to Ceylon, and afterward to the mainland, Hindostan, which Marco calls "Greater India." Madagascar was also visited, and the African continent, which is styled "Lesser India." Finally, after a voyage of eighteen months, during which their retinues had been diminished by sickness to eighteen persons, the Poli and the princess bade each other farewell at Ormus on the coast of Arabia. Our indefatigable travellers now set out overland for further adventures. Turning toward the Caspian, they visited Tauris, and remained there nine months. Then they stopped awhile at Trebizond, then at Constantinople, and at length arrived in Venice in the year 1295. The elder Poli had been travelling forty-five years, and Marco twenty-four, in countries which were, nearly all, hitherto unknown to Europeans, and they had never met with a serious accident.

When the Poli presented themselves at their olden residence in the Via di San Giovanni Crisostomo, they found it occupied by certain relatives, who, since the travellers were supposed to have attained immortality some time before, had entered upon the rights of the next of kin. When they declared their identity, they only excited an explosion of incredulous laughter. The idea of those haggard wretches in Mongolian clothing, and that in tatters, claiming to be Venetian gentlemen! And how could they dare to hope that their leathery skins, their goodness-knows what of the Mongolian in expression, the slantingness of their eyes, their purring and other cat-like manners, would ever be mistaken for Caucasian attributes? To jail with the impostors! But Marco soon convinced the doubting Thomases of the truth of his claims. He produced the money wherewith to furnish an elegant banquet to an immense assembly of those whom his father and uncle had known in the olden time; and when the guests had arrived, the Poli appeared in garments of gorgeous hue, the finest texture, and ultra-fashionable style. Then leading the way to the tables, they seated the company; and flinging off their trappings, they shone in garments of still greater splendor, and gave their previous clothes to the menials. Again they performed the lightning change act at the end of the feast; and the now good-humored relatives began to suspect that the eccentric hosts might be, after all, what they claimed to be. Finally, Marco produced the rags in which his party had come to Venice; and from many hidden pockets he

brought forth handfuls of precious stones of every kind and of such purity and size as had never before been seen in the West. Then indeed the bewildered guests swore that the claimants were true Poli, the Simon pure article.

An active and adventurous life was a necessity to Marco Polo; therefore it is not strange that we find him, in 1295, in command of a Venetian galley at the battle of Curzola, fighting against the Genoese. Here, together with 7000 of his countrymen, he was made prisoner, and held in close confinement for twenty-five years. But this terrible misfortune was a benefit to Venice, and indeed to all Europe; for it was in order to alleviate the torments of prison ennui that Marco composed the narrative of his travels. He obtained his liberty in 1328, and saw his eightieth year before the angel of death bade him relinquish his checkered career. The book written by Marco Polo, which soon came to be known as the *Millione*,¹ was long regarded by many as a mere collection of fables, worthy of no more credit than we now accord to the romances woven around the shadowy form of the mythical King Arthur, or to the legend of William Tell. And in modern times, the Protestant mania for a decrival of all good, and of nearly all science, in the age of faith, confirmed this notion. But the investigations of competent and impartial critics have shown that three centuries before the modern "emancipation" of humanity from the presumed thralldom of Rome, three mediæval travellers had traversed the entire width of Asia, described all its kingdoms and their institutions, even the then new court of Cambalu, now Peking. Polo is now regarded by the best judges as an authority in matters of olden Chinese and Persian history. He made men familiar with the rich manufactures, the immense cities, and the majestic rivers of China; he spoke of the gentle monks of Thibet;² he described the shining pagodas of Burmah; he dilated on the beauties of that Indian Archipelago which moderns do not yet know perfectly; he made men tremble with his pictures of the man-eating savages of Sumatra; he told of the precious gems of Ceylon, and of the supposed tomb of Adam in that interesting island; and he gave to the European world a very different idea of what occurred under the burning sun of Hindostan, from that they had derived from the Alexandrian fables. Ridicule was his portion when he described the wonders of the Polar regions, as he had heard them depicted by men from Siberia;

¹ In his prologue to the *Millione*, Ramusio tells us that the stories of Marco Polo about the wealth of Cathay and the magnificence of the Grand-Khan so constantly harped upon "millions" of ducats, that the name of *Messer Millione* was given to the narrator, and hence to his book.

² It is noteworthy that although Polo is merciless toward the schisms and heresies which distracted Christendom, he shows much sympathy for those peoples who have not heard the doctrines of Christ.

and let us not deem this ridicule blameworthy in his first readers, for while we are comparatively familiar with Polar bears, Esquimaux, trained dogs, and reindeer, our own almost immediate forefathers did not believe in them.

The first Jesuit missionaries to China (year 1584) surprised Europeans by their account of the coal burnt by the Chinese, "a bituminous stone which kindles easily, and furnishes a stronger and more lasting heat than that emitted by carbon." Three centuries before this was written, Polo had told his countrymen about "black rocks which are found in veins, and which are used exclusively by the people of Cathay for heating and cooking." He also showed the Westerns how the Chinese used what we know as paper money. "The imperial money factory is in Cambalu, and one would credit the Grand-Khan with a knowledge of magic, for his money is made of strips of bark. Each piece is stamped with the names of different officials, and having been thus authenticated, it must be received by all as good, under pain of death." It was, in all probability, through the narrative of Polo that the art of printing was finally disseminated in Europe. For whether that art was practiced first by Castaldi of Feltre, or by the Dutch priest Coster, or by that priest's disciple, Gutenberg,¹ it is more than likely that the idea of printing with movable types was first ex-cogitated by men who had seen the xylographic prints which Polo brought from the Celestial Empire. Polo's description of Pekin, as he saw it, is interesting. The imperial palace, built by Kublai-Khan, formed a square, each side of which was a mile in length. The walls of most of the rooms were covered with gold and silver, and there were "many beautiful sculptures, illustrating tales of knights and ladies, and many of the sculptures were of birds and beasts." In the grand hall, 6000 persons often dined at the same time. On the outside, the palace was covered with paint of vermilion, purple and green hues, and the varnish shone like crystal. Through the luxuriant gardens of the palace flowed a wide river, "so netted, that no fish could escape." The reader is informed that when the emperor hears of any especially fine tree, no matter how tall it is, and how far off it is, "it is transplanted, branches and all, to the imperial gardens, elephants being used for that purpose." The capital was twenty-four miles in circumference, and its walls were pierced by ten openings, in which hung brazen gates, and near each one of which was a splendid palace. At nightfall, a tremendous bell was rung thrice, and from that moment until sun-

¹ We leave Faust out of the question, for he seems to have been merely an adroit speculator, who appropriated the plans of Gutenberg which this enterprising man had perfected from the ideas of Coster; if, indeed, he had not learned the secret, as the *Chronicles of Feltre* assert, from the humanist, Panfilio Castaldi.

rise, "no person could leave home, unless to summon a physician for a lying-in woman or for some other person dangerously ill." When the Grand-Khan was in residence, 40,000 men took all their meals in his palace. "And you must know that when he dines, great barons are the waiters, and their mouths and nostrils are covered by beautiful silk napkins, so that their breath may not taint the viands of their sovereign." Perhaps Shakespeare had been reading Polo's book, just before he thought of putting on the lips of Denmark's king an order for plenty of noise, because his Majesty was about to drink to Hamlet. For the Venetian says than "whenever the Grand-Khan drinks, all the musical instruments, and there are very many, are sounded." And no persons, even of the most exalted rank, could stand or sit while their dread lord was imbibing. "All fall on their knees with great humility." When the birthday of the emperor was celebrated, the imperial tunic was "of beaten gold, and each one of the 12,000 barons and knights in attendance wore similar, though not so costly, apparel." It is well to know, however, that "all these garments, as well as the cinctures of gold, were imperial gifts," and that Kublai distributed them to all his courtiers thrice a year. We have observed that Marco Polo carefully tabulated the statistics of the Celestial Empire. Excluding Corea, which was, even at that early period, an independent state, save only in the matter of a small tribute, he calculated the population as 59,000,000. If we observe the rate at which the population of Western countries has increased since the thirteenth century, we need not wonder that many think that the Celestials now number nearly five hundred millions.

After one has read the quaint, but carefully penned recital of Marco Polo, which often appears to have come down to us from the author of the "Arabian Nights," he is not astonished when he learns that the traveller's friends besought him, when he was at the point of death, "to retract his lies, for the good of his soul." But time has verified nearly all his assertions; and if we consider the inadequacy of the means at his disposal, we must pronounce him the peer, at least, of any explorer of modern times.¹

REUBEN PARSONS, D.D.

¹ As an illustration of the manner in which the narrative of Polo was at first received, we cite the following commentary subjoined to a codex of the fourteenth century. "Here ends the book of Messer Marco Polo of Venice, transcribed by me, Amelio Bonaguisi, with my own hand, while I was magistrate in Cieretto Guidi, in order to drown melancholy and to pass the time. The contents appear incredible to me; not that they are necessarily lies, but because they seem so miraculous. They may be true, but I do not credit them; although, of course, it is certain that things are different in different countries. While copying these tales, they certainly interested me, but I deem them unworthy of belief. At any rate, that is my opinion. And I completed this copy at Cieretto aforesaid, on Nov. 12, 1392."

BALFOUR'S PHILOSOPHY.

PART I.

(SOME CONSEQUENCES OF BELIEF.)

EVERY now and again it is granted to exceptionally gifted minds to make known, it may even be unconsciously, a new path which men are about to follow in the pursuit of some form of science or some department of art. It is not absolutely necessary for such men to be distinguished as promoters of either of these forms of human activity. It is enough that they should serve to make manifest that a new spirit is abroad which is destined to influence men's tastes and aspirations and largely control their actions.

Such were the men who first raised the pointed arch in western Europe, and such again the earliest artists of the Renaissance. Such also were Ray and Lamarck in biology, the immediate predecessors of Shakespeare and Scott in literature, and both Roger and Francis Bacon in philosophy.

A distinguished place amongst the precursors of a new era is, we believe, destined for Mr. Arthur Balfour. His two works not only deserve but demand a careful and detailed examination, and such an examination is especially incumbent upon Catholics; and this even more on account of their defects than on account of their many merits. His first work, entitled "A Defence of Philosophic Doubt," was published in the year 1879. Its great importance—the precious and pernicious characters it possessed—were at once recognized by men who had made a serious study of the grounds of our deepest convictions. His second and recent publication, "The Foundations of Belief," has, however, excited a much more widespread interest. Less abstruse and addressed for the most part to a more popular audience than was his former book, it has produced a greater effect in England than has any other work which has appeared since Darwin's "Origin of Species."

This is, of course, partly due to the distinguished ability which its author has shown and the increase of fame which he has acquired in the field of politics since 1879, the date of the appearance of his earlier volume. It is also due to the excellence of the style in which his recent work is written, to its great, but delicate humor, its refined and ever-courteous irony, the overwhelming force of many of its arguments, and the limpid clearness of its

sentences—though, it must be confessed, that not a few lengthy passages require careful re-reading before their import can be fully mastered. Its efficiency is thirdly, and finally, due to the fact that the fundamental position taken up by its author favors that halting, undecided and doubtful spirit which is so widely diffused at the present time; although, happily, in all the most effective portions of his volume he argues in favor of sound conclusions with a force and urgency beyond all his predecessors. Thus it is that the appearance of his second work, as we have already said, marks—and fitly marks—an important era in the history of speculative thought—nothing less than a turning point from the most fatal error towards saving scientific truth. We believe it marks the initiation of a profound change in the popular apprehension of what is to be regarded as rational and as to those who are to be deemed the best guides to all higher knowledge.

After the long decline in philosophy since the decay of scholasticism began, there is a very manifest and hopeful change for the better. This reaction, which, at the latest, began in the third quarter of the present century, has now become so unmistakable that it is publicly rejoiced at or lamented by friends or foes.¹

The disciples of subjectivism and empiricism are disappearing without leaving successors behind them. Mill has gone and Darwin has gone, the sophistical rhetoric of Tyndal can be heard no more, and in the very midst of Professor Huxley's assault on "the foundations of belief" the sword was struck from his hand and he passed away from amongst us, to the sincere regret of not a few of his most determined and persistent opponents. Very remarkable, too, was his passing. To nothing was he so opposed as to Roman Catholicism—Catholics being (as he himself declared) *feræ naturæ* in his eyes—and he hated and dreaded above all things the increasing sway of the representative and successor of St. Peter. But it was on St. Peter's day he died, and while the sights and sounds of this world were fading from his consciousness, a great crowd of priests, of monks and of friars were with solemn chants and majestic ceremonial assisting the Cardinal-Primates of England and of Ireland to lay the foundation stone of the first Metropolitan Roman Catholic cathedral to be erected since the disappearance of the mediæval Church of England. Soon after its abolition, the use of the pallium, the visible sign of lawful jurisdiction, ceased in our land. Fitly, then, was it displayed on the shoulders of the successor of St. Augustine, St. Thomas, Archbishop Warham and Cardinal Pole, while he blessed

¹ Very noteworthy are the reiterated shrieks of distress and alarm which it has called forth from that typical example of obscurantism, Prof. Karl Pearson. (See his article in the *Fortnightly Review* for September, 1894.)

the foundations of that church in which the archiepiscopal metropolitan throne is to be once more set up.

This most eventful year, 1895, which has thus witnessed the end of the greatest and most skillful of all the promoters and preachers of empiricism and non-theistic evolution, has thus also witnessed the appearance of Mr. Balfour's second book, which has dealt the most powerful and effective blow yet delivered against that system of thought whereof the late Professor Huxley and the as yet surviving Mr. Spencer may be said to have been the chiefs.

But the great influence which Mr. Balfour's work has exercised and will exercise, is partly due to yet one more cause than those we have before enumerated. It is so influential, because Mr. Balfour himself belongs, to a considerable extent, to that very school of thought he so effectively combats. It is thus as if that school had actually committed suicide. Fully acquainted with all the details of the various forms of empiricism, he well knows their weak points, and thrusts unmercifully through the joints of their armor, the construction of which is so familiar to him, because he himself is clad in a coat essentially similar in build. His, then, is necessarily a most fatal attack, and, in his denunciation of what he terms "naturalism," to the absurdities of which he has opened the eyes of so many of his readers, we are reminded of that far-resounding fatal voice which told the world, "The great Pan is dead!"

But some readers may not unnaturally exclaim: "How can Mr. Balfour, possessing the acuteness and ability he does possess, how can he stultify his own position, as well as that of his opponents?"

The fact, however, is, that in a sense, and according to his intention, he does not stultify his own position. That position enables him who holds it to criticise destructively either science or religion as he will. It was religion that received all the attacks of those subjectivist empiricists he opposes. It is the widely-received philosophy of (physical) science which is, in turn, the victim of his assaults. His own sympathies and aspirations are entirely and energetically on the side of religion, which he venerates, and the social benefits, not to say necessity, of which he clearly perceives and strongly urges on his readers. The outcome of his philosophy may be thus expressed with extreme conciseness: Neither science nor religion is capable of satisfactory proof, and the scientific arguments urged by the former against the latter are vain, because the philosophy of science, as commonly understood, is incoherent, baseless, and self-contradictory. Religion, on the other hand, responds to our inmost and most urgent needs, and is to be accepted on that ground, because its disproof is impossible.

To the defence of this position both of Mr. Balfour's volumes are devoted. They are exceedingly valuable on account of their triumphant overthrow of all the recent popular anti-religious philosophies, and also on account of the many very excellent remarks concerning morals and religion which they contain. But his position urgently needs to be supported by the truths of Catholic philosophy, for lack of which all that would be instructive in it is necessarily weak, because reposing upon no adequate foundation. This fact, however, is the necessary result of the affinity which exists between his own system and that of his opponents, and is hardly to be regretted, because that very affinity has so well enabled him to dispose, triumphantly, of those who are our greatest enemies, as well as his.

That we have not misrepresented his true position is shown by the following extracts from a chapter¹ from his earlier work, entitled "Practical Results;" but it is to a careful and rather full review of his later work that this examination will be devoted.²

¹ Pp. 296-327.

² On this account we think it may be useful to supply here a brief analysis of his earlier publication: "A DEFENCE OF PHILOSOPHIC DOUBT; BEING AN ESSAY ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF BELIEF."

All the parts of this work bear a common relation to the contents of the first chapter, wherein are stated the conditions which any system of thought must satisfy to be reasonable. The other chapters contain an examination of how far these conditions are satisfied by orthodox science.

The author takes for granted that the ordinary topic of science is correct, only modifying the assumption when this is found untenable. The conclusion is that the principles of science are unproved, its inferences are inconclusive, and its conclusions incoherent and that there is no defect to which systems of belief are liable, from which it may not properly be said to suffer.

PART I.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF INFERENCE.

This part shows that, assuming the phenomena of the world to be persistent and governed by causation, there is, even then, no method by which inference from particulars is possible, but some further principles or modes of inference must be added to the knowledge we derive from observation, to enable us to arrive at a law of nature, and to place science on a reasonable foundation.

CHAPTER I.

On the Idea of a Philosophy.

All things knowable may be grouped under one of four heads:

1. *Science*, or knowledge of phenomena and their relations.
2. *Metaphysics*, or the study of noumena (the non-phenomenal).
3. *Ethics*, or rules for actions with reference to an end.
4. *Philosophy*, or the study of the ultimate grounds of belief and disbelief and not the study of their causes or antecedents.

Philosophy must consist of two main departments (*a*) that of ultimate, or self evident propositions; (*b*) that of modes of inference. Philosophy has neither to investigate the causes nor prove the grounds of belief, but only to disengage the truly ulti-

"The reader who has followed the long argument of this essay . . . may perhaps be disposed to ask, what, if any, is intended to be the practical result of a piece of criticism of so purely distinctive a character? . . . If . . . it is intended to influence actual belief what effect can it have, except the foundation of a universal or nearly

mate from the apparently so, to distinguish valid inferences and classify axioms. Neither the forms of inferences nor axioms are the grounds for the belief of any particular truths, but philosophy distinguishes and classifies particular self-evident propositions into forms of valid inference and into axioms. There is no ground for supposing that ultimate judgments are all general or all particular. This is the form to which every reasonable system of belief must be capable of being reduced.

Does the modern system of physiological science conform to this standard? It affirms itself to be founded entirely on observation and experiment, which are the sole evidence of scientific truth.

CHAPTER II.

Empirical Logic.

Any system of logic may be criticized (1) as to whether it is satisfactory in its account of the inferences with which it deals, and (2) as to its completeness in dealing with all methods of inference. Mill affirms there is no inference save from particulars and therefore mistakenly objects to syllogism on the ground that its conclusion is already contained in its major premiss. In this he is wrong. But (1) the question does not lie within the province of logic; (2) it cannot be proved, and (3) it does not apply to ethical inferences. Mill can never prove universal causation. He says a wide observation of sequences may justify their attribution 'to causation, excluding chance or the action of collocation; but such distinctions are meaningless unless the law of causation be already known. An attempt to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate inductions from particulars, needs some general principle and then the inference ceases to be from particulars. Some general preparation, therefore, must be added to observation, to attain to a law of nature—namely the law of causation; but this can never be inferred and proved from particulars.

CHAPTER III.

Induction.

Admitting the law of causation, and that particular sequences and co-existences between phenomena can be observed, can we single out causes and effects, and special laws of nature? Induction, even by Mill's method "of difference" and "of agreement," cannot give certitude because the universe is never the same in all particulars save one, at any two successive instants, and it never has occurred that two instances of a phenomena have only one circumstance in common. Therefore, we can never tell which accompanying phenomena are or are not necessary as concauses, still less as to their future occurrence, and so, granting the uniformity of nature, and the law of universal causation, induction can never alone assure us that supposed laws of nature will apply to unobserved instances.

CHAPTER IV.

Historical Evidence.

Every scientific proposition expresses a law or a fact, while every law must repose on known facts, and every fact (not immediately observed) on known laws. Knowledge of past events reposes on reasoning from effect to cause, but more than one cause may produce a given effect. Therefore, if two explanations of the universe are but possible, they would, for all we know, be equally probable, and there is no period of history at which creation might not have taken place. To have confidence in the teachings of science about the cosmos, a man must be more than an agnostic. He must

universal scepticism? . . . Scepticism taken without explanation is ambiguous. It may mean either the intellectual recognition of the want of evidence, or it may mean this together with its consequent unbelief . . . In the second of these senses, it might be well, before asking whether such scientific scepticism is desirable, to see whether it

have solid ground for believing not only that one past series of phenomena has been possible, but that nothing besides phenomena capable of acting on phenomena ever existed, and these grounds must be derived from his own immediate observations. Empiricists base our knowledge of the law of causation on long uncontradicted experience, but unless we already possess this, we have no reason for believing past observations, while the only experience we can infer from is the direct experience of each individual.

PART II.

CERTAIN PROBABLE PHILOSOPHIC SYSTEMS AND ULTIMATE SCIENTIFIC PREMISES.

The arguments of philosophic systems in England are invalid, and cannot support the doctrines of a persistent universe or of causation, while neither Idealism nor Realism can be proved. Science, also, is a system of belief which, for anything we can allege to the contrary, is logically unsatisfactory; its inferences are erroneous, and its premises are unproved.

CHAPTER V.

Introduction.

Berkeley and Hume say we know nothing save sensations and ideas. Green's school says we do not perceive these, but only qualities which are "relations," which are thought, not felt. Do we by perception gain an assurance, both immediate and reflective, of the existence of persistent objects? No! for the senses occasionally deceive us. Besides, may not persistence be a "relation?" But to think of an object as persisting, cannot make it persist. Scepticism is not impossible, and, therefore, systems affirming the persistence of objects must be criticized. What, then, is the evidence for the law of universal causation and for a persistent universe which is implied in individual particular experiences?

CHAPTER VI.

Transcendentalism.

Transcendentalists (Kant, Green, Caird, etc.) cannot dispose of sceptical objections to a permanent external world and causation, for their argument from change to permanence and from succession to causation are both insufficient. The transcendental premises are: (1) We have some knowledge; (2) whatever is involved therein (can be transcendently deduced) must be granted; (3) an external world and causation are involved therein. As to the first, Kant says we cannot experience change (know facts) unless we assume an unchanging substance—a uniform nature. But many do not perceive this relation, therefore either an object can be known without being so thought (*i.e.* without assuming an unchanging substance), or we so think while we think we do not so think, and either alternation is fatal to transcendentalism, and denies the identity of *esse* and *intelligi*. Kant's refutation of Idealism is: The consciousness of my own existence in time amounts to an immediate consciousness of things outside myself, for the existence of such things is the condition of determination in time.

His first analogy affirms permanent substance under changing phenomena. But change need only imply slight persistence, not permanence. Moreover, the Kantists allow alternation, which is all that is needed. But why for the permanent need we go to external matter? The ego is enough! The doctrines of refutation and first analogy taken together amount to a transcendental proof that our conscious states are mere accidents of matter.

is possible. . . . If then, scepticism in the second sense be impossible, is scepticism in the first sense of any but a speculative interest? Scepticism which does not destroy belief, it is natural to suppose, does nothing. This, however, is by no means, necessarily the case.

If, in the estimation of mankind all creeds stood on a philosophic equality, no doubt an attack which affected them all equally, would probably have little or no practical

As to causation (his second analogy), Kant says it is implied in our experience of succeeding events, but he confuses the order of events with the order of moments. Succeeding moments, however, can each occur, but only each at its own time; but events in causal succession, though they must occur at some time, may occur at any time. Men recognize succession without apprehending causation, and the transcendental argument only shows that we cannot have a clear idea of non-causal succession without the idea of some other succession which is causal. That the state of the universe at any one time stands in a fixed relation with that of the next instant is not enough. A law of nature refers to fixed relations between very small portions of each such succeeding cosmic state.

CHAPTER VII.

Three Arguments from Popular Philosophy.

The first argument that, from general consent, cannot be an ultimate ground of belief, for the proposition that what the generality of mankind assents to is true itself needs proof, and the fact of consent, and any particular beliefs which may be deduced from the above-mentioned proposition require proof by reasoning, while, as a fact, even philosophers do not agree. The second argument which would base truth or success in practice is but an appeal to experience, and "verification" can no more be an ultimate ground of belief than any other empiricism. Thirdly, an appeal to common sense as the ultimate ground of belief is a negation of philosophy, while as to "an intelligence working normally" confidence in that must rest on "design," and this again requires proof.

CHAPTER VIII.

The Authority of Consciousness and of Original Beliefs.

Hamilton is necessarily confused and ambiguous because he had to try and place desirable, but doubted, beliefs on the same level as our knowledge of our conscious states. Therefore he erected consciousness into a faculty vouching for both, and itself declared credible on five accounts which are themselves declared credible as deliveries of consciousness and original convictions of mankind, while he confuses the two meanings of "original," viz., (1) first in logical order and (2) first in time.

Mill only differs from Hamilton in consistently treating "original" beliefs as those first in time, and taking a young baby as the oracle of truth. But why is a baby to be believed and why are original beliefs more likely to be true than induced ones? There is no ground for deeming acquired beliefs specially unfitted, or original ones specially fitted, to serve as the foundations of a creed; while it is impossible to determine which are original and which acquired without assuming the truth of many propositions the only evidence of which can, on this theory, be that they are original.

CHAPTER IX.

Psychological Idealism.

Idealism is popular because so easy and simple, but it is untenable because, though reconcilable with ordinary observation, it is not so with science which postulates external causes and external actions, some actually imperceptible. Mill's "permanent possibilities of sensation" are either really substances external to the mind and absolutely inconsistent with idealism, or else they are a mere name to which nothing corresponds.

result. The only result it could reasonably produce would be general unbelief. . . . But if in the estimation of mankind there is the greatest difference in the relative credibility of prevalent systems of belief, if now one system and now another is raised to the dignity of a standard of certainty, it is plain that a sceptical attack, especially if it deals with the system which happens at the moment to be in favor, may have considerable consequences. . . . In a sentence or two I can map out in outline the creed secretly or avowedly professed by the two largest and most important classes. . . .

CHAPTER X.

Test of Inconceivability.

Mr. Spencer declares undecomposable propositions whose negative is inconceivable, to be unquestionable. This test is worthless, since such a proposition as "a thing must either be or not be is not decomposable, and cannot be reversed in thought," is less certain than the original proposition itself, that "a thing must be or not be." To assume that a psychological fact warrants some other fact, implies a pre-established harmony, and the inconceivableness of the contrary of any proposition affords no logical justification for holding it.

CHAPTER XI.

Mr. Spencer's Proof of Realism.

His proof rests on appeals which would justify what he scorns as "crude realism," while his arguments refute his own "transfigured realism," which satisfies neither science, theology, common sense, or philosophy. To appeal to the judgment of rustics, or to common sense, is absurd; while the theory that a vibrating particle can cause a sensation is, on Mr. Spencer's system, nonsense, since such a particle is but part of the faint aggregate of mental states.

PART III.

This part turns from the study of philosophers to an examination of the general character of the scientific system regarded as a logical whole, the reality of an external world being taken for granted. The result is, that as a general system of belief, science is also incoherent, for, there is a discrepancy between the facts which science asserts to be its (particular) premisses and the facts which it puts forward as its ultimate conclusions. Also, its conception of the universe is purely anthropomorphic. Besides this, all ultimate beliefs are necessary results of the primeval arrangement of atoms, which arrangement has also produced much error, and science shows that the premises of all science are doubtful. Therefore, science fails in its premises, inferences, and conclusions—the first are unproved, the second are inconclusive, and the third are incoherent.

CHAPTER XII.

Science as a Logical System.

The contrast is great between the world as it appears and what science assures us it is; and the scientific reasoning which makes our knowledge of what it is depend (as it does and must) upon its appearance (the data given in perception), must—since its conclusions are in contradiction with their data—be incoherent and confused. Science declares the world to consist of atoms and ether, which is very unlike the perceived world. Science, also, is necessarily anthropomorphic. As to its two main constituents, force and matter, our mental imagery of the former must be very different from the reality; while matter is quite unimaginable and uncolored atoms, ether and magnetism are also unimaginable. All scientific truths are inferred from immediately-known appearances, which appearances (*e.g.*, as to color) are not to be trusted. Moreover, if we cannot argue from perception to the existence of material objects, still less can we argue from them as to such objects' qualities.

In the opinion of both of these, beliefs tend to assimilate themselves to one of two types. The first type is that presented by established science . . . the second type may be found in any superstitions,

Our more advanced thinkers . . . deal very shortly with the distribution of beliefs

CHAPTER XIII.

The Evolution of Belief.

Every belief may be considered from two points of view—as a member of a logical, or of a causal series. As to cause, science tells us that every belief has a cause, but by no means every one has a reason; and ultimate ones cannot have such. As products they belong to the class of opinions, multitudes of which are passing and temporary. Like them, they are (according to science) the necessary results of a primeval arrangement of atoms. This cause has produced many errors—possibly, more error than it has truth; therefore, any ultimate belief may be deemed probably erroneous. Regarded logically, if the premisses of all science are thus doubtful, the more certain we consider our inferences, the less assurance we have for believing them at all. If it be said, the scientific system is merely probable, no system can be deemed such, which, if it were suddenly to become certain, would be self-contradictory (would contradict its premisses), and therefore impossible. No conclusion less than the recognition that some fundamental error or omission has been made in the system of science, will satisfy the argument, and this especially applies to the doctrine of evolution. For, that becomes impossible to accept as really true, as soon as it is certain, because by the very fact of its becoming certain, its premisses must be true and these make its conclusion uncertain. It is thus a specially incoherent doctrine. But evolution alone claims to regulate the whole world of phenomena; if it is not universal, it is nothing. If its deductions are correct, its premisses must be wrong, while if its premisses are correct, its deductions must be wrong.

Note.—Though the origin of ultimate beliefs can never supply any ground for believing them—since their origin can only be known by inference—nevertheless their origin may furnish ground for doubting or disbelieving them. Thus, if it could be demonstrated that the world was the work of a deceitful power, we should be compelled either to doubt our beliefs or that demonstration. This is the sceptical dilemma which evolution applies to all our ultimate beliefs.

SUMMARY.

If these criticisms seem too destructive, the reason is that speculation seems now sadly to want a destructive criticism. Any faith held strongly tends to convert philosophy, from being its judge to be its servant. In Mediæval times philosophy became almost identical with theology, and it has now become almost a scientific department, as if it consisted of the more general aspects of scientific truth. But, as we saw in the first chapter, no scientific knowledge can ever supply grounds of belief. Our path of argument has been narrow, neither deviating with science on the one hand or metaphysics on the other, and however trying, must be traversed before intellectual repose can be attained.

PRACTICAL RESULTS.

Entire scepticism as to facts being impossible, the apparent simply negative result of this treatise is to show that if religion is destitute of satisfactory evidence, it is quite as well off in that respect as science is. This is practically useful, because so many persons are persuaded that the best warrant for a creed is that science supports it, and that the most fatal objection to it is that science contradicts it. But we have seen that science has almost every possible philosophical defect, and we may turn the tables on it by making objections to it which are parallel to those raised against religion. Many theologians are to blame for their anxiety to exhibit a perfect congruity between science and religion, and are ready to lop off everything not agreeable to the former,

between these types. Everything which has to do with phenomena they put into the first class; everything else they put into the second. . . . Though in the first class are to be found almost all those who disbelieve in religion, while the second includes almost all those who believe in it; yet, however great may be the practical differences between them . . . they nevertheless agree in thinking that no more certain warrant for a creed can be found than the fact that science supports it: no more fatal objection to one, than the fact that science contradicts it. . . . Has science any claim to

which is equivalent to seeking to abolish religious mysteries. In accepting both science and religion, we resign ourselves to acquiescing in the demands of impulses and needs, and the need for religion (rooted in the loftiest region of our moral nature) is one from which we would not, if we could, be freed. Freethinkers assure us that religion depends on science; but the two great creeds (religion and science) repose upon separate bases, and freethinkers should, as a moral duty, examine into the philosophy of science. This treatise will not convert them, but it may be of use to some inclined to give up religion on scientific grounds, and if so, it will have a satisfactory utility.

NOTE ON THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE.

This discord is mainly due to the exerted interference with the natural by the supernatural, which seems to contradict "the uniformity of nature"; but the law that "similar antecedents are always followed by similar consequents" is in no way inconsistent with miracles; for a supernatural being acting is a new cause, as Mill admitted. Moreover, such events are so few that they are lost in the mass of facts which have succeeded each other. Therefore our confidence in causation is in no way impaired, and it only seems possible it should be so, because freethinkers approach the question with minds that are saturated with a conviction of the dependence of religion on science.

APPENDIX.

On the Idea of a Philosophy of Ethics.

Here we extend and apply the idea of philosophy in general (as depicted in the first chapter) to the philosophy of ethics. Ethics is no department of science, though it has been supposed to be so, because psychology, physiology, ethnology, etc., have something to say as to the origin and development of moral ideas, though all such inquiries are irrelevant to ethics. All knowledge is either certain in itself or validly deduced. Therefore the general propositions which lie at the root of any ethical system must themselves be self-evident and ethical. By no artifice can an ethical statement be evolved from scientific or metaphysical ones. Therefore ethics is not, and never can be, founded on experience, and questions of origin and causation cannot answer the question why any precept is to be accepted. Similarly, the supposition of a moral sense—a conscience—invalidates the fundamental nature of a moral precept, or is tautological. But ethic is wider than morality; for an ethical proposition is one which prescribes an action with reference to an end, and these may be non-moral ends or immoral ones, such as the gratification of revenge. Ethical propositions, therefore, may be either moral, non-moral or immoral. "Universality," or the existence of a special mental faculty, cannot be a ground of obligation; for we may say, why should we conform to either? It follows that no instructive analogy exists between ethics and aesthetics. The duty of the moralist is to clear away the confusion which so widely exists amongst men, as to their ethical first principles. (1) What do I hold to be the ultimate ends of action? If more than one, how do I estimate them in case of conflict? It is his duty to help his readers to discover these facts, not to force his own views down their throats by attempting to prove what, by its nature, can never be proved. His task is to place before his inquirers various problems of ethics free from the misleading particulars which surround them in practice. He has to make clear to his readers what ethical precepts are to them fundamental and self-evident. His method is casuistical, and not dogmatic.

be thus set up as the standard of belief? A close examination of its philosophic structure reveals the existence of almost every possible philosophical defect. We have seen that whether science be regarded from the point of view of its premises, its inferences, or the general relation of its parts, it is found defective: and we have seen that the ordinary proofs which philosophers and men of science have thought fit to give of its doctrines are not only mutually inconsistent, but are such as would convince nobody who did not start with an implicit and indestructible confidence in the truth of that which had to be proved. That men of science should exaggerate the claims of science is natural, but why the ordinary public should do so is not quite so easy to understand. There exists now a kind of literature produced by experts for the benefit of those who desire to be "generally informed;" there are easily found eminent authors anxious to purvey for that apparently increasing class of persons who aspire to be advanced thinkers, but who like to have their advanced thinking done for them. Now the very starting point of these productions is the principle that science is the one thing certain. . . . And since this is the doctrine which is constantly reiterated, we need not be surprised that a not very critical public should easily believe it. . . . How it comes about that the distinguished authors who so serenely take for granted this principle of criticism should themselves never be troubled by any suspicion as to its solidity is harder to understand.

The whole tenor of this essay goes to prove that claims to belief do not consist, so far as science at least is concerned, in *reasons*. It would be more proper to describe them as a kind of inward inclination or impulse. The reader may, perhaps, think that we ought not to rest content with this "impulse." If so, I am quite of his mind. I know no means, however, by which the evil can at present be remedied. Religion is, at any rate, no worse off than science in the matter of proof. I and an indefinite number of other persons, if we contemplate religion and science as unproved systems of belief standing side by side, feel a practical need for both the need for religious truth is one from which we would not, if we could, be freed. In the absence then of reason to the contrary, I am content to regard the two great creeds by which we attempt to regulate our lives as resting in the main on separate bases. I cannot hope that my reasoning will produce any but a negative effect on those who approach the question of religious truth in that indifferent mood which they would perhaps themselves describe as intellectual impartiality. There may, however, be some of another temper, who would regard religion as the most precious of all inheritances—if only it were true; who surrender slowly and unwillingly, to what they conceive to be unanswerable argument, convictions with which yet they can scarcely bear to part; who for the sake of truth are prepared to give up what they had been wont to think of as their guide in this life, their hope in another, and to take refuge in some of the strange substitutes for religion provided by the ingenuity of these latter times. It is not impossible that to some of these, hesitating between arguments to which they can find no reply and a creed which they feel to be necessary, the line of thought suggested may be of service. Should such prove to be the case, this essay will have an interest and utility beyond that of pure speculation; and I shall be more than satisfied."

That his second work is a further elaboration and development of his first, is shown by their respective titles. The second part of the title of his first book "An Essay on the Foundations of Belief," is taken up by his second, which is designated "The Foundations of Belief, Being Notes Introductory to the Study of Theology."

It is much more directly concerned with religion, above all with Christianity, than was his earlier volume, but the fundamental

unity which underlies such divergences of treatment and exposition as exist between the two will, we think, plainly appear in the course of that examination of the latter work to which we now proceed to address ourselves.

The "Foundations of Belief" consists of four parts; the first, considers *some consequences of belief*; the second, examines *some reasons for belief*; the third part treats of *some causes of belief*; while the fourth part is devoted to *suggestions towards a provisional philosophy*.

In a preliminary explanation of the nature and purpose of the work, he declares it to be an introduction to theology, only "in the narrowest sense," and might be fitly described as "Considerations Preliminary to a Study of Theology." They are, truly, not the less important on that account; for, the decisive battles of theology are, as Mr. Balfour says, often fought beyond its frontiers, and depend largely upon each man's general mode of looking at the universe, and with this physical science and ethics are often largely concerned. He declares that his object is "to recommend a certain attitude of mind, and a particular way of looking at the world-problems, which, whether we like it or not, we are compelled to face." The author, while denying that his book is a work of "Apologetics," defending successively different theological dogmas, solving doubts and allaying difficulties, nevertheless expresses (as one citation has already shown) his hope that it may indirectly aid the task of the apologist, as, in his opinion, the greater number of such doubts and difficulties are but due to the superficiality and one-sidedness with which the wider problems of belief are habitually considered.

Therefore it is that there is more secular matter in the book than its title might suggest. He declares it to be intended "for the general body of readers interested in such subjects," no knowledge of the history or technicalities of philosophy on the part of the reader being assumed.

As a contrast to his own views he has selected "the only system which ultimately profits by any defeats which theology may sustain, or which may be counted on to flood the spaces from which the tide of religion has receded."

This system is the one which teaches that we can know nothing but phenomena and the laws by which they are connected, and that what, if anything, unknowable to us may exist, the world of which we can alone have any cognizance is that which is the subject-matter of the natural sciences. This system he designates "Naturalism." We have here already spoken of it as "empiricism" and "subjectivism;" but although the word may be open to some objection, we find (and have found it) convenient to call

it "*sensism*" instead. To that we oppose what we believe to be the only possible sound system of philosophy, and that we distinguish as "*intellectualism*." Henceforth, then, "naturalism" and "sensism" will be used by us as equivalent terms. Here "intellectualism" will be employed to denote our own system, but not that of Mr. Balfour, from which ours widely and most fundamentally differs.

There is sometimes much ambiguity in his use of the terms "reason" and "rationalism," and on that account we desire to distinguish between two kinds of intellectual cognition which seem often to be confounded in Mr. Balfour's use of the term "Reason." We propose to distinguish between (1) The *direct* and (2) the *reflex* modes of action of our intellect.

We have elsewhere explained at length¹ what are our lower, sensuous, mental powers, the possession of which we share with the higher animals,² and that instinct is a faculty essentially both telic and blind, being directed to a practical, though unforeseen, end.³

But our sensuous faculties being "sensed" by a reasonable human nature, become transfigured, "consentience" being replaced by "consciousness."⁴

These truths being premised, we would discriminate between two modes of the action of our intellect as follows:

Direct cognition is the mind consciously (but not reflexly) perceiving facts and the relations between facts and apprehending them directly (but not reflexly) as being doubtful, probable or certainly true, as the case may be, in each concrete instance perceived.

Amongst the facts thus apprehended is the fact of our own continuous existence, and amongst the relations between facts are inferences, the truth of which may be known without any advertence to the process of inference.

Reflex cognition is the mind consciously and, of course, reflexly perceiving (1) facts and certain relations between facts and (2) abstract truths thereto related—the former as being absolutely evident and indisputable and the latter as being absolutely evident, universal and necessary truths.

Amongst the facts thus recognized as evident is that of our own continuous existence as distinguished from its passing states, and amongst the relations seen to be necessary are logical processes of

¹ See *On Truth*, chap. xiv., pp. 178–202.

² See *op. cit.*, chap. xxii.

³ See *op. cit.*, p. 427.

⁴ For a definition of consentience, see *op. cit.*, p. 133; for its relation to consciousness, see p. 213.

inference, apprehended not only directly but reflexly, as processes of valid ratiocination, as also the various abstract necessary truths which concrete facts imply.

There are two truths which it is very necessary to bear in mind: (1) One is that instinct is blind, as are all impulses the ends of which are not foreseen. They can form no part of "reason," or "intellect," with which instinct stands in the most marked contrast. The other truth is (2) that all rational perception is conscious and the certainty it may attain to is absolute and evident, although the mind may not, by any reflex process, attend either to the process it has performed as a process or to the evidence of the result as being evident.

Having, as we hope, made clear the foregoing distinctions, we must return to reconsider Mr. Balfour's term, "naturalism" and his conception as to its meaning. With that term the late Professor Huxley expressed¹ much dissatisfaction as insufficiently defined and as quite inapplicable to agnosticism. He said:²

Agnosticism has not necessarily anything whatever to do with naturalism properly so-called. For one may surely hold that he knows nothing about any supernatural powers, and even is unacquainted with any means of knowing about them, and yet totally refuse to commit himself to a denial of their existence. This elementary consideration is so often, but it would seem quite uselessly, urged that a man may say he knows nothing of any Saturnians and does not believe we shall ever have the means of knowing, and yet leave the existence or non-existence of inhabitants in that planet quite open, is surely worth some attention.

But this is a false analogy, for no one whatever asserts that there is satisfactory evidence as to the existence or non-existence of Saturnians, but multitudes of mankind, and most eminent philosophers amongst them, affirm that there is such abundant evidence for believing in the existence of God, that to decry it in one's heart fully merits for the denier the appellation bestowed upon him in Holy Scripture. Professor Huxley wholly repudiated³ Mr. Balfour's portrait of agnosticism and even went so far as to say⁴ that Mr. Balfour's "conceptions of empiricism and agnosticism" must refer to what is "non-existent."

But this cannot be maintained, for agnosticism loudly asserts that we have no sufficient reason to believe the world, including human nature, to be the work of a power of superhuman intelligence and that we cannot affirm with certainty that all the goodness and intelligence which exist on the earth may not have been due to the action of non-intelligent forces and have been potential,

¹ See the paper entitled "Mr. Balfour's Attack on Agnosticism," in the *Nineteenth Century*, No. 217, March, 1895, p. 527.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 533.

³ P. 540.

⁴ P. 539.

as the late Professor Tyndal said in his Belfast address, "in the fires of the sun."

All these agnostic doctrines Mr. Balfour confidently denies, not, indeed, as we do on the ground of necessary deductions from self-evident fundamental intuitions, but on the ground that a reasonable recognition of the lessons to be learnt from the consideration of our highest perceptions, our noblest emotions and our supreme needs alike demand it.

But Professor Huxley seems an avowed admirer, disciple and, as we believe, a very remarkable dupe of the great Scotch sophist, who, we believe, had far too acute a mind to be the victim of his own ingenious paradoxes.

There is a remarkable passage in Hume's writings (which Professor Huxley quoted and referred to in his *Lay Sermons*) to the following effect:

If we take in hand any volume of divinity, or school metaphysics, for instance, let us ask, *Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number?* No. *Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence?* No. Commit it then to the flames for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.'

To this Professor Huxley referred (p. 159) as follows :

Permit me to enforce this *most wise* advice. Why trouble ourselves about matters of which, however important they may be, we do know nothing and *can* know nothing?

Professor Balfour's meaning with respect to "Naturalism" must surely be clear enough to the understanding of all those whose volition does not entitle them to admission amongst that well-known class as to whom the proverb says there are "none so blind."

Agnostics, positivists, secularists, and empiricists—such men as the late Professor Huxley himself, Mr. Herbert Spencer, the late John Stuart Mill, the living Karl Pearson and the deceased John Tyndal are (or were) one and all, disciples of "Naturalism" in Mr. Balfour's sense—the system, that is, which affirms there is no evident absurdity in the evolution of intellect and morality from a cosmos utterly devoid of intellect and therefore of the most rudimentary sentiment of goodness. We fully adhere therefore to what Mr. Balfour affirms as to the existence, prevalence and necessary characteristics of the system he calls "Naturalism" and we "sensism."

But he makes use of the term "phenomena" in a peculiar manner, for which he apologizes,¹ saying :

¹ See the *Foundations of Belief*, note on page 7.

I feel that explanation, and perhaps apology, is due for this (his) use of the word "phenomena." In its proper sense the term implies, I suppose, that which *appears*, as distinguished from something, presumably more real, which does *not appear*. I neither use it as carrying this metaphysical implication, nor do I restrict it to things which appear, or even to things which *could* appear to beings endowed with senses like ours. The ether, for instance, though it is impossible that we should ever know it except by its effects, I should call phenomenon. The coagulation of nebular meteors into suns and planets I should call a phenomenon, though nobody may have existed to whom it could appear. Roughly speaking, things and events, the general subject-matter of natural science, is what I endeavor to indicate by a term for which, as thus used, there is, unfortunately, no substitute, however little the meaning which I can give to it, can be etymologically justified.

As to this use of the word we think a certain distinction requires to be drawn, but before proceeding to draw it we would call attention to a remark of Professor Huxley on the subject. He says:¹

The doctrine that the subject-matter of knowledge is limited to phenomena, is common to all I have mentioned (*i.e.*, to Kant, Hume, Berkeley and Locke—critical, sceptical, idealist and empiricist schools), and it is as common to all of them to include mental as well as physical phenomena among the subject-matter of knowledge.

Of course if everything that can be known is a "phenomenon," then it is very clear that we can know nothing but phenomena. The question, by such an assertion, is simply begged. We are certain that Kant, Hume, Berkeley and Locke with all their followers—including Professor Huxley—are absolutely wrong in their common doctrine above stated, but we also think that the term "phenomenon" should have some distinct reference to "appearance," while we agree with the late Professor Huxley and the metaphysicians he quotes, in thinking that certain mental states should be classed amongst "phenomena."

We regard "phenomena" as being essentially related to the senses and sense-perception—vivid and faint sensations, sense-impressions and sense-perceptions—such as we share with animals as we do dreams and imaginations. Phenomena are apprehended as being such by our intellect exclusively.

A man's own existence—his persistent personality as made known by memory—is *not* a phenomenon, though the various aspects in which our existence reveals itself to our external or internal senses are so many phenomena.

I would, therefore, divide phenomena into two classes; (1) *external*, and (2) *internal*.

The first class—phenomena referred to external causes—I would further subdivide into (a) "*real*" and (b) "*imaginary*."

By the "real" I would signify such phenomena as are ordi-

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 535.

narily referred to the real action of something external to the mind—such as all the phenomena of nature, living and not living, including our own corporeal frame. By the “imaginary,” I would denote phenomena supposed to refer to distinct entities external to the mind, but which do not actually appear, and yet can be imagined as appearing to ourselves as we are, or as we should be if we were endowed with higher powers of sense-perception. Amongst such phenomena would be the “ether” and the “coagulating nebulae” of Mr. Balfour.

By “internal phenomena,” I would denote feelings and perceptions which we do not refer to distinct entities external to the mind and external to our own body. Reminiscences of past sensations and sense perceptions, appearances which may be produced by pressure on the eyeball, smells and tastes which are but subjective affections, “singing in the ears,” rheumatic pains, those of colic, cramps, etc., are examples of phenomena of this kind. As these may be actually felt or subsequently imagined, they also may be subdivided into (a) “real,” and (b) “imaginary.”

Our thoughts about our own continuous existence, necessary truths, the soul separated from the body, about angels and devils and about God, are none of them phenomena, because they can never be imagined, though the various mental images (*phantasmata*), by and through which¹ such unimaginable thoughts may be sustained before the intellect, are, of course, but so many different internal phenomena. Professor Huxley quotes² his own words in a former publication saying: “To all these mental phenomena, or states of consciousness, Descartes gave the name of ‘thoughts,’ etc.” But as, according to him, we can know nothing but phenomena, it was necessary for him either so to designate his thoughts, or else to commit the absurdity of saying that his thoughts were things he did not and could never by any possibility know.³

¹ See our article entitled “Science in Fetters,” in the *Dublin Review*, for January and July, 1895.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 557.

³ It is very interesting, and it should awaken the reader's sympathy for the late Professor Huxley, to note how he fell a victim to the influence, first of Sir William Hamilton, and subsequently of Mansel. He quotes (p. 534), a passage of the former writer (first read by him in the year 1840), which, he tells us, so far as he was concerned, was “the original spring of agnosticism,” and he describes the thrill of pleasure he felt when, many years later, he first read Mansel's *Limits of Religious Thought*.

It is also interesting to know, and it is only just to call attention to the fact, that Prof. Huxley in his earlier days was attracted by Hamilton's rhetoric in favor of a theistic belief, which he (Hamilton) taught, was implied by the very limitations of human knowledge, as he depicted it, and that Prof. Huxley was (p. 535) as ready as Hamilton himself, to forget his own warnings, to confuse the necessities of thought with the obligations of things, and, by positivising nescience, pretend, under the guise of faith, to the possession of knowledge. But riper years brought rooted dislike to the lan-

In the same note wherein Mr. Balfour explains his use of the term phenomena, he is careful to restate what was the subject of the first chapter of his "Defence of Philosophic Doubt," namely, the signification he assigns to the two terms "Philosophy" and "Metaphysics."

By the former he means any study or exposition of the *grounds* of belief or disbelief in any proposition as distinguished from the consideration of the *causes* or *antecedents* which may have produced it. "Thus," he tell us (p. 7), "the philosophy of religion or the philosophy of science would mean the theoretic justification of our theological or scientific beliefs."

As to metaphysics, on the other hand, he affirms that he usually means "the knowledge that we have or suppose ourselves to have respecting realities which are not phenomenal, *e.g.*, God and the soul."

Having now, we think, sufficiently noted Mr. Balfour's preliminary observations and certain points we deem indispensable for a comprehension of his work and our treatment of it, we will proceed to examine its first part which deals with ethics, æsthetic and

guage, and distrust of Hamilton's dialectic process. He then adds the following passage, which we think most valuable and quite true: "It seems to me that the admission of a state of mind intermediate between knowledge and no-knowledge is fatal to all clear thought, and holds the door open to the return of one or other of the many forms of the absolute which Hamilton took so much trouble to expel. There is no intermediation between a right line and a bent line; however slight may be the deviation of the latter, it is not straight. There is nothing intermediate between darkness and light; the merest glimmer of twilight is as much not-darkness as broad sunshine." This does not affirm that we have no such thing as partial knowledge—a knowledge true but inadequate to give us a full acquaintance with the thing known. The importance of the cause which Mr. Balfour champions is very distinctly admitted by Prof. Huxley. He says (p. 530): "The future of our civilization as certainly depends on the result of the contest between science and ecclesiasticism which is now afoot, as the present state of things is the outcome of former strife. . . . For it is by opinion that men always have been, and always must be, governed since force, their obvious and immediate master, is but opinion's bully." He also adds the significant words (p. 531): "Force no longer waits upon the orders of only one of the combatants: the heretofore weaker has become strong, and is daily growing in power."

This we very much doubt. Reaction against the folly of sensism and its consequences is everywhere in the air, and one evidence thereof has been afforded by the late Parliamentary election. The "reaction" so dreaded while its imminence is proclaimed by Karl Pearson will, we are confident, be brought about, not by any special dexterity, political or ecclesiastical, but by the judgment of the mass of the people when their eyes are once opened to the nature and consequences of that absurd mode of thought called "naturalism" or "sensism." The healthy normal human mind recoils with aversion from teachers who, in order to undermine religion, deny that we can know each event to need an adequate cause, that a thing cannot both be and not be, that a whole must be greater than its part, that conclusions logically drawn from certain premises must be accurate, that our faculty of memory is trustworthy, and even that we have a most certain knowledge of our continued personal existence. (See our article entitled *Professing Themselves to Be Wise They Became Fools*, in the AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW for April, 1891.)

reason (in Mr. Balfour's sense) in their relation to "naturalism," which is entitled, as we before stated, "Some Consequences of Belief."

This is the special section of assault, directly destructive, with suggestions towards reconstruction. It is as remarkable for the charm of its style as for its dialectic acuteness, while the richness of its humor and the sparkle of its wit are not less remarkable than the polished courtesy of even its most sarcastic passages. Seldom have we read anything more thoroughly enjoyable than the first four chapters of Mr. Balfour's second work, which, in our opinion, triumphantly demolishes the whole sensist system—above all, in its relation to morality—by an unanswerable *reductio ad absurdum*.

Its first chapter is entitled "Naturalism and Ethics," and therein he forcibly draws out the inevitable tendencies of such systems as those of Herbert Spencer, Huxley, and their allies, on the morals of mankind.

He begins by noticing the remarkable unanimity with which the majority of the professors of the most diverse speculative views inculcate not only obedience but also attachment to our generally received moral ideals and precepts, a fact which suggests¹ that at least some of them in their speculations

Have taken current morality for granted, and have squared their proofs to their conclusions, and not their conclusions to their proofs.

His first object is to call attention to certain questions relating to the origin of morality on the naturalistic system since, men being what they are, a moral code to be effective must be revered, and this feeling of reverence cannot be wholly independent of the source and origin from which such code may have sprung. But according to naturalism, life, sensation, thought and, therefore, moral perceptions, form but a petty and passing episode in the history of the universe, as also do all our sentiments and desires. In Mr. Balfour's words:²

On most of the processes by which consciousness and life are maintained in the individual and perpetuated in the race we are never consulted. . . . But in the few and simple instances in which our co-operation is required, it is obtained through the stimulus supplied by appetite and disgust, pleasure and pain, instinct, reason and morality; it is hard to see, on the naturalistic hypothesis, whence any one of these various natural agents is to derive a dignity or a consideration not shared by all the others, why morality should be put above appetite or reason above pleasure.

It is true that many sensists have moral "tastes," but then their tastes and creed are antagonistic; for, according to the latter, tastes

¹ P. 12.

² Pp. 14-15.

have but been evolved by "natural selection," because their existence has been an advantage, not to the individual (often the reverse), but to the race. The very existence of such expressions as "noble" and "base" is exclusively (if Darwinism is true) due to such a cause.

Nature, indifferent to our happiness, indifferent to our morals, but sedulous of our survival, commends disinterested virtue to our practice by decking it out in all the splendor which the specifically ethical sentiments alone are capable of supplying. . . . Kant compared the moral law to the starry heavens and found them both sublime. It would on the naturalistic hypothesis be more appropriate to compare it to the protective blotches on the beetle's back, and to find them both ingenious.

Of course, our author is far from denying, indeed he asserts, that in spite of all theories men will long retain the moral lessons received in childhood :

But if, while they are being taught the supremacy of conscience and the austere majesty of duty, they are also to be taught that these sentiments and beliefs are merely samples of the complicated contrivances, many of them mean, and many of them disgusting, wrought into the physical or into the social organism by the shaping forces of selection and elimination, assuredly much of the efficacy of these moral lessons will be destroyed.¹

With respect to free will, apart from the question of the truth of its existence, it has plainly been of the greatest service in producing a keen sense of responsibility, and therefore, in modifying a multitude of human actions. Without it remorse, self-condemnation, and repentance, would be but amiable weaknesses and essentially absurd, though the facility with which men ignore the consequences of their own accepted theories, would, of course, mitigate the evil results of the naturalistic creed.

It is plain that between the dicta of Naturalism as to the origin of ethics and our moral sentiments, there is a striking incongruity. Is the incongruity less between what it tells of the final goal of human endeavor and our perceptions of what is equitable and right? Are such perceptions satisfied, when we view the world as it is and accept the doctrine of Naturalism, which denies the existence of future rewards and punishments? Are they satisfied with such an object as the perfection and felicity of the whole sentient creation? Is such an end emotionally adequate to satisfy our ethical imagination? Is its importance sustained and augmented by Naturalism? On the contrary: it tends constantly to dwarf, more and more, our estimate of man's importance. Mr. Balfour well depicts its teaching in this respect :²

We survey the past, and see that it is a history of blood and tears, of helpless blun-

¹ Pp. 17-19.

² P. 30.

dering, of wild revolt, of stupid acquiescence, of empty aspirations. We sound the future, and learn that after a period, long compared with the individual life, but short indeed compared with the divisions of time open to our investigation, the energies of our system will decay, the glory of the sun will be dimmed, and the earth, tideless and inert, will no longer tolerate the race which has for a moment disturbed its solitude. Man will go down into the pit, and all his thoughts will perish. The uneasy consciousness, which in this obscure corner has for a brief space broken the contented silence of the universe, will be at rest. Matter will know itself no longer. Imperishable monuments and immortal deeds, death itself, and love stronger than death, will be as though they had never been. Nor will anything that *is* be better or worse for all that the labor, genius, devotion, and suffering of men have striven through countless generations to effect. "Though the substance of the moral law need suffer no change . . . [that] is irrelevant. We desire, and desire most passionately, when we are most ourselves, to give our service to that which is Universal, and to that which is Abiding. Of what moment is it, then (from this point of view), to be assured of the fixity of the moral law, when it and the entire sentient world, where alone it has any significance, are alike destined to vanish utterly. . . . We may well feel inclined to ask, whether so transitory and so unimportant an accident, in the general scheme of things, as the fortunes of the human race, can any longer satisfy aspirations and emotions nourished upon beliefs in the Everlasting and Divine."

Excellent as Mr. Balfour's reasoning and rhetoric are, while thus combating Naturalism on the ground of its inconsistency with, and fatal tendency against, what all reasonable men most venerate and prize, his appeal, on the whole, is rather to our sentiments and our needs than to our evident ethical intuitions.

The fact is interesting because this method is in harmony with his contentions in other portions of the work. Nevertheless, it would be very unjust to him to be anything less than quite certain that he is as much in harmony with Catholic philosophy in this matter as any upholder of his sceptical system can well be. This is abundantly evident from the appendix to his work on "*Philosophic Doubt*,"¹ wherein he so well shows that moral perceptions can never have been evolved by or founded on experience, since the propositions which lie at the root of our ethical system must themselves be ethical. Moreover, he has declared in the beginning of this first chapter² that his business in it is not "to examine the philosophy of morals, but to show that the origin naturalism assigns to moral precepts and sentiments entirely nullifies them." As he has said,³ though the origin of ultimate beliefs never can supply grounds for believing them because such origin must be inferred, it is nevertheless quite possible that some origin assigned to them may, if accepted, furnish logical grounds for doubting or disbelieving them. And of the origin which "naturalism" assigns them—namely, complex waves of ether and vibrations of

¹ See *ante*, p. 23, note.

² P. 12.

³ *Defence of Philosophic Doubt*, p. 275.

atoms and molecules—our author well shows the complete absurdity.

Mr. Balfour's second chapter is called *Naturalism and Æsthetic*. Therein he presents us with his conclusions as to the logical outcome of the system of naturalism when applied to our perception of beauty. He assumes that whereas morality has (on that system) been developed by the "natural selection" of feelings beneficial to the tribe, sentiments known as æsthetic must, on the other hand (inasmuch as they are useless in occasioning survival), have been mere by-products of the great machinery by which varying organisms have been selected and preserved.

Choosing, then, as an example, our æsthetic enjoyment of music, he very rationally contends that however much "sexual selection" may have increased the fervor of male animals' power of making appropriate noises and improved their vocal apparatus to that end, it could never have increased the artistic side of such sensibilities, and, we may add, could certainly never have initiated them.

How, he asks, does the fact that our ancestors liked the tomtom,¹ account for our liking the ninth symphony?

As to the question of the objectivity of beauty, he urges the great divergences in taste which exist amongst mankind and their frequent and great mutability. That critics often agree, he tells us,² is explicable because

An agreement . . . is to no small extent an agreement in statement and analysis, rather than an agreement in feeling; they have the same opinion as to the cooking of the dinner, but they by no means all eat it with the same relish.

"Naturalism" evidently, as he contends, is irreconcilable with anything objective in beauty, and its advocates scout the idea that æsthetic sentiments are anything more than merely subjective feelings, modified by convention and fashion. Yet Mr. Balfour urges:³

When we look back on those too rare moments when feelings stirred in us by some beautiful object not only seemed wholly to absorb us, but to raise us to the vision of things far above the ken of bodily sense or discursive reason. . . . We must believe that somewhere and for some being there shines an unchanging splendor of beauty, of which in nature and in art we see, each of us from our own standpoint, only passing gleams and stray reflections, whose different aspects we cannot now co-ordinate, whose import we cannot comprehend,⁴ but which at least is something other

¹ P. 38.

² P. 63.

³ P. 65.

⁴ The reader no doubt recollects the splendid passage of Cardinal Newman on this subject, written before he became a Catholic. It specially merits perusal in this connection. See *Sermons Before the University of Oxford*, Sermon XIV., p. 348.

than the chance play of subjective sensibility or the far-off echo of ancestral lusts. No such mystical creed can, however, be squeezed out of observation and experiment. Science cannot give it us; nor can it be forced into any sort of consistency with the naturalistic theory of the universe.

Science, so-called (that is "naturalism"), most certainly *cannot* give it us—for such beauty is but the chance occasion of a passing pleasurable feeling. But *rational* science no less certainly *can* do so. This we have elsewhere¹ endeavored to show. Mr. Balfour, however, does not distinguish between the nervous thrills which may accompany our æsthetic perceptions (and may also accompany much lower human activities) and intellectual apprehensions of the beauty of objects, states and actions. We have pointed out,² concerning our *idea* of the beauty of an object, that it is profoundly distinct from any corresponding *feelings*. To feel attracted towards, or very pleasurably excited by, any object is one thing; to have a conception of its beauty is another and very different thing.

As to the divergences of taste and the preferences of many persons for things which are æsthetically inferior, we argued that they might be accounted for by pleasurable or fanciful associations formed between the feelings and mental images which underlie and support the intellectual æsthetic perceptions.³

In his third chapter, "*Naturalism and Reason*," Mr. Balfour observes that some find compensation for the irrationality of reason in the thought that at least nature produced it, though accidentally, there being, of course, no such thing as design in nature. The inadequacy of reason—since it has been merely evolved for the preservation of the species—to satisfy speculative curiosity (a most curious by-product of evolution) is, by many persons, readily

¹ See *On Truth*, chapter xvii., pp 225–261, and also in the AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW, "Why Tastes Differ," January 1888, p. 12.

² *On Truth*, p. 255.

³ In our article *Why Tastes Differ* (A. C. Q. R., January, 1888, p. 27) we said: "We think it may be confidently affirmed, that such a being as man, replete with animal feelings and desires and dim, unconscious memories of ancestral brute experiences, but with an intellect endowed with a perception of truth, goodness and beauty, would hardly fail to show, in his tastes and perceptions, just those mingled and more or less discordant and varying mental phenomena which we find mankind do exhibit. . . . Tastes differ because we human, intellectual animals vary as to the peculiar influences we have received from parents, family and tribe, from the diverse associations and feelings to which we have been severally exposed, and from the action upon us of the tastes and feelings of our friends and fellow-tribesmen."

We venture to think this article constitutes a full reply to the objections of the sensists, and might do away with the difficulties which Mr. Balfour feels as to the evidence of the objectivity of beauty. We would refer our readers especially to pp. 24 and 14, and we are convinced much of the difficulty felt about this matter has been due to non-appreciation of our composite nature and the co-existence of our higher and lower psychical faculties.

acknowledged, but not so the inadequacy of our senses. But besides the limitations of those we have,

There must be countless aspects of external nature of which we have no knowledge, of which, owing to the absence of appropriate organs, we can form no conception, which imagination cannot picture nor language express. . . . To suppose that a course of development carried out, not with the object of extending knowledge, but solely with that of promoting life, on an area so insignificant as the surface of the earth, between limits of temperature and pressure so narrow, and under general conditions so exceptional, should have ended in supplying us with senses even approximately adequate to the apprehension of nature in all her complexities, is to believe in a coincidence more astounding than the most audacious novelist has ever employed to cut the knot of some entangled tale."

Our author points out the fact, familiar to every biologist, that the organic actions of the body are performed unconsciously by reflex action, sensory-motor action¹ and instinct. The best way of looking at reason, according to "naturalism" (and according to Herbert Spencer), is to regard it as an instrument for securing a flexibility of adaptation which instinct cannot attain to.

Instinct is incomparably the better machine in every respect save one. It works more smoothly, with less friction, with far greater precision and accuracy, but it is not adaptable. Many generations and much slaughter are required to breed it into a race. Once acquired, it can be modified or expelled only by the same harsh and tedious methods. Mind, on the other hand, from the point of view of organic evolution, may be considered as an inherited faculty for self-adjustment, and though, as I have already had occasion to note, the limits within which such adjustment is permitted are exceedingly narrow, within those limits it is, doubtless, exceedingly valuable. . . . But if the conscious adaptation of means to ends was always necessary in order to perform even those few functions for the first performance of which conscious adaptation was originally required, life would be frittered away in doing badly, but with deliberation, a small fraction of that which we now do well without any deliberation at all.²

Thus by the formation of habits, "attention and intelligence are set free to do work from which they would otherwise be deterred by their absorption in the petty needs of daily existence."³

Yet this "formation of habits" must, on the principles of naturalism, be a first step towards the actual destruction of conscious deliberate activity according as natural selection forces men to be

¹ See *On Truth*, p. 168.

² P. 73.

³ On this point we formerly (*On Truth*, 1888, p. 363) expressed ourselves as follows: "It is, moreover, very fortunate for us that such is the case, as thereby we are saved great mental friction. Our intellect has first to be laboriously applied to learn what afterwards becomes almost automatic—as is the case with reading and writing. Sensations and bodily actions having been duly kneaded together, the intellect becomes free to withdraw and apply itself to other work, leaving the organism to carry on automatically, and with little effort, the new powers acquired by a great effort. Were it not for this power which we have of withdrawing our attention, our intellect would be absorbed and wasted on the merest routine work, instead of being set free to appropriate and render practically instructive a continually wider and more important range of deliberate, purposive action."

more and more conformed to their environment, till, as Mr. Spencer teaches, and Mr. Balfour says :

The reign of absolute righteousness will prevail; conscience, grown unnecessary, will be dispensed with; the path of least resistance will be the path of virtue. He adds: "But I confess that my own personal gratification at the prospect is somewhat dimmed by the reflection that the same kind of causes which make conscience superfluous will relieve us from the necessity of intellectual effort, and that by the time we are all perfectly good we shall also be all perfectly idiotic."

Such a state of things, however, would evidently bring upon us so much loss of adaptability to new circumstances that these might become fatal to the whole community. Our only hope would then repose upon those individuals who had, fortunately, remained less virtuous, and so, not having become altruistically idiotic were able, on such conditions as might suit them, to save society from destruction.

Mr. Balfour professes himself¹ as

Sensibly poorer by this deposition of reason from its ancient position as the ground of all existence, to that of an expedient, among other expedients, for the maintenance of organic life; an expedient, moreover, which is temporary in its character and insignificant in its effects. An irrational universe which accidentally turns out a few reasoning animals at one corner of it, as a rich man may experiment . . . with some curious "sport" accidentally produced amongst his flocks and herds, is a universe which we might well despise if we did not ourselves share its degradation.

In his next and fourth chapter, headed *Summary and Conclusion of Part I.*, the results arrived at in the three preceding chapters are very forcibly driven home and we think our readers will be grateful to us for furnishing them with some rather copious extracts therefrom.

The great result arrived at he expresses as follows:²

If naturalism be true, or rather, if it be the whole truth, then is morality but a bare catalogue of utilitarian precepts; beauty but the chance occasion of a passing pleasure; reason but the dim passage from one set of unthinking habits to another. All that gives dignity to life, all that gives value to effort, shrinks and fades under the pitiless glare of a creed like this.

As to æsthetics, he reminds us of what "naturalism" declares, but adds how certain it is we cannot accept without suffering the conviction that in referring beauty to an eternal and unchanging reality, we are but the dupes of our emotions.

But if, on the naturalistic hypothesis, he adds,³ the sentiments associated with beauty seem like a poor jest played on us by Nature for no apparent purpose, those that gather round morality are, so to speak, deliberate frauds perpetrated for a well-defined end. The consciousness of freedom, the sense of responsibility, the authority of con-

¹ P. 75.

² P. 77.

³ P. 79.

science, the beauty of holiness, the admiration for self-devotion, the sympathy with suffering—these and all the train of beliefs and feelings from which spring noble deeds and generous ambitions are seen to be mere devices for securing to societies, if not to individuals, some competitive advantage in the struggle for existence. They are not worse, but neither are they better, than the thousand-and-one appetites and instincts, many of them cruel and many of them disgusting, created by similar causes in order to carry out through all organic nature the like unprofitable ends.

The feeling of discord to which such considerations as these must give rise, are, he tells us,¹ due to our intellectual vision having grown out of proportion to our actual circumstances and been enormously increased by recent scientific discovery.

We have learned too much: We are educated above that position in life in which it has pleased Nature to place us. We can no longer accept it without criticism and without examination. We insist on interrogating that material system which, according to naturalism, is the true author of our being, as to whence we came and whither we go, what are the causes which have made us what we are, and what are the purposes which our existence subserves. And it must be confessed that the answers given to this question by an oracle are extremely unsatisfactory. We have learned to measure space, and we perceive that our dwelling place is but a mere point, wandering with its companions, apparently at random, through a wilderness of stars. We have learned to measure time, and we perceive that the life not merely of the individual and of the nation, but of the whole race is brief, and apparently quite unimportant. We have learned to unravel causes, and we perceive that emotions and aspirations whose very being seem to hang on the existence of realities of which naturalism takes no account, are in their origin contemptible, and in their suggestion mendacious.

To me it appears certain that this clashing between beliefs and feelings must ultimately prove fatal to one or the other. Make what allowance you please for the stupidity of mankind, take the fullest account of their really remarkable power of letting their speculative opinions follow one line of development and their practical ideals another, yet the time must come when reciprocal action will perforce bring opinions and ideals into some kind of agreement and congruity. If, then, naturalism is to hold the field, the feelings and opinions inconsistent with naturalism must be foredoomed to suffer change; and how, when that change shall come about, it can do otherwise than cast all nobility out of our conception of conduct and all worth out of our conception of life, I am totally unable to understand.

To the objection that so many persons who hold naturalistic views lead irreproachable lives he replies by comparing them to so many parasites. If their conduct is practically consistent with ethical ideals with which their creed has no affinity, it is because²

their spiritual life is parasitic: it is sheltered by convictions that do not belong to them, but to the society of which they form a part; it is nourished by processes in which they take no share, and when those processes come to an end, the alien life which they have maintained can scarce be expected to outlast them.

One other and final quotation we must make before bringing to a conclusion our notice of the first part of Mr. Balfour's work. In it he further makes manifest what he understands by "natural-

¹ P. 80.

² P. 83.

ism," with his concluding reflections on the consequences which he believes must follow therefrom. By the letter A he denotes the ordinary philosophico-religious opinions common amongst us, while B signifies the teaching of naturalism as Mr. Balfour understands it.

A. The universe is the creation of reason, and all things work together towards a reasonable end.

B. So far as we are concerned, reason is to be found neither in the beginning of things nor in their end; and though everything is predetermined, nothing is preordained.

A. Creative reason is interfused with infinite love.

B. As reason is absent, so also is love. The universal flux is ordered by blind causation alone.

A. There is a moral law, immutable, eternal; in its governance all spirits find their true freedom and their most perfect realization. Though it be adequate to infinite goodness and infinite intelligence, it may be understood, even by a man, sufficiently for his guidance.

B. Among the causes by which the course of organic and social development has been blindly determined are pains, pleasures, instincts, appetites, disgusts, religions, moralities, superstitions; the sentiment of what is noble and intrinsically worthy; the sentiment of what is ignoble and intrinsically worthless. From a purely scientific point of view these all stand on an equality; all are action-producing causes developed, not to improve, but simply to perpetuate the species.

A. In the possession of reason and in the enjoyment of beauty we, in some remote way, share the nature of that infinite personality in whom we live and move and have our being.

B. Reason is but the psychological expression of certain physiological processes in the cerebral hemispheres; it is no more than an expedient among many expedients by which the individual and the race are preserved, just as beauty is no more than the name for such varying and accidental attributes of the material or moral world as may happen for the moment to stir our æsthetic feelings.

A. Every human soul is of infinite value, eternal, free; no human being, therefore, is so placed as not to have within his reach, in himself and others, objects adequate to infinite endeavor.

B. The individual perishes; the race itself does not endure. Few can flatter themselves that their conduct has any effect whatever upon its remoter destinies; and, of those few, none can say with reasonable assurance that the effect which they are destined to produce is the one they desire. Even if we were free, therefore, our ignorance would make us helpless; and it may be almost a consolation to reflect that our conduct was determined for us by the distribution of unthinking forces in pre-solar æons, and that, if we are impotent to foresee its consequences, we were not less impotent to arrange its causes.

The doctrines embodied in the second member of each of these alternatives may be true, or may, at least, represent the nearest approach to truth of which we are at present capable. Into this question I do not yet inquire. But, if they are to constitute the dogmatic scaffolding by which our educational system is to be supported; if it is to be in harmony with principles like these that the child is to be taught at its mother's knee, and the young man is to build up the ideals of his life, then, unless I greatly mistake, it will be found that the inner discord which exists, and which must gradually declare itself, between the emotions proper to naturalism and those which have actually grown up under the shadow of traditional convictions, will, at no distant date, most unpleasantly translate itself into practice.

Such is Mr. Balfour's first part. It is an admirable attack on

Sensism,¹ and an excellent demonstration of its folly by the process of *reductio ad absurdum*. If Naturalism was veracious, all inquiry after what is good or beautiful or true would be an absurdity. Our conviction that we are free and responsible is pathetic or ludicrous, according to the temper with which we regard it; morality is a fraud, and reason itself but a transitory passage from one set of unthinking habits to another. Nevertheless, excellent as is the book we are examining, that strong tendency which, as we shall plainly see later on, impels Mr. Balfour to appeal to impulse, feeling, and opinion, rather than to the solid ground of evident certitude, is already apparent. Hereafter, we hope (following the tradition of Catholic philosophy) to show how the inestimable truths for which he contends repose on a far more solid foundation than he provides for them.

Our second part will be devoted to the examination of the "Reasons for Belief," which Mr. Balfour has drawn out, and his representations as to certain philosophical systems.

ST. GEORGE MIVART.

¹ Such readers as may care to peruse a further enforcement of Mr. Balfour's arguments, are referred to our article entitled "*Spencer versus Balfour*," in the *Nineteenth Century* for August, 1895.

EPISCOPAL ELECTIONS.

FORMER PRACTICES ; MODERN DISCIPLINE.

I.—The rules of the Council of Baltimore are based on the traditions of ecclesiastical antiquity—The Sovereign Pontiff immediately or indirectly has always exercised his authority in episcopal elections—First appointment made by Christ and his apostles—The people had afterwards a certain rôle in the choice of bishops—This rôle was not so considerable as is generally supposed ; it was especially one of consultors—Why so many divergences in its interpretation—Information given by the documents of the first four centuries—Electoral power of provincial bishops—“*Docendus est populus, non sequendus*”—Still there existed another principle—“*Nullus in vitis detur Episcopus*” ; traces of its continuance to this day—Reflections on the wisdom of the Church—In fine, the word “electio,” has, in ancient writers, several distinct senses.

II.—The *Honorati* soon replace the common people—13th canon of the collection of Laodicea—Strange religious phenomena produced by the change of worship in the old Roman city—The great families nurseries of bishops—Governmental interference—The emperors usurp the choice of prelates of the most important sees—Some bishops, to avoid the danger of an interregnum, thought they could choose and consecrate their successor—There is no historical foundation for the assertion that the Popes had no right to reserve to themselves elections—Why they seem to have at first taken no part in them—They asserted from time to time their authority—Powerful argument of Pius VI. against the Febronian objections.

III.—How the Popes were led to reserve to themselves episcopal elections—Interference of the Visigoth kings in church matters in Spain—Similar conduct of the Merovingians in Gaul—The Carolingians follow the same way—A few words on the quarrel about investitures—Fruitless attempt to introduce a new method of election—The cathedral chapters—Influence of secular princes also prevents the advantages of this method—Clever and prudent policy of pontifical reservations—The Councils of Constance and Bâle try to hinder it—Mute struggles between the papacy and royalty—Understanding come to through Concordats.

IV.—Various forms of discipline—Specially advantageous conditions of the United States—A few words of the procedure followed here for episcopal appointments—This system safeguards the ancient rights of the Church, and avoids the abuses shown by experience—Proofs of this assertion—Nobility of the Roman Church ; its practical knowledge of ecclesiastical antiquity.—*Ubi Petrus, ibi Ecclesia.*

IN the Catholic Church there are several points of discipline which are fixed and unalterable, because they are of divine right, and of Christ's own institution. There are others, which vary according to the times, because the Divine Author of the Church left it to herself to take into account the ever changing vicissitudes of human society, the progress of civilization, and the needs and requirements of succeeding ages. To a hierarchy strongly organized and deeply imbued with His spirit and His teaching, He entrusted the delicate task of adapting the Church's discipline to the wants of the moment.

No more striking example of what we assert can be found than in the history of the episcopacy. A sacred order, ranking higher

than the priesthood, with powers of jurisdiction and with authority partially sovereign—although controlled by a central administration, which, in view of the general good determines the extent of its action—the episcopacy instituted by Jesus Christ, and ever remaining the same, has, however, been conferred in various ways in different ages of the Church. The reason of this changing discipline is to bring it more in touch with the spirit of the times and the needs of the faithful.

The late Council of Baltimore,¹ confirmed by papal decree in 1885, fixed a very prudent and far-reaching ordinance with regard to the election of bishops. Like all disciplinary decisions of the Church, these laws although in some respects new, are not, however, innovations nor without canonical precedent. The Church does not like changes; it loves to model its action on the traditional past, and even when it has to modify its discipline so as to meet some pressing local need, or satisfy some national tendency, it never loses sight of its old methods, and tries to engraft the new practices it adopts on the time-honored usages of the past, and above all, to preserve the *spirit* which influenced it in any particular line of action. The present case is an example of this. In the choice of bishops for this country, the Church revived the old system of election, but, while adopting the principle, every precaution is taken to guard against its abuse. Later on we shall see how, while even giving some liberty to secular interference, it has scrupulously guarded against the danger of allowing anything to destroy or diminish the authority of the central organization.

To understand thoroughly the laws which actually govern episcopal nominations in the United States, we shall take a rapid survey of the past history of the Church, dwelling with preference on the early ages of Christianity, since it is there, especially, that our separated brethren try to find arguments and objections against our present discipline.

Without canonical election and papal institution, no one would ever dream of assuming the title or performing the duties of a bishop. In our present paper we propose to consider exclusively the first of these two conditions, and treat the question of canonical election.

The Catholic Church recognizes as a fundamental principle that it is for the Sovereign Pontiff to meet the needs of our holy religion by appointing to the different regions or circumscriptions known as dioceses, spiritual heads, or pastors, called bishops, either by his own immediate selection, or by establishing rules to guide others in making such a choice. This principle is based on

¹ *Concil. Plenar. Baltim. III.*, tit. 2, No. 15.

solid arguments, and it is not without good reason that it is universally accepted. Here, as in many similar cases, we cannot do better than to go to the source of all information, and see how Christ acted, and how his immediate followers understood him and imitated him. Did not Christ himself choose his apostles? "Non vos me elegistis, sed ego elegi vos, et posui vos" They in turn appointed bishops in virtue of the apostolic authority which they shared with Peter, through whom it was to be transmitted to the Roman bishops, Peter's successors in the headship of the Church. There was no semblance of secular interference then. The pagan magistrates, both civil and imperial, were in no way interested. From the beginning, then, we see the hierarchy specially set apart for the election of the bishops. An impartial investigation of the succeeding ages of the Church will bring to light no other principle and no other practice. Guided, then, by the light of history, let us draw our own conclusions.

We do not intend our assertion to be so sweeping as to exclude the entire diocesan family from all participation in the selection of its head.

For the first eight centuries at least, and in some countries even for a longer time, the faithful took a more or less active part and had a sort of suffrage in the nomination of bishops. It is certain that this secular interference had no other object and was permitted for no other end than to aid the preliminary inquiry in removing all candidates deemed unworthy, either from some hidden crime, or from some unknown disqualification. Laymen were not the only advisers of the bishops in these matters; the earliest records show us how much more important was the action of the inferior clergy; but we have no warrant for ascribing to either, anything more than a purely deliberative influence¹ in the ordinary course of Episcopal nominations. Individual cases of violence or local revolutions are not to be confounded with existing discipline nor to be considered as such. Above both clergy and laity is the real power that acts, if not always with absolute independence, at least with an unquestioned inherent right. This power is that of the Provincial bishops united in synod under the presidentship of the metropolitan, and this body having heard the wishes and examined into the reasons of the faithful, determine upon the ad-

¹ Thomassin very aptly resumes this discipline in the following terms: "Eligebant Episcopi testimonio suo, plebs eam electionem approbabat, atque ita et ipsa eligebat. Plusculum etiam momenti erat in suffragio cleri quam populi testimonio. Sed utrique imminebat autoritas Episcoporum synodice ibi collectorum, vota cleri, testimonia populi audientium, librantium, nunc probantium, alias improbantium, suo denique iudicio et arbitrato rem conficiendum."—Thomassin, *Vetus et Nova Ecclesiæ disciplina*, p. ii., lib. i., cap. i., No. 2.

mission or rejection of a candidate according to their own conscience and the virtue of their own authority.

It is often a matter of astonishment to see the very widely diverging interpretation of the documents of antiquity which bear on the question of Episcopal elections. If we listen to the followers of the Reformation, or to some adherents of the Gallicans or Jansenists, we should be inclined to leave the dogmatical theory as a still controverted point, and to assert that it has no historical documents to strengthen or maintain it. Let us not hope to find in history more than it can give. It is for us to make the most of what is handed down to us, by a careful grouping, close comparison and scientific analysis of all the references and allusions it furnishes us. It is not necessary to remind our readers that the ecclesiastical language of the early Church had an infancy and a development, so we cannot expect to find it, at every stage, of the same technical precision that it has in our days; and again, that the observance and enforcement of the laws of the Church were hindered by geographical and political difficulties, which we can hardly conceive in the altered conditions of our modern society. All this must be carefully considered and kept in view, if we wish the past to be a guide to lead us to the truth, and not a misunderstood accumulation of facts, which will invariably lead us astray. Premising this, and taking into consideration the circumstances of the times, we can assert that for the first four centuries of the Church's history, there is to be found no positive enactment and no weight of evidence sufficiently strong, to warrant our calling in question the theory of the Pope's authority in episcopal nominations. But our opponents appeal to history, and would fain have us see examples of secular interference everywhere. Well, certainly, the people took no part in the Apostles' selection of the first bishops. And if there is frequent mention of the people in connection with subsequent appointments, is there a single scrap of evidence to show that they were electors, or even that they had any weight in the elections? The contrary is borne out by all the documentary evidence of the time, and from the best records we can safely come to the following conclusions: There are laws governing these elections; laws clear, formal and well defined, but all concern the action of the bishops of the province in the selection of their future colleague. Later on we shall examine their right to vote. As to the people we find nothing definite, nothing uniform, nothing absolute. The sacred authority of the bishops perpetuated by a kind of mutual selection and brought about by the choice of other bishops almost required the electors to take into consideration the wishes of the people. From that arose the custom of consulting the faithful about their future pastor. And

if, as it frequently happened, the new bishop was chosen among the local priests,¹ it was only natural to make inquiries into his character, abilities, zeal and sanctity, from those best qualified to give reliable information. An investigation was ordered,² but frequently all the desired information came unsolicited. Very often the names of the most fitting candidates were proposed, thus facilitating the election. The alleged admissions of St. Cyprian, which some try to exaggerate into a difficulty against the present discipline, do not amount to anything when considered in this light.³

But as every one knows, public opinion is a very fickle standard, changing, uncertain, unreliable. In the frequent clash of parties, in the outbursts of passing enthusiasm, some calm reflection is needed to see through conflicting reports and determine the value of opposing claims, and the fitness of different procedures. This was the duty of the official electors. A check was needed to moderate the ardor of the unthinking, to control the passions of the ignorant and to keep within bounds the selfish aims of clique and caucus. For, if the Church, which makes itself all to all for the sake of humanity, takes into consideration the temporal and transitory concerns of its children, still, it must never forget and never force into the background the only interests worthy of the name and worthy of the Church—the interests that are eternal. Hence, then, after hearing all the considerations proffered and heedless of all influence, and undue pressure, the electors in virtue of their rights and privileges, determine on the fitting one to be bishop. “*Docendus est populus non sequendus*,” was the terse remark of

¹ Tradition favored the choice of a bishop in the vacant diocese itself. Pope Celestine writing to the bishops of the Province of Vienne and Narbonne in 428, gives the following advice (*Cf. Jaffé, No. 152; Coustant, Ep. R. P., c. 1065*). “*Tunc alter de alterâ eligatur Ecclesiâ, si de civitatis ipsius cui est episcopus ordinandus, nullus dignus (quod evenire non credimus), poterit inveniri. Primum enim illi reprobandi sunt ut aliqui de alienis Ecclesiis non merito praeferantur. Habet unusquisque clericorum suae fructum militiae in Ecclesiâ in qua suam per omnia officia transegit aetatem.*”

² That is all that can be drawn from the famous text of St. Cyprian, *Ep.* 68, Migne, *P. L.*, v. iii., p. 1027, No. v. To prevent the election of an unworthy candidate, says the saint, “*diligenter de traditione divinâ et Apostolicâ traditione observandum est, et tenendum, quod apud nos quoque et ferè per provincias universas tenetur, ut ad ordinationes ritè celebrandas, ad eam plebem cui praepositus ordinatur, episcopi ejusdem provinciae proximi quique convenient, et episcopus eligatur plebe praesenti quæ singulorum vitam plenissime novit et uniuscujusque actum de ejus conversatione per-spexit.*”

³ “*Dixit quidem Cyprianus primariam potestatem eligendi dignos et repudiandi indignos episcopatu, penes populum esse sed his verbis non significatur nisi conscientia et testimonium populi cui potissimum explorata sunt vel virtutum insignia, vel vita eorum qui candidati sunt S. S. dignitatum. Multa fallunt episcopos, quæ plebem non fallunt, sive in vitio, sive in laude posita privatorum gesta. Hac ergò libertate, imò et hac necessitate denudandi quæque quisque resciet de moribus et factis eorum qui ad episcopatum invitabantur, videbatur electio in plebis potestate esse.*”—Thomassin, *op. cit.*, p. ii., lib. i., cap. i., No. 3.

Celestine to the Bishops of Apulia,¹ a saying which gives us the true inner meaning of a thought only too often liable to be overstrained and misunderstood.

We may go still further. Not only were the bishops elected without this kind of popular consent which we have described, but it often happened that all secular interference was rejected and totally discarded. Was not this the case, when St. Cyprian himself tells us,² that the votes of even absent bishops were made to play a part at election times? We have here the example of the bishops of a province making known by letter the subject of their choice, and forwarding their vote several days, if not weeks, before the public opinion found expression. Here at least the faithful had little influence on votes recorded in that way, and in a system of suffrage which sanctioned such a practice. The Council of Nice tells us that such was the usual procedure, another proof, if needed, of the very secondary rôle taken by laymen in the matter of episcopal elections. So true is this, that we have instances on record, of the people rising up against an unpopular pastor selected for them by the metropolitan, in defiance of their wishes.³ A very subtle distinction is introduced here. The validity of the election was entirely independent of the people, but the acceptance of the bishop elect, was, even after his consecration, left in a measure to the good will of the diocesans. This was not, it is true, so much a right as a prudent concession made to popular feeling in view of preventing scandal and averting discussions. The facts are there. We have Celestine I. positively forbidding the French bishops from imposing an unpopular candidate on a diocese, alleging the decrees of preceding councils as the grounds for his action. "Nullus invitis detur episcopus." This principle still holds good. Although far from wishing to cater to the ever-changing desires of the masses, still the Church is ever on the alert so as not to cause any needless irritation nor wound any reasonable susceptibility. Thus in a newly conquered country, acquired and held by force of arms, it would be to go contrary to public opinion to appoint as bishop an openly avowed partisan of the conquerors, while at the same time it would be equally imprudent and a danger to the public peace, as well as a slur on the invaders, to select any unyielding factotum of the old *régime*. The same rule holds good after great intestine strife and social upheavals. The principle of "nullus invitis" accommodates itself to times and to surroundings, the same spirit directs its numerous applications. We see in this a reason, why the Sovereign Pontiff keeps up friendly relations

¹ Epist. 3, *Dist.*, lxii., can. 2.

² S. Cyprianus, Ep. 6. Migne, *P. L.*, *loc. cit.*

³ *Cf. Concilium Aceranum* an. 314, can. 18.—Labbe, iv., p. 519.

with schismatical, heretical, and even Mahometan governments, and tries by every means in his power, such as special delegations, frequent interchange of letters with the official and officious representatives of these governments, to secure their friendly interference in the filling of vacant sees. Coming down more closely to our present subject we shall see that the weight attached to the demands of the people does not, in any way, constitute them voters, or give them the rights of suffrage. Celestine puts the matter clearly when he says, "*Nullus . . . detur episcopus . . .*" A bishop is chosen *for* the faithful but not *by* the faithful, although their wishes are consulted and followed as far as practicable, without putting them on an equal footing with the legally authorized electors.

We have in this matter another example of that mild and considerate treatment which the Church ever uses in regard to her children. In every age, however, there have not been wanting men who, carried away by gusts of human passion, have left nothing undone, nothing untried, to distort the nature and change the bearing and import of these wise laws; but to the unprejudiced mind how noble is this foreseeing goodness, which accommodates itself to every weakness—nay, even to every foible—to accomplish more thoroughly the great mission of the salvation of souls.

Here is how Leo the Great considered it necessary to reprove the bishops of the Province of Vienne for nominations of prelates who were odious to the people and who could only be put in possession of their sees by military intervention.¹ "*Militaris manus per provincias sequitur sacerdotem . . . ad invadendas Ecclesias quae proprios amiserint sacerdotes. Trahuntur ordinandi . . . his quibus proficiendi sunt civitatibus, ignorati . . . per vim imponuntur.*" These abuses have lasted too long already, says the Pope; let the people express their wishes; they will quietly make known their candidate, and then you may see how far you can satisfy them or what prevents you from accepting their choice. "*Expectarentur certe vota civium, testimonia populorum, quaereretur honoratorum arbitrium, electio clericorum, quae in sacerdotum ordinationibus solent ab his qui noscunt Patrum regulas custodiri.*"² These words should be carefully considered; the far-reaching effects of this wise advice merit our consideration and are worthy of our closest attention. The Pope is far from acknowledging in the people a right to vote; he speaks of their desires and wishes, of their leanings and inclinations, of the popular verdict in favor of any particular candidate, but he maintains

¹ *Epist.*, S. Leon. Papae, Migne, *P. L.*, vol. liv., *Ep.* x., p. 634, cap. 6.

² *Ibid.*, p. 632, cap. iv.

that the right of suffrage is exclusively reserved to the bishops of a province. We must not let our feelings take the place of arguments, and in the light of the explanation given, we cannot but see the meaning of that most used and abused formula which we find in the same decretal: "Qui praeftuturus est omnibus, ab omnibus eligatur."¹

The word "electio" had, as we have seen, different significations when applied to different things, and it would be absurd to confound the "electio," properly so called, which was made by the provincial bishops, with that manifestation of sympathy and support given by the clergy, or the more pressing solicitations of the people. Evidently, when all these different elements favored the same person, there was a well-grounded reason for proclaiming the total independence and unquestioned validity of the election; but care must be taken not to strain the natural import and recognized meaning of the word.

* * * * *

The custom tolerating this popular interference, even in the minimized form in which we have exposed it, could be exercised only in small communities. This co-operation of the laity supposed a continuance of the primitive fervor, a thorough and personal knowledge of the candidates, great fraternal union and enlightened zeal. From the time the city churches extended their influence to the adjoining country, and when the faithful increased in numbers, a necessary selection had to be made, and a few of the prominent and most influential members were appointed to watch over the interests of the masses. Thus, when the cabals of intriguers, always on the alert to use the crowds for the furtherance of their own ambitious schemes, had compelled certain ecclesiastical² provinces to forbid the people to take any part in the elections, still the influence of the laity was far from being destroyed by the prohibition. The canonical collection commonly known as the Council of Laodicea, renews this prohibition; but how was it observed? It is very hard to say with anything like accuracy. Even if we suppose that every ecclesiastical province which inserted the decrees of Laodicea in its directory had positively enforced the observance of this law, still the question would remain, as Thomassin very well puts it, to know whether this was not understood only as a needed temporary condemnation of factions and malcontents, or, again, as the law had been later on interpreted by Justinian,³ who contended that the profanum vulgus

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 634, cap. vi.

² Can. 13 *Conc. Laodicensi*: "μη τοῖς ὄχλοις ἐπιτρέπειν τὰς ἐκλογὰς ποιεῖσθαι τῶν μελλόντων καθίστασθαι εἰς ἱερατεῖον."

³ *Novell.* cxxiii. (an. 546), cap. 1: "Sancimus igitur, ut quoties episcopi ordinandi

was merely replaced by the most prominent influential citizens, "the honorati." No matter who is right, Gratian is historically wrong when he tries to bring the Canons of Laodicea under a title which is too sweeping and too misleading to represent the Church's discipline in the fifth and sixth centuries.¹ "Laici nullo modo debent se electioni immisceri."²

The monopoly by an aristocracy (no matter how called) of popular rights is a fact too general, and seemingly too necessary, to cause us any surprise. Every epoch gives examples of such forced evolution.

Later on, indeed, there will be a revulsion, the masses will join hands in self defence, and in an endeavor to win back the rights of which they were deprived, but their numbers are their greatest source of weakness; and no matter what their works may be, their aims or ambition, they are compelled to confide their interests to a few, who, unassumingly perhaps at first, always end by becoming masters, and by centering in their own persons the authority of which they were originally the mere instruments and representatives. This is the almost invariable line of action of the prominent citizens in every Christian community. At first lost among the crowd of humble followers of the Crucified, their worldly position, their independence, their easy circumstances, their superior training and education, brought them gradually into prominence, and gave them a privileged place among their brethren. For a time their co-operation was useful, but too often, alas! it was most baneful and pernicious, and in Italy, especially during the Middle Ages, the *λειτουργοί* usurped the rights of the people, and exercised an unhealthy detrimental influence in all ecclesiastical nominations, not even excepting the elections of the Roman Pontiffs. Memnon, Bishop of Ephesus, had to denounce John of Antioch to the clergy of Constantinople for the intrigues of this

necessitas exstiterit, *clerici et primores urbis* in qua episcopus ordinandus est, de tribus personis periculo animarum suarum decreta faciant, etc. . . ." *Novell.* cxxxvii. (an. 564), cap. 2: "Sequentes igitur ea quæ à sacris canonibus definita sunt, præsentem legem facinus, qua jubemus, quoties episcopus creandus est, clericos et primores urbis, in qua episcopus creandus est convenire, etc. . . ."

¹ ". . . . Notum est Gratiano sat familiare fuisse canones detorquere ad disciplinam sui temporis . . . canonibus sensum plane à mente Patrum alienum assignando." —Van Espen, *Jus Eccles. Universum*, tit. xiii., cap. I, n. 4, p. 65.

² Thomassin also is of this opinion: "Quamquam visa sit multis Laodicena synodus populum spoliassè pristinâ potestate eligendorum altaris ministrorum, certum est tamen, illum semper aliquas ad eam partes interposuisse Itaque, hoc canone, non suo suffragii qualicumque aut testimonii jure excussa est plebs; sed, aut summotæ tantummodo tumultuosæ turbæ quæ negotio pacis et sapientiæ plerumque obstrepebant; sed illud diffinitum est, non ex voluntate plebis, sed ex judicio et arbitrio episcoporum terminandas esse electiones aut eorum qui sapientia et religione præstant; ut ponderari magis debeant suffragia quam numerari." —*Op. cit.*, cap. ii., n. 1.

potentate, both in the senate and with the λαμπρότατοι in his efforts to dethrone the bishop. "Quotidie," says he, "venerandum senatum illustrissimosque cives ad se evocans magna importunitate efflagitabat, ut eorum suffragiis ab iis in meum locum ordinaretur Episcopus."¹

This lay intervention was never looked upon or exercised as a right, but merely as a manifestation of popular opinion, so as to enlighten the electors on the subject to be chosen. Even Van Espen admits this in spite of his well known desire to magnify the popular rights, of which he makes the secular rulers the guardians and dispensers, "Neque etiam eo tempore electio illa plebis jus aliquod *ad rem* dabat ipsi electo, sed potius, erat simplex postulatio ipsius plebis et cleri de persona sibi gratâ in suum pastorem."² The great danger of popular or aristocratic interference was soon to show itself in a more tangible manner, for even after Rome changed its religion, it still retained many of the old pagan customs which had grown, as it were, into its very growth. The teachings of Christ supplanted nearly everywhere throughout the empire the old worship of Cæsar and of Rome, which had heretofore been the state established religion. The Pontifex or Sacerdos of old, usually chosen among the noble or senatorial families, ceased his ministry at the altar of pagan divinities, to become the *Episcopus*, the *Sacerdos* of the new religion. The same intrigues, the same family pride and family ambitions made the new positions sought after and coveted as were the old, and often secured in the same fashion. For the last one hundred and fifty years of the empire, the episcopacy seemed to be the exclusive appanage of the rich, and we can easily conceive how political intrigues and purely human considerations tainted the manner of elections and vitiated the lofty conceptions of the primitive Church. We even find the true electors, the provincial bishops,³ torn asunder by family influences, by party spirit, and by the clamors of a salaried mob. Sulpicius Severus gives us a proof of this in the election of St. Martin of Tours. From the surrounding country and neighboring villages the crowds thronged into the city. All wanted Martin for bishop; he was in public opinion the only available man capable of governing the Church. The electors at first resisted the popular outcry; "nonnulli ex Episcopis qui ad constituendum antistitem fuerant evocati, repugnabant, dicentes contemptibilem esse personam, indignam esse Episcopatu, veste sordidum." This curious trait gives us an insight into the respective parts taken by both the people and the bishops. Worldly

¹ Cf. Synod. Ephesina, Labbe, iv., p. 1439, *Epistola ad Clerum Constantinopl.*

² *Op. cit.*, No. xi., p. 66.

³ Sulpicius Severus, *Vita Martini*, Migne, P. L., vol. xx., p. 169.

views were gaining ground in the Church, while the motives of self-interest, and of the powerful families, all combined to fix the choice of the electors on some magnate, but the people complain and murmur, and their faith sustains and nurtures their discontent; they implore and threaten, and disregarding their ordinary representatives, they join issue with the electors, and finally the bishops yield and accept the people's choice. Moreover, the great were less influential in the Western than in the Eastern Churches, and there the common people maintained that influence which they had attained as early as the second century. But soon there was to rise above the civil magistrates an authority which was to make all subservient, and which was alone to wield all the civil power, and exercise every influence, we mean the despotic interference of newly converted¹ emperors and barbarian sovereigns. The recognition by Constantine and his successors of certain civil rights and privileges—heretofore denied—to bishops, invested the episcopacy with secular rank and dignity, and as a natural consequence entailed state interference, sometimes openly exercised, more frequently covertly employed in the elections to vacant sees.² Thomassin tries hard, but labors in vain, to explain or excuse this abuse. From the very outset the results were so pernicious that no reason and no palliation can be offered for this unfortunate State-meddling which has always proved itself a danger and a menace.³ The necessities of political situations and the growth of civil institutions may require concessions, but it would be folly to deny that this policy is dangerous and unsafe. We would not be far astray in ascribing to these regrettable weaknesses the abuses and disorders which so often tarnished the fair history of the Church, and were the cause of so many schisms which centuries have not succeeded in uprooting.

Some find cause for wonder and astonishment that the Popes

¹ "Simul ac fidem christinam susceperunt principes et reges, continuo et ipsi coeperunt curam et auctoritatem adhibere, non quidem ut ad se plenum jus conferendi aut nominandi avocarent . . . sed quo providerent ut sacerdotia rite ac canonicè conferrentur . . . ideoque, et sine suo assensu consecrari confirmari electos episcopos ægre sinebant."—Van Espen, *op. cit.*, P. I., tit. xiii., cap. iii., n. 1, p. 70.

² "Mit Constantin erhielt die Kirche an dem Kaiser einen Schutzherrn, aber darin lag auch der Keim einer Einflussnahme der Staatsgewalt auf die Besetzung der Bisthümer . . . Indem Constantin ferner der Kirche die ihr in den letzten Verfolgungen entrissenen Güter zurückgab, er und spätere Kaiser den kirchlichen Vermögenserwerb begünstigten, und nun die Kirche ein grösseres Vermögen erwarb, so bot das bischöfliche Amt auch grössere Vermögensvortheile. Eine Folge davon war es, dass, in der Folge auch öfter die bischöfliche Würde um irdischer Vortheile willen und auch mit unerlaubten Mitteln erstrebt wurde. Diese musste dann zu Unordnungen bei den Bischofswahlen führen."—Phillips-Vering, t. viii., p. 13.

³ St. Athanasius in his time was indignant at this interference.—*Historia Arian. ad Monachi*, Migne, P. G., xxv.

gradually withdrew from the people and centered in themselves every right of nomination or selection. Our only regret is that the Popes did not do so much sooner; many evils and misfortunes would undoubtedly have been spared the Eastern Church.

The imperial intervention grew gradually more exacting, especially in cases of important sees,¹ and consequently the influence of the people and inferior clergy soon disappeared completely from the Eastern Church. The courtier prelates, who were indebted to imperial favors for their bishoprics, were powerless to complain, and the dreadful Iconoclastic persecution was needed to urge on the Eighth General Council to demand for them freedom of election. The Fourth Council of Constantinople (869) says formally:

"Neminem laicorum, principum vel potentum semet inferre electioni vel promotioni . . . cujuslibet Episcopi, ne videlicet inordinata hinc et incongrua fiat confusio vel contentio: præsertim, cum nullam in talibus potestatem quemquam potestativorum vel ceterorum laicorum habere conveniat, sed potius silere, ac attendere sit, usquequo regulariter a Collegio Ecclesiæ suscipiat finem electio futura pontificis."

It was not so hard to find a remedy for another abuse which showed itself very early in the Church. The bishops, grown old in the service of the diocese and attached to the faithful among whom they lived, naturally desired to preserve their authority and end their days among their people; hence the temptation to many of them to choose their successors and form them to the workings and administration of the diocese and to the continuance of their own works of zeal. This was a ready way, it is true, to check the intrigues of the ambitious and to prevent the confusion and disorders of a vacancy; but it was, nevertheless, a violation of the electoral laws and the generally admitted principle of a certain secular participation. Again, it was putting too much power in the hands of men at an age when the likes and the dislikes of the man often betray the whims and fancies of approaching dotage, not to speak of a still greater objection in the transmission of ecclesiastical charges by way of legacy or inheritance. This abuse was already condemned in the Council of Antioch (341),² but we see it reappear in Spain and in Italy in the fifth century, when it was again censured by St. Hilary in a Roman synod.³ In Gaul it

¹ "Einer Bestätigung durch den Kaiser oder eine Staatsbehörde bedurfte die Wahl nicht. Wohl aber, nahmen die Kaiser die Befugniß in Anspruch in jedem einzelnen Fall aus eigner Machtvollkommenheit den neuen Bischof zu bezeichnen. Selbstverständlich kam es verhältnismässig selten vor, dass sie bei entfernten oder wenig bedeutenden Bischofsitzen von dieser Befugniß Gebrauch machten."—Ed. Loening, *Geschichte des deutschen Kirchenrechts*, t. i., p. 122.

² Can. 23.

³ *Synodus Romana*, 46. Labbe, t. vii., p. 961, an. 5: "Hilarus . . . dixit . . . nova et inaudita, sicut ad nos missis de Hispaniis epistolis . . . pervenit . . . per-

often showed itself, and, fostered by royal protection, it waxed¹ strong.

From all we have seen so far we can infer nothing which would lead us to doubt the inherent power of the Roman pontiffs to choose candidates for the episcopacy and to legislate on all electoral matters.

In the very earliest age of the Church, when persecutions were raging, and when Christianity had no social standing in the state, it was impossible for the successors of St. Peter to send representatives of their authority all over the world to see to the exact enforcement of discipline. However, as Christianity took deeper root and spread more widely, there was soon established the custom of consulting the Roman Pontiffs when difficulties arose and doubts had to be met and solved. The Pope, as metropolitan or patriarch, settled controversies in Italy, Gaul and Spain.² When communications were addressed him from more distant countries, he was never slow in interfering, in spite of the difficulties to be encountered and the scanty information supplied. Moreover, he showed his authority by sending missionaries of the Gospel into savage and barbarous lands and in appointing vicars to direct the growth of rising churches. The bishops and patriarchs who were far away from Rome were obliged to notify him about their election, and if they failed to do so, they were invariably called to order and reminded of their duty. Thus did Pope Hormisdas³ severely censure the Bishop of Constantinople, reproaching him for neglecting time honored regulations and insisting upon his compliance with this important formality. The reproof, though

versitatum semina scribendo nascuntur. Denique, nonnulli episcopatum . . . non divinum munus, sed hæreditarium putant esse compendium et credunt, sicut res caducas, ita, sacerdotium velut legati aut testamenti jure posse dimitti. Nam, plerique sacerdotes in mortis confiniis constituti in locum suum nituntur alios designatis nominibus subrogare, ut scilicet non legitima expectetur electio, sed defuncti gratificatio pro populi habeatur assensu . . . hanc licentiam generaliter de ecclesiis, auferamus.”

¹ Gregorius Turonensis, *Vita Patrum*, viii., 3. Migne, P. L., t. lxxi., p. 1042: “Quo rege (Childeberto), redeunte, ait episcopus: . . . rogo ut Nicetius presbyter, *nepos meus* ecclesiæ Lugdunensi substituatur episcopus.” Respondit rex: “Fiat voluntas Dei. Et sic, pleno regis et populi (?) suffragio, Lugdunensis episcopus ordinatus fuit.”

² Zaccharia, *Antifebronius vindicatus*, dissert. viii., cap. 3. “Nihil eorum quæ ad ejusmodi electiones pertinent (sive eligendos sive electores, sive ipsius electionis formam spectes), designare erit, de qua Apostolica Sedes pro suâ auctoritate, multa sæpius non præscripserit observanda. Imò, quæ saltem in Occidente servata est universa electionum norma, eam ad Romanorum Pontificum leges prorsus exactam invenies . . . , etc.”

³ Cf. Thiel, *Epistola R. P.*, p. 913: “Diu nos nuntiata tuæ primordia dignitatis tenere suspensos, et in ipsa communis gratulatione lætitiæ, *mirati admodum sumus, morem pristinum fuisse neglectum* . . . Docuerat siquidem . . . te legatos ad Apostolicam sedem inter ipsa tua pontificatûs destinasse, ut, et quem tibi debeamus effectum bene cognosceres, *et vetustæ consuetudinis formam rite compleres.*”

conveyed in words of kindness and charity, gives us to understand that the Pope did not relinquish his control—a small proof, it is true, of his hierarchical right, but still an official declaration of it. The Popes always maintained the principle that the sole jurisdiction by which the eastern prelates ruled their charges was derived from Rome and from the successors of Peter. The sees of Alexandria and Antioch, which became patriarchal, were founded by St. Peter, and it was because the beneficiaries of them remained in communion with the centre of Catholicity that they maintained a supremacy over the other churches. Hear on this point the sound reasoning of Pius VI. in his admirable answer, “*De Nunciaturis*.” Whence comes, he asks, this distinction of power which places one bishop above another? From divine right, do you answer? or from some general or provincial council, or in virtue of some mutual understanding? In a few brief sentences he shows peremptorily the impossibility of all or any of these courses:

“*Non à jure divino*: quippe ordo episcopatus, ut ipsimet sentiunt, unus est et par in omnibus. *Non ab universali concilio*: quippe jam longè antè invaluerat ea distinctio antequam de cogendo universali concilio cogitaretur.

Non à provincialibus Synodis: quippe, provinciarum distinctionem antecedere debuit graduum distinctio quâ unus in definita regione cæteris ejusdem provinciæ episcopis præesset.

Non ex pacto convento inter nonnullos episcopos quibus commodum visum esset hanc hierarchiæ formam instituere: nam, nec isti minuere poterant, aut alteri subicere auctoritatem sibi divinitus tributam, nec præter divinum institutum alterius cujusvis auctoritatem amplificare; aliundè nec successoribus eam legem præscribere potuissent, cui se ipsi suâ voluntate subjecissent.”

The ancient patriarchs of the East did not reason otherwise nor recognize any other source of their dignity and pre-eminence than the authority of the Pope. The rules which they made were, like themselves, subject to papal control, and it was always understood and admitted that the supreme head of the Church could change, modify and even abolish all provincial ordinances as the good of the Church demanded.

* * * * *

Let us now see how the Popes were led gradually to modify the electoral right, and at length to reserve it to themselves, or at least so to supervise its action that it remained virtually in their hands alone.

The intervention in elections of secular princes in place of the people soon increased. Not alone did the Greek emperors, at the bidding of their heretical counsellors, choose from among the courtier ecclesiastics bishops whom the clergy dared not refuse, but barbarian kings even, feeling the necessity of strengthening their power by the support of the Church, named their creatures to important sees, and gave to politics rather than to the needs of the

Church a preponderating importance in the nomination of titularies. The Twelfth Council of Toledo shows us, in the seventh century already, the kings of Spain exercising a truly exaggerated power in the promotion of bishops.¹ The wishes of the people and of the clergy, who until then had been considered an important factor in Spanish elections, were united in the hands of the princes; and the electoral body of provincial bishops had little to do but give a hurried assent to the royal will, meanwhile not making the slightest pretence of interference. Is not this, alas, the story of all the abdications of the Church? The first Visigoth kings converted felt, in their unstable power, the necessity of obtaining the assistance of the Church, then so powerful over the minds of the nations. Far from trying to rule her, they sought her strength in state affairs, whether regarding foreign wars or internal discord. In the meeting of the great men of the kingdom, the bishops took the foremost place, and their decision prevailed. But once the throne was firmly built, once the kings ceased to fear attacks from without and revolts from within, instead of showing, at least by respecting ancient customs, their gratitude to the Church, they aimed at developing their own supremacy at the expense even of those that had made it, and to control more surely the episcopal nominations, they monopolized them to their own advantage.

With slight differences, such is the history of the relations between Church and State all through the West. In Gaul, for instance, when the Franks established themselves they found an episcopacy already firmly constituted. It would have been the height of imprudence to attack it; for though the Church refused to mix in the intrigues of politics and human ambition so long as these remained in their domain of temporal discussions, she rose heroic and undaunted against whoever tried to encroach upon her ministry of salvation. Clovis, even before baptism, always showed a deserved consideration towards the bishops, who were both justly satisfied and even flattered. When his sway was established by his conversion to Christianity he went yet further. He sought their counsels. He gave them territories conquered in war, which, by the way, cost him little. And thus the Church in Gaul was attached to the fortunate conqueror by a thousand ties of friendship and interest which joined her to him much more closely than ever she had been united to the Roman emperors. These good rela-

¹ Gratiani, *Decretum*, dist. 63, can. 25: "Undè placuit omnibus pontificibus Hispaniæ, ut, salvo privilegio uniuscujusque provinciæ, licitum maneat deinceps Toletano pontifici, *quoscumque regalis potestas elegerit*, et jam dicti Toletani episcopi iudicium dignos esse probaverit, in quibuslibet provinciis in præcedentium sedibus præficere præsules, et decedentibus episcopis eligere successores."

tions were not without danger. Very soon by their counsels, their influence, their creatures, and at length by their official expressed will, the Frankish kings came to govern the entire episcopacy and to claim the right of sharing in the elections. The attempts at resistance were limited to maintaining the principle of the ancient rules, subordinated, however, to the king's will.¹ The king seemed to control these rules with the power, often, of suspending them.² Against the timid reserve of the Council of Orleans, in 549, the Council of Paris, in 557,³ tries, it is true, to react, but apparently in vain; for the kings, when they pleased, threw into the balance of justice their heavy sword, and in spite of all rights the elections were corrupted.⁴ The Pope was too distant, too materially weak, to be able to interfere or even to be warned in time. The evil then had to be endured until the central spiritual authority, casting off the bonds that still checked it, could counterbalance the material strength of human power opposing its temporal weakness.

The kings did not even hesitate to directly name their own creatures for episcopal sees. Old formulas, published by Marculfe, later by Sirmond, and often since, show us the preponderating part the kings played in elections. Van Espen could then say, that these formulas prove beyond doubt the action taken by the kings in such matters;⁵ but it by no means destroys the fact that, by acting thus,

¹ The *Conc. Arvernense* (535), can. 2; Labbe, t. viii., p. 860, says clearly: "Eminentissimæ dignitatis apicem electione conscendat omnium, non favore paucorum, etc. . . ." but soon modifications were introduced.

² *Conc. Aurelian.* v. (549), can. 10; Labbe, t. ix., p. 131: "Ut nulli liceat episcopatum præmiis adipisci, sed, cum voluntate regis, juxta electionem cleri ac plebis, à metropolitano cum comprovincialibus pontifex consecratur."

³ *Concil. Parisiense*, iii., 557; Labbe, t. ix., p. 746 (can. 8): "Nullus civibus invitis ordinetur episcopus, nisi quem populo et clericorum electio plenissima quæsièrit, non principis imperio. . . . Si per ordinationem regiam honoris istius culmen pervadere aliquis præsumpserit, à comprovincialibus loci ipsius recipi non mereatur."

⁴ A better proof of this cannot be given than the following example. In the V. Council of Paris, in 614 or 615, the bishops decided in I. can., "Ut decedente Episcopo, debeat ordinari quem metropolitani cum provincialibus suis, clerus vel populus civitatis elegerint," Labbe, vol. x. Here there is no question of the royal pleasure, but since the canons of the council became law only after being promulgated by the king's authority, here is how Clotaire II. transformed the decree before publishing it: "Episcopo decedente, in loco ipsius qui à metropolitano ordinari debet, cum provincialibus à clero et populo eligatur; et, si persona condigna fuerit, per ordinationem principis ordinetur" And, in order to make more precise his intentions, and show what special class of clergymen he wished to promote, the king adds: "Si de palatio eligitur (episcopus), per meritum personæ et doctrinæ ordinetur" (Pardessus, *Diplomata*, n. 229). The king's chaplains, and even the royal favorites, will have no need of metropolitan or popular election. The king's recommendation as to their science and sanctity suffices.

⁵ Van Espen, *op. cit.*, cap. iv., p. 72.

they outrageously outstepped their power, and violated the unalterable rights of the Church. The Carolingians imitated their predecessors. Charlemagne himself, in spite of his protestations of submission to Holy Church, at times forgot himself, and promoted to bishoprics courtiers and ecclesiastics warmly recommended by the imperial princesses; deceived perhaps, himself, by the eulogies made of their talents, and thinking to benefit the Church by assuring the interests of the state.¹ At any rate, his successors, from weakness or led on by the times, sought, above all to have faithful vassals; and did not refrain from distributing sees to their trusty followers, just as they did lay benefices.²

The evil was so great and seemed so incurable, that the Popes dared not attack it directly; and, in order to keep for those they elected the sees of which they judged them worthy, they appeared to beg the Emperors' condescension and permission. Thus, Leo IV. wrote to Lothaire: "*Vestram mansuetudinem deprecamur quatenus Colono humili diacono eamdem (Reatinam) Ecclesiam ad regendam concedere dignetis, ut vestra licentia accepta ibidem eum, Deo adjuvante consecrare valeamus episcopum. Sin autem in praedicta Ecclesia nolueritis ut praeficiatur episcopus, Fusculanam Ecclesiam quae viduata existit, illi vestra Serenitas dignetur concedere ut à nostro praesulatu consecratus, Deo omnipotenti vestroque imperio grates peragere valeat.*"³

This humble attitude on the part of a Pope, towards an emperor unjustly exercising a right that was not his, doubtless is revolting to us; but we forget that the Good Shepherd must often run to meet his faithless sheep, and endure humiliating fatigue in order to save them from straying, and to lead them back to the fold. How often in the history of civilization have we seen the Church lowering herself, so it seems, to the greatest concessions, passing over in silence the vindication of her most just prerogatives, that she may save souls; and reserving her greatest energy for an unconquerable effort if her rights are systematically denied.

The time was nearing. All possible concessions had been made; the measure was full. So long as they could, without

¹ Cf. Flodoardus, *Historia Rhemensis Ecclesiae*, lib. iii., cap. 25, 28. Migne, t. cxxxv. p. 236 *et seq.* Baluze, *Capitularia* ii., p. 601: *Allocutio Missorum*. Phillips, adopting the views of the monk of S. Gall, says notably:

"Karl der Grosse mit dessen Kaiserkrönung das kirchliche Schutz und Schirmrecht vom Pápste ausdrückliche Anerkennung gefunden hatte, besetzte die meisten Bisthümer, wie es sein Vater Pipin gethan hatte in einer der kirchlichen Bedürfnissen entsprechenden Weise, und die Pápste traten auch ihm daher hierin nicht entgegen." — *Op. cit.*, viii., p. 277.

² Dist. 63, cap. 16.

³ Cf. also, the Canon 18 of the same Dist., where Stephen IV. uses similar language.

sacrificing dogma, without positively renouncing the sacred theory of their hierarchic sovereignty, endure the innovation of the lay element represented by the emperor in the promotion of prelates, the Popes were patient, silent, suffering. On the day that the empire, reducing to a system its abuses, directly claimed a right the exercise of which was only tacitly granted in order not to cause incalculable evils, the Church rose up, feeble in human resources, but strong in the certainty of her duty, and did not shrink, after the example of Gregory VII., from breasting the power of the German emperors until she lowered their pride. We cannot here recount, even in outline, that wondrous struggle; it is enough for our purpose to have sketched its origin, and shown its necessity. We see better, now, with what noble aim the Papacy, supreme president of the Church's destinies, has been forced to reduce the participation of laymen in elections; and how, for the utility of the faithful, she has been obliged to eliminate, at the price of the greatest efforts, the never-ending causes of confusion and disorder.

However, before centralizing in the Roman curia the care of looking after the vacant sees, the Popes tried another system, which promised much good fruit, but the political influences of which soon came also to add to the unsatisfactory state of things.

From the twelfth century, we see the cathedral chapters representing, officially, the diocesan clergy, proceed to elect. Generally, the people disappear entirely,¹ even in those countries in which they have longest preserved some share in elections; and the power of temporal princes is efficaciously neutralized.

In the beginning of the thirteenth century, this method was commonly admitted, so much so, that the resistance made by the Episcopal College became unwelcome at Rome.² Thus, Innocent III. overruled the provincial bishops in their claim to elect a bishop other than the choice of the Chapter. However, it appears that the Chapter was obliged to proceed then according to public opinion, as formerly the electors were supposed to do.³ This is, also, the opinion of Thomassin, who has made a most serious study of the matter.⁴

¹ Notwithstanding we see them interfere in certain circumstances. Cf. S. Bern, *Ep.*, 13 and 27.—Migne, *P. L.*, clxxxii, pp. 117, 131.

² Cap. 4, "Bonæ Memoræ," tit. v., lib. i.: *De Postulatione Prælatorum*.—Van Espen, *op cit.*, p. 68, § 4.

³ Cf. Cap. 20, tit. vi., lib. i., Decret., *De Electione* (Innocent III.): "Faciebant ad id non modicum concurs capituli Vigoriensis electio, petitio populi, assensus principis, votum tuum, suffraganeorum suffragia."

⁴ Thomassin, *op. cit.*, p. ii., lib. ii., cap. xxxiii., No. 3: "Nec tamen in unius capituli gremio ita circumscriptæ erant electiones, ut populi, abbatum, comprovincialium episcoporum, metropolitanorum vota pro nihilo reputarentur. Certè quidem scrup-

This evolution of the electoral right did not perfect itself suddenly and without opposition. It seems to have taken as precedent the papal elections. From the day the Sovereign Pontiff was elected by the cardinals, and not as before by the bishops, the example was set, and the custom spread;¹ for the western provinces accepted as of common right, the special customs originally admitted for the Roman Church alone.² But the royal policy had no idea of yielding because of such a change in the ecclesiastical system. It was at first abashed, but soon took control by its clever moves, so influencing the new episcopal elections that its power was by no means lessened. Van Espen admits this candidly.³ At one time the secular princes obliged the chapters to wait for the royal authorization in order to hold its election. At another, they forced them to seek approbation on the choice they made; but in one way or other, the canons could not but elect the person designated by the king. In fact, princes have a way of requesting that seems very like commanding.⁴

We may well believe that Rome was not slow to see the insufficiency of the new system. Numberless appeals, complaints, timid accusations, supported, however, by documents, reached the Supreme Pontiff after nearly every election. The Pope would gladly have overlooked these disorders, but at times there was clamor for a protest. Hence, oppositions on the part of Rome, refusals to confirm, prohibitions to consecrate, etc. On the other side was obstinacy. The kings thought the Popes would tire of leaving the sees vacant, disorder reigning in ecclesiastical administration, and souls perishing. And, indeed, these considerations at times did actually induce the Pope to legalize unjust elections to avoid greater evils. Yet, on the other hand, so great was the scandal, that resistance became a duty.

It is in the fourteenth century that we find the first pontifical reservations; and this practical proceeding took deep root, especially under the administration of Clement V.⁵ Barbosa⁶ shows in a few words how this change was brought about.⁷

tinium in solo et à solo fiebat capitulo; conferebantur, numerabantur, ponderabantur suffragia, et ita electio concludebatur: sed, nihilominus, certissime eas dicebatur testimonio populi et consensione episcoporum roborari et invalescere."

¹ "Admodum verisimile est jus . . . electionis ad capitula cathedralia demum transisse, postquam jus cleri Romani in electione Romani episcopi ad solos Cardinales translatum fuit, quod contigisse sub Alexandro III., id est, sub finem sæculi xii." . . . videtur.—Van Espen, *op. cit.*, P. I., tit. xiii., p. 67.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, cap. iv., p. 73, No. 4.

⁴ Cf. P. de Marca, *Concordia Sacerdotii et Imperii*, L. vi., c. ix., Nos. 12 et 13.

⁵ Extrav. . . . "Et si in temporalium," . . . *de præbendis*, in com.

⁶ Barbosa, lib. i., *Juris Eccles. cviii.*

⁷ Clement, tu plerosq. de Electione.

"Primum cathedrales ecclesias quæ apud Romanam tantum curiam vacare contigissent, suæ dispositioni reservare cæpit Clemens; vacantium quoque ecclesiarum provisionem quæ clero et populo Christiano carerent Romani Pontificis dispositioni reservavit." . . . It was an energetic remedy, but necessary. As in many analagous cases, the evil was at first attacked indirectly, under other pretexts, by way of exception, which may cause unfriendly minds to err in regard to the end pursued by the Popes, and to accuse them of avarice¹ or Machiavelism; but the general plan soon showed itself. Benedict IX. declares the supremacy of the Roman Pontiff over the great patriarchal sees, whose direction is henceforth reserved directly² to the Pope. John XXII. takes another step forward.³ Benedict XII. (1335)⁴ and his successors develop yet more this disciplinary principle seen in the famous rule of the chancellry, reserving to the Pope the election of all bishops.

Of course, this energetic action, though prudently and gently carried out, was not effected without difficulties. Bishops, chapters, secular patrons, all protested vehemently and resisted boldly, or hypocritically, according to circumstances. The councils of Constance and Bâle⁵ in particular allow us to see in life this great struggle of a portion of the episcopacy fighting to safeguard what it claimed as its prerogatives, and of the papacy ever faithful to its duty, ever enlightened in its judgments, and which, while seeming to restrict secular rights, preserved in reality their independence and their purity. In France especially the struggle was fierce. We may say that for fifty years it went on without respite between the royal might and the pontifical authority.⁶

The concordat of Leo X. and Francis I. put an end to these unhappy misunderstandings. The Holy See and the prince profited, and the Church of France found again peace. In fact, it is undeniable that the capitular electors had come to lose their inde-

¹ "Ex translatione Sedis et Curie Romanæ in civitatem et ecclesiam Avenionensem, reservationibus his omnibus, non excusatio tantum parabatur, sed et perspicua quædam necessitas providendæ curiæ, et sustentandi sacrum Collegium accedebat et alia gravissima necessitas ex electionum corruptissimâ jam disciplinâ."—Thomassin, *op. cit.*, p. ii., lib. ii., chap. xxxiii.

² Extra, "Sancta Romana," cap. iii., *De Electione*, tit. iii., lib. i., inter communes.

³ Extrav. "Ex debito," cap. iv., *eod. tit.*

⁴ Extrav. "Ad regimen," cap. xiii., *de Præbendis*, tit. ii., lib. ii., inter communes.

⁵ See especially the famous *Pragmatic Sanction* that was adopted in the 23d sess. of this Council. Cf. also Van Espen, *op. cit.*, p. 68, No. 8.

⁶ "Electiones enim litigiosæ Romam adhuc referebantur, et ubi electus minus idoneus probabatur, id quod sæpe eveniebat, beneficium à papâ conferebatur; electiones metropolitanorum à papâ confirmandæ adhuc erant, mittendumque pallium; facile autem ille abnuebat, nostra retinenda pragmaticæ constantiâ. Ne episcopos quidem fere ordinare audebant metropolitani nisi eorum electio à papâ confirmata fuisset, propter eas quæ alioqui sæviebant, interminabiles lites."—Thomassin, *op. cit.*, p. ii., lib. ii., cap. xxxiii., No. 8.

pendence by the daily growing influence of secular princes. The popes could not, however, endure that bishoprics became uniformly recompenses of political or literary merits—at times, of merits still less respectable—and they sought to satisfy a government anxious to keep away all internal dissension, and to give to the Church the best possible pastors. This was one of the aims of the Concordat of 1516, which was so severely judged by both the clergy and the parliamentary law makers. According to the concordat, the king presented the persons and the Pope conferred the canonical institution. This system was extended afterwards, and was perfected. Other analogous conventions renewed it or adapted it to other countries.

If we wish now to examine the legitimacy of the pontifical action in the important modifications of the electoral right, we cannot do better than reason with Bouix thus: The popes, he maintains, have not gone beyond their powers in acting as they did; for the right of electors, left to certain colleges or individuals, was exercised only in virtue of an interpretative concession, tacit or formal, of the Pope. This concession, made for the public good, could be revoked from the same motive. No one has even doubted that a bishop chosen and charged with his mission by the Pope was valid from all antiquity. But this would not have been admitted had not the Pope at the same time the right to control the election or the confirmation made by his hierarchical inferiors, whether habitual electors or confirmers. In case of conflict a decided authority was needed. We cannot admit a double principle of authority equally independent and powerful.

From these, and similar reflections, Bouix concludes, very lawfully :

“Ergo, si vere potuerit Papa episcopos legitime constituere cum solâ suâ electione et confirmatione, potuit hoc ipso illegitimos reddere electos et confirmatos ab aliis. Ergo, potuit semper irritum reddere jus quod habuerunt olim alii præter ipsum, episcopos eligendi et confirmandi. Ergo, *jus illud nemo unquam habere potuit nisi ejus concessione.*”

To try and follow the study of episcopal promotions, would be, so to say, to try and write anew the history of the Church. It would be interesting to speak of the attempts made by Louis XIV., by the Revolution, and by Napoleon I., to fill the vacant sees without recurring to Rome; it would be no less useful to treat of the government of the Eastern Churches, of the condition of the schismatic churches; but, it would take several volumes. Before finishing, let us say a word of the actual discipline of the Catholic Church.

1. Nowadays, the Pope chooses and names directly the per-

sons destined to fill the vacant sees within the limits of the Roman Church—the titular bishops and the vicars apostolic.

2. Some chapters, by special derogation, have yet preserved their electoral right. Such are the chapters of Cologne, Trèves, Paderborn, Münster.¹

3. France, Austria, and Spain, have concordats that leave their chiefs the right of nominating, according to fixed rules, while the Holy Father always confers the canonical institution.

4. A somewhat analogous system appears in Russia. The Holy See and the government agree as to the nominations, without the schismatic power exercising a real right of nomination, or even of official presentation.²

5. When the hierarchy was restored in England, the chapters obtained a right of presentation, which in no way binds the Sovereign Pontiff; so that, he can designate and promote a candidate different from the one recommended.³ This régime has since been applied likewise to Holland.⁴

6. In America, where there are no chapters, the method is different.⁵ The diocesan consultors and the immovable rectors of the vacant church draw up a list of three names, which list is sent to the bishops of the province. These, under the presidency of the metropolitan, or of the oldest bishop, discuss the merits of the persons proposed, and adopt or modify at pleasure the list, even substitute another, if they judge proper. The reason of this refusal, must, however, be expressed. They then send the list of their candidates to the Sacred Congregation of the Propaganda. The information given about each candidate is on the following points:⁶

1. Nomen, cognomen, ætas, patria Candidati.

2. Cujus diœcesis sit ac Provinciæ ecclesiasticæ?

3. Ubinam studiis theologicis vacaverit, et quo profectu?

4. An gradus assecutus fuerit, et quos?

5. An professor extiterit et cujus facultatis?

6. An et ubi missiones sacras obiverit, et quam in eis experientiam obtinuerit?

7. Quot linguas calleat, et quas?

8. Quibus officiis sit perfunctus, et quo successu?

9. Quam prudentiam exhibuerit in deliberationibus et agendi ratione?

10. An sit corpore sanus; frugi, patiens, atque in administratione rerum temporarium versatus.

11. Utrum sit propositi tenax, an ingenio mutabilis?

¹ *Const.*, "De Salute Animarum," Pii VII., an. 1821.

² *Conventio* Pii IX. cum Nicolao I., Russorum Imperatore, an. 1847, art. xii.

³ *Decret. S. Cong. de P. F.*, 21 Apr. 1852. *Collectanea, S. C.*, p. 22, No. 42; *Concilium Westmonaster*, an. 1852.

⁴ *Cong. Gener., S. C. de P. F.*, 7 Jul. 1858.

⁵ *Cf. Conc. Plen. III., Baltim.*, tit. ii., n. 14, § 1 et seq.

⁶ *Cf. Conc. Balt., II. Plen.*, tit. ii., No. 107.

12. Num gaudeat fanâ honestatis, et an fuerit numquam in eo quid contra mores ?

13. An in exercendis sacerdotalibus muniis sit attentus, compositus cum ædificatione, rubricarum studiosus observator ?

14. An habitu, gestu, incessu, sermone, aliisque omnibus, gravitatem ac religionem præseferat ?

This system safeguards, as much as possible, the most ancient practices of the Church, taking into account abuses which the experience of centuries has shown to exist. These venerable consultants and immovable rectors represent the most healthy element of the clergy.

In a certain measure, they are also the spokesmen of the Christian people whose aspirations, needs, and desires, they know. Bound to secrecy, held by solemn oath to lay aside all intrigue and partiality, they feel the greatness of the mission entrusted to them.¹ They choose three names, which are sent to the bishops of the province.² These are, in a sense, the successors of the first electoral colleges which we have seen in action in the beginning of the Church. Like their brethren of sixteen or seventeen centuries ago, they listen to the voice of the multitude, they gather various testimonies, they ask the advice of the clergy belonging to the vacant see, and, under the eye of God, they ask Him who will be the most worthy to enter their "corps d'honneur." Generally, they have not to go outside the list presented them. "Nullus invitis detur episcopus." They remember the old adage. The interest of the Church, for which a head is needed, will inspire their choice. Perhaps there is need of a young man, enterprising, capable of enduring long fatigues, painful journeys; perhaps, on the contrary, in a diocese already old and counting many members, a man of experience is needed, a man who has already passed through many trials. Perhaps discipline is to be enforced, and a canonist is necessary; or again, the neighborhood of enterprising dissidents

¹ Such was the consideration put forward by a recent writer in a pamphlet entitled "Episcopal Nominations," where the good intentions of the writer may excuse many excesses otherwise very deserving of censure. His contention was, that the bishops should be elected by the priests alone; in this, he showed a lamentable ignorance of the spirit and tradition of the Church. As far as the Council of Baltimore adopted the idea which he put forward with such exaggeration, we may admit the following: "It will certainly give her (the Church) an element of strength which she needs just now by securing a co-operation of a majority of priests, and consequently of the laity. This is a most serious point, and we do not always secure it by our present system," etc.

² Popular agitation has tried, again and again, to revive those means of intimidation which provoked the indignation and censure of the Fathers at Laodicea. Every influence was enlisted for a candidate; the daily newspapers waged an energetic campaign in his favor, etc., to such an extent, that in 1892 Rome had to interfere, and did so in such a vigorous denunciation, that we think the candidate championed in such a way in the future stands little chance of acceptance by Rome.—*Cf. Litteræ Encycl. S. C. P. F.*, 15 May, 1892. *Collectanea*, Append., p. 869, No. 2 (5).

demands a powerful dialectician, a first-class theologian. It is for those that have experience of Church government, and of the people's needs, to weigh these considerations. Placed in a higher position, they see further. More detached from the spirit of companionship, more penetrated with the heavy responsibility for souls, they are better able to reject human considerations, to regard only religious interests. They decide conscientiously before God, with all the authority of their high functions, of their ripe age, of their evangelical labors, as to the priest who seems to them to fulfil the conditions required that he may become, according to the beautiful expression of the Scriptures, the "Angel" of the faithful.

Yet above them is another hierarchical grade. In Rome there is a most august senate, whose members, instructed in all ecclesiastical sciences, trained by a long acquaintance with the world and a daily management of the most delicate affairs to the finest measure of high administration, rule, in the name and under the control of the Universal Father, the great interests of the Church. Some of them, surrounded by prudent advisers, well *au courant* with varied and serious information, are especially occupied with the development of the faith in heretic and infidel lands. They are the members of the Sacred Congregation of the Propaganda. In their hands rests the last supreme decision, for the Pope will rarely reverse their choice. They study, then, the documents, they master the different pieces of information sent them, and away from local excitement and national prejudice, considering only the talents, virtues and qualities of the candidates, the needs, extent and nature of the dioceses; they make their choice as a rule from among the names presented.

This seems to us the most perfect organism the Church has yet set to work to effect useful and wise elections. Every element interested is represented, and in proportion to its worth and importance. The Christian people has no right to command; but its susceptibilities must not be outraged. The parish priests who know its needs and desires are its echo. The diocesan clergy take a natural interest in the choice of their pastor. They manifest their choice and put forward their candidates. The bishops of the province are judges sufficiently disinterested and competent; they follow the wishes of the faithful and the priests in determining him they judge worthy to take rank among them. But the jurisdiction of the bishop flows from the Vicar of Christ. He, then, more than any one else, is interested in having the Episcopal Authority confided to the person most fit to use it. As the many cares of the whole universe rest upon him and as he cannot do humanely alone such an immense work, he divides his labors among the

most eminent ecclesiastics of the world, called around him to help him with their counsels. And these men who see concentrated near them the glorious results of eighteen centuries of apostolic conquest, who know that they work with him to whom the divine co-operation has been promised forever, take up the work outlined beyond the seas. When they have decided, the Sovereign Pontiff ratifies and approves. He speaks, and in the silence surrounding him the representative of Christ on earth pronounces these words, never heard without emotion by those privileged to be present: "By the authority of God Almighty, by the authority of the Apostles Peter and Paul, and by our own, we provide for this Church in the person of N., whom we appoint as bishop and pastor in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost. Amen."

We ask any unprejudiced man, is there aught more grand, more wise, more regardful of all interests than this manner of selecting the pastors of the faithful? Surely the Roman Church has not degenerated from the primitive Church. She has, better than any other religious society, preserved the ancient spirit. Full of reverence for sacred antiquity, yet attentive to the needs of the present, she applies herself by an intelligent adaptation to preserving in their purity and developing in all their fruitfulness the institutions of the Saviour. The more we study her, the more clearly we see her faithful interpretation of His will. Here, as in all other points of dogma, of morals and of discipline, we have the delight of proving once again the oft-repeated assertion: The successors of Peter and the Church are inseparable. "Ubi Petrus ibi Ecclesia."

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FREDERICK BARAGA AMONG THE OTTAWAS.¹

BEFORE the British had surrendered Detroit "and its dependencies" in 1796, the bishops of Quebec had exercised spiritual jurisdiction in the Northwest Territory. St. Anne's, of Detroit, the mother-church of the Northwest, had, from 1701 till 1782, been served by Recollect fathers, and from the latter date by distinguished secular priests from Quebec. With the change of dynastic rule occurred a change of spiritual rule from the Canadian to the American hierarchy.

In 1796 Bishop Carroll sent the Sulpician, Father Michael Levadoux, to assume possession under his see; upon the advent of the latter, Rev. Peter Frichette, last of the illustrious line of pastors of St. Anne's, of Detroit, retired to Quebec, and Father Levadoux became the first incumbent under American hierarchical auspices of this ancient parish.

In 1798 Father Levadoux was recalled to France, but his departure was deferred for two years, to enable his successor, Rev. Gabriel Richard, who with his assistant, Rev. John Dilhet, both Sulpicians, had been transferred from Kaskaskia, Illinois, to become familiar with the situation at Detroit.

The parochial jurisdiction of St. Anne comprised a large portion of the Northwest Territory as then constituted. It extended from the head waters of Lake Erie to the Sault de Ste Marie, and beyond these rapids to distant points in Lake Superior. It included the shores and islands of Lakes Huron, Michigan, and the Georgian Bay in the Northwest; the south shores of Lake Michigan, the territory covered at the present time by Chicago, Green Bay, and the regions tributary to the St. Joseph River.

It included all of Michigan, portions of Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, as these States are at present constituted. Throughout this extensive lake region, which had been sanctified by the blood as well as by the labors of some of the most distinguished missionaries of the Catholic Church during nearly all the seventeenth century, there dwelt during the first four decades of the present century several of the most prominent western and northwestern nations of the extensive Algonquian Confederacy;

¹ Frederick Baraga, born, 1797. Ordained to the priesthood at Laibach in the Austrian Empire, 1823. Serves as a priest for seven years in his native province, and resolves to devote his life to missionary work among the Indians in Michigan. Arrives at Detroit in 1831 and enters upon his missionary labors at Arbre Croche. Dies Bishop of Marquette, 1868.

including the Chippewas, the Ottawas, the Illinois, the Menominees, the Miamis, the Kikapoos, the Pottawotomis, and a colony of several thousand of the people of the Oneida nation of New York, who had settled upon the shores of Fox River in the present State of Wisconsin. With the exception of the Iroquoian colony, the other nations had occupied the soil for centuries, while their population far exceeded that of the same nations during the missionary periods of the seventeenth century.

The most ancient was the Chippewa nation, which, according to General Cass, had been hereditary custodians of the council fire of the Algonquian Confederation from remote centuries.

After Father Richard had visited that portion of his parish lying between the River Raisin and Lake St. Clair, he determined to ascertain how much of Christianity had remained among the copper-colored races of the western and northwestern dependencies of the parish of St. Anne. He embarked in June, 1799, on board a trading schooner bound for the island of Mackinac, which after a stormy voyage he finally reached.

On this island at the time was one of the most extensive trading posts of the American Fur Company. It had been the centre of an extensive Ottawa mission during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

There probably had not been a Catholic priest on the island for several decades. Its population at the time of Father Richard's visit was made up of white traders, half-breeds and Ottawa Indians. There were a few French families among the company's officials, while the family of the resident physician was Catholic. Father Richard wrote Bishop Carroll that the half-breed and Indian population had become greatly demoralized, debauchery and immorality prevailed.

He remained on the island three months; baptizing, validating those holding conjugal relations, reforming the lives of many, and teaching the children their prayers.

What this æsthetic French priest endured from contact with the vilest, probably, of the occupants of the soil, would be difficult to describe.

When he had accomplished this good work, he resumed his journey; he visited the islands in the Georgian Bay, ascended the river Saint Mary, tarried at the Sault, and after an absence of four months he returned to Detroit to permit Father Levadoux to return to France.

The Lake region, the south shore of Lake Michigan, and the old missionary station on St. Joseph River, were subsequently visited; while the great need of missionary laborers in this extensive field was fully described to Bishop Carroll.

But no priests were available. It was not until the ordination of Rev. Francis Vincent Badin, a protégé of Father Richard, by Bishop Flaget, in whose diocese Detroit had been placed, that Father Richard obtained missionary aid. But in the interim he had visited at times all these upper lake dependencies, in order to keep alive what little faith existed. Father Badin in 1825 made a missionary tour and was very successful in reaping where Father Richard had sown.

Father Badin in the following year, made another tour, during which he dedicated many chapels and converted eight of the Ottawa chiefs at Arbre Croche.

To the old mission of Arbre Croche, 1740-1765, there came periodically some of the Jesuit fathers from Michilimacinac, and among these, was Father Pierre Du Jaunay, who in 1741, compiled a French-Ottawa dictionary. It is a manuscript of 581 pages in octavo, well preserved and bound; and it now forms one of the literary treasures of McGill College, Montreal. While at Arbre Croche in 1825, Father Badin found a connecting link between his mission and that of the eighteenth century, in the person of a non-agenarian Ottawa Christian, who had served mass for Father Du Jaunay.

He pointed out to Father Badin the place where the "black gown" used to walk up and down while reading his breviary.¹

By the persistent efforts of Father Richard, another missionary was obtained for the lake regions in 1827. Father Dejean, from Rhodéz, France, succeeded Father Badin and continued his work.

In the meantime Detroit, which deserved episcopal rank, had been placed under the jurisdiction of the see of Cincinnati created in 1822. But the pious Dominican, Bishop Fenwick, became the warm supporter of the missionary work of Father Richard in the Lake regions.

Father Bellamy arrived soon after Father Dejean and joined the latter in missionary work.

When, in 1830, Bishop Fenwick made his episcopal visitations to Father Richard's missionary centres in the Western waters, he was edified with the piety of their Christian constituents, and he wrote: "The happiest days of my life were those passed among the Ottawa and Pottawotomi Indians."

Realizing the great extent of this missionary field, Father Richard continued his efforts to increase his staff. Fathers Mazzuchelli, Stephen T. Badin, the brother of Father Francis Vincent, and Frederick Résé, the latter destined to be the first bishop of Detroit, in succession served in this missionary region of the Western

¹ Manuscripts, Rev. C. Verwyst, O.S.F., Indian missionary in Wisconsin.

lakes ; included within whose boundaries were all the localities celebrated in the missionary annals of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

We have shown how this Lake region had for thirty-one years been under the pastoral care of the Very Reverend Gabriel Richard, the distinguished pastor of St. Anne's Church of Detroit. No such extensive field of missionary work under the supervision of one head, had existed under the metropolitan rule of the first three Archbishops, Carroll, Neale, and Mareschal. The venerable prelates, Flaget and Fenwick, had blessed this work and had personally encouraged it by the prestige of their episcopal ministrations.

It forms an interesting chapter in the history of the Church under the early American hierarchy.

It occurs to us to introduce some testimony as to the success of Father Richard's missionary work among the Ottawas of the lakes, about the time he found the assistance of his protégé, Father Francis Vincent Badin, available. It is from the pen of Colonel Thomas Lorraine McKenney, of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Washington, D. C.

In 1826, this officer was appointed joint commissioner with Governor Lewis Cass, to negotiate a treaty with the Chippewas of Lake Superior, at Fond du Lac. He wrote an account of his journey from Washington to Detroit, where he joined Governor Cass, and the expedition which the latter had organized and of their voyage by sailing vessel to Mackinac, from which island the journey was to be continued in open bateaux up St. Mary's River to the Sault, and thence along the coast of Lake Superior to its head waters at Fond du Lac.

This account was written in a series of letters to his family, which in 1827 were published by Fielding Lucas, Jr., Baltimore, under the title of "Tour to the Lakes." It is an octavo volume of 494 pages, illustrated with original sketches in colored lithographs of Indian chiefs, Indian life, places of note, councils, etc.

On their way from Mackinac to the Sault, the expedition made a detour to visit Drummond's Island, where a battalion of British troops and the sub-agent of British Indian affairs in the West, were stationed. It was in the month of July, and the following is Colonel McKenney's account of this visit :

"On landing we found there several officers of the post ; we were received with great courtesy, and invited to their quarters. After having taken wine with the officers, Captain Anderson, who was in command, showed us the garden, and accompanied us to the Indian lodges.

"There remained, of the 3000 who had been there to receive

presents, about 600, principally Ottawas. Their lodges were in fine order, and filled with many comforts; and themselves well clothed.

"After having visited them pretty generally, we arrived nearly opposite Captain Anderson's quarters, when he invited us to take tea, adding Mrs. Anderson's request to his own; and when we referred to the lateness of the hour, he overcame all further difficulties, which our wish to return to the vessel might have started, by adding, 'Mrs. Anderson has prepared tea, gentlemen, and desired me to express the hope that she may not be disappointed in seeing you.'

"As we neared the house, my attention was attracted to a building not far off, in which some persons were singing. I inquired what it meant? the Captain answered, 'The Indians are worshipping.' 'Who are they?' 'Ottawas.' 'What is their religion?' 'The Roman Catholic.' 'Have they forms of worship?' 'Yes.' And then listening awhile, said, 'I will bring you the hymn they are now singing.' It was the following. The title is French, the words Ottawa:

' Sur cet autel.

Jesus nosé

Ontetuta kisa ki kin

Hustiwenig kimanna Ti hin

Jesus nosé

Kigate pue tun

Kakik kiga Pamitun

Jesus nosé.'

There were four verses of the hymn, the first of which is given. The Colonel gives the literal translation, which, in their simple language, is a pathetic appeal to the Saviour, and the utterance of faith in His mercy.

He continues:

"The Indians that remained on the Island were, no doubt, the most improved in all respects. I believe they were from L'Arbre Croche, about twenty miles west of Michilimacinac. The Ottawas of L'Arbre Croche have been, for many years, the most improved Indians in these regions, and upwards of fifty years ago supplied Michilimacinac with corn and other articles of subsistence.

"They are the best dressed Indians I have met with, and are so superior in cleanliness and comforts, and conduct, to the Chipewas, as to be known from them by their gait and exterior."¹

In religious belief, Colonel McKenney was a Presbyterian; his testimony as to the Ottawas on this account is all the more valuable. He may have been posted by Governor Cass, who was a

¹ *Tour to the Lakes*, pp. 165-7.

warm friend of Father Richard ; which friendship originated before the pusillanimous surrender by Governor Hull, of Detroit "and its dependencies," to General Brock during the "war of 1812."

After the exit of Very Rev. Frederick Résé, in 1831, Father Baraga commenced his apostolate among the Ottawas, in May of that year.

The high-born Carniolan priest came as a missionary among a race of people such as he had never known before ; but he conceived a paternal affection for these Indians, which grew warmer as he learned the honest and simple nature of these descendants of a great race of warriors ; while they, in turn, reciprocated his affection by filial obedience, by love, esteem, and veneration.

Our recollection of the personality of Bishop Baraga is quite distinct ; but we will describe him as he appeared to us in 1855, when he was Vicar-Apostolic of Upper Michigan.

He was then 57 years old. He had spent twenty-three years of his mature life in missionary work in the Lake regions ; he had compiled and had printed the most extensive series of Indian philological works known in modern times, the last of which, a work of 334 pages, in the Chippewa language, had just then been published in Cincinnati.

But he had not laid down the missionary cross ; although, perhaps, it was heavier to carry than ever before.

He was a man frail in appearance, whose weight, apparently, would not exceed one hundred pounds. He was short in stature, with regularly proportioned frame, small feet and hands ; his features were classic, and mild in expression ; his eyes were blue, but passive ; while his face was tanned to the color of a half-breed, the general expression of which tended to abstraction. His hair, which he wore rather long, was a light brown ; it was abundant, but apparently lifeless ; it had probably become so from the necessity of keeping his head protected from the cold atmosphere in which he lived during ten months of the year.

We were present at the second Plenary Council of Baltimore in October, 1866, and we saw the bishop after he had been stricken down by an apoplectic stroke, while his purple robe was stained with blood.

When two years later the death of Bishop Baraga occurred, January 6, 1868, his obsequies were held in the cathedral of St. Peter, Marquette, Michigan ; his eulogy was delivered by the vicar-general of the diocese, Very Rev. Edward Jacker. And in this eulogy we find the most reliable outline of the life and missionary work of the bishop.

Father Jacker was ordained to the priesthood by Bishop Baraga at Sault Ste Marie in 1865. He was the confidential friend of the

bishop ; he was a fine scholar, very pious, of splendid physique, and an adept in the practical use of the Chippewa and Ottawa languages.

Under such a mentor Father Jacker became a great missionary in the regions of Lake Superior ; the bishop placed much reliance upon his judgment ; while, when obliged to leave his diocese to go to the eastern cities or to Europe, he did not hesitate to place it in charge of Father Jacker.

Sharing the intimate life of his bishop, the associate and assistant in his philological studies, his confidant in missionary and episcopal affairs, Father Jacker, with his superb physique, and with his intelligent mind, was enabled to lighten the burden which the failing vigor of Bishop Baraga at times rendered him unable to carry. Unfortunately there has been no memoir of Father Jacker published, although it is said the material for such is in the possession of one of his brothers.¹ With his eulogy, therefore, we must be satisfied for the most authentic details of his bishop's career ; while we may avail ourselves of contemporaneous testimony relating to some particular occurrences or incidents not embraced within the outline of Father Jacker's tribute.

Appleton's "Cyclopædia of American Biography" has this to say of the family of Frederick Baraga :

"His family, a younger branch of the house of Hapsburg, was the most distinguished in Illyria."

This would give princely rank and the prestige of the blood of the imperial family of Austria, to the Baraga who became a priest, who devoted his life to the evangelization of the Chippewas of Lake Superior and the Ottawas of Lakes Huron and Michigan, and who died in the purple of the Catholic Church, and was buried in his cathedral of Marquette in Lake Superior.

If this account of his lineage be authentic, and while the biographies given in Appleton are generally reliable, we can add, that in Detroit during the "forties," where Bishop Baraga while yet a priest was well known, such was the general belief as to his birth-right ; it is the second instance where princely blood has coursed the veins of a Catholic priest who has won distinction on missionary fields in the United States.

The Prince Demetrius Augustine Gallitzin, the apostle and founder of religion in the Allegheny mountains, 1799-1840, was the first illustrious example.² It was a good kind of blood, how-

¹ Now residing in Lake Superior.

² For an authentic comparison of princely with plebeian origin in missionary experience in North America see *Autobiographie du Pere Chaumonot, S.J.*, eminent Huronian and Iroquoian missionary and philologist, who was the son of a poor vine dresser.—*Relations*, 1639-1679.

ever, that gave life to Frederick Baraga, who first saw the light of day in his father's castle on the feast of Saints Peter and Paul, 1797. The home of the Baraga family was in Carniola, kingdom of Illyria, in the Empire of Austria, and according to one of our authorities, "in the parish of Dobernith, while the family domain was in Treffen, Unterkrain."

A glance at the map of Austria as the empire was constituted before the Napoleons of France and the kings of Prussia had interfered with her boundaries, shows Carniola in Illyria to be within the influence of the breezes from the Adriatic, not far from the port of Trieste, between Lombardy and Croatia, near the great high road to Vienna.

As the family was wealthy, Frederick Baraga was instructed in the castle by a private tutor until he was nine years old, at which early age he was sent to the neighboring college of Laibach for a preliminary course of studies. He was the only son and heir to the family estate. The other children were two daughters.

His father evidently intended he should succeed to the family honors and perpetuate the Baraga line, and his education was shaped accordingly.

When he had finished his course at Laibach, although still a youth, he had already become an accomplished scholar. At that early age his capacity for philological study was evidenced by the fact that before he left Laibach, he could speak fluently his native Sclavonic, the French, German, Italian, Latin, and Greek languages.¹

This was in 1816. Since he had been born the star of the first Napoleon had shined brilliantly over all Europe, and then had paled in cloudy exile on St. Helena. All Europe had felt the power of the great soldier, and especially the empire of Austria.

When the Bourbons had been restored and the blessings of peace returned, a brilliant career seemed to await young Baraga; such seemingly was the impression of his father, for he sent Frederick to the University of Vienna for a five years' course of law and political science. When he graduated in 1821 his father must have complacently believed that he would leave a successor who would bring renown to the family name. Great was his disappointment, however, when Frederick announced his intention of entering the priesthood, which, at the time, was not a promising profession for such a brilliant young man. The fact was, that while gaining university honors, the young student had become convinced that his career was not destined to be a worldly one; his true vocation

¹ These facts indicate the studious nature of Frederick. German students of his rank at the time, and since, yielded to the attractions of women and wine. The mid-night lamp, and study such as his, were rare exceptions.

appeared to him to lead to the sacred ministry, and he followed the light. He commenced his theological studies at the Ecclesiastical Seminary of Laibach in 1821. His collegiate and university education enabled him to complete his theological course in two years, and he was ordained a priest September 21, 1823. He was then twenty-six years old.

If his father was disappointed in not having his family line perpetuated in the manner he had intended, he would have been consoled, had he lived, by the renown which his son shed upon the family name; first, as a missionary whose works and success have not been surpassed in North American history; second, as one of the greatest philologists in the languages of the Indians of America; and third, as a prelate whose name has added distinction to the roster of the American hierarchy.

His priestly labors were commenced in his native province, first as assistant pastor at Melitka, and then as parish priest at Smartna. It has been said of Father Baraga that he was a priest whose exemplary devotion and whose unwearied pastoral care, whose great charity, for there was much poverty succeeding the continuous wars, whose abstemious example, for there was much dissipation from the same cause, endeared him to the people among whom he ministered. No journey was too great, no hour of the night inopportune when the consolations of religion were required at his hands. He was for seven years the good shepherd in this field. If he found leisure hours they were not wasted. His had not been the education of the average young priest of those days in his country. We have seen what an accomplished graduation was his at Laibach and Vienna; with such a mind as he possessed literary labor became a diversion. With filial devotion he sought to reform, to reconstruct his native Sclavonic written language, which had become to some extent hybrid. This he accomplished, and this was an appropriate beginning of what in after years he accomplished in America, which connects his name for all time in the world of letters with the languages of the Algonquin nations of North America.

Although we have seen no critical description of the works of doctrinal discussion and of devotional exercises which he wrote and published during these seven years of his pastoral life, it is said the former have been extensively republished in a translated form, while the latter continue to be used by the people for whom they were originally written. These first fruits of this distinguished mind should be collected and critically described.

In the meantime an arrangement had been made with regard to the succession to his ancestral estate. Where on the continent of Europe at that time, and since, there happened to be an only son

and heir to an estate, with one or more sisters whose marriage dowers would not be in proportion to the wealth or standing of their brother, it sometimes happened in Catholic families that the brother and heir entered holy orders. In such cases his share of the estate was made over to the sister or sisters and became a part of the marriage portion.

This custom generally prevailed in such cases as that of Father Baraga, but there are on record many examples of chivalric inheriting brothers renouncing their birthright and going forth in the world to carve out their own fortune, in order to enable their sisters to marry according to their family station.

Father Baraga renounced his rights of succession, reserving for himself an annuity of 750 Austrian florins. His intention to devote his life to the evangelization of the Indians of northern Michigan had probably been maturely considered; it was evidently among the results accomplished by Very Rev. Frederick Résé, who, while vicar-general of Cincinnati, visited Vienna to gain volunteers for these Indian missions and to establish permanent means for their support.

By the efforts of this young and distinguished prelate the Leopoldine Society of Vienna was founded, with an imperial archduchess as its patroness, whose annual allocations were to be principally applied to the support of these Michigan Indian missions of the lakes.

After his resignation as pastor had been accepted, and after some tedious formalities had been completed at Vienna, Father Baraga left that city November 12, 1830; he visited Paris, and embarked on board a sailing packet which left Havre for New York, December 1. The voyage lasted thirty days and on the last day of the month he landed on American soil in the city of New York. It required eighteen days, more than half the time consumed on the Atlantic, to reach Cincinnati, at which city he arrived January 18, 1831. He was then thirty-three years old. Here he was warmly welcomed by Bishop Fenwick, to whom he announced his intention of devoting his life to missionary work among the Indians upon the shores of the lakes and on the upper peninsula of Michigan. Access to these regions, however, during the winter season was closed.

During his detention in Cincinnati he studied the English language; while with the assistance of a young Ottawa, who was studying for the priesthood, he acquired his first knowledge of the Ottawa dialect, which he continued to study until he became a proficient in this language. But in the meantime Bishop Fenwick gave him the temporary charge of a German congregation, to whom he preached and brought many back to the performance of

their religious duties. He also performed missionary work in the city, bringing back to the fold many who had strayed away, including some who had been strangers to the sacraments from their youth. It was in Cincinnati that Father Baraga had the happiness of making his first convert in America. A negro deck hand on a river steamboat discharging cargo at the levee, was fatally injured by a hogshead of sugar rolling on him; he called for a priest. Father Baraga came, received the dying negro into the church, and after he had baptized and administered to him the last sacrament, consoled him with the assurance of eternal salvation until his last breath.¹ There is food for reflection in this dying scene.

He accompanied Bishop Fenwick to Detroit, performing the work of a travelling missionary while traversing the State of Ohio.² This journey commenced April 21st, and ended May 15th. During the five days he was detained at Detroit he sought out what few Germans there were in the city, preached to them and heard their confessions.

Father Baraga left Detroit on a steamboat May 20th, which landed him at Mackinac a few days later and procuring passage in an Indian's canoe, he arrived at Arbre Croche May 28, 1831.

This locality may be easily found on a map of Michigan; it is on the south shore, at the head of Little Traverse Bay, in the waters of Lake Michigan.

Its old name has been changed to Harbor Springs, and on the map it is in Emmet County. Its Ottawa name, *Wa-gan-a-kis-si* translated into French, is *L'Arbre Croche*, "The Crooked Tree." But it was commonly used during the first half of the present century without the article, *Arbre Croche*.

It was a flourishing mission of Michilimacina during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and on this account it is classic ground in the missionary annals of *l'ancien régime*. During this period, the Hurons and the Ottawas were the elite of the Indians of the West. The Ottawa cantons had from remote centuries existed on the shores and islands of Lake Michigan and the Straits of Mackinac, but in an evil hour for their welfare, their tribes were in 1702, to a great extent induced to leave their homes on the lakes, by La Mothe Cadillac, founder of Detroit, and to build their cantons on the south shore of the strait opposite where Detroit now stands.

Their village at the *Pointe des Ottawas* was surrounded with a high enclosure, while their castle or stronghold overlooked the vicinity and the bay at the head of the strait.³

¹ Manuscripts of Rev. Walter Elliot, C.S.P.

² Manuscript of Rev. C. Verwyst, O.S.F.

³ The canton and fort of the Huron nation had been built on the north shore of the

An official report to the government of France made in 1718, describes their status as follows: "Their fort is a strong one, their cabins similar to those of the Hurons, their people industrious and well clad, and the finest formed and most athletic appearing of the Indians in the vicinity."¹ Pontiac, leader of the Ottawas from about 1750, was not a type of the average Ottawa; he was about five feet six, with a powerful frame, while as a rule the Ottawa chiefs and warriors were six feet, and finely proportioned. They continued to be industrious farmers and expert hunters, until the failure of Pontiac's league for the destruction of the English, and the establishment of Indian supremacy in the West. After the discomfiture of their leader, their castle was destroyed, their canton abandoned, while their tribes wandered back to their old homes on the lakes. From this time the decadence of the Ottawa race commenced; while the fine standard of the men remained to a great extent.

But the habits of industry and tribal thrift which had long made them happy, gradually disappeared. The British, through Sir William Johnson, sought to conciliate them, and they were paid an annuity; the payment of this annuity was continued after the war of 1812 and down to modern times; while the American government by treaty made them yearly payments in money and kind. Before the end of the eighteenth century the Ottawas of the lakes had become, what Father Richard found them in 1799, a demoralized people. The vicinity of such a trading post as was on the Island of Mackinac, where the product of one day's hunt would purchase enough raw "Ohio whiskey" to keep an Indian drunk for a week, was a temptation to which they yielded.²

Tribal rule or human influence failed to wean them from habits of debauchery, with its immoral and degrading accompaniments.

The supernatural aid invoked in their behalf by the saintly men who sought to win them to Christianity and to reform their habits, was alone effectual. It was the spectacle of their transformation from brutalized unbelievers, to pious, sober, and industrious Christians, which moved the heart of Bishop Fenwick to the extent he described in his letter, which was written just before the advent of Father Baraga.

In his missionary life, Father Baraga adapted his daily wants to the situation; he partook of the same simple food the Indians used. The people lived in bark cabins, while the young mission-

strait, but it was removed in 1733 to the south shore, where was the Huron mission, three miles below *Point des Ottawas*.

¹ N. Y. Col. Doc. ix., p. 888.

² An Indian does not get drunk like a white man, or go reeling for hours before he drinks enough to tumble him over. With a pint only of raw whiskey, the Indian will drink and drink, till he drops dead-drunk in his tracks.

ary, who had been reared in a castle, was content to live in a cabin which afforded but poor protection against the elements; while he, who had been accustomed to have a valet within call, found from necessity the way to prepare his own moderate meals.

He adopted the same mode of life which had been his rule while serving as a parish priest in Carniola. He rose early, and devoted the morning hour to meditation and prayer. He soon found the Christian elements of the population and led them to the practice of Christian life. At 5 o'clock, the little bell of his rude chapel rang out the Angelus; again at noon, and at 6 o'clock in the evening. At the early morning Mass, there were prayers recited by some of the Christians before the Holy Sacrifice was offered. When he had fully instructed the men, women, and children, who had been baptized before his coming, he turned his attention to the reclamation of the unbelievers. The services in the chapel on Sundays and festivals, consisted of High Mass and vespers, at both of which Father Baraga preached. At first, his instructions were interpreted by a competent lady whom Bishop Fenwick had sent to him, but he soon became sufficiently proficient in the Ottawa dialect to address his remarks direct to his hearers. These services attracted the attention of the unbelievers, but when any among them were found to be inclined to listen to the explanation of the Christian ceremonies they witnessed, Father Baraga sought them out, instructed them, and by prayer and perseverance prepared them for baptism.

The presence of such a man as Father Baraga, in the Ottawa community, his saintly personality, his simple and abstemious mode of living, and his devotion to missionary work, was not without its effect upon the minds of those he sought to win to Christianity.

While his work was laborious, his nourishment poor, and his dwelling but a poor protection against rain or snow, he still persevered.

In ten weeks he had baptized 75 Indian converts, young and old. During one day, which he described as a most happy one, and never to be forgotten, he baptized 11 persons.

In seven months from his coming to the mission, he had baptized 131 Indian converts, who became fervent Christians, attended church regularly, and frequented the sacraments. This was the result up to the 4th day of January, 1832. Six months later, June 24th, the number of baptisms of converts during the half-year had been 109, mostly adults. If Father Baraga's work had been laborious, if his privations had seemed great, his soul was overjoyed at what he had accomplished."¹

¹ Manuscript, Rev. C. Verwyst, O.S.F.

He found a log schoolhouse at the mission when he came, which he had repaired. During the favorable season, he gathered forty children, whom he instructed during part of the day, and then commenced his round of visits to the cabins of his neophytes, to explain and to instruct where necessary.

Bishop Fenwick came to the mission in April, 1832; and this devoted prelate was again made happy by the results of Father Baraga's missionary work. He confirmed 137 persons at this visit; another school was opened for the Ottawa girls.

Among the places he visited was Manistique, where there was an unfinished chapel.

The people of this village were mostly unbelievers; but, by assistance, he completed the chapel, dedicated it, and offered the Holy Sacrifice in it regularly. After long and careful instruction, he baptized all the people of the village except one man.

When contemplating his work at Manistique, he was inspired to write: "The thought, that in this wild spot, in the midst of the ancient forests, where but yesterday only the cries of the wild children of nature resounded, and idolatrous sacrifices were offered to the evil spirits—that on this spot now stood a temple of the living God, in which the unspotted Lamb of God was offered to the Holy Father—this thought seized me so mightily, that I wept tears of the deepest emotion, and could find no words to offer thanks to God. This poor little church is, indeed, built only of logs and of the bark of trees; but, to me, it seems a more precious temple than so many of those more costly edifices enriched with gold, and adorned with the genius of the masters, which are dishonored by the lukewarmness, and, indeed, the indecorum of those who enter them."

After the bishop's departure, and after he had seen the performance of their paschal obligations by his congregation, Father Baraga visited Beaver Island, which could be indistinctly outlined from the Lake shore at Arbre Croche.

This is the largest of the islands grouped in Lake Michigan, near the Straits of Mackinac; its circumference is about 12 miles. On Beaver Island lived a large tribe of Ottawas governed by a chief. They had been solidly pagan, until one of their warriors hearing at Mackinac of Father Baraga's renown, had the curiosity to come to Arbre Croche to see and converse with the "black gown." That man remained, was instructed, baptized, and he became a fervent Christian; he obtained a promise from the missionary that he would visit the island and preach to its people.

When the Beaver island convert returned to his tribe, he told the chief of his visit and of his conversion, and of the promise made him by the "black gown," that he would come and preach to the people of the island.

The account of this visit is minutely given by Father Baraga. He was cordially received by the chief and his people, and the honors of a distinguished guest rendered in true Indian fashion. At his first interview with the chief, he informed him that he had come upon important business, and, in accordance with Indian etiquette, he asked that a council might be assembled on the following day.

The North American Indians transact all important affairs in council ; whether it be a tribal question or a national question, a message to be received from another tribe or nation, or a chief "to raise up," a council is assembled. Father Baraga appeared before a council of the chiefs, head men and warriors of Beaver Island. He writes :

"I made a speech briefly and energetically explaining the necessity and advantage of the Christian religion, and finally requested the chief to give me an answer. He did so by his orator, saying they considered themselves happy to see a priest on their island, and that they frequently desired to adopt the Christian religion. The joy with which such an answer filled the missionary's heart can be imagined ! I remained with them some time and instructed them, and the 11th of May was the happy day on which I baptized twenty-two of these Indians."

But much hard work had to be done before the Beaver Islanders were made Christians. It was the most compact body of anti-Christians in any one place in the lake region.

In time, however, all opposition was overcome, when a chapel was built and dedicated.

That same summer he extended his apostolate to La Croix, known as Cross Village, and returned in time to preach to the head men and warriors at Arbre Croche prior to their departure for Canada to receive their annual presents from the British government. It may seem strange that Indians domiciled on American soil should go every summer to Canada and receive the bounty of the British ; but not only the Ottawas received such annuities, but many tribes of the Chippewas and of other nations did likewise. It is apparent that as late as the "thirties" the British government entertained the idea that these Indian nations might become useful allies in the West in case of war with the United States. They had been subsidized during the war of 1812 and harassed the settlements on the American frontier to a fearful extent ; in the event of another war they might be utilized in a similar manner. This was probably the policy of Sir John Johnson, son of Sir William, and controller of Indian affairs in Canada.

But this coddling with our Indian nations probably induced the United States government to hasten their removal from the frontier to a safe place west of the Mississippi. The manner in which

this was done in the case of some nations, we regret to say, was discreditable to humanity.¹

His Indians having gone to Canada to be absent three weeks or more, Father Baraga took occasion to fulfil a purpose he had much at heart.

During the long and dreary winter season of 1831-2 his nights had been devoted to the preparation for the press of a little book of 200 pages, written in the Ottawa dialect.

It was intended as a prayer book for his neophytes, containing prayers at Mass, at vespers, litanies, hymns and devotional prayers, besides a catechism.

This little book was his first philological effort in America, and he went to Detroit in August (1832) to have it printed.

It was no easy matter to have such a work go through an American press. It involved in its proof reading much labor and patience on the part of Father Baraga; but it was nevertheless published by George L. Whitney, proprietor and editor of the *Detroit Daily Advertiser*, in 1832.

If the missionary toil of Father Baraga during his first year at Arbre Croche had been incessant, we have every reason to believe that he enjoyed much satisfaction in the compilation of this little Ottawa prayer book. When he returned to his cabin, chilled with the cold and fatigued from a day's tour in the deep snow, he found his solace in this philological study, of which he was so fond. His young neophytes, boys and girls, could read and write in their native dialect. He would instruct the elder members of his fold, and then old and young, with book in hand, could assist at the solemnities in the chapel.

But the remarkable talent displayed by Father Baraga as a linguist deserves notice. We have seen how he had commenced the study of the Ottawa language upon his arrival at Cincinnati in 1831. This was his first contact with an American Indian dialect, and yet by July of the following year he had ready for printing a work of 200 pages in a language to which, a few months before, he was an utter stranger.

To Father Baraga this was an important event. His book was intended solely for the use of his Ottawa congregation; its use would make the Christian members of his fold better able to spread the light of faith among the unconverted. Linguistic contributions to the Ottawa language have been altogether limited to Catholic missionaries who have worked within the central zone of

¹ The scenes attending the forcible removal of the Pottawatomies from their homes on the St. Joseph by United States troops were heartrending. They were mostly Catholic.

Michilimacinac. The earliest of these contributions is a manuscript, extant, of 50 pages, in the Ottawa language, written by Father Louis André, S.J., 1680.¹ Father Du Jaunay sixty years later compiled his French-Ottawa dictionary, the location of which manuscript we have given. The first book printed in the Ottawa-French language appeared fifty years later. Father Augustine De Jean, a missionary under Father Richard, whom we have mentioned, had this work printed at Detroit in 1830 by George L. Whitney. It has 106 pages 18mo, and comprises prayers, hymns, devotions and catechism in French and Ottawa, designed for the use of the Ottawas living in the same lake regions where Father André had labored one hundred and fifty years previously.

But Father Baraga had the honor to compile and write the first book ever published in the Ottawa language pure and simple.

While Father Baraga in Detroit was occupied in correcting the proof sheets of his forthcoming book, an event occurred of serious import to the progress of religion in Detroit "and its dependencies." This was the death of Very Rev. Gabriel Richard, the founder of the Indian missions of the lakes, at the old presbytery of St. Anne, September 13, 1832. He died a martyr to Christian charity. By his bedside at his last moments were the tried soldiers of the cross, Francis Vincent Baden and Frederick Baraga.²

On his return to Arbre Croche he brought with him Father Saenderl, a Redemptorist missionary, whom he introduced as his assistant, and, leaving him in charge of that and of contiguous missions, he spent the year 1833 in a series of visits to the Ottawa villages; at Manistique, where he had a chapel, at Grand Traverse, and at the chief canton of the Ottawas on the Grand river. There were at the time a number of Ottawa villages in the Grand River Valley. At the chief canton a Baptist missionary had been established for some years, but he had secured only a small following. Here was the seat of the United States Indian agency for Southern Michigan; Indian traders and their white followers were numerous, with the result that the Ottawas in these cantons, who were nearly all unbelievers, had become badly demoralized. Raw Ohio whiskey could be had for twenty-five cents per gallon.

Debauchery had taken a strong hold to the great pecuniary advantage of the Indian traders. But Father Baraga built his cabin where the city of Grand Rapids now stands, and he began to preach in the Ottawa dialect. This enraged the Baptist missionary's followers, who found active allies among the traders.

¹ See memoir of Father André, S.J., by Father A. E. Jones, S.J., Archivist St. Mary's College, Montreal.

² For our sketch of the career of Father Richard see the AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW, vol. xviii., No. 69, January, 1893, pp. 94-101.

They instigated a drunken crowd one night to attack Father Baraga's cabin. He had been hastily warned of their coming and had strongly barred the doors and windows. Fortunately they were too drunk to effect an entrance. Had they succeeded he would have been murdered. For hours this drunken mob besieged his cabin. Their yells were frightful. He expected every moment to see the bark roof ablaze and contemplated his death by fire. Word, however, was sent to the acting United States Marshal of the riot, and he came and dispersed the rioters.

All during this infernal uproar Father Baraga remained on his knees in prayer. Convinced of the evil brought upon this people by the abuse of liquor, he came to the conclusion to offer himself as an example. There in that cabin, but unawed by his assailants, he solemnly vowed to abstain from intoxicating drink during the whole course of his life.¹ He kept that pledge faithfully to the last. But many a time, when overcome with exhaustion, when his stomach was nauseated by unpalatable food, when shivering in his wet clothing or partly frozen during Lake Superior winters he sadly needed a glass of wine or of brandy to revive both body and mind he may have been tempted, but the night scene in his cabin on the Grand River would recur to his mind and he offered the privation to his Redeemer whenever experienced. But opposition such as this could not deter Father Baraga. He improvised a chapel and continued to preach while the number of his hearers increased, and in a short time he had baptized forty-three Ottawa converts. On Whitsunday he baptized thirty-eight, and wrote home to his sister that it was the happiest day of his life. His success continued. On the shore of Lake Michigan, west of the Grand River Valley, was Mus-ke-gon, an Ottawa village of many cabins. This Father Baraga visited. He built his cabin and a small chapel and commenced his missionary work. There was a sober and well-ordered community of Ottawas living in this village and he converted nearly all of them. There was a council assembled at Mus-ke-gon to deliberate about moving west of the Mississippi.

Father Baraga attended this council and greatly admired the native eloquence of some of the speakers. He decided to remain among the Ottawas of Grand River, and in the autumn of 1834 he made an overland journey to Detroit, probably to obtain funds for missionary necessities.²

Although many pioneers had located in Michigan, the journey

¹ Manuscript, Rev. Walter Elliott, C.S.P., from V. Rev. Father Jacker.

² Among the objects of this memorable journey was to obtain an assistant and to arrange for the printing of his second work in the Ottawa language.

to and from Detroit, which was partly in the saddle and partly on foot, exceeded any experience Father Baraga had yet had of the hardships of travel in Michigan. The journey east lasted seven days. The return journey was longer. In some bad places one horse had to carry three persons on his back, while during the last two days not a dwelling of any kind, log cabin or Indian lodge was seen until the vicinity of the Indian cantons was reached.

One fortunate result of his visit to Detroit, was the obtaining from Rt. Rev. Dr. R    , its first bishop, the services of Rev. Andrew Viszoczky, a young Hungarian priest, who had devoted his life to missionary work among the Indians of Michigan. He was taught the English and Ottawa languages by Father Baraga.

His coming was a great solace to the latter; being from the same empire which had Vienna for her capital, he proved not only an agreeable companion but also a very pious and zealous missionary priest; he soon acquired a practical knowledge of the Ottawa dialect and was able to preach to and instruct Father Baraga's neophytes, while this missionary was, by his aid, enabled to give more attention to the reformation of the habits and to the conversion of the unbelievers.

Father Baraga had converted and baptized about two hundred Ottawas on the Grand River. He had reformed the habits of these neophytes before baptism, having won them over from their propensity to get drunk and they gradually fell into the practice of industry and thrift.

Their example had had its good effect on others; but there were opposing influences at work of such strength as he had never encountered before in his missionary experience.

The situation was this. All that part of the Grand River valley, where at the time, the Ottawa cantons were located and which embraced the field of Father Baraga's missionary labors, was an Indian reservation under the United States government.

Within the limits of this reservation, the potency of the United States Indian agent was supreme; he had for his assistance, in case of need, a small force of United States soldiers; while on any extraordinary occasion he could have a full regiment sent from Fort Dearborn, now Chicago, to the reservation. But the fate of the Ottawas had already been decided.

The outbreak of the Black Hawk war had demonstrated the danger menacing the western frontier settlements from the vicinity of such Indian nations as the Ottawas, Pottawotomis, Miamis, Illinois, and the Sac and Foxes.

During this outbreak, by adroit and prompt measures, the Pottawotomis and Prairie tribes were all assembled at Fort Dearborn, placed under guard, and regularly rationed until Black

Hawk had been captured, and his revolt had collapsed; then they were permitted to return to their cantons, placated with presents of blankets, kettles, and silver trinkets for the squaws. The following summer the Miamis, Ottawas, and Pottawotomis, were assembled in council at Fort Dearborn, and by the usual methods, these nations were induced to sign a treaty by which they ceded their reservations in Michigan, Indiana, Ohio, Illinois, and Wisconsin, for reservations of five million acres of lands west of the Mississippi to each of the nations entering into treaty obligations.

But there remained the matter of form process of obtaining the assent of the separate tribes of each nation to their emigration to the West. With the Christian tribes this assent was not so easy to obtain. This duty devolved upon the Indian agent resident with each nation.

The Pottawotomis, who were mostly Christian, were reluctant to leave their homes and the vicinity of the graves of their ancestors, where for centuries this nation had occupied the soil of the fairest regions of Michigan and of Indiana, and were not unanimous; but speculators wanted their lands and means were found by the United States Indian agent to obtain the signature of a sufficient number of chiefs to make a majority in favor of removal, which being in opposition to the wishes of the minority, the latter refused to leave their homes. A regiment of United States troops was sent from Fort Dearborn to drive these Christian men, women and children, from their own homes by the bayonet and to escort them like wild cattle to the place assigned them in the far distant West.¹

Hence the painful scenes accompanying this outrage to which we have already referred. The process of obtaining the assent of the separate tribes of the Ottawas to emigration in accordance with their national treaty was then in progress. Hence the tribal councils to which all came, hence the presence of so many Indian traders on the Grand River reservation, and the debauchery prevalent while Father Baraga was there. It is certain he would not advise his converts to leave their homes. The United States government did not want a repetition of the disgraceful scenes which had blackened its reputation in the Pottawotomi removal. But the Ottawas were more efficient warriors; should there be any trouble

¹ The Christian Pottawotomis were not all expatriated; the Catholic chief Po-kagon, and others of his tribe, remained in their homes.

Among the great historical paintings which adorn the walls of the University of Notre Dame, is one representing the first meeting of its illustrious founder and his companions of the Order of the Holy Cross with the Pottawotomi Indians more than half a century ago. In this painting the distinguished artist outlines to perfection the tall and slender form of Father Sorin, while giving the peculiar and perhaps inspired reflection visible upon his face.

another general Indian war might ensue, and the development of the Western States, then in fair progress, would be retarded; Michigan, which at the time was rapidly filling with settlers, would be the theatre of this war. The Indian agent was instructed to effect the removal of the Ottawas peaceably, and to avoid the violent methods resorted to with the Pottawotomis. The government had acquired the title to the Indians' lands by treaty, while the less important details could be managed by well known methods. Besides, there was not at the time, the same sharp crowd of land sharks and speculators eager to acquire lands in Michigan there had been in Indiana and Ohio, to rush the Indian agent to rid the Territory of the original owners of the soil.

While Father Baraga was so successful in his apostolic work, this success was creating an opposition he probably was not at first aware of. The number of his converts crazed the Baptist missionary with his dozen or more followers.

The reform in the morals of the Ottawas seriously lessened the quantity of whiskey which the Indian traders had been selling; while the probability that the converted Ottawa bands would object to remove to the unknown country west of the Mississippi, would bring the Indian agent into trouble with the government at Washington for inefficiency in effecting their removal.

This functionary, as stated, was virtually controller of the reservation. That he was influenced by the sectarian missionary there is but very little doubt; that he was a sharer in the profits of the traders, through the permits he sold them for privileges on the reservation, there is every reason to believe, for that was in all probability the rule.

That Father Baraga was considered a serious obstacle to the personal interests and to the official task of the United States Indian agent, however, is beyond any question, for it is proved by the edict of the latter functionary, that the Catholic missionary should leave the reservation for the alleged reason that he was disturbing the peaceful status of its Indians, and that he would in all probability thwart, to some extent at least, the plans of the government for their removal. Father Baraga opposed this edict. Notwithstanding the efforts of Bishops Rézé and Purcell, and the intervention of Stevens T. Mason, the youthful governor of the Territory of Michigan, the Indian Department at Washington sustained the action of the Indian agent of the Grand River reservation, and Father Baraga was forced to leave the scene of his successful missionary works. The Indian agent then accomplished the conditions of the treaty of Fort Dearborn, and the Ottawas were removed to their new reservation west of the Mississippi. Father Baraga left Father Viszoczky in the Grand River valley.

This distinguished priest remained after the missions had been abandoned by the Ottawas, Christians and unbelievers alike.

His chapel was located where the city of Grand Rapids was subsequently built. Such was the rapid settlement of the newly created State of Michigan by immigrants from the older States and from Europe, that Kent county, which included the Grand River country, possessing as it did fine water-power facilities, and rich agricultural advantages, attracted from 1835 a large number of pioneer settlers.

What is now the second city in population and wealth in Michigan, was founded; and at Grand Rapids, from the time its first log house was built, until long after it had obtained commercial prominence, Father Viszoczky remained.

No other county, except perhaps Monroe, during all the "thirties" and "forties" in Michigan, outside of Wayne county, in which is Detroit, had a resident priest such as Kent county was blessed with. The nucleus of Father Viszoczky's congregation was composed of the Franco-American families whose chiefs had been connected with the Indian trade; these were not numerous; but the fact that there was a Catholic church and priest at Grand Rapids, induced many Irish, a few German, and a still smaller number of American Catholics to locate in the town or in its vicinity; and this Hungarian disciple of Father Baraga soon found himself in charge of the largest Catholic English speaking congregation in Michigan, outside of Detroit. His rude log and bark roofed chapel was replaced by St. Andrew's Church which was in time enlarged.

After twenty-five years of incessant labor, Father Viszoczky—being worn out, was placed on the superannuated list and came to Detroit, where his days were peacefully passed until he was called to his eternal reward. In 1883, Grand Rapids was created a see. St. Andrew's Church has been made a cathedral.

Where Father Baraga preached to the Ottawa Indians in their village, and where he had built his first chapel in the Grand River valley, in which he baptized the aboriginal owners of the soil more than sixty years ago, there are now five Catholic churches. The foot-prints of this holy missionary on Grand River soil, have not been trodden by generations of the Ottawa race. What the fate of these generations has been, it would be difficult to say. Their history differs but little perhaps, from that of other western Indian nations, whose presence, in their normal state, in the homes of their forefathers, had become an impediment to the settlement of the regions in which these homes were located, by the white races. The red man required ten thousand acres of wild land to constitute his hunting domain; while the white man who culti-

vated the soil, required for his support, fifty acres at the utmost. The Indian had to get out of the white man's way.

The expatriation of the tribes of the Ottawa nation, depopulated the missionary centres of Father Baraga. Arbre Croche, particularly, is a name which has a place only in the history of the past.

This locality where sixty-two years since Father Baraga preached to the Ottawas, and where, during the long winter of 1831-2, he wrote his first book in an American Indian language, has become a summer resort; while its peculiar and ancient Indian name has been changed to the common-place one of Harbor Springs. It is one of the beauty spots on the shores of Michigan's lakes. Its springs are said to be healing; they ought to be, for they were blessed by holy men from Michilimacinac more than one hundred and fifty years ago. The island of Mackinac, whose eventful history during the past is so interesting, is an example of some of the remarkable changes which have occurred during the last two decades. During the early part of this century, as has been stated, it was one of the principal stations in the western lakes of the American Fur Company, whose trappers gathered furs in regions as far west as the Pacific Ocean. The condition of the inhabitants of the island, when Father Richard first visited it in 1799, has been outlined. It had not materially changed during Father Baraga's sojourn at Arbre Croche.

Coueurs de Bois, traders, half-breeds, Ottawas and other straggling Indians, forming the lower strata of its population, came and went, season after season. The chief-factor of the American Fur Company and his staff, the officers of the garrison and their families, formed the exclusive upper circle of its population. The removal of the Ottawas was soon after followed by that of the Fur Company's depot. The garrison of two companies remained, but the trade of the island became of little account.

During the past fifty years, a Catholic church has been maintained, whose pastor visited the settlements on the islands and main shore, but his local parishioners were few. The Indian department assembled the near-by Chippewas and a few Ottawas, during the month of July of each year, and distributed the government annuities. While the Fur Company had its depot at Mackinac, and under the auspices of its factor an evangelical missionary agency was established.

The Indians have gone; the Fur Company also; and the missionary agency has been discontinued. All that was left, connecting the present with the past, was the Catholic church and the garrison of the U. S. soldiers. Since the "fifties," the island has become a favorite summer resort.

During nine months of the year it is a solitary place; but, during June, July, and August, crowds come from far and near to enjoy the health-inspiring air, and to eat the fish caught in the cold waters of the vicinity, which are probably unsurpassed among the fresh-water species. Another great change is now going on. Congress has donated its military reservation to the State of Michigan for a State park. In the month of September, 1895, the commanding officer lowered the United States flag, which had fluttered for a century, and the troops retired to Fort Brady at Sault Ste. Marie.

The Catholic Church is all that has life on Mackinac Island connecting with its past history of more than two centuries.

Wheresoever the footprints of Father Richard and of his missionaries, and of Father Baraga and his assistants, had marked the advent of these saintly men, on the mainlands of the coast of Lake Michigan, the most wonderful transformations have taken place.

Take, for example, Chicago, Grand Rapids, Milwaukee, Green Bay, Muskegon, and many other cities, on both shores of the peninsula of Michigan.

The missionary career of Father Baraga had but commenced when he was forced to leave his work on the Grand River.

But a more extensive, and a far more hazardous field, was now to be entered. Some of the tribes of the once great Chippewa nation still clung to their homes on the coasts and islands of Lake Superior, towards its eastern extremity.

The condition of their people was wretched. They had lost their pride of race, succumbed to debauchery, and they were living in dire poverty. As a rule, Christianity was unknown, while idolatrous superstition prevailed. Father Baraga resolved to reform their habits, and to lead them to the knowledge and practice of Christian life.

RICHARD R. ELLIOTT.

A HERO OF OUR DAY.

IN last September there passed from this life one who, in exile and suffering, had been for over thirty years the foremost object of veneration of a great nation and whose funeral was such as the mightiest rulers could not rival. That man was Sigismund Felinski, the former Archbishop of Warsaw, the historic capital of Poland and the centre of a nationality of twenty millions of human beings. Like Louis Kossuth, another prominent figure in the life of a nation, Archbishop Felinski had outlived the storms and struggles of his public career and spent his last years in privacy, but the difference was wide between the sentiments which each displayed in his retirement. The once popular idol of Hungary expressed nothing but disappointment and despair of the future during his declining years, while Archbishop Felinski at three score and ten busied himself with the duties of an humble parish priest and never once expressed a doubt of the ultimate triumph of right in the struggle still waged by his countrymen for faith and freedom. The man of the world had got the world's reward and found it only vanity and vexation of spirit, the Christian had borne the world's penalty for those who hold conscience as their guide; but he had won the peace which passes human understanding and in it he closed his chequered life.

Sigismund Felinski was born in 1821 in Volhynia, a province of the old Polish nation, but not included in the modern kingdom of Poland. Since the Treaty of Vienna the larger part of the former Poland has been politically incorporated with Russia, while the title "Kingdom of Poland" with a separate administration in some respects is left to the western provinces around Warsaw. Volhynia, the native province of the future Archbishop, is officially regarded as Russian soil, but its people still retain their faith and nationality in defiance of the Czar's will. The Felinski family were distinguished in science and literature. Sigismund's father who died (1831) when he was still a child was a professor in the College of Kremenetz and his Uncle Aloysius was the author of the celebrated hymn "Boze Cos Polske," "God who guards Poland," which has been to the Polish race for fifty years what the "Marseillaise" is to the Frenchman or the "Star Spangled Banner" to patriotic Americans. His mother, Eva Felinski, was also a writer of distinguished merit in the literature of Poland and her "Memoirs of Exile" ranks with Silvio Pellico's "Le Mie Prigioni."

The young Sigismund was only permitted a very brief enjoyment of his parents' care. Subsequently to his father's death his mother was accused of conspiracy (1838) against the Russian Government and transported to Siberia, leaving her six children wholly unprovided for. Her place of exile was the town of Bere-zoff near the Arctic Ocean, where Mentchikoff, the once favored Minister of Peter the Great, had been sent to die early in the last century. The children were adopted by different friends and a wealthy Polish proprietor, Count Brzozowski, took Sigismund into his family and educated him with his own children. He was sent by his benefactor to the College of Klevan and subsequently to the Russian University of Moscow, where he graduated in the Scientific Course. During his studies at Moscow he was permitted to see his mother, who had been allowed, after some years, to leave Bere-zoff for the milder climate of Saratoff in Southern Russia, though forbidden entrance to her native land. To aid her he employed nearly the whole of the allowance made for his own support by M. Brzozowski and he literally lived the life of an anchorite in the Russian capital during his university course. His yearly visit to his mother was his chief indulgence, and that, too, was commonly shared by another brother, whose expenses Sigismund defrayed out of his scanty savings. The bond of affection, which united all members of the family, was remarkable and in this respect as in others there was a strong resemblance in character between Archbishop Felinski and the late Cardinal Newman.

His university course finished, it was open to young Felinski to enter upon a professional career with very favorable prospects. He preferred to make some recompense to his benefactor by taking charge of the education of his younger boys. In the capacity of their tutor he visited Paris in 1848 and spent several months there. His acquirements and polished manners made him a favorite in society and he contracted acquaintance with many distinguished men, especially amongst the large colony of Polish emigrants. Chopin, the composer, was amongst them and in the last illness of Chopin it was Felinski who brought him a priest and secured him the consolations of the Church. About this time he conceived the wish of adopting the ecclesiastical state in his native land, and on his return to Volhynia he offered himself to Bishop Borowski as a student for the priesthood, at the age of thirty. He was received into the Ecclesiastical Seminary of Luck-Zytomir in 1851.

The life of a Catholic priest in Volhynia as in other Russian lands is a career which recalls the old penal days in Ireland. The Russian Government while tolerating their existence within limits fixed by the administration, regards the Catholic clergy with unconcealed

distrust and regulates their actions much as it would those of suspected criminals. To speak or write against the state church is felony, to administer the sacraments to any but their own parishioners is punished with transportation, and any direct communication with the Holy See involves the same penalty. It would be rebellion to build or even repair a church without government permission and the organization of confraternities for any religious purpose is equally forbidden. In every act of his life the Catholic priest is hampered by a minute legal code which restricts his motions, examines his sermons and even scrutinizes those who approach his confessional or residence. Such, however, was the career chosen by Sigismund Felinski in the flower of early manhood with every prospect of a brilliant worldly life before him.

His stay in the Zytomir Seminary only lasted two years and he was then sent by his Bishop to the Central Seminary of St. Petersburg. This is an institution for the higher education of distinguished students from all the Catholic seminaries of the Russian Empire, and has been established by the Imperial Government with the view of training the future prelates of the Church in a distinctively Russian institution, even if it allows Catholic teaching in their purely theological studies. In fact it was founded on much the same principle that induced the Protestant Ascendancy Parliament of Ireland to establish the College of Maynooth in the last century. As in Maynooth, too, the Catholic influence has dominated over the political and the Seminary of St. Petersburg has furnished no small proportion of confessors to the church in Russia. In it Felinski completed his studies and received ordination, but not for his native diocese. The Archbishop of Mohileff, whose vast diocese embraces nearly the whole of Russia east of Poland, claimed his services and his mission work began in St. Petersburg. After some time the popularity which Father Felinski attained in the capital gave umbrage to the jealous Russian police. He was in consequence named a Professor in the Ecclesiastical Academy, where he continued residing until 1862.

During these years Father Felinski had kept aloft from any share in politics, devoting himself exclusively to his priestly duties. A time had come, however, when he was forced into unsought prominence. The people of Poland began in 1860 to show symptoms of restlessness under the oppressions which had weighed on them since the overthrow of their national constitution by Nicholas I. in 1831. Warsaw became the scene of public demonstrations of a new kind. On the anniversary of the Battle of Grochow, fought under the ramparts of the Polish capital in 1830, an immense procession visited the battlefield to pray for the souls of the slain. An officious police officer, Colonel Trepoff, ordered

the crowds to disperse, but in vain. Either through mistake or in vexation at his repulse he ordered a band of Cossacks to charge the members of a procession coming from one of the Catholic churches, which was only a common funeral. Four persons were killed and forty wounded and the scandal was so great that the Governor of Warsaw, General Gortchakoff, publicly condemned the act of his subordinate. The popular feelings were inflamed terribly and found expression in the form of immense gatherings in the various Catholic churches, where unarmed crowds joined in singing patriotic hymns. These gatherings were spontaneous manifestations of public sentiment and they were highly offensive to the Russian authorities; who revenged themselves by numerous arrests and banishments. The Agricultural Society of Poland, the most important public body in the Kingdom, which had established a bank for the transfer of the land to the peasantry on a system similar to Mr. Gladstone's subsequent legislation for Ireland, was summarily suppressed and on several occasions numbers of unarmed citizens were shot down or butchered by the police and Cossacks. The Governor of Warsaw vainly tried to end this condition of turmoil and alternately apologized for the police outrages and threatened greater severities. The archbishop, Mgr. Fialkowski, was ordered to forbid the chanting of hymns in the churches, but he steadfastly refused and addressed a spirited remonstrance to the Governor of Poland against the conduct of the executive. It was almost his latest act as he died in September, 1861. An administrator of the Archdiocese was duly elected to fill his place, but only held the office a few weeks. On the 15th of October, 1861, a public funeral service was held in nearly all the Catholic churches of Warsaw in memory of Kosciusko. The police and Cossacks surrounded five congregations and kept them seventeen hours shut up in the churches, after which they drove them out by brute force and arrested nearly 2000 of every age and sex. The sensation caused both in Poland and throughout Europe by this brutal action was enormous and the administrator ordered the suspension of all services in the Catholic churches of Warsaw until the government would secure the worshippers against a repetition of such outrages. He was at once arrested, tried by court martial and sentenced to death, but he steadily refused to allow the churches to be opened. Alexander II. was deeply affected by this unexpected turn in events, which covered his government with disgrace in the eyes of the civilized world. He called the Minister of Worship for Poland, the Marquis Wielopolski, a Catholic and a Pole, but a thorough aristocrat of haughty temper, to St. Petersburg for consultation. Wielopolski advised as the only remedy that a new archbishop should be immediately

chosen. He further urged that a candidate should be proposed, who would be acceptable as a Catholic to the Holy See but not a member of the Warsaw or Polish clergy. Felinski united both qualifications and Wielopolski advised his nomination. On the following day, 15th December, 1861, a courier was dispatched to Rome with the Imperial nomination and on the 22d of the same month Pius IX. held a consistory and preconised Mgr. Felinski to the Archiepiscopal See of Warsaw. His consecration followed within the next month, 26th of January, 1862, and on the 9th of February, 1862, he arrived in his new diocese where he was escorted to his residence by a squadron of cavalry, so anxious was the governor to give the population the impression that their chief pastor would support with all his authority the measures of the Russian authorities.

It is hard to conceive a more difficult position for a man of conscience and honor than that in which the new archbishop found himself placed. On the one hand the Catholic population had been excited by gross oppression to the verge of open revolt, on the other he could not but be aware that against the power of Russia such a revolt could only produce still worse disaster to the whole of Poland. Under a thin mask of official respect, the Russian authorities required an absolute obedience to all their demands. On the other hand, the Catholic population demanded not less imperatively that their bishop should show his sympathy in the persecutions they were suffering for faith as well as for Fatherland. It required consummate prudence as well as fearless courage to guide Mgr. Felinski in such a conjuncture, but though a novice in public life he quickly showed that he possessed both. The churches were re-opened and at the same time he selected as vicar-general, Father Rzewuski, whose patriotism as well as his courage had been already shown. In May an order was issued by the chief of police that there should be no lighting of candles at the altars of the Blessed Virgin. The archbishop was requested by the director of public worship to order his priests to regulate their churches according to this order, with the threat that, if not, they would be liable to legal punishment. The answer of the archbishop was addressed to the Governor of Warsaw and was a respectful but firm refusal to regulate Catholic worship by governmental rules. After pointing out that the May Devotions were simply a religious observance and had been practised for many years as a part of Catholic devotion he wrote :

Considering that the practice of decorating the altars of the Saints goes back to the farthest times and that it is suggested by pure sentiments of Christian piety which religion must approve instead of condemning, I ask you, Mr. Director, to hold the

Episcopal authority excused when it cannot issue an order forbidding its clergy that which religion itself does not forbid. Allow me to add that the request made to the first dignitary of the Church in this country, to publish police regulations to his flock, offends so strongly the respect due to the character of a bishop that I hope the Director will be good enough to dispense with forwarding me similar requests for the future.

It seems easy to write such a letter for an American accustomed to no higher worldly authority than public opinion for his utterances, but it was a widely different thing to address it to an official who held the writer's liberty and life at his almost free disposal. General Luders, the governor, however did not think fit to reply directly to the courageous prelate, but the police adopted the course of entering the churches during the May Devotions and arresting arbitrarily some of the worshippers, especially women, each evening. Luders summoned the archbishop to his palace and complained bitterly of the attitude of the clergy, finishing by demanding if the archbishop knew what responsibility he was incurring. Felinski answered calmly that he felt no scruple about his action though he knew well he might be sent to Siberia. Luders gave up further attempts to make an impression on Felinski's courage for the time, but the storm continued to gather over his head.

The following month the Grand Duke Constantine, brother of the Emperor, was named Lieutenant of Poland and it looked as if a conciliatory system of government was about to be tried by Russia. An educational system was drawn up by Wielopolski, which was a decided improvement on existing methods and Archbishop Felinski gave it his public approval and used all his influence to allay the excitement still prevalent among the Polish people. He endeavored to obtain from the Grand Duke some measure of freedom for the clergy and that the Bishops should be free in their choice, and also that the priests exiled to Siberia in the past year should be released. At times Constantine seemed favorably disposed on these points, but the police system was stronger than his will and the arrests continued with ever growing exasperation of the public mind.

In August the Viceroy published a proclamation inviting the Poles to trust in him and labor in concert with him in promoting the national welfare. The principal members of the proprietary signed an address in answer, in which they promised their aid on condition that the government should be Polish and that all the provinces of Poland should be united under a common head. The immediate result was the arrest of Count Zamoyski, the most prominent man in Poland, and things grew worse than before. The Polish population in the old provinces, officially sepa-

rated from Poland, joined in the movement for Home Rule and a few weeks after the arrest of Zamoyski the assembly of notables of Podolia prepared an address to the Czar pointing out the wretched condition of their country and asking for a reunion with Poland as the only remedy. The only answer was the summary arrest of the marshals and most of the signers. Everything pointed to a new outbreak and the Russian government felt it with mixed feelings of regret and anger. At this moment Archbishop Felinski had to address his first pastoral letter to his clergy and it would be hard to find braver words than it spoke at such a time. We give an extract :

My love for my country is a sacred sentiment which, like you, I have drawn from my mother's breast and from which I will never part. I am a Pole by the Divine Law and also the law of man. Our tongue, our history, our national way of life, are an inheritance which we received from our fathers and which we are bound to transmit to the coming generations. I am convinced that the Kingdom of God is not in words, but in the will, and that true love of country is not a thing of noisy clamor, but of conscientious works directed to the common welfare. The development of public instruction, the teaching of human knowledge and of morality in the schools, the organization of charitable works, and above all the formation of a truly national character by the practice of public and private virtues. Such is the sublime and useful task in which every effort adds to the common well-being of the country. But in the case of armed revolt, of conspiracies and demonstrations, when the project fails of success all sacrifices for it are lost.

Besides, can we say that our country is blameless; can we say that our misfortunes are not the punishment of the faults of our fathers and ourselves? Sincere penitence, zeal to acquire virtue and fervent and humble prayer are the surest means for our nation to recover peace and prosperity. Every one, in this direction, can help the public happiness. To build up, not to destroy, is our word of command. If we work always for God, God will be always with us.

It would be hard to find words which more clearly express the true course of a Christian patriot than this pastoral address, but it was too fearless for the suspicious rulers of Poland and its public reading was forbidden by the Grand Duke. He abandoned all idea of making the archbishop an instrument of his administration and passed further in the common course of despotic misgovernment. To crush the spirit of the people a forced conscription of the young men of Warsaw, made at police selection, was ordered, and on the night of January 15, 1863, the garrison of Warsaw filled the streets while bodies of police entered private houses and seized some thousand young men to be sent at once to distant parts of Russia as forced recruits. Similar measures followed in other cities of Poland, and on the 22d of the same month a number of conscripts who had escaped broke into open rebellion, which quickly spread through both Poland and Lithuania.

A general disarming of the population was ordered on the 16th

of February, 1863, and the Grand Duke followed it up with a proclamation calling on the peasantry to seize all suspected persons in the country districts with promises of rewards and governmental favor to the most active. The members of the Council of State of Polish birth, of whom the archbishop in virtue of his office was one, refused to join in this proclamation and resigned their offices, as did most of the government functionaries of Polish nationality. Constantine threatened and begged alternately the archbishop to withdraw his resignation and sent it back to him, while it was officially declared that he "remained in his post." Constantine declared that the two offices of Archbishop and Councillor of State could not be separated and at an interview he demanded of Mgr. Felinski if he was ready to resign both.

"I hold my place as archbishop from God and by institution received from the Holy See," was the answer. "No human power can take it from me. It has pleased you to join to it certain civil functions, which I believe I cannot discharge without violating my conscience. I have a perfect right to resign these functions. But as for my pastoral charge I cannot and I will not lay it down. Should I quit my post I would deserve the name of a hireling. With God's help I hope to prove myself a good shepherd and, if need be, to give my life for my flock."

The Grand Duke angrily replied that he wished to take the part of a rebel, and dismissed him with the declaration that by will of the emperor he would still be regarded as a state councillor. It was evident that such a state of affairs could not last, and on the 15th of March, 1863, the archbishop, making use of the privilege granted him at his consecration, addressed a letter to the Czar himself. In the general servitude of Russia it is doubtful if such a document was ever received by a Russian emperor. It is too long to give here in full, but an extract will give an idea of Felinski's character better than many pages. To appreciate the full value of this utterance, we must remember that it was addressed by an unarmed ecclesiastic who but a year before had been filling a quiet professorial chair in a seminary and whose public experience was compressed within that year. Also that it was addressed to the absolute master of the lives and liberties of a hundred millions of men, who reckoned the writer as his own subject and to whom Polish nationality and the Catholic clergy were at the time special objects of suspicion and dislike.

"Sire," wrote Felinski, "it has ever been the mission and the privilege of the Church to make its voice heard by the powers of the world in times of public misfortune. It is in the name of that privilege and duty that, as first pastor of the kingdom of Poland, I venture to address your majesty to show you the urgent needs of the people entrusted to my charge. Blood is flowing in floods and repression is only

exasperating men's minds in place of intimidating them. I beg your majesty in the name of Christian charity and of the interests of both Russia and Poland to end this war of extermination. The institutions granted by your majesty are not enough to secure the welfare of the country. Poland will not be satisfied with a separate administration; she needs political life. Sire, assume the initiative in the Polish question boldly. Make Poland an independent nation united to Russia simply by your august dynasty. It is the only solution which can stop the flow of blood and lay a solid basis for a definite peace. Do not wait, sire, for the final outcome of the combat. There is more true greatness in the mercy which recoils from the shedding of blood than in the victory which depeoples a kingdom. I dare to hope that the monarch who has delivered from serfdom twenty millions of his subjects will not hesitate before the equally glorious task of restoring the happiness of a suffering nation. Pardon, sire, the frankness of my language. The moment is too serious for aught else. Pardon the pastor who, in view of overwhelming misfortunes, ventures to intercede for the flock entrusted to his charge."

Alexander made no reply to this letter, and the rebellion with its attendant carnage and executions went on. Archbishop Felinski felt there was only one course for him to follow as a Catholic prelate, and that was to abstain from taking any part in the tyranny, which he condemned while urging on his flock the criminal folly of vain resistance. He showed his people that a bishop in his sacred ministry can receive no instructions from any earthly power. The Russian government might dispose of his life, but they should not make him their accomplice in oppression. The test was soon made. The Feast of St. Mark (April 25th) is a special festival in Warsaw; but in 1863 the chief of police thought proper to forbid any celebration by the customary 'processions.' It was not alone that he issued a proclamation to that effect, but he called on Mgr. Felinski and required him as archbishop to prohibit processions in the Catholic churches on St. Mark's Day. The archbishop replied firmly that he could not receive rules of episcopal action from police authorities, and the ceremonies were conducted as usual. The police then arrested and imprisoned all priests who had officiated, and the archbishop himself was placed under military arrest in his own residence. A few days later the Grand Duke Constantine summoned him to the viceregal palace and required him to forbid the Corpus Christi processions. Mgr. Felinski refused unless he were allowed to telegraph for instructions to the Sovereign Pontiff. "I cannot allow that," said the viceroy. "Then," replied the archbishop, "I am forced to repeat that I have no right to issue such a prohibition." "And I," said the viceroy, "will use force and what can you do? I will place soldiers at the churches and will not let processions leave their doors." The archbishop rose and replied, "If so, I will be the first to head a procession, and with the crucifix in my hand I will meet your bayonets. It will then be seen whether it is I or your highness that seeks religious war."

The processions were not stopped, but loaded cannon were turned on all the principal streets as a hint of the possible consequences. In face of this military display the archbishop attended the Uniat Church of the Basilians and celebrated divine service according to both the Latin and Slavonian rites. It was a public declaration that he regarded both Uniats and Latins as equally belonging to his flock. This point was one which the Russian government, while admitting formally, had always sought to confuse. To keep the Latin and Uniat Catholics as far as possible separated has ever been the policy of Russia, and this action of Archbishop Felinski determined the viceroy to get rid of him at any cost. A number of arrests were made by the police among the Uniat Catholics of Warsaw with a view of striking terror, and within a few weeks another requisition was made on the archbishop to employ his pastoral authority for police purposes. A Capuchin, Father Konarski, who had acted as chaplain to the insurgents under Langiewicz, was made prisoner, and the Grand Duke himself directly ordered his execution. As a preliminary he desired Archbishop Felinski to formally degrade him as an unworthy priest. The latter refused absolutely. He could not apply the rules of canon law on the orders of a civil tribunal without any trial of the accused. He was then ordered to proceed at once to St. Petersburg and there await the judgment of the Czar himself. In obedience to this order he quitted Warsaw, never to see it again, on the 14th of June, 1863, just sixteen months after his entry as its archbishop.

He was not allowed to see the Emperor, however, nor even to reach St. Petersburg. Orders on the road detained him at Gatchina for three weeks during which the Secretary of State for Poland vainly endeavored by remonstrances and threats to change his mind and get him to lend his episcopal authority to the political action of the Russian government. He was finally ordered to forward a memorial in explanation of his conduct to Alexander II. The latter read this document in the presence of a few members of his Court, one of them a Catholic lady. Turning to her in high excitement he said: "See what your Felinski has written to me! He shall never return to Warsaw while I live." Next day the archbishop was ordered to proceed at once to Jaroslaf, a city in the interior of Russia, and remain there under police surveillance. All communication with his see or the Holy Father was strictly forbidden.

The exiled archbishop thus found himself practically a solitary prisoner in a distant land and absolutely cut off from all communication with either Poland or the Church authorities. Alexander to his last moment refused to allow even his name to be mentioned

to him. The Polish insurrection was suppressed and the country deluged in blood. The vicar-general, left by Mgr. Felinski in Warsaw, was banished to Astrakhan and the two substitutes appointed by the archbishop before his departure were banished to Siberia. Nearly every diocese in Poland was deprived of its bishops by exile or death and the Russian government refused to allow successors to be appointed. Twenty years of this persecution passed and at the end Catholicity was more deeply seated than ever in the hearts of the Polish people. Mgr. Felinski in his lonely exile won the respect even of Russian officials and he was allowed to exercise priestly functions among the few Catholic residents of Jaroslaf. To the task of a simple parish priest he devoted himself as ardently as to those of head of the Church of Poland. The whole face of Europe changed in the meanwhile. The German empire had risen and France had been cast down from its pre-eminence. The war between Russia and Turkey had begun and ended. Alexander II. slept in his blood-stained grave, and still Felinski lived in exile and Warsaw continued without a head for its Church. At length the Russian government grew sick of the persecution. Negotiations were opened in 1882 with the Holy See for establishing some *modus vivendi* for the Catholic Church and the Russian empire. The new Czar agreed to allow Bishops to be appointed to the ten sees that were without them, but with regard to Warsaw it was made an indispensable condition that Mgr. Felinski should be removed from his office.

To remove a Bishop from his see is certainly within the supreme jurisdiction over the Church of the Sovereign Pontiff, but it is a power which he, like every other human being entrusted with authority is bound strictly to exercise according to the law of justice. Mgr. Felinski had done nothing but his duty in resisting the commands of the Czar, and Leo XIII. refused to deprive him of his dignity for any motive of human expediency. At such a crisis the archbishop showed the full nobleness of his character. He had told the Grand Duke Constantine, that he would suffer exile or death rather than renounce his charge, but now he placed his resignation of his dignity freely in the hands of the Sovereign Pontiff for the common welfare, March 13, 1883. The Holy Father accepted his resignation and named him Archbishop of Tarsus in *partibus infidelium*. He was then permitted to leave his place of exile and a small pension was assigned for his support, but coupled with a prohibition to enter the Russian dominions.

On leaving Russia Mgr. Felinski proceeded at once to Rome where he was received with the highest favor by the Holy Father. His journey through Austrian-Poland was a great popular ova-

tion, for Poles throughout the world recognized him as the fearless confessor and champion of fatherland. With the permission of the Sovereign Pontiff he then took up his residence in Gallicia near Cracow under the dominion of Austria. There he spent his time between literary work and priestly duties, avoiding all publicity and the honors which popular favor was anxious to bestow on him. His mode of life was most simple, but his charities exceeded the limits of his small income and even his episcopal cross was sold to help the needs of those poorer than himself. Such was his life up to last summer, when his health began to fail and, after a visit to the springs of Carlsbad, he died on the way home at the hospitable house of the Bishop of Cracow in Gallicia.

The population of Cracow, itself once the capital of Poland, gave a royal funeral to the exiled archbishop. Delegations arrived from every part of Poland. Two archbishops, five bishops and many hundred priests joined in the celebration in the old Cathedral of Wawel on the 20th of September, 1895, while the famous Sigismund, the historic bell which for centuries has tolled the funerals of Poland's kings, rang the nation's mourning over the body of the patriot prelate. His life had not been a failure, though spent so long in exile, for the Catholic faith for which he struggled still holds sway in Poland in spite of Russian bayonets and despotic schism, and Catholic Poland fitly honored her dead hero.

B. J. CLINCH.

CATHOLICISM IN THACKERAY AND DICKENS.

THE works of non-Catholic genius are often mines of Catholic sentiment. In some, more especially the writings of the great poets, this treasure is very much thrown out on the surface. Who runs may read, who passes by may know that the minds of these men, unconsciously to themselves, have been more or less formed in the school of the Mother of Souls. Thus, any one who was acquainted with Longfellow's poems, but not with his life, would easily suppose him to have been a Catholic; and Tennyson's Arthurian legends breathe the spirit, the ethics, the doctrine, the outward beauty, the inward grace of the ancient Church. In prose fiction, where the element of commonplace, the sordidness, follies and ironies of everyday life must necessarily be taken into account, the precious strata may lie deeper down; but undoubtedly they are there, if the writers are really of those great ones who understand human nature and to whom was given, each in his degree, the gift of grappling with the problem of a fallen world. A commanding intellect can find but little material and few suggestions in religions of human selection, which only meet the needs of mankind so far as shreds and patches of Catholic teaching have been retained; for genius and common sense alike tend, however unwittingly, towards the one God-created system of faith and morals.

There is a passage in a well-known novel where a lover of Shakespeare says, "You cannot speak without quoting him." This is true enough in its measure; but far truer is it that no man can dive into the secrets and sorrows, the greatness and miseries of the human soul without quoting from the abounding wisdom and knowledge of the Catholic Church, as unconsciously it may be as we often drop into Shakespearean phraseology in our ordinary conversation. Not for nothing did the Church mould the mind of Europe for fifteen centuries. A novelist, unless he be of that modern type which flouts both morals and belief, and of which type the really great writers were not, could hardly treat of sin without a tacit reference to the Church's code of laws, nor of repentance without being influenced by her doctrine of mercy and justice, nor of grief without falling back on the soothing thoughts inspired by her consolations. And as both Dickens and Thackeray were strongly imbued with a certain Christian reverence which is wanting to the inferior writers who imagine themselves to be the present wearers of their mantles, we should have a *prima*

facie certainty that their works would contain treasures of Catholic thought well worth digging for, even though the outer soil show but little promise of the gem-bearing deeps within.

In Dickens especially we find the rich ore of a quite exuberant good will towards men, or at least towards certain classes of men, those whom he looked on as the weaker and the more unfortunate. Undoubtedly these riches are overlaid by the spirit of exaggeration inseparable from his peculiar mental temperament and by a certain unintentional falsification of facts. Active charity would become easy, instead of being one of the most difficult of problems, if Dickens's portraits of the poor and lowly were a reproduction of real life and an extreme selfishness an accompanying mark of culture. At the same time there is no doubt that this kind of exaggeration was a protest wrung from generous natures by the almost unbearable hardships which beset the poor in former times. It is to be found in writers of an older date, and quite unlike Dickens in all their other characteristics; for instance, in Miss Edgeworth and Mr. Thomas Day, the author of "*Sandford and Merton*." In Kingsley, a writer of the forties and fifties, it was modified by his clear observation of facts which were under his eyes (widely as he went wrong when writing from foregone conclusions on subjects of which he knew nothing), and by a dispassionate study of the objects of his sympathy, of whom Dickens took a rather one-sided view as he wandered through the streets of the London that was.

But honor to all those writers, whatever their shortcomings in other respects, to whose courage and charity we owe the blessed fact that such a London no longer is nor ever will be, whose vivid and terrible word-painting startled the public conscience into a horrified inspection of the slums of the great cities! Very much the work of Dickens is it that the pathetic figure of "Jo," nameless child of want and ignorance, and the dreadful squalor of his indescribable dwelling-place, have disappeared from amongst us. And yet one cannot but wish that Jo, in the gutter but not of it, capable of gratitude and even of delicacy of feeling, sturdily truthful above all, had been reclaimed and Christianized, but not abolished. "Know it's wicked to tell a lie!" Not many a board-school boy, brought up without religion or reverence, without either outward or inward grace, knows that much, as did the outcast whom Dickens painted in such sombre yet tender shades.

In Thackeray there is far less than in Dickens of the spirit which "has compassion on the multitude." Thackeray, indeed, seldom thought about the multitude. They interested him but little. The bent of his genius was to hunt out the vulgarities and hypocrisies of every class, rather than to right the wrongs of any. Nor

can it be said that Thackeray's campaign against abuses was so successful as that of Dickens. Though he had charity, it was not quite of the sort which hopeth all things. His spirit was destructive of evil, but not exactly constructive of good.

He lacked, too, that especial attraction towards childhood which runs like a golden warp through the works of Dickens, who, non-Catholic by birth and training, yet was somehow filled with the beautiful Catholic devotion to the Sacred Infancy. Dickens's nature was of a kind to which that most joyful of mysteries would strongly appeal, as it did of old to the hearty and joy-loving people of the Merry England that once was. To such a temperament the thought of the Babe on His mother's knees hallowed the weakness of even the most pitiable and woebegone human childhood.

"It looks as if it was born yesterday," Dickens makes Bucket say of the wretched brickmaker's poor little baby; and goes on, "He is not at all rough about it; and as he turns his light gently on the infant, Mr. Snagsby is strangely reminded of another Infant encircled with light that he has seen in pictures." In the "Short Stories," and most especially in the "Christmas Carol," the same theme recurs again and again, always with the same reverent salutation to the Babe of Bethlehem, yet often, too, with a curious oblivion of the austere circumstances which surrounded the Divine Child. For Dickens's gospel is strangely alloyed with an idea of the necessity to spiritual well-being of material comfort. No wonder, perhaps. The poverty with which he was acquainted was the squalor of a hopeless heathen poor, the dreadful destitution of a people robbed of their faith. The holy poverty of a pious peasant's home in Spain or Italy, a humble and devout though infinitely distant copy of the house of Nazareth, might have shown him that even without turkey and plum-pudding, holly and punch and blazing fires, the festival of our Lord's nativity may be worthily kept; and how people whose bodies are devoid of everything except hardly-earned daily bread and scanty clothing may yet save their souls, and that generously.

The "Christmas Carol" is, of course, especially inspired by an attraction to the human gentleness and mercy of the Christ child; though the writer sees Him in the worldly setting of the observances with which a half-heathen Northern custom has surrounded the feast of Christmas. Nevertheless, the famous "Carol" stands first and foremost among all the works of Dickens as a mine of buried Catholicism.

For, in the first place, it gives us a glimpse of a very real and orthodox purgatory. This may possibly have been confused in the author's mind with the state of everlasting punishment spoken

of in the New Testament; but to a Catholic it would seem certain that the wandering spirits of dead misers and money-getters, clogged and weighted with their safes and ledgers and keys, cannot have been of the damned. For lost souls could not feel charitably towards the living; neither, if Marley were in hell, could he by his intercession—for it really comes to that, ridiculous as the word sounds when used in connection with Dickens's description of the ghost—have obtained the grace of Scrooge's conversion—"A chance and hope of my procuring Ebenezer." The whole incident is full of good theology. Marley is in purgatory because of his love of Mammon, and his want of mercy for his fellow-creatures; and his prayers avail to save his old partner from a like doom. It is the general belief among Catholics, though not of faith, that the souls in purgatory can help others yet on earth, even while powerless to help themselves; and thus the sad picture of the suffering spirit, floating out on the night air to continue his melancholy wanderings and fulfil the sentence from which he hopes to preserve his partner, is one that comes home to every Catholic heart. Also Marley's exclamation of "Mankind was my business! The common welfare was my business; charity, mercy, forbearance, and benevolence were all my business! The dealings of my trade were but a drop of water in the comprehensive ocean of my business!" is the natural outcry of the soul whose eyes have been opened by death, and illumined by the piercing light that shines around the judgment seat.

The extreme suddenness and thoroughness of Scrooge's conversion is, of course, of a piece with the exaggeration and want of artistic shading and of fine gradations, natural to the author's mind and style. Nevertheless, it is curiously like some of the popular Spanish legends of a complete renewal of heart and transformation of sinner into saint consequent on a supernatural vision, some fiery glimpse of the things beyond the grave.

Sin and repentance, indeed, are a very favorite subject with Dickens, who always treats them from a Catholic point of view. In poor, passionate, unselfish Nancy; in Em'ly, vain and feeble, yet never utterly lost, there is the same desperate perception of the necessity of flight from the occasions of sin; and Nancy dies in her new contrition, while Em'ly struggles back to a fresh and untainted life. Mr. Haredale is another type. He is represented as a faithful Catholic of virtuous life, though he is strangely melancholy and devoid of the cheerfulness which as a rule comes naturally to Catholics who practice their religion. But there is something fine, though pitiable, in the story of his fall when he allows himself to be lashed into fighting the duel with Sir John Chester, when, after he has implored his enemy not to sting him into an

act of crime, the taunt of cowardice and the code of honor of the age overthrow the resistance of his conscience and his sword is steeped in that cruel enemy's blood—a sin afterwards mourned through years of penance in a Trappist monastery. In "Bleak House"—at once the gloomiest, the most humorous and the most graphic of all Dickens's books—we have a picture of unprofitable repentance, of all but Judas-like despair, in Lady Dedlock's hopeless, remorseful, godless death at the terrible churchyard gate.¹

Very few of these scenes are to be found on Thackeray's canvas. He seems rather to have held the opinion that, as a rule, people die as they have lived, that those defects in their character which cause their sinfulness are so little perceived by themselves, or else are looked on as of such small account that correction does not occur to them as the one thing necessary. He has, indeed, given us an easy kind of reformation in the cases of Lord Kew and the Vicomte de Florec; not that the reformed attain to any heroic degree of virtue, but that they turn in a commonplace way into the beaten path of decent and sober living.

As to the hypocrites of the various books, one is happy to think that they would be almost impossible as Catholics. When Catholics wilfully remain out of the grace of God they do so as a rule without any veneer of piety or sacrilegious show of devotion. They are openly, defiantly bad. It is only Protestantism, leaving everything to private judgment, and not even safeguarding its sacraments by any definite rule of penance, that has made the Heep and the Pecksniff possible. One of Dickens's best studies of a truculent hypocrite is the apostate Gashford, whom he paints realistically as persecuting the creed which he had disobeyed and deserted.

There is one matter in which both the great mid-century novelists were distinctly un-Catholic, and that is in their general idea of womanhood. It was the influence of the Reformation that brought into vogue the imbecile and clinging woman, no less than the aggressively strict and Puritanical woman, against both of whom there is now a too fierce reaction which is agnostic in its origin and sympathies. All these types are very far removed from the Catholic ideal, modelled on the Blessed Virgin and the saints. Shakespeare, whether he were a Catholic at heart or not, and he almost undoubtedly was, had certainly not lost sight of this great ideal of Christian womanhood; his heroines are attractive, brave, pure, kind, full of wit and of common sense. From time to time their type has been reproduced by more modern

¹ The space formerly occupied by the dreadful inter-mural burial-ground, described in *Bleak House*, is now a playground for the children of the poor districts near Drury Lane.

English authors, but only by those who have studied in the school of the Church.

Neither Thackeray nor Dickens had that grasp of the Catholic idea of womanhood which we find, for instance, in George Eliot, who could create a Dinah Morris, or, rather, could copy her from the lineaments of a Saint Catherine of Siena, and in Kingsley, who, all Protestant though he was, seems to have gone to Catholic models for his study of Grace Harvey and of Lady Ellerton. Thackeray, indeed, has painted woman, not unbeautifully in the Brown letters, but his portraits of her in his books are touched in quite otherwise. With the exception of Madame de Florac (of whose character we shall speak later when considering the direct attitude of our authors towards the Catholic religion), he has never given us a woman who was at once good, lovable, natural, and life-like. Women natural and life-like he drew by the score, but they are not high types. His vulgar women, his worldly women, his old dragons, his *intrigantes*, are studies for all time, truthful but assuredly not very pleasant ones. His good women may be real portraits of women as they existed in his day; but they are either disagreeably pedantic, displaying at every turn a conscious certainty of being infinitely more virtuous than any one else, or fatuously weak and gullible. It may almost be said that with the exception already named, Lady Jane Crawley is the only one of Thackeray's female characters who is not positively irritating to the reader. Dickens's womankind is doll-like where it is not grotesque and laughable. We who live in these latter days and are accustomed to see women foremost among the toilers, can hardly imagine that bygone ringleted woman who was always fainting or screaming and whose one remarkable point was her incapacity for every duty in life. There are, of course, sensible and highminded heroines in Dickens; but they have not the ring of reality, of an absolute human personality about their attributes. The rest, Trotwoods, Peggottys and the like are delightful caricatures, but do not seem to come out beyond the realms of the imagination. More good-naturedly drawn than Thackeray's women, those of Dickens are much more unmistakably lay figures. All, perhaps, are mementoes of the futility of female education as it existed in England in the early part of this century.

The failure of both writers to portray woman in a lovely and lovable light is the more remarkable because they could both rise to the saint-like in painting the characters of men. For instance, Colonel Newcome in his latter days is very nearly a saint. He had failed, of course, in that unfortunate lapse which seems so foreign to his nature that one marvels at the author for permitting it when he launches himself on a career of vengeful opposition to

his wretched nephew; and he is originally wanting, too, in that prudence which, even though it be "*la plus triste de toutes les vertus*," as St. Francis of Sales called it, has rarely been absent from the canonized saints. But in his patience, his mercy to the weak, his purity of heart, his shining honor, his unfailing trust in God, the noble and gentle old soldier reaches the heroic and almost climbs up to the supernatural weakness of those saints who bowed their heads before actual blows and wounds. There is no pathos in all the writings of Thackeray—who did not abound in that quality—equal to his description of the old man's beautiful meekness as the cruel tongue of his son's mother-in-law writhes about him like a lash; nothing that at once pierces and soothes the heart like that humble lying down to die, that last "Adsum" in the almshouse bed.

Then, again, the little painter, "S. S.," in the same book, is a perfect creation—a lily-white soul, which Thackeray has not allowed his spirit of satire to tarnish with so much as a touch of meanness, malice or self-seeking. And William Dobbin approaches very nearly to sanctity in the selflessness which is the inmost being of a saint. We do not see such types now in the godless and soulless, weak and useless heroes of the impure modern novelist.

Nor will the spirit of infidelity which infests the novel of our day allow us to rejoice in the presentment of such a character as Daniel Peggotty, patient, forgiving, forbearing, manly, noble, God-fearing; or in men like the sweet old Cheeryble brothers; or in the tender-heartedness of quaint but chivalrous Cuttle. All these are studies of far more than common virtue, though touched with that dash of the comic which was the favorite and prevailing colorer on the painter's wonderful palette. Daniel is strangely like the beautiful peasant studies in the works of Fernan Caballero; and Cuttle is drawn somewhat on the lines of Don Quixote, that delightful creation of a mind at once profoundly Catholic and humorous in every fibre of its being.

Much, then, of Catholic feeling, and of intuitive good theology, is to be found in these two great English novelists. But what were their direct thoughts, what was the attitude of their minds towards the Church ever ancient and ever new, the city set on a hill and which cannot be hid?

Nothing can be inferred from their ridicule of sectarian Protestantism. Thackeray especially was sure to be keenly alive to the absurdities and incongruities of the sects; but he was ever given rather to pulling down than to building up.

"Tu sais que mon esprit est fait pour le satire,"

wrote Boileau, who thus gave it to be understood that he chron-

icled the defeats of bad poets more willingly than the conquests of victorious armies ; and so Thackeray, whose spirit was similarly formed, found a greater enjoyment in running a tilt against the Anglican establishment, worldly State bishops, and the sybaritic and sycophantic State clergymen of the times of Queen Anne and the Georges ; or dissenting divines with austere professions and large appetites, than he would have taken in recording the triumphs of saints and martyrs.

He was very far from being anti-Christian or irreverent. No Catholic could have burst into a grander protest of indignation than was wrung from him in one of his early essays by the blasphemies of George Sand and of Heine. "Oh, awful, awful name of God! Light unbearable! mystery unfathomable! vastness immeasurable! Who are those who come forward to explain the mystery and gaze unblinking into the depths of the light, and measure the immeasurable vastness to a hair?" a rebuke which some of our modern novelists might very well take to their own hearts. And Dr. John Brown has given us a beautiful anecdote of the impression made on Thackeray by the sight of the accidentally found figure of a cross uplifted on Corstorphine Hill, dark against the clear horizon of a winter afternoon. "He gave utterance in a tremulous, gentle, and rapid voice, to what all were feeling, in the one word, 'Calvary.' All that evening he was very gentle and serious, speaking, as he seldom did, of divine things—of death, of sin, of eternity, of salvation."

Evidently, in fundamental, and so far as his times and his education and his traditions went, the novelist was a sincere Christian ; and only played with the artillery of his sarcasm on what rightly sometimes and wrongly sometimes, he imagined to be a superstructure of inventions raised by human self-interest. And of Dickens, in a lesser degree, the same may be said.

As a general rule, though it was not an unbroken one, they both wrote with respect of the Catholic Church. It must be borne in mind that Dickens and Thackeray lived and worked at a time when the prevalent feeling in England towards Catholicism was almost inconceivably different to what it is now ; a time when, on the one hand, the cultured few, the flower of English intellect, the pride of Oxford scholasticism, found themselves irresistibly drawn into the arms of the Church, and when on the other hand, for that very reason, every prejudice of old-fashioned ignorance was roused up to struggle against her incomprehensible fascination. In the days of the great Victorian writers, the No-Popery craze was at its height. The restoration of the hierarchy raised a storm of savagery which would be quite impossible in the England of our day ; an explosion not only of un-Christian hatred,

but of unmannerly insult. The public press, which in our time is respectful enough to all men who act according to their conscience, teemed with abuse and ribaldry, grounded solely on the imaginings of the writers. "Punch," now edited by an eminent Catholic and convert, was then so offensive in jest and caricature that Richard Doyle—"the immortal gentle who signs his drawings with a D surmounted by a dickybird,"—as Thackeray calls him, withdrew, as in duty bound, from the staff. At this time Thackeray, who throughout the forties had helped more than any one else to build up with his genius the fortunes of the celebrated comic journal, had ceased to be more than an occasional and rare contributor to its pages. Then, as ever, it followed rather than led public opinion,

And public opinion in the early fifties was but an extension of that of the posse of old ladies who are depicted in the latter part of "Vanity Fair" solemnly and eagerly plotting the extinction of the Pope.

One can well imagine how the absurdity of the outcry of 1851 must have appealed to the satire which sprang in Thackeray like a fountain and to the wide human sympathies of Dickens. Dwellers in the London of the forties and fifties have told us how the tall form and quaint, shrewd face of the renowned author of "Vanity Fair" were often to be seen at the newly-opened Church of the Oratory in King William Street, where he made one of a group of eminent non-Catholics who came to hear the preaching of Newman and Faber; and how all the great intellect of the time, even though it remained outside the Church, budded and brimmed, as it were, with sap in the vigor and balm of the second spring; while Protestant stupidity and wrong-headedness opposed the inevitable resurrection with the same success that attended the setting of a guard and rolling of a stone over against the door of the sepulchre.

For intellect was out of sympathy with the Protestant howl, and even where it was not prepared to cast in its lot with the great band of converts, of whom some happily remain with us yet, it at least conceded to them willingly enough that right of private judgment which it claimed for itself. Intellect recognized the absurdity of the imitative traditional cry about "the fires of Smithfield," "foreign priestcraft," and "Bloody Mary." "That unfortunate Bloody Mary has done more harm in her grave than she ever did in her lifetime, I believe," remarks Lord George Gordon's honest servant, John Grueby, in "Barnaby Rudge," the famous book in which Dickens has immortalized his own spirit of toleration and his full appreciation of the usual meaning of anti-Popery outcries.

"They cried to be led on against the Papists," says the apostate

Gashford, speaking of the rabble, "they vowed a dreadful vengeance on their heads, they roared like men possessed—'

"But not by devils," said his lord.

"By devils, my lord. By angels!"

"Yes, oh surely, by angels, no doubt,"

said Lord George. . . . "I suppose it would be decidedly irreligious to doubt it. . . . Though there certainly were some plaguy, ill-looking characters among them."

We may almost wonder that such a book as this, which had appeared in the early forties and had been universally read, did not succeed in precluding the absurdities of 1850-51; but old-fashioned Protestantism had no sense of humor. It would have died a natural death if it had. The agitation of 1851, on which Newman, in his "Lectures," has turned the limelight of a wit as ineffable in its way as Dickens's own, was the general insurrection of old foggydom against a thing too great, too ancient and too new, to be understood by narrow minds. And nothing is so irritating to human nature, unless its outlook be very broad, as that which it is incapable of understanding.

From Foster's "Life of Dickens" it would appear that when "Barnaby Rudge" came out the author was very generally supposed to be a Catholic. This mistake arose because Dickens, wiser than the majority of non-Catholic authors, avoided those subjects of which he knew little or nothing, namely, the doctrines and practices of the Church. His sympathies and respect were with an oppressed and conscientious minority; but he never dipped into details which must have betrayed him as an outsider. Thus the only internal evidence of his Protestantism in the whole of "Barnaby Budge" is a sentence which might easily escape observation, wherein he speaks of the prostitution of a "noble word"—the word Protestant—to evil and selfish ends.

Thackeray, though equally tolerant, was not always so prudent. It is a foible of non-Catholics to fancy that they know all about the Catholic religion without ever having studied it. Even Thackeray was not above this foible. But he was well-intentioned. It must not be forgotten that his one truly amiable, pure, lovely and noble female character, Madame de Florac, is a Catholic, a veritable Monica, venerable, mild and dignified, whose prayers prevail in the end for her foolish sinner of a son.

Had Thackeray limited himself to his limning of Léonore de Florac we should have been content to applaud this one only example, in the whole of his works, of a lovable, holy and virtuous woman. But in his digressions about the other members of her family he digresses too much, and like many other Protestant writers rushes in where angels fear to tread, namely, into the con-

fessional itself, of which even the best-intentioned and most benevolent outsiders seldom have a correct idea. "Mon frère ce saint homme," says the Vicomte de Florac, speaking of his brother, the Abbé, and of his brother's former penitent, Madame d'Ivry, "ne parle jamais de Madame la Duchesse maintenant. She must have confessed to him des choses affreuses—oh oui! affreuses! ma parole d'honneur."

In another part of the book the dissolute vicomte is made to say that he does not care to frequent his home because the same saintly abbé will only *troquer* absolution against repentance. The author does not seem to know that the same may be said of every priest with faculties for hearing confessions throughout the Catholic world, nor to be aware, either, that M. de Florac was by no means obliged to confess himself to his brother. Thackeray evidently fell into the common error of not distinguishing social intercourse and ordinary conversation with a priest from sacramental confession with its solemn obligations and inviolable secrecies.

But one word above all others, will arise in the minds of those who read these reflections, and that word is "Esmond." For in "Esmond," of all his books, does Thackeray deal most directly with the Catholic religion and betray most unhappily the innate and invincible ignorance and misapprehension of the outsider. And yet he is not without a sort of tender leaning towards the Church, which he misrepresents, not without a half-puzzled appreciation of her irresistible attraction and mysterious power. Bitten as he was by the strange mania of belief in Jesuit intrigue and the occult power of what prejudice has been pleased to represent as a secret society, he yet draws in Father Holt a figure at once fascinating and to some extent sincere. Father Holt had brought Harry to think as he himself "thought with all his heart that no life was so noble, no death so desirable, as that which many brethren of his famous order were ready to undergo. By love, by a brightness of wit and good humor, which charmed all, by an authority which he knew how to assume, by a mystery and silence about him which increased the child's reverence for him, he won Harry's absolute fealty and would have kept it, doubtless, if schemes greater and more important than a poor little boy's admission into orders had not called him away."

"Schemes!" How unfortunate it is that the popular idea of a Jesuit should have appealed so intimately to Thackeray's weakness of trying to see the worst side of all people, as to betray even him, who usually valued a popular craze at its true worth, into following without inquiry the worn-out old invention! Even so, Father Holt contrasts very favorably in dignity and unselfishness, with the ludicrous cringing figure of poor Dr. Tusher; the

State parson of Anne's or the Georgian times having within himself every quality that could make him a target for the satirist's shafts. But the whole book is full of illusions and disillusion, and of incorrect deductions from equally incorrect premises and traditional cries. Because the Stuarts were a weak, injudicious, infatuated race, who discredited every cause which they made their own, and because the Catholic priesthood and laity, ground down by penal laws which Thackeray, to do him justice, by no means approves, naturally strove for the restoration of a friendly house to its senses and to its kingdom, he involves priests and Jesuits in State intrigue, fatuity and folly. There is not a shadow of ground for the supposition that the priesthood were involved in "designs against King William that were no more honorable than the ambushes of cutthroats and footpads." And in spite of Esmond's protest that he always entertained "a great reverence for Mother Church, that hath been as wickedly persecuted in England as ever. She herself persecuted,"—there can be no question that this book, in other respects one of the greatest historical novels ever written, uses stereotyped misrepresentations to point a false moral, and is, besides, a disagreeable study of religious profession in contrast with a concurrent immorality. The spirit of rebellion against central authority is perhaps at the root of its mistakes.

"I want English Church and English king," Esmond is made to say. "English Church" is not represented as very holy or venerable in this book, or as having much to say on the matter of faith and morals; still, such as it was, the nation chose it and belonged to it; and moreover, the heroine of the story, one of the author's disagreeable virtuous women, happen to be deeply attached to it. The whole is an affair of likes and dislikes, and of its not mattering particularly to what religion one belongs.

Painful as "Esmond" is, it is certainly less so than "Barry Lyndon," the most irredeemable story that Thackeray ever wrote, and containing nothing but selfishness and wickedness from cover to cover. But even in "Barry Lyndon," the ferocity of the author seems rather to lie down at the feet of the Church. He despises from his very heart the father of Barry for the apostacy which earned for him his brother's estate; he makes the son a worthy heir of such a parent; and speaks of the Irish priests alluded to with something of respect, and without the cheap ridicule which would have been introduced into such a book by a novelist of lesser genius, writing in the dark days of half a century ago.

Of converts to Catholicism, some of whom were figures of such great note in Thackeray's day, he generally speaks with the reverence for their conscientious and often dearly-bought convictions

which one might expect from one who had listened to Faber's fervent eloquence, and to Newman's clear, concise, yet gentle words—"like falling snow," as Manning said of them. He is tender in his allusions to men who "went over." He knew that at that time their number included many distinguished persons. Of a friend of Clive Newcome's, who "belonged to the old religion," and tried to convert him, he makes Clive say, "I could not but feel a kindness and admiration for the good man. I know his works are made to square with his faith, that he dines on a crust, lives as chastely as a hermit, and gives his all to the poor."

A few pages further on in the same book Clive expresses the feeling of the author who made him in a cry of almost pathetic yearning towards the great Church of his forefathers, yet a cry, too, which dies off mockingly into the inevitable satire, levelled chiefly against the insular church to which the writer himself belonged.

"There must be moments, in Rome especially, when every man of friendly heart, who writes himself English and Protestant, must feel a pang at thinking that he and his countrymen are separated from European Christendom. . . . One must wish sometimes that from Canterbury to Rome a pilgrim could pass and not drown beyond Dover. Of the beautiful parts of the great Mother Church I believe many people have no idea; we think of lazy friars, pining cloistered virgins, etc., and the like commonplaces of Protestant satire.

"Lo! yonder inscription, which blazes round the dome of the temple, so great and glorious it looks like heaven almost, and as if the words were written in stars—it proclaims to all the world that this is Peter, and on this rock the Church shall be built, against which hell shall not prevail. . . . Come, friend, let us acknowledge this and go and kiss the toe of St. Peter. Alas! there's the channel always between us; and we no more believe in the miracles of St. Thomas of Canterbury than that the bones of his grace John Bird, who sits in St. Thomas's chair presently, will work wondrous cures in the year 2000."

Thus it ever is with Thackeray! His fiercest sneer is reserved for his own church; yet he somehow includes all defined dogmatic religion in the same sneer and seems to refer the welfare of mankind to some hitherto undiscovered dispensation. With Dickens the case is very nearly the same. The fault was not their own. Dissatisfied with the narrowness of sects, misinformed from childhood as to the breadth and all-sufficiency for human needs of the Church with the reality of which their spirit and intellect were in sympathy, they could but present us with fragments of Catholicity and leave us regretting the accidents of birth and breeding which deprived two such minds of its entirety.

A. M. GRANGE.

POETIC PROSE VERSUS PROSAIC POETRY.

“ . . . both of precept and example shows
That prose is verse and verse is merely prose.”
—*Byron.*

THE above verses extracted from Byron's playful criticism of Wordsworth's poetry are epigrammatic, if not quite iridescent with “a crystalline delight.” There is, indeed, little of delight in them. They will, however, serve a double purpose—their condensation fits them for use as a text and their strictly prosaic thought, while it is very much in the nature of a critical boomerang, is also itself a proof of the truth it expresses :

“ Convincing all by demonstration plain
Poetic souls delight in prose insane.”

Byron had evidently one ideal in poetry and “the dull disciple of the school” another. Byron, again, made verse the vehicle of very prosaic criticism. Wordsworth made prose the vehicle of an elevated, if not strictly poetical, view of his own art. Byron awoke one morning to find himself suddenly famous. Wordsworth entered slowly into a recognition which cannot be called “popular.” Differing from each other, both in their ideals and in their successes, they are but symbolic of the wide fact that there are many different, and at times opposite, views respecting the nature and province of poetry. From the long history of these varying ideas one is almost led to infer that poetry is only a matter of taste and that it contains but little to serve as a basis for objective criticism. Nevertheless, the question involved is not wholly one of taste. If it were, the antagonism suggested in the title of this paper would be without justification. For tastes are almost as various as character and have had their prerogative of dignity and unassailable propriety guaranteed in every language under the sun. “Tastes differ,” say the descendants of the Anglo-Saxons, who, like their ale-swilling ancestors, have no taste. “Chacun à son gout,” say the heirs of the old Romans, who, like their patrons, acquired a monopoly of it.

Unless, therefore, anarchy is to reign in the republic of letters (which, by the way, the “signs of the times” almost persuade us it is going to do), we must agree with the critics that there are certain masterpieces in literature as in art, concerning which there can be no real ground for disputation. To analyze them is but to

demonstrate their possession of those characteristic excellences which constitute genius in literature. It shall not be the ambitious attempt of this paper to illustrate this postulate by an analysis of any masterpiece. Our office is the humbler one of pointing out some of the difficulties lying in the terminology of criticism.

The terms "poetry" and "prose" are, of course, the most immediate of all the divisions of literature. They are, nevertheless, while the most common, the most difficult to define. In passing to this subject, however, it might not be useless to give a slight illustration of the postulate of objective worth as opposed to the wide license claimed for itself by "taste." If Byron's diatribe against the "dull disciple of the school" be analyzed, there will be found in it neither a sentiment nor an expression rising higher than the level of the plainest prose. Rhyme there is and metre—*vox et præterea nihil*. Place in comparison with it an epistolary—and, therefore, an unpretentious and private—diatribe written by Lowell against his critics, and there will be found an unquestionable advance into the poetic realm, an imaginativeness and a rhetorical expressiveness which clearly, if not indeed very deeply, mark a distinction between poetry and prose:

"Gainst monkey's claw and ass's hoof
My studies forge me mail of proof;
I climb through paths forever new
To purer air and broader view,
What matter though they should efface
So far below my footstep's trace!"

What is poetry? What is prose? The question of their essence is an old one, going back even to the earliest dawn of history, when in truth prose and poetry were identical. "See deeply enough and you will see musically," said Carlyle. He might have substituted "poetically," and he would have announced practically the same thought. In the old days when history was just beginning to be made, men could see deeper and with less trouble than men may see now, because they had not to remove first a vast superincumbent mass of conventionality and traditional formalism,

"Heavy as frost, and deep almost as life."

Within and without themselves they saw rhythmically, not with the mathematical straight-lacedness of our modern sense of rhythm, but with that of men who could see, having their eyes "anoint of nature." Then it was that all of nature spoke to them, in the unmeasurable rhythm of the wind-furrowed grain, the slow-lapsing stream, the sun-kissed ripple, and what Wordsworth so elegantly and so truly called:

"The soft eye-music of slow-waving boughs."

"Culture" had not hampered them with a scholarship run down into pedantry. "Form," or what the Chinese call "face," had not stifled emotion with an overweening desire to be superior to feeling.

But the inevitable came at last. Prose made its appearance (perhaps at the same time as patterns), and so the critics began to discuss the nature of the newly-discovered beast. But the critics stated wrongly the real question at issue. And the world still follows their error in the query, What is poetry? Rather should we ask, What is prose? The oldest of literary monuments, the Bible, would furnish, and has furnished, very interesting material for analysis, in the attempt to answer this question. Looking through its venerable pages with the embarrassment of modern spectacles, we are too apt to furnish its poetry with a dress of the externals of poetry as we have it now—a dress which in truth the ancient melodies may not tolerate. Had the Hebrews rhythm, either accentual or quantitative? It is extremely questionable. Had they rhyme or assonance? No. And yet, without any one of these external earmarks to guide us, how shall we assert that they had poetry? Modern Philistines would certainly deny that they had. A literal and inelegant translation of the Songs of Moses and Mary, of Debora and Barac, of David and Jeremias, even the grand Song of Solomon, would appear as simple prose in its external dress. All these are, nevertheless, poetry; and Byron esteemed the Book of Job as the sublimest poem ever written.

Lacking rhyme and assonance, accentual and quantitative rhythm, modulation and cadence, in what externals did the prose of the Hebrews differ from their poetry? In a system of correspondence between the lines or verses, say some investigators into their poetical form. This is the so-called "parallelism"—synonymous when the second line varies the expression, but retains the sense, of the first; antithetic, when it contrasts with the first; whether in sense or only in expression; synthetic, when there is neither an equivalence nor a contrast, but a balancing of the propositions with respect to each other and to the completed sentence. None of these parallelisms could constitute for us anything more than a matter of the periodic style of prose.

Our distinction, therefore, between prose and poetry is, in the matter of their externals, the merest conventionality. It has been our purpose thus far to "illustrate a truism"; it shall be our purpose henceforth to "demonstrate a paradox," which, sensitive to the force and justness of Macaulay's witty criticism, we shall do at greater length. Our paradox is that prose may, and at times should, adopt some of the trappings of poetry, without thereby laying itself open to the charge of trespass. Strange to relate,

while prosaic poetry is infinitely less tolerable than poetic prose and while essentially there is no difference between the finest imaginative prose and the finest imaginative poetry, the critics still persist in drawing that line of demarcation which Walt Whitman viewed with contempt—*measurable verse*. They contend that if a man thinks poetically, he may be allowed to express himself either in ordinary prose-style or in verse; but that he may not camp on both sides of the line in the same composition, and, for a greater reason, in the same sentence. They have scarce objected to tricking out the prosiest of thought in the meretricious ornaments of metre and rhyme,—a feat of endless occurrence in English literature; while they meet with a storm of opposition the prose writer who would adorn a poetic thought with occasional use of measurable rhythm. This is a repetition of the old Roman disgust at the rounding of a sentence with a strictly quantitative adonic in the manner of a hexameter. And like that piece of Ciceronic abhorrence, it would seem to be a piece of classical pedantry, an insistence on the merest of conventional formalities.

Our paradox would cease to be one if the old, old question, what is poetry, had not been asked in every rhetoric and every essay with endless insistence. To add to the confusion, what poet has not written a poem on "The Poet?" Neither poetic expression nor poetic thought can be invoked to settle the difficulty; for these are not easy things to measure, and are found, as a matter of fact, not to have settled it. The old question returns again and again to puzzle and it would seem, to baffle, the whole fraternity of rhetoricians and critics. At last, in what must seem to be the resort of despair, the text-books have practically confessed judgment by entitling their treatment of "the other thing" verse. And so we have now the distinction of prose and verse. But again the distinction will hardly avail; for out of the hazy mist looms up a new terror. Walt Whitman scattered the devices of the text-books to the winds; wrote verse; published volumes of it, was hailed, in not illiterate circles, as the prophet of a new order; and entertained with a Spartan simplicity, typical of his "verse," men who had acquired a reputation in the "legitimate" kinds of verse. How shall his muse be measured? Rhymes are abandoned, alliterations and the rest of the tricks of the trade are regarded as puerile, and in the Camden poet even metre is discarded.

Our paradox would, as has been said above, cease, if the poetic mind were not worried perpetually over a wrong-headed question—What is Poetry? Ask instead, What is Prose? and leave the poet free to pack his thought into whatever form will best hold it;

for *Poeta est omnis scriptor* ! He is an artist, not an artisan. He creates, he does not fashion. He can crystallize the carbon—do not quarrel with him if he polish his diamond to suit himself; for he is to be a chemist first, and only secondarily to be a lapidary. Not one or two faculties (as with the metaphysician), or several (as with the scientist), but the whole man is necessary to make up the poet. He is not to be measured with a foot-rule, and he cannot be categorized and labelled. Prose or verse—the distinction should have no meaning for him; he writes poetry! If, then, “prose” be the medium which he happens to be employing, and he becomes suddenly aware of an unsuspected beauty lining the pathway of his thought, or of some precipice of feeling at whose verge he stands, or of some mountain peak beckoning him up to the sublime heaven—why must he pause to guard himself from traditional rhythmic forms of beauty in which he is instinctively impelled to put such thoughts? For while there are some thoughts which are best expressed in what is called “prose,” others demand blank verse; others, the various rhymed metres and stanza-forms. If prose, then, has been the medium of the thought, must the writer choose either the sacrifice of his poetic thought, or its admission in a less beautiful (because unrhythmic or unrhymic) form? Again the thoughts that lie on the borderland of poetry are too modest to rush into garish rhyme and rhythm; and yet, if they seek only prose dress, they lose some of the piquancy of their freshness, and must relinquish an adornment to which they are entitled.

In spite of the arbitrary line drawn between verse and prose, there are not a few examples in English of the employment of strict rhythmic prose. If the rhythmic form be not consciously employed, but the writer has nevertheless sought expression in rhythm as in the most natural form for the worthy housing of the thought, then is our contention approved by instinct itself. On the other hand, if it be sought out with conscious effort, then there is given a testimony of the unnecessarily hampering limitations of prose. A few examples will illustrate our contention.

Ruskin, writing “prose,” suddenly finds his mind filled with the beauty of the rich landscape he is describing and is allured into poetic pathways. He continues to use the prose form for a few sentences, but with scarce-noted gradations falls at last into a clearly-marked rhythm, which, if it were not for the absence of the conventional rhythming, would sound as musical as the great Wordsworthian ode. Any one on reading the description of Ruskin would certainly appreciate it as musical; but in order to draw attention to its almost mathematical precision it is given here, not in the prose form in which it is printed, but arranged into verses in the Pindaric form:

"Consider what we owe to the meadow grass, to the covering of the dark ground by that glorious enamel, by the companies of those soft, countless and peaceful spears. The fields! Follow but forth for a little time the thought of all that we ought to recognize in those words. All spring and summer is in them—

The walks by silent scented paths,
 The rests in noonday heat,
 The joy of herds and flocks,
 The power of all shepherd life and meditation,
 The life of sunlight upon the world,
 Falling in emerald streaks, and soft blue shadows,
 Where else it would have struck on the dark mould
 Or scorching dust.
 Pastures beside the pacing brooks,
 Soft banks and knolls of lowly hills,
 Thymy slopes of down
 Overlooked by the blue line of lifted sea,
 Crisp lawns all dim with early dew,
 Or smooth in evening warmth of barred sunshine,
 Dinted by happy feet,
 And softening in their fall
 The sound of loving voices."

The attentive ear will have noticed several extremely felicitous alliterations in these lines; while the constant use of poetic words, smooth sounds and other scarce definable poeticisms leave only rhyme to be added to make of the verses—not poetry, for that they already are—but an ode in its most common of forms. "The walks by silent scented paths," "pastures beside the pacing brooks," "overlooked by the blue line of lifted sea," "and softening in their fall the sound of loving voices." How gently rhythmic are these verses, and how subtly the alliteration enters as well to emphasize as to beautify words which have some close connection of meaning!

It is a great gain in effect that such rhythmic writing should not advertise itself to the reader beforehand by any division on the printed page into well-defined verses. It is rather more pleasant to enjoy a thing without a previous notification that one is expected to enjoy it. In such prose the reader is sensible of a pervading harmoniousness which suits the thought admirably, and which, if he retrace his pathway to analyze the writing, will bring to him, when he has found out the secret, only "a gentle shock of mild surprise" that such a device is not resorted to more frequently to adorn the simplicity of "prose."

Of course it would not be desirable that every poetical thought or emotion should be cast in such a mould. Variety is the spice of all good feasting, and perhaps most of all in "the feast of reason and the flow of soul." The palate will be palled at last with sweets, the eye will turn away from the soft but endless swaying of leafy boughs, the ear will grow impatient of perpetual melody. The balanced sentence is refreshing at intervals, but will soon

bring tedium in its wake. Witness the style of Sir Jonah Barrington, as regular as the rolling of a ship, and almost as likely to end in producing nausea. A typical example of how to give readers too much of a good thing is furnished by Marie Corelli's "Barabbas." An ear quite insensible to rhythm could hardly fail to awake to some appreciation of its meaning in the perusal of this tedious volume. About the same time as such a reader will have realized the fact of its melodiousness the man possessed of an ordinary ear will have become quite surfeited with rhythm. We might quote in illustration almost the whole long and tedious volume, "which," to repeat Waller's unjust criticism of "Paradise Lost," with a just application, "if its length be not considered a merit hath no other." But a few extracts must suffice.

"'Twas a face to be remembered,' said Melchoir meditatively—
Set in the solemn shadows of the trees,
'Twas a pale warning to the world !
Nevertheless, despite
Its frozen tragedy,
It was not all despair.
Remorse was written in its staring eyes—
Remorse, repentance ; and for true repentance
God hath but one reply—pity and pardon !

The last three lines are quite good pentameters ; indeed, the frequent use of couplets in pentameters throughout the whole novel, in places where the thought seemed to desire some special rounding off, this device is employed unsparingly. As before, illustrations would be endless, the type being like this :

"A glowing cactus-tree confronted him,
All in a seeming angry blaze of bloom."

The following could hardly have been accidental, and if the rhythmic swing of the entire book had not already fatigued the reader, would prove an acceptable mould in which to recast a fragment of "the story beautiful :

"A little way beyond where he stood—beyond
The roses and the sentinel cactus-flowers
The dewy turf still reverently bore
The impress of a form divine that there
Had fallen prone and wept for all the world—
Wept with such tears as never yet had rained
From mortal eyes—
There, too, had lighted for a little space
A great consoling angel,
And there no human step had passed
Since the fair king of perfect love
Had gone forth patiently to die."

Again :

("One tress of her fair hair escaping)
 Glittered against her throat,—and on her lips
 Rested the tender shadow of a smile,
 Behind her flamed the sunset,—
 Round her the very air grew dense and brilliant,
 As though powdered through with the fine dust,
 Of finest amber,—
 And at her feet one fallen lily-bud
 Opened its satin petals to the light,
 Disclosing its interior heart of gold."

Again :

"Rememberest thou His shining face in death?
 Methought He wore the lightning as a crown!
 Hast thou not subtly slain the Nazarene?
 If He indeed were dead the world should know
 That thou has killed Him."

One more quotation to show to what an ambitious length the rhythmical device has been carried in this book :

(" I knew not what did chance to me,
 Nevertheless it seemed I was awake,
 And wandering solitary within
 Some quiet region of eternal shade."

She paused, trembling a little, and then went on :

"A solemn depth of peace it seemed to be,
 Wherein was neither landscape, light nor air.
 Methought I stood upon a rift of rock
 Gazing far downward,—and there before mine eyes
 Were laid millions on millions of the dead,—
 Dead men and women white
 As parchment or bleached bone.
 Side by side in wondrous state they lay;
 And over them all brooded a pale shadow
 As of outspread wings.
 And as I looked upon them all and marvelled
 At their endless numbers,
 A rush of music sounded like great harps
 Swung in the wind, and far away a voice
 Thundered hosannah!" etc.

Plainly, this is not alone rhythmic prose, but mathematically rhythmic, and highly poetic in its conception and treatment. A little of this is what we have been contending for; but we think the principle has been carried entirely too far,—so far, indeed, as to make "Barabbas" constitute an argument against "poetic prose." In such a treatment, too, there is a danger to be feared like that which perpetually lurks in the caves of allegory. A step sepa-

rates allegory from mixed metaphor, pathos from bathos, the poetic from the prosaic, the sublime from the ridiculous. Notice this description in the same volume, of what a woman's scream was able to do: "Beholding this, she leaped erect, and tossing her arms distractedly above her head, gave vent to a piercing scream that drove sharp discord through the air, and brought the servants of the household running in." This sounds very much like the pathetic declaration, "I will soon follow you to the grave—in a hackney coach." Scott, although his poetic narratives read like versified prose could not write anything like this, partly for the reason that his attention was not embarrassed by a conflict between an elevated poetic style and a prose medium. Evidently, the authoress of "*Barabbas*" has overdone her cooking. What should be an occasional graceful ornamentation of prose has developed into the whole staple of the style. A straining, too noticeable to be pleasing, after poetic effect, caused her, again, to employ an almost reckless abundance of figure, comparisons, contrasts, alliterations, and bizarre expressions. A single sentence will show many of these defects, which by a writer who seeks what we have claimed to be a lawful device in poetic prose, must be guarded against with unceasing care: "And with a sharp shriek that seemed to stab the stillness with a wound. . . ." The alliteration is here too much in evidence; the figure employed is somewhat startling, and is slightly mixed," the effect being put for the cause in a strange manner. One is tempted to ask without fear of seeming hypercritical, How could anything be stabbed "with a wound?"

This illustration leads us to remark on another device used rarely with effect in prose, although of pleasing pungency when skillfully introduced into poetry. We mean alliteration. It is a lawful device, but should be sparingly employed. In a few of our proverbs it serves to accentuate related words, and perform besides something of the function of the initial letters in the old abecedaries,—that, namely, of stamping the verse or the saying on the memory: "Waste not, want not," "Where there's a will there's a way," "Many a mickle makes a muckle," "At length the fox is brought to the furrier," "Every path hath a puddle," etc. But it was reserved for the most rhythmical of all our poets to discard, with rare exceptions, rhythm as an ornament of prose, in favor of alliteration. This Swinburne has done frequently in his earlier prose, and with an iteration plainly indicative of malice prepense, in his "*Studies in Prose and Poetry*." In an earlier work, "*A Study of Shakespeare*," he occasionally indulges the alliterative temptation to excess, besides invoking at times the aid of a pentameter iambic to give a sonorous finish to a piece of

"fine writing." A few examples of the former will suffice to prove the excess: "*Fresh follies spring up in new paths of criticism, and fresh laborers in a fruitless field are at hand to gather them and to garner.*" "Though the pedagogue were *Briareus* himself who would thus bring *Shakespeare* under the rule of his rod or *Shelly* within the limit of his line, he would lack fingers on which to count the syllables that make up their music, the infinite varieties of measure that complete the changes and the chimes of perfect verse. It is but lost labor that they rise up so early, and so late take their rest; not a *Scaliger* or *Salmasius* of them all will sooner solve the riddle of the simplest than of the subtlest melody." It is not a refinement of criticism to underline the initial letters of the proper names appearing in the above extract; for the names too evidently have been selected by *Swinburne* not less for their sound than for their power of illustrating his thought. If not, why does he revel, a couple of pages after, in this: "The genius of *Titian* or of *Raffaele*, of *Turner* or of *Rossetti*?" In the following quotation from the same work, the alliteration becomes quite intolerable: "I must part from his presence again for a season and return to my topic in the text of *Macbeth*. That it is piteously rent and ragged and clipped and garbled in some of its earlier scenes, the rough construction and the poltfoot metre, lame sense and limping verse, each maimed and mangled subject of players' and printers' most treasonable tyranny. . . ." Or this: "The passion of *Posthumus* is noble, and patent the poison of *Iachimo*!" Not only the excessive use of alliteration makes these extracts faulty in style, but as well their wholly uncalled for poetical rhythm. The prosaic thought will admit of neither; and all that this singer of melodious songs has succeeded in doing is but to furnish an easy argument against the use of poetic adornment in prose. In his studies in "Prose and Poetry" he shows that added years have not brought added wisdom; if possible, his prose style has become worse—has degenerated into a tropical growth of leaf and flower and the heavy undergrowth of interweaving tendrils and interlocking branches and upshooting ferns and mosses—an impenetrable mass of luxuriant verbiage which it is safest, as well as most pleasant, to view from a distance. Without any justification in the nature of his thought and sentiment, he multiplies, with reckless ingenuity, and perverse insistence the paraphernalia of poetic expression which only poetic thought or emotion can justify, and even then can justify only within modest limits. His completed production becomes thus, not an elegant tapestry, but a "crazy quilt."

Despite the unfavorable impression left by such a preposterous use of alliteration it is, if employed with moderation and skill, a

real adornment of prose. Some of the greatest rhetoricians have not disdained to use it when a certain piquancy was desirable or a contrast of thought could be secured with more emphasis by a consonance of sound.

But, in truth, Swinburne should not be quoted against our thesis. He does not write prose colored by any poetic sentiment or emotion; and, indeed, although very rhythmical in his poetry, rarely uses rhythm in his prose. He seems to be simply a man who could not write good prose.

Possibly as fine and subtle a use of rhythm in prose as can be instanced in our literature is given by Dickens. Only where the thought will bear it and the expression will be notably enhanced in beauty does he permit himself an occasional use of it. But when he does so he furnishes us with the best of vindication for our contention. The quotations already made from Marie Corelli, and to some extent those also from Ruskin, showed a less felicitous application of rhythm to prose in the too evident cadences and modulations of the phrases. *Ars est celare artem*. The ear should applaud the beauty without being asked to assign its cause. Even if the reader, filled with the unperceived rhythm of the language, pauses to analyze it, and at length discovers the secret of its beauty, he will still be left in a pleasant doubt whether Dickens elaborated his rhythm with conscious purpose, or found himself an unconscious artist whose thought has dressed itself in the most appropriate expression. The second chapter of *Martin Chuzzlewit* will illustrate our meaning. It opens with a description of an autumn scene, full of accurate and artistic touches, which paint to the imagination with greater skill than most of our painters could to the eye, the mellow richness of the dying year. The description is finely poetic as well; for it clothes the landscape with life and motion and mixes in with the soulless character of all landscapes the subtle fancies of the beholder. Here the poet is discerned; and if he choose to write in what is called "prose," he may justly employ any poetic device he finds suitable for the best exposition of his theme. If he be not a true poet, and still attempts such devices, he will but furnish us with a few "purple patches" instead of a royal robe. He may not plead in apology the beauty of the scene he attempts to paint. He must himself be a poet who can clothe "the empty world that round us lies, dead shell, of soul and thought forsaken," with his own vigorous life. For Dame Nature, even in what have been styled her "various moods," is not poetic. "Old ocean's gray and melancholy waste"; Mont Blanc with its "bald, awful front"; the moon, that "doth with delight look round her when the heavens are bare"; "waters on a starry night"—all these inspiring beau-

ties, all these majestic glories have poetry in them only when looked at through poetic spectacles. It is proper to have insisted on this fact if we are to escape an avalanche of examples warring against our "paradox" that poetic prose is allowable—to the poets! Alchemy has found its best success in the laboratory, not of the scientist, but of the poet. It has there found the stone which can turn all base things into gold. It has indeed found it, not in the projection of some midnight alembic, but in the sun-warmed hearts of the children of men.

Dickens, whatever else he was, could claim to be a poet, not that he wrote good verse, for that seems to have been rather beyond his power, but, because he found that beauty in life, he saw in all of God's creatures that exquisite skill of the Divine Artisan which neither squalor could utterly deface nor sin could wholly mar,

"Which neither listlessness, nor mad endeavor
Nor man, nor boy,
Nor all that is at enmity with joy,
Can utterly abolish or destroy!"

The whole poetic treatment of this autumn scene is justified by its success. With respect to its rhythmic qualities, a few illustrations must suffice. "On the motionless branches of some trees autumn berries hung like clusters of coral beads, as in those fabled orchards where the fruits were jewels; others . . .

Showed somewhat stern and gloomy in their vigor,
As charged by nature with the admonition
That it is not to her more sensitive
And joyous favorites,
She grants the longest term of life.
Still athwart their darker boughs
The sunbeams struck out paths of deeper gold;
And the red light,
Mantling in among their swarthy branches,
Used them as foils to set their brightness off
And aid the lustre of the dying day.

A moment, and its glory was no more.
The sun went down beneath the long dark lines
Of hill and cloud which piled up in the west
An airy city,

wall heaped on wall, and battlement on battlement; the light was all withdrawn, the shining church turned cold and dark, the stream forgot to smile, the birds were silent, and

The gloom of winter dwelt on everything."

Again, describing "a dark and dreary night," in the same novel, Dickens treats the reader to a rhythmic account of the "cautious

wind" in what is almost a tone-picture, so admirably is the sound forced to echo the songs: "The earth covered with a sable pall as for the burial of yesterday; the clumps of dark trees, its giant plume of funeral feathers, waving sadly to and fro:

All hushed, all noiseless, and in deep repose,
Save the swift clouds that skim across the moon,
And the cautious wind,
As, creeping after them upon the ground,
It stops to listen, and goes rustling on,
And stops again,
And follows, like a savage on the trail.

Whither go the clouds and wind so eagerly? If, like guilty spirits, they repair to some dread conference with powers like themselves,

In what wild region do the elements
Hold council,
Or where unbend in terrible disport?

Here! Free from that cramped prison called the earth,
And out upon the waste of waters. Here, . . .

in the fury of their unchecked liberty they storm and buffet with each other, until the sea, lashed into passion like their own,

Leaps up, in ravings mightier than theirs,
And the whole scene is madness.
On, on, on,
Over the countless miles of angry space
Roll the long heaving billows,
Mountains and caves are here, and yet are not,
For what is now the one is now the other . . ."

It is questionable if the most rigid upholder of the unadorned beauty of prose would quarrel with such an unostentatious, but very sensible, rhythm. The stately but unmeasured modulations and cadences of oratorical prose, the "parallelism" of phrase and and clause and sentence, the harmony of the diction—all these are the peculiar possession of a good style in prose and are hardly to be sought in verse. But splendidly as they deck out the thought, they do not necessarily forbid such a quiet use as this of a device which our reading has led us to associate exclusively with "poetry," or at least with verse. A classical example of the felicity with which Dickens employed rhythm, and always interesting on its own account, is the description of the funeral of Little Nell in "The Old Curiosity Shop." In it the rhythm is less measurable, or rather is not so easily divided into equal verses. But it is plainly perceptible throughout. It resembles very much more a poem written in the style of an ode, with unequal lines, than it does blank verse. It is able thus almost to cheat the ear into an ap-

prehension of rhyme, somewhat after the fashion of Collins's "Ode to Evening" or Milton's translation of the "Ode to Pyrrha" of Horace. The extract is a long one, but it so well exemplifies the kind of rhythm best suited for occasional use in a piece of prose that it is here quoted almost entire :

"And now the bell—
 The bell she had so often heard,
 By night and day,
 And listened to with solemn pleasure
 Almost as a living voice—
 Rung its remorseless toll, for her,
 So young, so beautiful, so good.
 Decrepit age, and vigorous life,
 And blooming youth,
 And helpless infancy, poured forth—
 On crutches, in the pride of strength and health,
 In the full blush of promise,
 In the mere dawn of life—
 To gather round her tomb.

Old men are there,
 Whose eyes were dim and senses failing—
 Grandmothers,
 Who might have died ten years ago,
 And still been old—
 The deaf, the blind, the lame, the palsied,
 The living dead in many shapes and forms,
 To see the closing of that early grave.
 What was the death it would shut in,
 To that which still could crawl and creep above it?

Along the crowded path they bore her now ;
 Pure as the newly fallen snow
 That covered it ; whose day on earth
 Had been as fleeting. Under the porch,
 Where she had sat when Heaven in its mercy
 Brought her to that peaceful spot,
 She passed again ; and the old church
 Received her in its quiet shade.
 They carried her to one old nook,
 Where she had many and many a time sat musing,
 And laid their burden softly on the pavement.
 The light streamed on it through the colored window—
 A window where the boughs of trees
 Were ever rustling in the summer,
 And where the birds sang sweetly all day long.
 With every breadth of air
 That stirred among those branches in the sunshine,
 Some trembling, changing light
 Would fall upon her grave.

Then, when the dusk of evening had come on,
 And not a sound
 Disturbed the sacred stillness of the place—
 When the bright moon

Poured in her light on tomb and monument,
On pillar, wall and arch, and most of all
(It seemed to them) upon her quiet grave—
 In that calm time,
When outward things and inward thoughts teem with
Assurances of immortality,
 And worldly hopes
And fears are humbled in the dust before them—then,
 With tranquil and submissive hearts,
They turned away, and left the child with God,

When Death strikes down the innocent and young,
 For every fragile form
From which he lets the panting spirit free
 A hundred virtues rise,
In shapes of mercy, charity, and love,
 To walk the world, and bless it.
Of every tear that sorrowing mortals shed
 On such green graves,
Some good is born, some gentler nature comes.
In the Destroyer's steps there spring up bright
Creations that defy his power, and his
Dark path becomes a way of light to Heaven."

While in this extract many perfect pentameter iambics occur, and in several places consecutively, it will perhaps be objected that not a few lines are arranged in verse-form without being really rhythmic; that a little ingenuity could make almost any prose composition appear metrical if it be split up into lines of a length arranged to meet the exigencies of a preconceived theory. In answer this much of truth may be conceded to the objection that an occasional iambic swing can be observed in our English prose, due to the fact that our monosyllabic particles enter with such frequency and in such great abundance into the fabric of composition as to form a series of hinges corresponding well to the short, or rather unaccented, alternate syllables of iambic metre. But it is also equally clear that where a curious ingenuity may be able to construct verse out of such an accidental arrangement of syllables the unsuspecting ear would rarely divine the fact. On the other hand, the quotations introduced thus far to illustrate our contention first recommended themselves by their own melodious character to versified treatment before any thought had been taken to make them serve as proofs of a thesis.

To a great extent the question raised by the objection resolves itself into one of fact, and this last comes within the province of the rhythmic ear for decision. Certain it is, however, that less violence is done to the prose selected thus far for analysis, in the attempt to versify it, than must be done to several passages in Shakespeare which have been always classed as prose until Maginn suggested spacing them as blank verse. This is his attempt to

versify the porter's soliloquy in "Macbeth:" "Here's a knocking indeed! If a man || were porter of hell gate, he should have old || turning the key. Knock, knock, knock! Who's there, || in the name of Beelzebub? Here's a farmer, || that hanged himself on th' expectation || of plenty: come in time; have napkins enow || about you; here you'll sweat for't. Knock, knock! ('I) faith, || here's an equivocator, that could swear || in both the scales against either scale; (one) who || committed treason enough for God's sake, yet || could not equivocate to heaven: O come in, || equivocator. Knock, knock, knock! Who's there? || Faith, here's an English tailor come hither, || for stealing out of a French hose: come in, tailor; || here you may roast your goose. Knock, knock! never at quiet! || What are you? But this place is too cold for hell. || I'll devil-porter it no further: I had thought || to have let in some of all professions, || that go the primrose way to the everlasting bonfire (darkness). || Anon, anon! I pray you, remember the porter." After this performance the Shakesperian scholar remarks ingenuously enough that the "alterations" he proposed were "very slight—*upon* for 'on,' *i'faith* for 'faith,' and the introduction of the word *one* in a place where it is required." It is somewhat regrettable that he preferred this "labor of love" to the easier task of rejecting the bulk of the passage (wherein he would have agreed with the best of the Shakesperian emendators and critics) as spurious. Maginn also believed the succeeding dialogue to be in blank verse, and that the sleeping scene of Lady Macbeth is in blank verse, "and that so palpably that I wonder that it ever could pass for prose." Difficult as was his task in the porter's soliloquy, the arranging of the sleeping scene would prove even more so, as in some parts it is not rhythmical to any appreciable extent. Delius does not go so far as to assert that the scene is in verse, but is willing to admit that "the speeches of the doctor in this scene have a certain cadence verging on blank verse without quite gliding into it." Behind the shield of such illustrious vindicators of the Shakesperian rhythm in prose, in places where the ear would scarce surmise it, our much easier attempts to versify a prose which the uninformed ear cannot fail to find instinct with rhythm may well pass unchallenged.

Reference was made in the first part of this paper to the poetry of the Hebrews to "illustrate the truism" that poetry may appear with all appropriateness in "prose," and that the better distinction lies between poetry and verse than between poetry and prose. To bring to an end the attempt "to demonstrate a paradox," reference may be made again to the Old Testament. The twenty-fourth chapter of Proverbs ends with an Oriental apologue as daintily sketched as though it were a vignette to fill in with a few sug-

gestive strokes of the pen a blank space of some grandly printed page. It is shorter than the ordinary "Oriental apologue" of our English poets and tells its moral with greater force and finer poetic phraseology than any of them. Its translation into English will serve to point the moral to the tale of this paper. For one of the two translations we shall quote here is in rhythmic phrases, and the other lacks such melody. The first is taken from the King James' version; and it seems to us that the superiority in elegance and harmony of diction claimed for that version over the Douay translation would receive nowhere throughout the sacred text, a more striking confirmation:

"I went by the field of the slothful, and by
The vineyard of the man void of understanding:
And lo, it was all grown over with thorns,
And nettles had covered the face thereof,
And the stone wall thereof was broken down.
Then I saw, and considered it well:
I looked upon it, and received instruction,
Yet a little sleep, a little slumber,
A little folding of the hands to sleep:
So shall thy poverty come as one that
Traveleth; and thy want as an armed man."

Not only is the versification wonderfully melodious for prose, but the lines almost spontaneously fall into the form of iambic tetrameters. A silent but, if intentional, a very skillful use of alliteration, together with a traditionally "poetic" diction, heighten the poetic treatment of the composition, and could suffice to have it ranked as what is commonly called "poetry." Is it not likely that the translator of this passage, having made at first a prose draft in his work of translation, afterwards felt the propriety of dressing in a more ornate style a piece of Hebrew poetry? If not, his rendering stumbled, with exquisite felicity, on "a thing of beauty."

The Douay version seems to have aimed only at as literal a translation as possible, and not to have sought out any special adornment of the language. It is still, of course, a piece of beautiful thought, and a finely painted picture; but it suffers in contrast with the rhythmic flow of the previously quoted version:

"I passed by the field of the slothful man, and by the vineyard of a foolish man: and behold nettles had filled it wholly, and thornes had couered the face thereof, and the wal of stones was destroyed. Which when I had seen, I layd it in my hart, and by the example I learned discipline. A litle I say, thou shalt sleep, a litle thou shalt slumber, a litle shalt thou joyne thy hands together to rest: and as a poste, pouertie shal come to thee, &

beggerie as a man armed." The quaint spelling, and slightly antique flavor in the diction, of this extract from the unrevised Douay version, have been retained in order to compare it with the emendation of Challoner, and to show that in neither edition did the editors think a rhythmical cast of expression desirable: "I passed by the field of the slothful man, and by the vineyard of the foolish man: And behold it was all filled with nettles, and thorns had covered the face thereof, and the stone wall was broken down. Which when I had seen, I laid it up in my heart, and by the example I received instruction. Thou wilt sleep a little, said I, thou wilt slumber a little, thou wilt fold thy hands a little to rest: And poverty shall come to thee as a runner, and beggary as an armed man." In the first of these three versions, the translator seems to have lent an ear to the melody of the language, and to its rhythm. He inserts, for instance, "thereof" in the line, "and the stone wall (thereof) was broken down,"—evidently for the rhythmic swing to be attained by the insertion, which brings this line into consonance of rhythm with the preceding lines. In the line, "the vineyard of the man void of understanding," it would seem that he desired the play of the alliteration in "vineyard" and "void"; and that by using the phrase "void of understanding," instead of the single "foolish" he found himself able to round out a sonorous cadence in the metre which prevails throughout his whole piece of work; and that in the same way he preferred the phrase "one that traveleth," to such single words as "runner" and "poste." In Challoner's emendation the changes are in the line of improved rhythm, but probably without any view to this end.

The King James' version of this passage from Proverbs proves, we think, the desirability of a rhythmic treatment of such a poetically conceived parable. In the original Hebrew the Book of Proverbs was a poetic composition, and although our poetry has nothing in common with that of the Hebrews with respect to the external forms of expression, still there is a fitness in retaining in a translation a hint of the fact that its original is not ordinary prose. A clearly versified translation would not, indeed, be appropriate, since it would be apt to mislead a reader into supposing that the original had also a clearly defined metre—a thing which will probably forever remain a matter of the merest conjecture and surmise: it would also offer difficulties in the way of a literal version—a thing for lack of which no mere ornamentation of language would supply. Still, however true it may be that Hebrew poetry is "a poetry, not of sounds, or words, but of things," it does not follow that a mere literal rendering of the words of the original will fairly present it in our modern vernacu-

lars. A certain delicate cast, not so much of metre as of rhythm, will enhance the expression, and sufficiently intimate its discrimination from mere prose. This the Anglican version has done. It is rather couched in rhythmical, than in metrical language—a distinction which the extract given above will clearly illustrate: but the rhythm is nevertheless not identical with that large definition of rhythm implied by the word when used to describe oratorical prose. It is such a rhythm as is found best exemplified in the old Anglo-Saxon alliterative verse, where accents, and not the number of words, differentiate the poetry from prose. In the revised version of a decade of years ago, the discrimination between the prose and poetry of the Bible is set forth in the varied manner of printing; and no apparent attempt was made to have the form of expression correspond to anything like our modern idea of a poetic cast of language. With respect to the quotation from Proverbs, however, the revision did not succeed in depriving it of its old pleasant rhythms; so that it may still stand as an example of how much a mere form may add to the content of thought—how much an ear that is sensitive to melody in language can illustrate by an apt choice of words and phrases, the power and beauty of the thought.

A careful and modest use of the external ornaments of poetry may well be permitted in prose. If any warfare is to be waged in the matter of style, let it first attack the most intolerable of all the old and sanctioned literary solecisms—prosaic poetry. To dress up a prosaic thought in the finery of verse is but to call attention to its vulgarity. It is to put a tyro's daub into a Florentine frame—to print an *édition de luxe* of a screed which has been rejected by a provincial daily. And yet this very thing has been done from the beginning until now. It excuses itself on the ground of its illustrious ancestry: for some of the greatest names of literature have lent their sanction to the abuse. What is a vast amount of Pope's "poetry," for instance, but versified prose? A didactic or philosophical poem is a *contradictio in adjecto*. For the province of poetry is rather to insinuate, than to teach, Truth; rather to warm the heart, than to sharpen the mind. It was a poet who gave this piece of advice to the poetasters:

"Put all your beauty in your rhymes,
Your morals in your living."

Like Madame Sévigné, who requested one of her correspondent's to open to her, not his library, but his heart, the reader of a composition which appears printed in the form of verse, has a right to expect that poetic thought shall be found underneath that form. The setting leads him instinctively to look for an inclosed

gem—he will be disappointed if he at once recognizes it to be only paste. A catalogue of names that might be used to illustrate prosaic poetry would embrace almost every name in the long annals of English poetry. And extracts from their works would alone furnish forth a great library. *Si monumentum quaeras circumspice*. Room may be made, however, for a single illustration which will serve as a type of prosaic verse in possibly its most ordinary form. In his translation of the Iliad, Chapman prefixes to the several books a versified argument :

“Apollo’s priest to th’ Argive fleet doth bring
 Gifts for his daughter, pris’ner to the king;
 For which his tendered freedom he entreats;
 But, being dismiss’d with contumelious threats,
 At Phoebus’ hands, by vengeful pray’r he seeks
 To have a plague inflicted on the Greeks.
 Which had; Achilles doth a council cite,
 Embold’ning Calchas, in the king’s despite,
 To tell the truth why they were punished so.”

And so on, through as much more verse, to give the argument of the First Book. He seems, however, to have admitted some little, though a tardy, sense of compunction after completing his little gem of verse, for he adds another, and a much briefer summary, in the distich :

“Alpha the prayer of Chryses sings:
 The army’s plague: the strife of kings.”

And Chapman was a poet, too! “Unless one’s thoughts pack more neatly in verse than in prose,” said Homer Wilbur to the young poetical aspirant in “The Biglow Papers,” “it is better to refrain. Commonplace gains nothing by being translated into rhyme.” Would not the argument have packed more neatly into prose than into such a verse—even though that verse had not included so many intolerably hissing English genitives? so many prosy and latinistic words and phrases? so little pleasurable rhythm? Would not the very plainest of prose have better suited, as well as better conveyed, its commonplace thought? If such a piece of writing, and the general principle for which it stands, go unrebuked, then an occasional dressing up of a poetic or semi-poetic thought in the midst of a prose composition may surely pass unchallenged.

The quotation from Chapman is an example of the rough-shod Pegasus of Shakespeare’s day. It is even more tolerable, because of its very roughness, than the smoother iambs which came in with Pope, and which formed a glittering ideal of rhythm for

the prosiest versifiers ever since. The prosier the thought, the more perfect the unendurable see-saw of the metre. No more is the sound an echo of the sense! Be the thought rapid or slow, rugged or smooth, intense or superficial, sublime or puerile,—the verse drags its slow length along with imperturbable grace and unconscionable peace.

The manifest evil in the whole matter is that such verse sets up a false standard by which many are misled in their inquiries into the nature of poetry. As the glittering paste passes with the vulgar for the crystallized carbon, so such a counterfeit poetry passes with the multitude for the real inspiration. It has become the vehicle for worlds of waste energy and tons of waste paper. But the judicious grieve. They have been themselves so often fooled into reading the first lines of such verses that they have come to look with suspicion on every new attempt at the heroic couplet. "The art of arranging words in that measure," says Macaulay in his essay on Addison, "so that the lines may flow smoothly, that the accents may fall correctly, that the rhymes may strike the ear strongly, and that there may be a pause at the end of every distich is an art as mechanical as that of mending a kettle or shoeing a horse, and may be learned by any human being who has sense enough to learn anything." Plainly, then, verse which serves such vulgar uses has fallen greatly from its high estate of ministering to the beauty of poetic thought. It flatters the ear and cheats the soul. It awakens expectations which it cannot satisfy. It gives intimations of a beauty which it neither conceals nor makes manifest. Serving alike the royal ambitions of poetic emotion and the meretricious aims of prosaic babbling, it tends only to confound the one with the other and to prolong a worse than useless distinction between prose and poetry. Without following Wordsworth so far as to assert that "there neither is nor can be any essential difference between the language of prose and metrical composition," we may safely adopt his view that "the language of prose may yet be well adapted to poetry . . . that the language of every good poem can in no respect differ from that of good prose," and that therefore good prose may well admit, on occasion, some of the less obvious adornment of poetry, the occasion being had when it is desirable to give worthy expression to some thought or some emotion, to some delicate fancy or subtle abstraction, which is too modest to advertise itself as "poetry" and which is still something above the ordinary levels of prose. Wordsworth properly inveighs against the common distinction between poetry and prose: "Much confusion has been introduced into criticism by this contradistinction of poetry and prose, instead of the more philosophical one of poetry and matter-of-fact or science. The

only strict antithesis to prose is metre; nor is this in truth a *strict* antithesis, because lines and passages of metre so naturally occur in writing prose that it would be scarcely possible to avoid them, even were it desirable." Let, then, the distinction lie between poetry and matter-of-fact, or perhaps metre, and we may rest our contention here that the thought should determine the form, whether one be writing in prose or in metre. It seems unreasonable that a writer in prose should be withheld from employing any device which can improve the expression of the thought. Prosaic poetry offers a much more profitable, however much less attractive, field for weeding-out than does poetic prose. After that task shall have been accomplished with even mediocre success, some enterprising publisher might find his advantage in issuing a complete edition of English poetry for a sum which would "place the work within reach of the masses." For of the vast quantities of verse in our language a small proportion is poetry, a larger amount is verse, and the vast remainder is prose indeed!

The overmastering desire *to analyze* is responsible for much of the embarrassment caused by the question, What is poetry? The philosophers and the rhetoricians must be able to give an answer of some kind. Accordingly, they analyze whatever is analyzable by unpoetic temperaments (and it may be stated as a general truth that the passion for analysis demonstrates such a temperament); and since the poetic lies quite beyond their ken they must perforce confine their efforts to the externals of poetry. After so many attempts even of poets, not to analyze, but to describe the divine afflatus, had been compelled to confess as many failures, the philosophers found it necessary to confine their attention rather to the usual concomitants of poetry than to its essential nature. They were therefore led to group under that sublime title all that could not with utter strictness be called prose. Whatever could be measured with a foot-rule, whatever gave evidence of a conscious employment of rhythm or rhyme or alliteration or assonance became, for such investigators, "poetry." But the quarry is as elusive as life itself, although quite as real. And the dissecting-knife of the anatomist, the microscope of the biologist, will never reach the essential principle—that soul by whose virtue alone the heart throbbed with love, the brain quickened into keen thought and warm fancy, the nerves tingled with an exquisite sense of vigor. It may happen that the flower of poesy will fade under such scrutiny; the knife of the botanist may destroy the beauty he would make manifest.

What is the inspiration of poetry? They who do most experience it are least able to tell it. It is not only beyond definition, it is even beyond description. It is like to a

“ . . . music heard once by an ear
That cannot forget or reclaim it,
A something so shy, it would shame it
To make it a show,
A something too vague, could I name it,
For others to know,
As if I had lived it or dreamed it,
As if I had acted or schemed it,
Long ago ! ”

Leave the poet alone in his heaven. Be he a Ruskin in the fields, or a Dickens in the streets, a Solomon on his throne, or a Job on his dung-hill, he will not question the spirit of poesy, though it should lead him on to-day through wonted pathways of poetical expression and

“ To-morrow to fresh fields and pastures new ! ”

H. T. HENRY.

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Scientific Chronicle.

PRECIOUS STONES OF THE BIBLE.

IN the two last numbers of this REVIEW we spoke somewhat lengthily on "Precious Stones, Gems," etc., and have at times since then thought that perhaps our readers have had enough of such things. Still, we hope that a few parting words on "The Precious Stones of the Bible" will prove neither out of place nor altogether uninteresting.

The second chapter of Genesis gives us a description of the terrestrial paradise, saying, among other things: "The name of one (of the rivers) is Phison; that it is which compasseth all the land of Hevilath, where gold groweth. And the gold of that land is very good; *there is found bdellium and the onyx stone.*"

The Hebrew word "*bedolach*" occurs only twice in the sacred Scriptures, first, in the text just quoted, and secondly in Numbers xi., 7. In both of these cases the Vulgate (Latin) translates it by *bdellium*. St. Jerome may have known what the word meant, but his translators evidently did not, for the Douay Bible does not even attempt to render the word into English, but merely inserts the Latin one.

The verse of Numbers referred to reads: "Now the manna was like coriander seed, of the color of *bdellium*," while in Exodus xvi., 14, the manna is described thus: "And when it had covered the face of the earth, it appeared in the wilderness small, and as it were beaten with a pestle, like unto the hoar-frost on the ground."

The Septuagint translates the word in Genesis by the Greek word *anthrax*, but the same word in Numbers by *crystallos*. Notwithstanding this discrepancy, it is clear that they took it to mean a precious stone. The first meaning of *anthrax* (from which word we moderns derive our word *anthracite*), is "coal," not indeed a dead coal, but a "coal of fire that shineth." On this account the ancients applied the word to several different brilliant stones, such as the carbuncle, the ruby, the beryl, and even to the mineral cinnabar, which, though dull in itself, often shines with drops of liquid mercury.

Theophrastus, who died only a few years before the Septuagint was begun, gives the name *anthrax* to a stone whose description exactly suits the ruby, "which is red in color, but when held against the sun assumes the appearance of a burning piece of charcoal." The Seventy Interpreters, or perhaps rather the one who tackled that verse in Numbers, saw clearly that he could not translate *bedolach* by *anthrax*, because he knew the color of the manna was "like unto the hoar-frost," that is, "white." He therefore put *crystallos* (crystal), which is from *cruo*, to freeze, and may therefore, according to the idea of the ancients,

stand for frost, ice, glass, rock crystal, etc. Some moderns have, therefore, supposed that *bedolach* means rock crystal.

To this others object that rock crystal would hardly deserve to be classed with the gold and onyx-stones of Hevilath. An answer to this objection, however, would be that onyx differs from rock crystal only in color, the substance of each being quartz, and in the estimation of ancient times, rock crystal may have been judged worthy of just as high a place as onyx. Pliny says that bdellium was of the color of one's finger nail, white and shining; but this is our description of *onyx*, and its derivation too, *i.e.*, *ονυξ*, *a nail*. Moreover, "*onyx*" occurs in the same verse, and it would not be used twice. However it may be with the *crystallos* of the Book of Numbers, it is pretty evident that the *anthrax* of the Septuagint is an error, even though Dioscorides, in the first century, does use the word for a colored precious stone. He comes too late, and his views were probably colored by those of his predecessors.

Other views again differ widely from the foregoing. Thus, Bochart, whose authority ranks high, is of opinion that *bedolach* means "pearls"; and this agrees very well with the description of the manna, as made out from the quotations from Exodus and Numbers as already given. Besides, pearls are very abundant on the shores of the Persian Gulf, on which the land of Hevilath, according to the opinion of many, was situated. To get at this meaning however, Bochart refers us back to a Hebrew root, *badal*, and so makes *bedolach* mean "a choice and excellent pearl." Gesenius and some of the best modern commentators follow this opinion.

Bdellium has however yet another signification, about which there is little if any dispute. A tree growing in Arabia, India and Babylonia, formerly bore this name. It was about the size of the olive tree, and bore a fruit somewhat resembling the wild fig. From this tree exuded a gum-resin, whitish, semi-transparent, and resembling myrrh in appearance and qualities, but weaker though more acrid. The tree and its products have been described by both Dioscorides and Pliny. Some have supposed this gum to be the bdellium of Genesis, but this is now looked upon as altogether improbable. When what has been said above, with heaps more for which we have no room, is summed up, it seems pretty clear that the *bedolach* of the Bible is a precious stone, and that it is probably "pearls," though we still admit that this latter point is by no means certain.

Having got in the thin edge of the wedge, by settling, as far as possible, on the *first* precious stone of the Bible, the whole subject lies open before us, and we may go on with the others without insisting on any attempt at a chronological arrangement.

ADAMANT AND DIAMOND.

In the Hebrew text of the Bible we find the word *shamir* three times. The Vulgate in all these cases has *adamas*. The Douay, however, for some reason or other, or perhaps for no reason at all, varies the rendering of the word. The three passages are (1) Jeremiah, xvii., 1: "The

sin of Juda is written with a pen of iron, with the point of a *diamond* it is graven on the table of their heart, upon the horns of their altars." (2) Exechiel, iii., 9: "I have made thy face like an *adamant* and like a flint." Here the Protestant version has: "as an *adamant*, harder than flint." (3) Zacharias, viii., 12: "And they made their heart as the *adamant* stone, lest they should hear the law."

All linguists agree that the *shamir* means a thing of excessive hardness, and as the Greek, *adamas*, *adamant-os* (which naturally became *adamant* in English) means, according to the etymology, "untamed," "unsubdued," it no doubt translates the original *shamir* correctly, at least in a generic way. The word *adamas* was employed by both the earlier and the later Greek writers, and by the Romans as well, either as an adjective or a substantive, but always to render this idea of "unconquered," "unconquerable." Homer applied it as a personal epithet to his heroes; Hesiod to the hard metal, iron or steel, used for armor; Theophrastus applied it to a precious stone, probably the diamond; Pliny almost certainly to the diamond, and perhaps also to corundum; Ovid thought the lode-stone, or magnet, hard enough to deserve the epithet. The French word for magnet (*aimant*) is thought to have come to them over this road.

Shamir in its generic sense, and its equivalent, *adamas*, would therefore appear to mean anything excessively hard; and, in a specific way, is especially appropriate to the diamond, the hardest of all known substances. The Arabic name for the diamond is "*almas*," and the Greek word is probably derived from that.

A confirmation of this view is found in the fact that nearly all authorities in these matters derive the word "diamond" precisely from "*adamas*." Speaking of the change from *adamas* to diamond, the "Century Dictionary" says: "The change of form (in simulation of words with prefix *dia* = Greek *διὰ*) is supposed to have been due to some association with the Italian, *diafano*, = French, *diaphane*, = Greek, *διαφανής*, transparent." This may possibly be so, but it seems like "looking for noon at fourteen o'clock," as the French saying goes. Trench, whose word is worth that of ten, says, under the title "Diamond:" "Diamant and adamant are in fact no more than different adoptions by the English tongue of one and the same Greek, which afterwards became a Latin, word."

This is common sense boiled down, and, knowing that in classical English literature, the words are often used, one for the other, seeing also how the backbone of the two words is the same, viz. d-m-n-t (for d and t are easily interchanged), we philologically *feel* that one may very well have come from the other, and if so, we would know that diamond, the younger, came from adamant, the older. There is another Hebrew word besides *shamir*, which has sometimes been translated diamond. We refer to "*yahalom*," but there is a good deal of doubt, and a great deal of dispute about it, some translating it *emerald*, some *onyx*, and other some *jasper*; but of this, more anon.

In order to render more intelligible what should, in the logical order

of things, follow just here, we shall have to ask permission to make a rather long digression into the domain of sacred history.

About the year of the world 2280, and before Christ, 1724, Joseph, the eleventh son of Jacob, was sold by his brothers, to some Ismaelites, and was by them carried into Egypt. He became a great man there, and when a few years later, a famine arose in the land of Jacob, Joseph brought his father and brothers, with all their households and belongings down, and settled them comfortably in the land of the Pharaohs. They were at first, and for a long time, in great favor, and prospered exceedingly, so that by the end of about 250 years, their census footed up to over six hundred thousand. This was exclusive of the descendants of Levi, of all boys under twenty years of age, of the infirm, and of all women and girls. It was in fact, a war census, and consequently represented at least two million souls all told.

However, long before the 250 years were ended, there arose in the land, a king who "knew not Joseph," and who reduced the whole colony to a condition of hard servitude. Next, by the intervention of Divine Providence, through the leadership of Moses, and in spite of all opposition on the part of the king, the day of deliverance dawned at last, and the afflicted people went forth out of the land of bondage.

For the orderly carrying out of this retreat, and accomplishing of the journey which the Lord knew was to last so long, the Israelites were divided into twelve bands, according to their descent from the sons of Jacob. These bands were called tribes. Now the sons of Jacob, in the order of their birth were: Ruben, Simeon, Levi, Juda, Don, Nepthali, Gad, Aser, Issachar, Zabulon, Joseph and Benjamin. In the numbering of the tribes, however, for offensive and defensive purposes, the tribe of Levi was left out. They were set apart for the priesthood. Neither in this place is the tribe of Joseph named, but all his descendants were counted under the names of his two sons, Ephraim and Manasses. This brought back the number of tribes to the original number, twelve.

Of the tribe of Levi was Moses, the great leader, or commander-in-chief, the future law-giver, the prophet, the wonder-worker, the type of the One that was to come, and with the exception of that One, the grandest figure that has ever trod the stage of human history.

But what has all this to do with precious stones? Much, and with other closely connected matters too. Patience, and we shall see. During the first year after the departure of this great army out of Egypt into the wilderness, God commanded Moses to make a "tabernacle," and showed him, on Mount Sinai, the pattern after which it was to be built. By tabernacle is meant not merely the ark, but everything pertaining to it, as the altar, the table, the propitiatory, the cherubim, bowls, dishes, censers, candlestick, snuffers, lamps, etc.

The description of the tabernacle, with all its appurtenances, fills up three whole chapters of Exodus (xxv., xxvi., xxvii.). Everything is described to the most minute details, and though too long to be quoted here, we recommend their perusal in connection with this subject. Gold

and silver, and brass and setim (acacia) wood ; and skins and fine linen, dyed in gorgeous colors ; and pure olive oil for lights, and spices for incense, are contributed in abundance, and even in excess, so much so that Moses had finally to stop further contributions. Only once in these chapters, and even then not for the tabernacle, do we find mention of gems, thus : “. . . . onyx stones and precious stones to adorn the ephod and the rational ” (Ex. xxv., 7). We shall meet them again below.

When the tabernacle was completed it was set up (on the first day of the second month) in the middle of the advancing hosts, and was given in charge to the descendants of Levi, and it was death for any one else to come near it. It was they who set it up when a halt was made, and carried it when it was time to move on ; and day and night they formed a bodyguard around it. The other tribes were arranged around it too, but at some distance, in the following order, which was invariably preserved whether the great army was at rest or on the march :

On the east side, the camp of Juda, which was made up of the tribes of Juda, Issachar and Zabulon ; on the south side, the camp of Ruben, made up of the tribes of Ruben, Simeon and Gad ; on the west side, the camp of Ephraim, composed of the tribes of Ephraim, Manasses and Benjamin ; on the north side, the camp of Dan, composed of the tribes of Dan, Aser and Nephthali.

The tabernacle, as we have said, was in the centre of the hosts. But what is a tabernacle without a priest ? And what is the priest in his sacred functions without his vestments ? For since the priest is as far above the tabernacle as living- is above dead-matter, and since, at the same time, man always stands in need of symbols and emblems to aid him in his public worship of God, therefore it follows that the priest in the discharge of his priestly functions should be adorned more gloriously than the tabernacle itself.

Gold, and silver, and brass, fashioned in all the fairest forms that art knew how to give ; curtains, and veils, and coverings of the finest linen, and of skins, all doubly-dyed in the richest hues, were lavished upon the tabernacle. How then shall the central figure of all this, the priest, be vested ? Surely it must be in glorious vesture, and every part of it must have its meaning in symbol. We have not space to refer to these symbols in detail, but we cannot refrain from mentioning one, the “bells.” “And beneath the feet of the same tunic, round about, thou shalt make as it were pomegranates, of violet, and purple, and scarlet twice dyed, with little bells set between ; so that there shall be a golden bell and a pomegranate, and again another golden bell and a pomegranate. And Aaron shall be vested with it at the office of his ministry, that the sound may be heard when he goeth in and cometh out of the sanctuary in the sight of the Lord, and that he may not die.” Exod. xxviii., 33-35. The same thought is again expressed in Eccclus. xlv., 10-11.

The poet has tuned his lyre to this theme, and sung in words full of meaning, and pathos, and beauty :

"Since sound and sight in eye and ear
 Are fabric of man's mind-spun thought,
 Jehovah philosophic wrought
 When thus he clothed his majesty :
 A bearded priest with sweet-faced boys,
 His tunic hemmed about with bells ;
 A tinkling golden clink, that tells
 The heart, God passes in the noise.
 A heaving dome of incense clouds
 Through which uncertain glimmer floats,
 The light of myriad taper boats,
 With haze of awe in all their shrouds.
 God dwells not in the whirling wind,
 God rides not on the wingéd storm ;
 He steals in with the subtle charm
 That permeates a quiet mind.

* * * * *

"Each people has one common heart,
 Which all the nation's glory thrills,
 On which the nation's heavy ills
 Inflict a universal smart.
 In sobbing Israel's history
 No page with blacker lines is crossed
 Than page recounting how she lost
 The priest and bells of mystery.
 She opes the tome, and spells the rhyme,
 To which the golden tongues made song ;
 She wails things hid amid the throng
 Of spectre-sounds in silent Time.
 Her grief is not a precious pain :
 'Tis hopeless sad. For, God is passed,
 His pathway is with curses cast ;
 The bells—they must not ring again,"

This chapter of Exodus (xxviii.) is entirely devoted to the description of the vestments that were ordered to be made for the high-priest, Aaron, and the more simple ones for his four sons who were to assist him in the ministry, and with which they were commanded, under pain of death, to be clothed whenever they were engaged in their sacred functions. These vestments were : "A rational and an ephod, a tunic and a straight linen garment, a mitre and a girdle" (verse 4), to which is added in verse 42, "linen breeches." Though not mentioned here, it is supposed there were two forms of mitre, a high and a low one. The rational, and ephod, and high mitre were worn, only by the high-priest, the other articles both by him and his sons. The "ephod" and the "rational" bring us back to the precious stones, from which we have so long strayed. They were both made of the finest materials, richly dyed and heavily embroidered.

The ephod is described as consisting of two parts, one of which covered the back, the other the breast. These two parts were connected to one another on the shoulders by two large onyx stones, set in gold, the attachments being made by means of rings of pure gold. Each stone had engraved on it six of the names of the tribes of Israel. "And

thou shalt take two onyx stones, and shalt grave on them the names of the children of Israel; six names on one stone and the other six on the other, according to the order of their birth. With the work of an engraver and the graving of a jeweller, thou shalt engrave them with the names of the children of Israel, set in gold and compassed about; and thou shalt put them in both sides of the ephod, a memorial for the children of Israel. And Aaron shall bear their names before the Lord upon both shoulders, for a remembrance" (verses 9-12). The Hebrew word that is here translated onyx is "shoham," concerning which we shall have something to say further on. The ephod was further tied around the waist with a twisted girdle of gold, blue, purple and scarlet.

The "rational," or "rational of judgment," called in some translations "pectoral," in others "breast-plate," was made two spans long, and one span wide, but was doubled cross-wise, and stitched at the edges, so that its final form was a square of probably eight or nine inches on the side. It was slung from its upper corners, by chains and hooks of fine gold, to the rings which served to connect the front part of the ephod with the onyx stones; while its lower corners were fastened to the edges of the ephod, "that the rational and ephod may not be loosened one from the other" (verse 28). It seems therefore that the rational was in front of the ephod and covered the lower portion thereof. So far, we have been merely skirmishing on the way to the real stone age of our article, into which we plunge forthwith.

There are three remarkable lists of precious stones given in the Bible; the first in Exodus xxviii., 17-21, and this is repeated word for word in Exodus xxxix.; the second in Ezechiel xxviii., 13, but this is like the first, except for the omission of three of the stones; the third in Apoc. xxi., 19-20, in which two of those of the first list are left out, and two others inserted. Practically then the first list is the important one. It is as follows:

"And thou shalt set in it (the rational) four rows of stones; in the first row shall be a sardius stone, and a topaz, and an emerald; in the second a carbuncle, a sapphire, and a jasper; in the third a ligurius, an agate, and an amethyst; in the fourth a chrysolite, an onyx, and a beryl. They shall be set in gold by their rows. And they shall have the names of the children of Israel; with twelve names shall they be engraved, each stone with the name of one, according to the twelve tribes." We have already quoted concerning the ephod.

One would think that all this was clear enough, and that it would not be difficult to construct from the descriptions given, exact *fac similes* of both ephod and rational. The ground work of cloth, dyed and hemmed and embroidered, is easily settled, but it is with the precious stones that we are concerned just now. For the ephod therefore let us, in company with an expert in gems, visit a first-class jewelry house, and order two large onyxes, and have engraved on them the names of the twelve tribes, "according to their birth." Well and good—let us now pass to the rational. For this we shall order the twelve stones enumerated above, and have engraved on each the name of one of the twelve chil-

dren of Israel. How simple and easy! But just here, when we set ourselves fairly at work, we shall probably encounter worse snags than ever fell in the way of a Mississippi steamboat.

The first of these snags is, uncertainty about the identity of the stones; the second, uncertainty about the order of their arrangement; the third, uncertainty as to what name was to be engraved on each several stone; the fourth, uncertainty as to *how* the names were engraved; the fifth, uncertainty as to the symbolical meaning that each stone was supposed to bear. There may be yet more of them, but we think these will suffice; and the man or woman (for even ladies are men now) who succeeds in changing these five uncertainties into as many certainties, or, even into real, good, strong probabilities, will deserve to have a rational of his (or her) own, as the high-priest (or priestess) of the highest criticism; and, on our own part, we would be willing to add the ephod, and perhaps even the mitre. To prepare the way for the one who is to undertake this work, we shall condense a good deal of what has been already said by various authorities on the subject.

I.—IDENTIFICATION OF THE STONES.

Here we have just one little, fairly-solid piece of ground for a foothold, and that is, the Hebrew names of the stones. The moment, however, we step off this little spot, and endeavor to discover the *meaning* of these names, we find ourselves in a treacherous bog. As a guide through the labyrinth (if we be allowed thus to change the metaphor) we have compiled from various sources the following table (A), to which we shall frequently refer in the course of our remarks:

In explaining this table, we shall find occasion to get in the bulk of what we know or guess about the stones of the rational.

The headings of the columns are:

(a) The received Hebrew text of the Bible, the first five books of which, the Pentateuch, being from the pen of Moses, who died in the year of the world (A.M.) 2553, before Christ (B.C.) 1451. The other books were written by various authors at various later dates.

(b) The "Septuagint," a version made in Greek by seventy-two interpreters (commonly called the "Seventy") of the five first books of the Old Testament, about A.M. 3719, B.C. 285. It is referred to by the sign LXX. The most esteemed copy is the Codex Vaticanus.

(c) A Greek version of the rest of the Old Testament, probably by several persons, in Alexandria of Egypt, A.M. 3874, B.C. 130. It is included in later editions of the LXX., but is sometimes referred to separately.

We have deemed it unnecessary to insert in the columns the name of the great Jewish historian, Josephus, since he agrees, line for line, with the Vulgate, except that he has Sardonyx for the eleventh stone, instead of Onyx. He was born A.D. 37, and died about A.D. 100. He was himself a priest, and is considered a very high authority in the matters which we have in hand.

(d) The Vulgate, St. Jerome's Latin version, made between the years

385 and 405 of our era. This is the version authorized for use in the Catholic Church.

(e) The Douay Bible, a translation into English from the Vulgate, the Old Testament at Douay in 1609, the New Testament at Rheims, in 1582.

(f) The authorized version of Protestants, or so-called King James's Bible, brought out in 1610. It was translated from various sources. It is referred to by the sign A. V.

Table (A) of Comparative Translations from the Original Hebrew of the Twelve Stones Mentioned in the Rational.

Rows.	Nos.	(a) Hebrew.	(b) Septuagint.	(c) Alexandrine.	(d) Vulgate.	(e) Douay.
First Row.	1	Odem.	Sardion.	Sardion.	Sardius.	Sardius.
	2	Pitdah.	Topazion.	Topazion.	Topazius.	Topaz.
	3	Bareketh.	Smaragdus.	Smaragdus.	Smaragdus.	Emerald.
Second Row.	4	Nophek.	Anthrax.	Anthrax.	Carbunculus.	Carbuncle.
	5	Sappir.	Sappheiros.	Sappheiros.	Sapphirus.	Sapphire.
	6	Yahalom.	Jaspis.	Onychion.	Jaspis.	Jasper.
Third Row.	7	Leshem.	Ligurion.	Ligurion.	Ligurius.	Ligure.
	8	Shebo.	Achates.	Achates.	Achates.	Agate.
	9	Achlamah.	Amethystos.	Amethystos.	Amethystus.	Amethyst.
Fourth Row.	10	Tharshish.	Chrysolithos.	Chrysolithos.	Chrysolithus.	Chrysolite.
	11	Shoham.	Beryllion.	Beryllion.	Onychius.	Onyx.
	12	Jashpeh.	Onychion.	Jaspis.	Beryllus.	Beryl.

Rows.	Nos.	(a) Hebrew.	(f) Protestant.	(g) Chaldean.	(h) Syriac.	(i) Arabic.
First Row.	1	Odem.	Sardius.	Samkan.	Sumoko.	Jacuth Achmar.
	2	Pitdah.	Topaz.	Yarkan.	Sorgo.	Jacuth Azphar.
	3	Bareketh.	Carbuncle.	Barkan.	Borko.	Samurod.
Second Row.	4	Nophek.	Emerald.	Ismaragdan.	Zadiro.	Cochli.
	5	Sappir.	Sapphire.	Shabbez.	Saphilo.	Maha-al-Ballur.
	6	Yahalom.	Diamond.	Sibhalom.	Neketho.	Bahraman.
Third Row.	7	Leshem.	Ligure.	Kanchara.	Konkenum.	Gasa.
	8	Shebo.	Agate.	Tarkja.	Karkedono.	Sebh.
	9	Achlamah.	Amethyst.	En Egla.	En Eglo.	Firusag.
Fourth Row.	10	Tharshish.	Beryl.	Krum Yama.	Thorshish.	Asrak.
	11	Shoham.	Onyx.	Burla.	Berulo.	Ballur.
	12	Jashpeh.	Jasper.	Panthireth.	Jashpeh.	Jasaf.

(g) A translation of the Hebrew text into Chaldean, with considerable amplifications, done by Onkelos, shortly after the return of the Jews from Babylon, A.M. 3468, B.C. 536. The work, however, suffered many modifications, and in its present form is said to date back no earlier than the third century of our era.

A little later, Jonathan Ben Uzziel made a similar version, which does not differ much from that of Onkelos, at least as far as regards our subject.¹

¹ Vigouroux says that both Onkelos and Ben Uzziel were of the first century of our

(h) A version in Syriac, of both the Old and the New Testaments. It appeared in the eighth century of our era.

(i) An Arabic version of both Testaments, a little later in date than the Syriac.

With all these, as finger-posts to point the way, let us start out on our search for the gems of the rational. As headings, we shall place first the Hebrew name, and then the English word according to the Douay.

1.—*Odem* = *Sardius*.

The root of the word *odem* is "adam," which means "red," and the same is the name of our first father. On looking over Table A, a great similarity, in fact you might say identity, will be noticed between the different names, in all the versions, until we get to the Chaldean "*Sam-kan*," and the Syriac "*Sumoko*"; but even in these there is a family likeness with the others. When we strike the Arabic, however, we meet "Jacuth Achmar," who looks like a foreigner, or perhaps a "Jesuit in disguise." Yet he is quite innocent and means well, and his meaning is "Red Jacinth" (qu. Hyacinth?), but whether that means a corundum stone, or only a common Hyacinth, it has been impossible to determine. At any rate, in all Chaldean and Syriac versions, and Persian too, that have been pointed out to us, just as in the Hebrew, the root of the word always means "red."

Pliny, however, who ought to have been at the head of his class in geography, derives the name *Sardius* from *Sardis*, in *Lydia* whence the gem was obtained, but remarks at the same time that the best specimens came from *Babylon*, *Josephus*, in his "History," calls it "sardion," but in his "Antiquities" uses the word "sardonix." Some commentators have taken him to task for this inconsistency, while others think it is all a much-ado about a trifle, for, they say, the sardonix is a variety of *sardius*, or as *we* commonly call it, "sard." We think, however, that since *Josephus* puts the sardonix in the eleventh place in the rational, its occurrence here is a mere slip of the pen. This stone is also called *carne-*lian** (à *carne*), from its color which resembles that of raw flesh.

The *sardius* has always been a favorite with engravers. *C. W. King* ("Antique Gems," p. 5) says: "On this gem all the finest works of the most celebrated artists are to be found. And not without good cause, such is its toughness, facility of working, beauty of color, and the high polish of which it is susceptible, and which *Pliny* states that it retains longer than any other gem." The testimony of eighteen centuries since *Pliny's* time has served but to confirm his judgment; and it is meet that this gem "*odem*," "*adam*," "*Adam*," should hold the first place in the rational of the high priest.

2.—*Pitdah* = *Topaz* (modern chrysolite).

The root of this word *pitdah* may, according to *Fürst*, be the *San-*

era, but the controversy as to that point is too long, and too useless for our purpose, to be entered upon here. (*vid.* Emanuel Deutsch.)

scrit, pita = yellow; and Skeat thinks the root of *topaz* may be *tap* = to shine. The Septuagint, the Alexandrine version, Josephus, and the Vulgate all translate "pitdah" by the same word, the equivalent of topaz, and Bellermaun claims that the "Oriental Topaz," of modern mineralogists is here meant. Others claim that it means our modern chrysolite, or as it is sometimes called Peridot. We shall discuss this point under No. 10, below.

3.—*Bareketh* = *Emerald* (oriental).

The Hebrew root of this word is *barak*, which means "to flash like lightning," while a root of this root is *rakh*, "to light a fire." The Chaldean, *barkan*, the Syriac, *borko*, and the Arabic, *samurod*, mean "brilliant," while the roots of these words have the sense of "boring," a meaning which may be traced to the production of fire by rapid boring. The Greek and Latin versions of Table A., as well as many others, render *bareketh* by "smaragdos," "smaragdus," which surely means "emerald." The Sanscrit form is *marakata*, or *marakta* = emerald. To many people it would perhaps seem almost like a joke to attempt to find any etymological relationship between *marakta*, *emerald*, and *smaragdos*. And yet that relationship does exist, and for one who can not only see the words, but see through them, it is as plain as a wart on the end of the nose, it is even obtrusive. Remember that *emerald* was once *esmeralda*, and then set the skeletons of the three words together:

Skeleton.

Marakta	=	—	m	—	r	—	k	—	t,	
Smaragdos	=	s	—	m	—	r	—	g	—	d,
Esmeralda	=	s	—	m	—	r	—	l	—	d,

and if one is blessed with the philological instinct, he will need no more; if he is not, then medicine is of no use to him, and his vocation lies along other lines. But let us return. Kalisch says the "*bareketh* is a sort of precious corundum of strong glass lustre, a beautiful green color, with many degrees of shade, pellucid and doubly refractive." Nothing but emerald will answer to this description, and how the A. V. fell upon "carbuncle," is hard to conjecture. There is a legend that a large *bareketh* was hung up in Noe's ark, to serve for a lamp during the voyage.

4.—*Nophek* = *Carbuncle*.

The Hebrew word means "glowing like a coal," and its root, *puk*, means "to inflame." Some however say that *puk* is the same as "red alkanet," from which a red dye or paint is made, but it is clear that these things are not contradictory. The Greek versions appropriately have *anthrax*, the Latin, *carbunculus*, and the Douay *carbuncle*, not only in this place, but in several others. By anthrax and carbunculus the Greeks and Romans respectively designated a stone of a deep red color, and this explains why some moderns have translated *nophek* by "ruby"; we think this is an error. Greater is the error of those who render it by

"garnet," for the stone of the rational was very hard, transparent, and beautiful, neither of which is true of garnet. The word *zadiro*, under the heading Syriac, is on the authority of Emanuel. It is probably a mistake, for we can find no such word, while the Syriac "*zdido*" means exactly the same as "*puk*." Onkelos has *ismaragdan*, and Ben Uzziel, *esmorad*, both evidently akin to emerald, the reading in the A. V. We think however we have firmer ground in standing out for the anthrax of the LXX., and of Josephus; and besides we believe we have given sufficient reason under No. 3 to show that the emerald has a clear right to that place, although, had we been free in the matter, we should have preferred to send the dear old emerald, not to the third place, but to the first, or above.

5.—*Sappir* = *Sapphire*.

The root of *sappir* is *shapher*, "to shine with splendor"; also, "to appear beautiful." This is too general to give us much help in identifying the stone, for it might be said of many other gems as well. In the rendering of *sappir*, both in the rational and elsewhere, there is an almost complete unanimity among the different versions, as will be seen by the table. The Persian too, *saffir*, is evidently the same word. The Arabic, according to Emanuel, has *Maha-al-Ballur*, which Freytag makes out to be "crystal of beryl." Richardson's Dictionary renders the Arabic (which he spells *ballawr*), by "beryl," and yet calls this fifth stone of the rational "*adamas*." Now, therefore, Emanuel, or Freytag, or Richardson must be wrong, possibly all three. We shall leave them in peace for the present.

Notwithstanding the identity in name, it has sometimes been asserted that the *sappheiros* of the Greeks, and *sapphirus* of the Romans is not our sapphire, the blue crystalline variety of corundum, but only our lapis-lazuli. This opinion is founded on a description by Pliny: "*Sapphirus* is refulgent with spots of gold, of an azure color, sometimes, but not often purple; the best kind comes from Media; it is never transparent, and is not well suited for engraving upon when intersected with hard, crystalline particles." Every word of this exactly suits our lapis-lazuli, but, except what is said about the color, not a word of it is applicable to our sapphire.

This looks like strong evidence, but yet we are persuaded that the sapphire of the Bible is our true sapphire. The reason of our opinion is because the lapis-lazuli does not come up to what the sacred text requires. Let us read Exod. xxiv., 10. "And they saw the God of Israel; under his feet as it were a work of sapphire stone, as the heaven, when it is clear." The stone is supposed to be durable, for it constitutes the floor of heaven, "under his feet, a work (or as the A. V. has 'a paved work') of sapphire stone." Now Pliny's "spots of gold" are iron pyrites (fool's gold), which easily decompose, and so cause the stone to crumble.

The stone is supposed to be transparent, "as the heaven, when clear." The A. V. has, "as it were the body of heaven in clearness." Moreover, Braun says: "*Sane apud Judæos sapphiros pellucidas notas fuisse*

manifestissimum est, adeo etiam ut *pellucidum* illorum philosophis dicatur sappir." Which being literally thrashed out, reads: "It is certainly most manifest that among the Jews sapphires were known to be transparent, so much so that *transparent* was by their philosophers called sappir." But the lapis-lazuli is densely opaque.

Now let us try Job xxviii., 16. "It (wisdom) shall not be compared with . . . the most precious stone sardonyx, or the sapphire." The same ideas are repeated in other texts, as Tobias xiii., 21: "The gates of Jerusalem shall be built of sapphire, and of emerald." In Apoc. xxi., 19, one of the foundations of the Holy City is to be of sapphire. The stone then is supposed to be precious. Now the lapis-lazuli neither is, nor was, nor ever can be really precious.

We think the Gordon knot of the difficulty can be untied by saying that probably Moses knew some things that were unknown even to Pliny, and that with his knowledge of "all the learning of the Egyptians" he would never have put a lapis-lazuli in the rational, thinking it a sapphire. Finally, there is a legend that the Ten Commandments were engraved on two large Tables of Sapphire, but for this we cannot vouch.

6.—*Yahalom* = *Jasper*.

The root of the word is given as "*halam*," "to strike," "to crush," "to conquer," "to be hard." This would apply perfectly to the diamond, which is, indeed, the rendering of the word by Eben Ezra, followed by the A. V. Still the best authorities hardly admit that the diamond could have been one of the gems of the rational. Among other reasons for denying we have, first, that it is generally admitted that the names of the children of Israel were really engraved on the stones, and as King says: "It would baffle all engravers, both ancient and modern, to cut an inscription on this invincible gem." Secondly, a diamond, to match the rest of the stones in the rational, would have to be equal in size to the Koh-i-Noor, which King, a clergyman of the Reformed Church, characterizes as "most absurd."

What then is the *yahalom*? By referring to the Table we shall probably be persuaded that the word has been made to mean altogether too much, or too many. The LXX., the Vulgate, and the Douay agree on *jaspis*. The Alexandrine, and many ancient versions have *onychion*. It seems that Josephus in one place gives *onychion* and in another *jaspis*. The *sib-halom* (or *sab-halom*) of Onkelos is no clearer than the *ya-halom* of the original. Ben Uzziel has *kadkodin*, by some rendered carbuncle, but which is evidently nothing more than the *kadkod*, or *chodchod* of Ezech. xxvii., 16. This word the LXX., by a little twist of replacing *d* by *r*, turns into *chorchor*, which is not much to the purpose; while the Vulgate gives it up and does not translate it at all. When, however, the same *kodkod* appears in Isaias, they both translate it by *jasper*, while the A. V., strangely enough forgets its "diamond" and is contented with *agate*. The Arabic *bahraman* (*bahr* = the sea, and *man* = like) evidently calls for a colored gem, while among the translations of the Syriac, *neketho*, we find *jasper*.

Rosenmüller attempts to find a way out of this labyrinth as follows: He says, in substance, that the Alexandrine translator must have fallen in with a Hebrew MSS., in which *yahalom* had, through carelessness or accident, been transferred from the sixth to the twelfth place, and *jashpeh* from the twelfth to the sixth. He left them transposed, but rendered them correctly by *onychion* and *jaspis* respectively. Next, some one in getting out a new edition of the LXX., and collating the original Hebrew with the Alexandrine Version, put the Hebrew words back in their proper place, but failed to notice the transposition that had been made in the Alexandrine, and hence put *jaspis* for the translation of *yahalom*, and *onychion* for that of *jashpeh*. Rosenmüller, therefore, means that it was all an accidental error, but still an error, and that *yahalom* should be translated by *onychion*, and *jashpeh* by *jasper*.

The explanation is ingenious, and we should be glad to leave it so, were it not for a very serious objection which meets us. Thus, whenever in the Scriptures any indication is afforded as to the nature of *jashpeh*, a beautiful, clear, transparent stone is supposed, and the quality of transparency is often strongly insisted on. In Ezech. xxviii., 13, it is emphatically called a *precious* stone. In Apoc. iv., 3, it is used as an emblem of the glory of the One sitting on the throne. In Apoc. xxi., 11, we read: "And the light of the Holy City was like to a precious stone, as to the *jashpeh* stone, even as crystal." In Apoc. xxi., 18, it is the superstructure of the walls of the New Jerusalem, while in the next verse, it is made the first of the twelve foundations of those walls. Now according to the universal opinion of mineralogists, ancient and modern, the *jaspis* had none of these qualities, and therefore it is not the true *jashpeh*. We cannot pursue this dispute any further, but as we have no other place for jasper except where the Vulgate puts it, we are content to put it in the sixth rank, as the probably true rendering of *yahalom*.

7.—*Leshem* = *Ligure*.

No root has been found for *leshem*. Fürst says: "Leshem, the name of a precious stone, whose origin is lost." Onkelos translates it by *kanchara* which a to-us-unknown author treats thus: "Kanchera = Gr. kenkros = 'millet seed,' which is like emery = smiris; whence shamir = diamond." Whew! . . .

The word *ligure* does not occur in modern mineralogy, and Houghton says it is impossible to make out with any degree of certainty what stone is denoted by the Hebrew term. We do not think it quite so hopeless. Passing over a number of conjectures that have admittedly very little foundation, such as *tourmaline*, *rubellite*, *sapphire*, *amber*, the fossil *belemnite*, etc., we come immediately to the stone which seems to enjoy a higher probability than any other, viz., the *jacinth* (our modern *hyacinth*, or *zircon* stone). The thread may be a slender one, but it is better than none.

Theophrastus derives the word "lynkourion," of which the "lygursion" in LXX. is only a corrupt form, from *lynx* (*lynkos*) a lynx, and

ouron = urine, basing his statement on the absurd notion that the stone was the petrified urine of the lynx. With this as a foundation, he solemnly goes on to inform us which kind of lynx produced the best sort, and where and how it was obtained. His next observation, and this time it was real *observation*, is more to the point. "Out of it signet rings are engraved, and it is very hard, exactly like real stone. It is highly transparent and cold to the touch." Ovid, in his "Metamorphoses," xv., 413, gives the lynx-fable in verse.

The Greek word became *lyncurium* in Latin, and this according to King was again corrupted into *ligurius*, which he says evidently means *jargoon*, or *jacinth*. Pliny loses all patience with Theophrastus for his superstitious lynx-yarn, and, overdoing it, refuses to believe in the stone at all, saying that unless it were "amber" it did not exist. But Pliny is wrong, having been deceived by the fact that amber was brought from Liguria. The true stone did exist, and was used very frequently both for intaglios and cameos, some of which have come down to our own day. One, a magnificent full-face intaglio, supposed to represent Maecenas, belonged to the Hertz collection; another, a figure of Ptolemy XII., brother of Cleopatra, was to be seen a few years since in the Somerville collection, in Philadelphia.

Now, the description of lynkourion, as given by Theophrastus and others, agrees perfectly, down to the minutest details of color, hardness, peculiar behavior under the burin, porousness, and everything else, with that of our jacinth, and with it only. All this is certainly enough of evidence that our jacinth = *ligurius* = *lyncurium* = lynkourion = *ligurion*. The weak point is the connection between *ligurion* and *Ieshem*.

Since however the ancient versions all agree, without even one dissenting voice, and since we can find no reason whatever for doubting their testimony, we think it wise to let it stand. The jacinth would be well worthy of a place in the rational. King says: "A fine jacinth is a splendid stone, and much superior to the best topaz, as it has a peculiar golden lustre mixed with its rich orange."

8.—*Shebo* = *Agate*.

Two derivations have, according to W. L. Bevan, been suggested for the word *shebo*; first, *shabah*, "he took him prisoner," or, "to shine," the latter of which agrees with the Arabic *sebh*, or *shaba*, "kindling a fire."

The second derivation suggested is the proper name Sheba, whence all kinds of precious stones were brought to Tyre. The first of these gives us no definite light as to the nature of the gem. Neither does the second, and moreover, according to the Vulgate, the prophet (Ezech. xxviii., 13), in describing the glory of the King of Tyre, enumerates all the stones of the rational, except the three of the third row, viz., ligure, agate and amethyst. Even if we admit with Bellermand, that the omission was through the carelessness of some scribe, there is no

known reason why Sheba should be connected with agate rather than with some one of the other stones.

We can find no reasons either for or against the translation "achates," adopted by the LXX., Josephus and the rest, and since everybody seems satisfied, we too are content to remain in blissful ignorance of what cannot be made out.

Our English word agate comes directly from the Greek. Theophrastus says: "A handsome stone is the achates, brought from the river of that name" (now the Drillo) "in Sicily, and is sold at a high price." But Pliny observes: "The achates was anciently in high estimation; now in none at all."

9.—*Achlamah* = *Amethyst*.

According to the Rabbins the root of *achlamah* is "*chalam*," "to dream," since: "He who constantly wears this ring on his finger sees dreams." Fürst denies this, saying, "Achlamah, a precious stone, named from its hardness, not from dreaming as Eben Ezra and Quinchi have imagined. *Chalam* means *to be strong*, firm; also, fat or hard." The root is *lam*, the same which is found in *halam*, which is found in *yahalom*.

About all the versions of the Bible either agree on the same word, or at least give one which means nearly the same thing. Even the Chaldean, "En Egla," and Syriac, "En Eglo" (= calf's eye), need not disturb our serenity, for if *we* honor the cat by calling one of our varieties of quartz "Cat's Eye," why should not others honor the dreamy (*chalam*) calf, by naming another variety "Calf's Eye?" It is all a matter of taste, and we even prefer calf to cat, as a dish, if not as a gem. The notion of the Greeks that the amethyst preserves from drunkenness we have not had occasion to test.

Anyhow, as to its special place, or presence in, or absence from, the rational, there is no real cause of dispute. Only one or two disgruntled rabbins want *onyx* or *beryl* in this ninth place; but we need those stones for other places from which they cannot be spared, so we shall leave *achlamah* and *amethyst* in possession of the situation.

The amethyst was formerly considered quite precious, and even as late as the last century Queen Charlotte's necklace of fine amethysts was valued at \$10,000; it probably would not bring as many cents now, so plentifully has the stone been found.

10.—*Tharshish* = *Chrysolite* (modern Topaz).

As was promised under No. 2 above, we now take up the rival claims of Topaz and Chrysolite. On this subject commentators are all at sea, and nearly all rowing in different boats. Having examined the conjectures, opinions and reasons of quite a number of them, we are, for the present, pretty well convinced that, contrary to the Vulgate and Beller-mann, *pitdah* should be translated by "chrysolite" and *tharshish* by "topaz." Let us see.

The word "tharshish" occurs eight times in the Bible. In order to take in the whole ground at a glance, we map it out as in table B.

Table B (Showing the Different Versions of Tharshish).

	Hebrew.	LXX.	Vulgate.	Douay.	A. V.
Exod. xxvii., 20. . . }	Tharshish.	Chrysolithos.	Chrysolithus.	Chrysolite.	Beryl.
" xxxix., 13. . . }		Tharsis.	Hyacinthus.	Hyacinthus.	"
Cant. v., 14.		"	Mare.	Sea.	"
Ezech. i., 16.		Anthrax.	Chrysolithus.	Chrysolite.	"
" x., 9.		Tharsis.	. . . " " " . . .
" xxxviii., 13. . . .		Chrysolithos.	"	"	Chrysolite.
Dan. x., 6.					
Apoc. xxi., 20. . . .					

This is a pretty muddle. To translate that sweet-sounding word "tharshish," the LXX. has three different words, the Vulgate (and Douay of course) three, the A. V., two. These however overlap so as to make in all *only* six different readings. The LXX. uses *tharsis* three times, *chrysolithos* twice, and *anthrax* once. The Vulgate and Douay agree with the LXX. twice, and differ from it four times. The A. V. agrees with the LXX. once, and differs from it five times.¹

What now is to be made of all this? There is no possible method of proving or disproving the identity of ancient with modern gems, except by comparing their properties. When the properties of an ancient stone have been thoroughly described, all we have to do is to go to our Cabinet of Gems, and pick out the one corresponding to the description, and after that we "don't care a fig" how ancients or moderns *spell* the name. But sometimes the descriptions that have reached us are very sketchy and incomplete; and in the Bible especially, which is not a treatise on stones, though it may say hard things at times, we cannot expect to find anything more than casual hints in this matter. Even so, a mere hint is often sufficient to prove a negative case (*i.e.*, to prove disparity), or help to prove an identity. For example, if a stone were described as, precious, transparent, of a yellow color, and easily engraved on, the "transparent," and "yellow color," might suggest our modern topaz, but the "easily engraved on" would prove it was not; though each of the statements would help to prove that it was "amber." Now in this case of Topaz *versus* Chrysolite, we have arguments both positive and negative.

(1) Let us now compare our texts of Table B. Exodus merely gives the word with no context to help us, so we let it pass.

(2) In Canticles v., 14, the Beloved is portrayed. The Latin of this text taken word by word from the Hebrew reads (leaving tharshish untranslated): "Manus ejus circuli aurei, pleni *tharshishim*" (this from Benedict Arias). The Vulgate has: "Manus illius tornatiles aureae, plenae hyacinthis." The Douay has: "His hands are turned, and as of

¹ We are aware of course that in the case of the Apocalypse, the Hebrew was translated from the original Greek, and not the Greek from the Hebrew; but that does not matter as far as we are concerned here.

gold, full of hyacinths." The A. V.: "His hands are as gold rings set with beryl." Braun (quoted by Smith, Dict. Bible, art. Beryl), has: "His hands are orbs of gold set with tharshish stones," and he argues thus: "The orbs or rings of gold, as Coccius has observed, refer, not to rings on the fingers, but to the fingers themselves, as they gently press upon the thumb, and thus form the figure of an orb or ring. The latter part of the verse is the causal expletive of the former. It is not only said in this passage that the hands are called orbs of gold, but the reason why they are so called is immediately added—specially on account of the beautiful chrysolites with which the hands were adorned." Braun concludes by saying that "the ancient chrysolite or the modern yellow topaz appears to have a better claim than any other gem to represent the tharshish of the Bible, certainly a better claim than the beryl of the A. V., a rendering which appears to be unsupported by any kind of evidence." This translation seems nearer the original than any of the others, and the exegesis in harmony with the canons of common sense. It throws out the *hyacinthus* of the Vulgate, which is *blue*, and the *beryl* of the A. V. which is *green*, neither of which can be reconciled with other texts.

(3) The next text is Ezech. i., 16, where the prophet in a vision of glory sees four wheels whose color was like tharshish, which the LXX. translates again by "color of tharsis." Nothing however can be gathered as to what that color was; and whence the Vulgate gets its "*visio maris*," "*appearance of the sea*," and the Chaldean (Table A) its *krum yama*, "sea color," can so far be but dimly conjectured.

(4) In Ezech. x., 9, we have again a vision of wheels, where the LXX., for no reason that we can discover, gives up *tharsis* and puts in *anthrax*, and for just as much reason apparently, the Vulgate deserts its first *hyacinthus* and substitutes *chrysolithus*; but here again the context gives nothing to judge by.

(5) Ezech. xxxviii., 13, speaks of the precious stones that adorned the King of Tyre in glory. The LXX. in our hands (Walton's "Polyglott," London, 1657) puts the same stones and in the same order as those of the rational, but the Vulgate, Douay and A. V. leave out three, as we said before, and mix up the others so badly that no comparison is possible.

(6) Dan. x., 6. We have been waiting for Daniel to come to judgment, and behold he is here. The prophet standing by the great river Tigris, and lifting up his eyes, is wrapt in a vision, in which he sees a man whose body was like the *tharshish*. The LXX. now changes back to *tharsis*, while the Vulgate has *chrysolite*, and the A. V. *beryl*. Up there in the clouds, a man, ten-fold gigantic, whose body "gleams with a glorious golden glowing," is something to look on; but a man of hyacinth, a *blue* man, or a man of beryl, a *green* man—shades of the beautiful, defend us. This is the keynote of the whole business, the man shone like gold in the sunshine.

(7) In Apoc. xxi. 20, the seventh foundation-stone of the New Jerusalem is, according to the LXX., *chrysolithos*, which word is preserved

in all the subsequent translations, even the A.V. wheeling into line at last with the others.¹

All the indications therefore afforded by Scripture as to the nature of the stone *tharshish* point to it as a stone of a *golden yellow color*.

A strong confirmation of this view is to be found in the testimony of nearly all mineralogists, ancient and modern, from Theophrastus down to Dana. They all describe the *chrysolithos* of the Greeks, *chrysolithus* of the Romans, as a stone of a bright golden-yellow color, excessively hard and beautiful. Pliny says: "A transparent stone, with a refulgence like that of gold." Josephus testifies that the *chrysolithos* was "a golden-colored gem." The Persians called it "a transparent stone with golden lustre." Marbodius, mineralogist, poet, and Bishop of Rennes (1081), says: "It is bright and yellow, and very hard." Albertus Magnus says: "A gem of yellow color, and good for the gout." Epiphanius has: "Chrysolithus, by some called chrysophyllus, is of a golden color." Propertius ranks the *chrysolithus* on a par with the emerald, and complains that the prætor of Illyria lured away his *fiancée* by bribing her with these gems:

" quoscumque smaragdos,
Quosque dedit flavo lumine chrysolithos."

" whatever emeralds,
And what chrysolites of yellow light he gave."

These are but specimens; numbers of others might be adduced.

On the other hand, the witnesses that the *Topazion*, *Topazius*, was *green*, are not less numerous, but we have space for only one. Pliny says: "The topazius is held in high estimation for its green tints."

Now what we moderns call oriental Topaz is certainly yellow, and what we call chrysolite is just as certainly green. Moreover, every point in the descriptions given by the ancients, of the *chrysolithus* fits our topaz perfectly, and fits nothing else; while all they say of the *topazius* is exactly applicable to our chrysolite, and to no other stone. Chrysolite (our modern article) is therefore the second stone in the rational; and topaz (our modern stone) is the tenth. But just how the curious interchange took place is another matter, and one which we have not room to ventilate now.

II.—*Shoham* = *Onyx*.

Braun derives the word *shoham* from the Arabic "*sachma*" = *blackness*, while Gesenius and Fürst refer it to another Arabic word "*sa-*

¹ A great deal of learning has been expended on that Greek word *tharsis*, of the LXX. Some hold that it is merely the Hebrew word spelled, as near as possible, in Greek characters; the Greeks had no such sound in their language as *sh*, and no means of representing it, and therefore they did the best they could by substituting *s* in its place. Others maintain that Tharsis was an old Greek name for Tartessus, a Phœnician city in the south of Spain with which the Jews traded. Others again think the word by some hook or crook came to mean "the sea." This of course would account nicely for the "visio maris" of the Vulgate in Ezech. i., 16.

hama," "to be pale." This looks like a bad beginning, but perhaps it is not really so bad as it looks. Onyx always consists of two layers, one of which is often white, the other often black, so that you can turn one side up and get "*sachma*," blackness, or turn the other side up and get "*saham*," paleness. Josephus says "*sardonyx*," but as *sardonyx* has three layers, one of which may be white, another black, and the third something else, there is no real contradiction. The LXX. has *beryllion*, but since for the same *shoham* it gives for the stone of Hevilath, *prasinus*, and for the one of the ephod, *smaragdus*, its inconsistent testimony is ruled out. In a similar way the Alexandrine version contradicts itself by putting *beryllion* in the rational and *chrysoprasi* in Hevilath. The Vulgate, the Douay, and the A. V., consistently put *onyx* in all three places. There is no positive internal evidence to be found, but the word of Josephus who testifies to having seen the two stones of the ephod, and whose fine quality he specially notices, must, in the absence of any other reliable authority, suffice for the present. Therefore *onyx*, and probably the species called *sardonyx*, was the eleventh stone of the rational.

12.—*Jashpeh* = *Beryl*.

The word *jashpeh* has lost its root, if it ever had one, just as is the case with the Manx cat and his tail. The Arabic words *jashaf*, *jashab*, *jashf*, have the same meaning, but they too are without visible root. In English, *jasper* has been given as the equivalent of *jashpeh* in many versions of the Bible, but we think we have given, under No. 6 above, sufficient cause for not accepting this reading. The LXX. has *onychion*, while the Vulgate has *beryllus*. In our arrangement, *onychion* is already settled in No. 11, and so it seems we have nothing left to wind up with except *beryl*. This reason if left alone would be rather weak, but when it is backed up by the authority of Josephus, and there is no solid reason advanced against it, we shall have to leave *beryl* at the foot of his class.

Josephus says that all the stones were remarkable for their size and beauty, and that they were of incomparable value.

The Rational must have been a thing of glory, adorned as it was with the fairest specimens of Nature's fairest handicraft, resplendent with twelve of the most precious gems of earth, emblems all, of other gems beyond the earth, shining, glistening, sparkling with rays of every gorgeous hue. The *Sardius* was red; the *Topazius* (= *chrysolite*), green, with a touch of gold; the *Smaragdus* (emerald), bright green; the *Carbuncle*, dark red; the *Sapphire*, dark blue; the *Jasper*, dark green; the *Ligurius* (= *Jacinth*), orange, with a hint of gold; the *Achates* (*Agate*), banded, probably of many colors; the *Amethyst*, royal purple; the *Chrysolithus* (= *Topaz*), bright golden yellow; the *Onyx*, black and white, or blue and white; the *Beryl*, light green.

II.—SIZE AND ORDER OF THE STONES.

The gems were arranged in four rows of three each, and the whole space covered measured a span each way. We take the span at nine

inches, so that each gem with its setting of gold, would occupy a space of 3 inches in length by $2\frac{1}{4}$ inches in width. The order was of course from right to left, as Hebrews are used to write. Table C shows this arrangement.

Table C.

3 Bareketh. Emerald.	2. Pitdah. Topaz.	1. Odem. Sardius.
6. Yahalom. Jasper.	5. Sappir. Sapphire.	4. Nophek. Carbuncle.
9. Achlamah. Amethyst.	8. Shebo. Agate.	7. Leshem. Ligure.
12. Jashpeh. Beryl.	11. Shoham. Onyx.	10. Tharshish. Chrysolite.

We have left the English names as they stand in the Douay. Should any one wish to make the slight changes suggested above, he may do so mentally.

III.—NAMES ENGRAVED ON THE STONES.

The names in Table C were *not* engraved on the stones, but have been put there merely to show the position of the gems themselves. In Exod., xxviii., it is ordered that the names of the twelve children of Israel shall be engraved on the stones, one name on each, while in Exod., xxxix., it is clearly stated that the order has been carried out. Every version of the Bible says the same thing, and yet in the face of this, there are found some who deny or at least doubt that it was real engraving. Why? We confess that we do not quite understand this. Is it because the stones are thought too hard? Yet, all known stones, the diamond alone excepted, have been cut, time and time again with both letters and portraits, in intaglio and in cameo. Ancient Egypt, Assyria, Babylonia, have left us specimens. Until further notice therefore we shall accept the words of the Bible in their literal sense, and suppose that the names were really engraved, either in full, or in initials, on the stones, not pasted on them, nor yet left floating around mentally in the air. A pen of iron with a point of shamir is capable of doing the work, but the dispute as to which twelve names, we shall attend to below.

IV.—ORDER OF THE NAMES.

For the two stones of the ephod it is expressly commanded that the names shall be in the order of birth of the children of Israel, *i.e.*, sons of Jacob. Some suppose that this order was preserved in the rational, others deny it. The whole thing is so complicated that we must perforce insert another Table, D, in order to straighten it out.

Table D.

(a).	(b).	(c).	(d).	(e).	(f).	(g).
Ruben	1	Lia.	1	1	4	2
Simeon	2	"	2	2	5	7
Levi	3	"	3	8
Juda	4	"	4	3	1	1
Dan	5	Bala.	7	9	10	..
Napthali	6	"	8	12	12	5
Gad	7	Zelpha.	9	11	6	3
Aser	8	"	10	10	11	4
Issachar	9	Lia.	5	4	2	9
Zabulon	10	"	6	5	3	10
Joseph	11	Rachel.	11	11
{ Ephraim	Aseneth.	..	6	7	..
{ Manasses	"	..	7	8	6
Benjamin	12	Rachel.	12	8	9	12

Column (a) gives the names of the sons of Jacob (children of Israel), together with those of the two sons of Joseph.

Column (b) the order of birth of the sons of Jacob, about which there is no doubt whatever. Gen. xxix., xxx., xxxv.

Column (c) the names of the mothers of all these men.

Column (d) is an arrangement in which the sons of Lia are all named first, and then those of Bala, Zelpha and Rachel in succession.

Column (e) is the order given in Num. i., 1-15. It is the war census of the host of the descendents of Jacob's sons, but not the order of battle array.

Column (f) is the order of Numbers ii., 3-34. It gives the position of the hosts around the tabernacle; 1, 2, 3 on the east; 4, 5, 6 on the south; 7, 8, 9 on the west; 10, 11, 12 on the north. This order seems to have been made in accordance with the strength and importance of the several tribes.

Column (g) is from Apoc. vii., 5-8, in which St. John gives the number of those that were "signed" of each of the tribes, from which Dan and Ephraim are omitted. This enumeration evidently has no connection with the order of the names in the rational.

On the whole, the most *probable* opinion seems to be that the order of the names on the stones was simply the order of the birth as in column (b). The reason for this is, in brief, as follows:

In Exod. xxxix., the ephod and rational are declared finished and ready. In Exod. xl., the tabernacle is set up and Aaron is vested with all his paraphernalia, on the first day of the first month of the second

year in the desert; up to that time there had been no mention of the tribes of Ephraim and Manasses.

Then on the first day of the *second* month of the second year, that is, *one month later* (Num. i.) the tribes were put on a war footing, and that of Levi put in charge of the sanctuary, but not counted among the twelve, while the tribe of Joseph was divided into two, under the names of his sons.

Therefore the names of Levi and Joseph were on the rational, not those of Ephraim and Manasses. This rids us of the order proposed in columns (e) and (f); while for that of column (d) no reason whatever has been assigned. Therefore we conclude that the order of the names was that of column (b), *i.e.*, the order of birth of the sons of Jacob.

V.—SYMBOLICAL MEANING.

It is generally thought that some symbolical meaning was attached to each stone in connection with the name engraved thereon, but if so, it has been lost in the mists of the ages, from which it will probably never emerge.

VI.—WHERE DID THE ISRAELITES GET THE STONES?

This may have happened in one or other, or both, of two ways. First, they set forth on their journey laden, by God's command, with the spoils of Egypt, and though only gold, and silver, and raiment are enumerated, other precious things may well have been included, and precious stones were well known in Egypt. There was no theft in this transaction, for God owned the treasures even of Egypt, and could rightly bestow them on whom he willed. Besides this, the Israelites had been refused their wages, and could therefore make use of the doctrine of occult compensation, *overtly*.

Secondly, their journey was through Arabia, famed throughout the ages for its precious stones of many kinds; and these could easily have been procured by trade or barter.

VII.—WHERE ARE THE STONES NOW?

King believes that, if not this set, at least a second set worn by the high priest after the return from Babylon, was, after many vicissitudes, deposited in the sacristy of Saint Sophia, in Constantinople, and that when the Turk gets his deserts, it will emerge from oblivion. May the Lord hasten the day.

VIII.—THREE OTHER STONES.

If we accept the list given above of stones of the ephod and rational, we find that all except two of them, are mentioned as foundation stones of the New Jerusalem (Apoc. xxi.), but their order is entirely different. The two left out are *agate* and *carbuncle*, instead of which we have *chalcedony* and *chrysoprase*.

We know what is now understood by *chalcedony*, a species of stone

belonging to the quartz group; but what the ancients meant by "*chalcedonius*" is not quite clear. From what Pliny says, this latter would seem to be an inferior kind of emerald from the copper mines of Chalcedon; but how the change in signification came about is still a mystery.

Chrysoprase is an opaque, apple-green stone, of a most agreeable hue and extremely hard. Its material is chalcedony colored by oxide of nickel. The name is derived from the Greek, and means "leek-green with a golden tinge."

Lastly, we find "pearls." The Hebrew words *gabish* and *peninim* (Job xviii., 18, Ezech. xiii., 11-13, and xxxviii., 22) have sometimes been translated by "pearls," but the majority of interpreters do not consider them stones at all.

In the New Testament the pearl is mentioned in Matth. xiii., 45, 46, where a merchant finds one of great price, and in exchange for it parts with all he owns. In 1 Tim. ii., 9, St. Paul advises women to "adorn themselves with modesty and sobriety, not with plaited hair and pearls."

Pearls are again mentioned in Apoc. xvii., 4, and xxi., 21. In the latter place: "The twelve gates (of the Holy City) are twelve pearls, one to each, and every one was of one several pearl." Here "pearl" must mean pieces of "mother-of-pearl," fitted together to form the doors, since an oyster big enough to furnish a pearl as large as a city gate would surpass the wildest dream of the wildest of archæologists. There is no difficulty about the matter anyhow, for the Greek word *margarites* and Latin *margarita* may mean either pearl or mother-of-pearl, according to circumstances.

IX.—TWO LISTS NOT IN THE BIBLE.

The first list, as such, is not given in the Bible, but it has a legendary connection therewith. In it the twelve Apostles are symbolized by twelve stones, thus:

- St. Peter is represented by Jasper.
- St. Andrew is represented by Sapphire.
- St. James is represented by Chalcedony.
- St. John is represented by Emerald.
- St. Thomas is represented by Beryl.
- St. James, the lesser, is represented by Topaz.
- St. Philip is represented by Sardonyx.
- St. Bartholomew is represented by Carnelian.
- St. Matthew is represented by Chrysolite.
- St. Simon is represented by Jacinth.
- St. Thaddeus is represented by Chrysoprase.
- St. Matthias is represented by Amethyst.

This is probably due to Apoc. xxi., 14: "And the wall of the city had twelve foundations, and in them the twelve names of the twelve Apostles of the Lamb."

Another list, neither in the Bible nor connected with it, is one in which a particular stone is sacred to each month, the list of "zodiac stones."

January	=	Aquarius	=	Jacinth.
February	=	Pisces	=	Amethyst.
March	=	Aries	=	Bloodstone.
April	=	Taurus	=	Sapphire.
May	=	Gemini	=	Agate.
June	=	Cancer	=	Emerald.
July	=	Leo	=	Onyx.
August	=	Virgo	=	Carnelian.
September	=	Libra	=	Chrysolite.
October	=	Scorpio	=	Aquamarine.
November	=	Sagittarius	=	Topaz.
December	=	Capricorn	=	Ruby.

Beyond this, there are superstitions innumerable attributing to gems many properties, hygienic, lethal, angelic and diabolical; but we have already trespassed too far on the patience of our readers.

We have found, in all, about a score of different precious stones in the Bible. The subject has been of deep interest to the writer, and he only regrets being unable to treat it in a more interesting manner.

T. J. A. FREEMAN, S.J.

Book Notices.

THE HISTORY OF THE POPES, FROM THE CLOSE OF THE MIDDLE AGES. Drawn from the secret archives of the Vatican and other original sources. From the German of Dr. Ludwig Pastor, Professor of History in the University of Innsbruck. Edited by Frederick Ignatius Antrobus of the Oratory. Vols. III, and IV. London: Kegan, Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1894. Received from Benziger Brothers.

Dr. Pastor occupies a unique position among the Catholic *literati* of our generation. Though still comparatively a young man he has already forged his way by persevering and conscientious work to the very front rank of that noble corps of men who have consecrated their lives to the investigation of historical truth. He has received most flattering encomiums from the Supreme Pontiff whose especial esteem he deservedly enjoys, and bears, among Protestant writers, the reputation of being *par excellence*, the champion of the Catholic Church. The position of Dr. Pastor is all the more honorable, as it does not oblige him to become a special pleader, or to distort or to slur over the witness of original documents. His commission from the great Pope who threw open to scholars the doors of the most secret archives of the Vatican is to present the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. He is to allow each historical personage to appear as he spoke, wrote, and acted: "Nothing extenuate, nor set down aught in malice." What an advance is this upon the old-time, polemical method of writing history, when every Pope, bishop, priest or monarch was either an immaculate saint or an unreclaimed fiend, according to the theological standpoint of the so-called historian. The time is past in reputable scientific circles when each individual actor on the page of history was regarded as a sort of abstraction, or the incarnation of the principles which he was supposed to represent. The bright idea has dawned upon us that the heroes of history were *men*, mortals like to us, with human motives, instincts, virtues, and weaknesses, and not demigods or demifiends come from a different planet among us.

It cannot be denied that our present method of studying history by means of original documents, while possessing the advantage of scientific truth and reality, has stripped it of a great deal of its poetic charm. The development of history as a *science*, or product of pure reason, has tended to hurt it as an *art*, the child of the imagination employing the embellishments of elegance and eloquence. This is painfully apparent in works like the one which we are introducing to our readers. Dr. Pastor is too busily engaged in overturning old errors and prejudices, and too scrupulously intent upon obtaining absolute accuracy, to devote much attention to the allurements of mere literature. It is next to impossible to be at the same time an expert in handling a microscope and a telescope; nor is it reasonable to expect that a scholar whose energies have been expended in ransacking archives everywhere for manuscripts, and establishing the dates and true readings of letters and other documents, should be able to rise to those brilliant generalizations which make history pleasant reading to the general public.

We regard, therefore, this work of the learned Pastor, and all similar

works, only as preliminary contributions to a Church history still to be written, and most probably not in the present generation, when it will be no longer necessary to distract the reader's attention from the current of the narrative by the encumberment of annotations as bulky as the text. Even now, it often causes us surprise and vexation when our eye is called off from some important statement to the bottom of the page without any sufficient justification. The suspicion is sure to be aroused that the writer is making a vain display of erudition. Every note or reference which is not of evident utility is a sheer nuisance and a disfigurement. Creighton's custom of massing his authorities at the end of the volume is vastly preferable to the method of Pastor, and of Germans generally. These notes are of no service to the great bulk of readers, who could not verify them if they wished, not having the documents at hand. The custom is somewhat amateurish, and better honored in the breach than in the observance. When we prove an author to be correct in essentials, we may readily trust him for matters of very slight importance. At any rate, in such things, he is to be judged, not by the general public, but by his fellow-experts, who can verify his statements without the assistance of a finger-post at every turn.

The period of history which Dr. Pastor has chosen for his special field is not one calculated to develop much enthusiasm in either the writer or his readers. No force of genius could elevate the public characters, ecclesiastical or civil, of the fifteenth century to the dignity or stature of heroes. There was no room for heroism in that age of trifling pedants and petty politicians. The grand ideals which had dominated, united and civilized Europe during the Middle Ages had lost their hold on the intellects and imaginations of men, who lived, so to speak, a hand-to-mouth existence, intent upon seizing, each what came next to him out of the universal wreck. It was a minor misfortune that the Holy Roman Empire was no longer a name to conjure with; the prime disaster and gloomiest outlook for the future, was the decadence of that papal prestige which, in happier times, had made a united Christendom not only a possibility but a living reality. The great schism had unloosed passions and scattered seeds of dissension and insubordination destined to produce in time most lamentable fruit. The calamities of the sixteenth century were the logical sequence of the follies of the fifteenth; the tocsin of the great apostasy was sounded, not at Wittenburg but at Constance and Basel.

Could a Leo or a Hildebrand have averted the impending catastrophe? Hard to say. It is much safer to affirm that no man of the calibre of a Leo or Hildebrand could have received the suffrages of the cardinals of the fifteenth century.

The two volumes before us contain a translation of Pastor's second volume in the original German edition. They deal with the pontificates of three Popes, namely, Pius II. (1458-1464), Paul II. (1464-1471) and Sixtus IV. (1471-1484), an aggregate of about twenty-six years.

It has been repeatedly asserted that the history of these and of the other pontificates of the fifteenth century will be entirely revolutionized by the new documents which are being every day discovered in the archives of Europe. The persusal of Pastor's work and a comparison between it and, say Creighton's, will show that this assertion is altogether too sweeping. The archives in question had been already fairly well exploited by earlier investigators, and the stale lies of the slanderous gossipers of the Renaissance era had been banished from the pages of reputable historians. Indeed, the errors which all Pastor's

diligence has been able to discover in Creighton's narrative are remarkably few and insignificant, and the result has been in our mind an increased appreciation of the Anglican bishop's worth as a fair-minded and capable historian. Taking into account the Anglican's point of view which makes him naturally adverse to the Papal claims, we are forced to avow that his judgments passed upon the Popes of the Renaissance are far less severe and his sympathy with their difficulties much more humane and kindly than those of the Catholic professor of Innsbruck. This is, no doubt, owing to the fact that a Catholic is prone to expect a higher ideal in the Vicar of Christ, to demand from him greater sanctity, purity of intention, disinterestedness, spirituality, than would a Protestant. The loftier one's conception of the dignity of the papacy, and the more intimate one's association of the Visible with the Invisible Head of the Church, the more intolerant must one be of the slightest appearance in the Roman Pontiff's character of human frailty. Hence, the severest critics of the papacy, and indeed of the clergy in general, have been the Catholics themselves.

Another remark: The History of the Popes is by no means the history of the Catholic Church, which is but slightly interested in the far-rago of petty Italian squabbles, intrigues, and family ambitions, which make up the main bulk of this book. Whether this or that cardinal is elected Pope, or whether one or a dozen of his brothers or nephews are made princes of Church or State,—these are things of very remote interest to the Catholic Church if they attend faithfully to their duties and lead lives of edification. And yet it is just such trifling and ephemeral matters which are most apt to engross the thoughts of the curia and of chroniclers of Roman gossip, of all gossips the most flat, stale, and unprofitable.

We conclude by complimenting Father Antrobus upon the fidelity and elegance of his translation and the publishers upon the beauty and accuracy of their work.

THE MONASTIC LIFE, FROM THE FATHERS OF THE DESERT TO CHARLEMAGNE. Eighth Volume of the Formation of Christendom. By *Thomas W. Allies, K. C.S.G.* London: Kegan Paul, French, Trübner & Co., Limited. 1895.

The casual reader will need a key to the rich store-house of the volume entitled "The Monastic Life." Superficially read, it will convey nothing new, and yet we venture to say that Mr. Allies' conception of monasticism is entirely new. He makes it the second great pivot which supports the edifice of Christendom. The fruitful generation of chastity is engrafted on the Apostolic See, its living force and its support.

The Rome of Peter has succeeded to the *Pax Romana*, as another volume pointed out, and inherited its traditions of human wisdom. The dominion of old Rome, mighty and far-stretching as it was, did not sacrifice the individual, or idiosyncrasies worthy of being perpetuated. Real genius recognizes genius wherever it is. Rome assimilated the good things of its world-wide tributaries, and was contented to eat the food prepared by other hands than her own. St. Peters' Rome has the same gift, and cries *Spiritus ubi vult spirat*. It does not constrain or localize the voice of the spirit, whose riches are poured into its great and ever open spiritual emporium. After the fashion of the *Pax Romana*, though in a sense as much higher as souls are than bodies, it draws, in the far-off land, its subject, the mystic boundary, which constitutes the Roman *civitas* and *ager*, and confers the proud title of Roman citizenship.

Monasticism, as a state and an institution, was not of Roman birth. It was a contribution of the East, transplanted to Rome, and submitted to Roman customers before it could gain the traffic of the West. St. Athanasius, whose confessorship placed him in the foremost ranks of Roman citizenship, conveyed St. Anthony's legacy to headquarters in 340, and found Rome only just recovering from the throes of persecution. Martyrs had been her principal achievement in the first ages; she was now to make confessors and virgins. The smallest *supplica* at Rome has to be regularly presented. No one could dispute the credentials of St. Athanasius. After suffering hair-breadth escapes, and all but death from heretical hands, he had written the life of Anthony, a book which stirred up the world itself and converted Augustine. Anthony was taking the Kingdom of Heaven by violence, he said, whilst he was given up to dry books. There were other enemies in the field than "dry books." Anthony's example in reality spoke to his heart as nothing else had done, and the heart is man's stronghold, whether for good or evil.

Athanasius did not stop at writing. He carried Anthony's fame with his inheritance to Rome. Rome tasted and saw that it was good, and after the example of old Rome, extended the benefit of the eastern institution to the whole Christian Empire, a work of assimilation which was accomplished by centuries.

As long as the Church is persecuted, and the courage of martyrs does not fail, she is safe in the higher sense. The want of security is the best security in the spiritual life. Constantine had produced a new state of things. No sooner had he paved the way for practice of the counsels than they were revealed by St. Athanasius, who, great saint and genius as he was, may possibly not have grasped the reasonableness of his tidings. It seems an anomaly to say that liberty and independence have their dangers, yet it is no less true. The moment when a bloody persecution stops is always a critical moment. The forces of the world immediately come into play and threaten to pervert even the children of martyrs by a subtle worldliness. Two years after Constantine became sole emperor, he concerted with the Patriarchs of the Petrine Sees the calling of the first Œcumenical Council at Nicea, in 325. It was the first Christian Emperor's "gift to the Church." (p. 117.)

Not by words only does the Church legislate. The history of General Councils reveals the simultaneous working of facts. Deeds were not slow to follow in the wake of Nicea. Fifteen years later Athanasius revealed to Rome the secret of Egyptian deserts. The first exposition of doctrine drew strength from the virginal life as an institution. The annals of the Church, in Rome as elsewhere, had from the first presented numerous individual instances of it. Anthony, expounded by Athanasius, drew it forth into the full light of the sanctuary. Greek philosophers had their porches for the study of human wisdom, and had practised a certain kind of *vita communis*. Philosophy was in fact its key-note. It was more skilled in the brain than in the heart. As St. Jerome said, *Plato in cerebro, Christus in corde*. The Christian philosophy differed from the Hellenic in its scope and in its end. It rested on a Crucified God, and aimed at reproducing His Divine Life. Yet no less than the Greek wisdom it had to be learned, or rather far more. On Christian lines, the monks were to the rest of the world what certified scholars are compared to amateurs, who are the Greek *ιδιωται*.

The cessation of persecution was not the only cause at work to make the times critical. The Roman Empire was slowly dissolving in the incapacity and instability of its rulers. The sons of Constantine showed a

falling off, and the barbarians who were at no distant age to be put into Constantine's inheritance, were already in the field. They constituted the future Christendom and were largely moulded by religious of both sexes. From the time that the religious rule took root, and between 340 and the appearance of St. Benedict in the following century, the life, as a life, was freely recognized; monasteries were generally called upon to supply the pastors of the church. It was found that the monk's religious training eminently fitted him for the task of governing, and this is an answer to an objection which is often raised against early vocations. The wisdom of these ages decided that the great study of all was the study of God. A knowledge of the world could bring no good. To live, therefore, for God's service was the highest life, whether as novice or professor. The experience of a London season, or of many London seasons, would have been declined as a disqualification, and the spiritual lilies, unsoiled by worldly contamination, freely gathered to adorn the high places of the Church. The choice of holy bishops was an important factor in winning barbarians to Our Lord, and it was due to religious houses.

Prior to the bishop, however, was the apostle, and these pages convey nothing if not the conviction that Europe would not have been converted at all without religious. The two apostles, who received most prominence, are St. Patrick and St. Boniface, whilst the conversion of Saxon England is ascribed with much detail to the practice of the counsels.

Another reason lay hidden in the design of Divine Providence for the rise and growth of monasticism. The personality of Benedict presented an exact antithesis to that of Mohammed, and the life which he inaugurated was the weakening and overthrow of sensuality. "The harem fought the monastery." (p. 481.) The work of St. Benedict was, not to build monasteries, for many great centres were in being before his time, but to give unity to the religious life by one fixed rule. No design or undertaking would be marked with God's sign if it lacked unity, neither would it take root. Even the splendid monasteries, with their hundreds of monks, Bangor, Marmoutier, Lérins, for instance, might have been temporary and passing wayside dwellings, without the abiding strength of a rule. Some houses followed several, and the obvious conclusion is that they would not have been followed long. Dissolution, more or less speedy, results from want of unity. During two hundred years the rule of St. Benedict was sinking into the spiritual soil, building up nations, scattering the seeds of civilization, and making saints. A new society, if society it can be called, was springing up in the "countless multitudes," who followed upon Roman decay. Benedict and his children fashioned them for the Yoke of Christ. They Christianized the barbarian world. Two centuries after St. Benedict's death, it was ripe for the new dynasty, which was crowned by Pope Leo in the person of Charlemagne.

Mr. Allies entitled the first chapter of his work "The Philosophy of History." To the uninitiated history gives no voice. It is a series of events, crimes and wars, which repeat themselves in dull confusion. Let an Augustine take hold of fifty years, or even of a single fact, which was hitherto judged absolutely insignificant, and he at once sheds broad daylight on the scene. Our minds open to the knowledge that God had a particular design in the fall of an empire, or the birth of a certain individual at a given time. In these pages, as throughout all his eight volumes, Mr. Allies follows in the wake of St. Augustine, and illumines the dull or obscure page of history. The degenerate Roman emperors,

the dying Empire, the savage barbarian hordes, the fate of Rome, five times sacked, the Holy See left in the city of ruins, and building up a principedom, in moral strength, these are facts which other volumes have clothed with startling reality. Then, we have the gradual formation of the new races, the hardly Christianized barbarian prince, who is half savage, half gentleman, with instincts often wholly good. The philosophy of history shows him to be an important factor in the new world, which grew up after the Roman Empire, and thus attaches interest to himself and his fortunes. In a former volume, too, the encounter of Pope St. Leo with Attila, was set forth, and it was a typical meeting. In his spiritual character the Chief of Christians spoke to the Scourge of God "as one having authority." The Papacy is the standing miraculous fact, which goes far beyond actual miracles, however striking. The monastic life is the second miraculous fact, with which the world has to count. It is so far beyond unaided human powers that Protestantism characterizes it as unnatural, or at best, the refuge of disappointed hearts, or a channel for the survival of the fittest. The Protestant who is an incipient agnostic, should be referred to these pages. *Amare et servire* was the device in deeds of St. Benedict. His heart was in heaven, his hand at work, tilling the soil either of the ground or of the human intellect. It mattered not in what way he toiled so long as he carried out his appointed labor.

The conversion of Saxon England is the poem of monasticism and the refutation of Protestant prejudices. The noblest of the land gave themselves up to religious life, and the bruised hearts belonged to those only who could not follow Christ alone. St. Ethelreda's story is wonderful in the annals of monasticism itself. For twelve years she was a wife only in name, hungering and thirsting for the hour of her spiritual espousals. Then, after her years of probation at court, she put off her royal crown, and received from St. Wilfrid the religious veil. What, the Protestant often asks, can be the attraction of the cloister? This book answers the question in the lives it exhibits. Christ, and Christ only, for He it is Who rivets the human heart to Himself by His divine election. Perfect happiness was the mark He set upon the higher life. It was the promised "hundredfold," and this was apparent in the names of religious houses, names chosen in the joy of crucified hearts, expressive of that peace which the world cannot give. The "fair place," the "good place," the "joyous place," the "delight," the "sweet rest," the "comfort," the "joy," (p. 203.) are some of the most touching. They are an epitome of man's cravings; joy, delight, rest and comfort, and a realization of the Gospel commands, "Leave all things and follow Me." They are a further bearing out of St. Chrysostom's words that God persuades by contraries. It was as if He had said, "Give up all and thou shalt find all."

The high ideal of domestic life which the Church placed before the world in the sacrament of matrimony was the first safeguard of the new society. Roman legislation had signally failed in giving a stable character, or indeed any character, to marriage. The Roman matron, who chose the epitaph *Uni viro*, recorded an exception which she fully appreciated. Human marriage had been raised to the dignity of a sacrament, and then the spiritual espousals of the soul to Christ in the monastic life came to encompass the society as with a shield. The philosophy of history points to the birth and rise of Mohammed as a reason for this double precaution. The false prophet grounded himself on sensuality, and thus appealed to every instinct of fallen man. To withstand the subtle temptation of his system, the Cross was not too much, and the

Cross strengthened by its "divine folly." An army stretched in battle array checked the onslaught of the Crescent, and offered man the only arms which would lead him victorious from the battle-field, chastity and purity. Mr. Allie's seventh volume treats specially of Mohammed's Flood beating vainly against Peter's Rock. This is in itself a powerful argument, and an overwhelming proof of the existence in the world of divine truth. Let the Agnostic, who says we know nothing, and that there is nothing to know, consider the rise of Mohammedanism. It put no check upon the natural appetites of man, and has, therefore, been the devil's most powerful instrument as well as man's most cruel enemy. Far from reinstating fallen nature, it would have swamped the world, and hurried it on to a premature dissolution, not the *felix exitus* of St. Augustine, but a second Deluge of ignominy.

The Flood beat vainly against the Rock in virtue of the divine promise, which caused the desert to fructify, and made human nature supernaturally strong. It was not enough to set forth the ideal Christian marriage in contradistinction to the harem. It was necessary to reach greater heights, and this was the marvel of the life to which the Rule of Benedict gave expansion.

'Αληθής

CHRIST IN TYPE AND PROPHECY. By *Rev A. J. Maas, S. J.*, Professor of Oriental Languages in Woodstock College, Md.

The first volume of this remarkable work has already been noticed in the AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW, and it is gratifying to find that our high estimate of its merits is fully borne out by the concurrent testimony of reviews and periodicals which reflect every shade of Christian opinion. "This is a very scholarly work and apparently exhaustive of the subject," says the *Christian Leader*. "He (Professor Maas) meets deists, dogmatics and infidels with extraordinary force, and, in his panoply of irrefutable testimony, routs them, foot, horse and dragoon." Others speak in the same strain. "Beyond anything else, it is scholarly . . . his work should have a place on the library-shelf of every careful student." (*New York Herald*.) "He (the author) finds Christ in type and prophecy throughout the Old Testament, and develops his argument with ingenuity, fullness of learning, patient study and with excellent spirit." (*The Independent*.) "His treatise is learned, able and exhaustive. . . . We bid Professor Maas hasten his work." This last wish has been realized; we are in possession of the second volume; it fully equals the first in erudition, logical power, clearness and directness of diction, and it far surpasses it in interest, owing to the growing impressiveness of the prophecies which refer directly to the life, death, perpetual priesthood and eternal kingship of Christ.

This second volume contains the Vth, VIth, VIIth and VIIIth parts, which treat respectively of the Offices of the Messias, the Public Life of the Messias, the Sufferings of the Messias and the Glory of the Messias. Each part is divided into chapters, each chapter into numbers or paragraphs. It is a true history of the *Life of Jesus*, written long before the events actually took place by those who saw in the light of divine revelation the future struggles, sufferings and triumphs of the Redeemer. The same tone of fair criticism with regard to the opinions of other scholars, and of deep reverence towards the sacred books that marks the first volume, is also conspicuous in the second. The best way to make the reader acquainted with the manner of dealing with the subject adopted by the author is probably to select one of the prophe-

cies, and to show how its meaning is brought out by F. Maas. We choose, almost at random, the Psalm cix. (cx.), which refers both to the kingship and to the priesthood of Christ. We are first told how Dr. Bickell describes the poetical form; even verses are pentasyllabic and the uneven are heptasyllabic. The movement is iambic. Then a short summary of the psalm is given. The psalmist hears the invitation of Jehovah addressed to a king, to be seated near him on his war-chariot; the king complies, and proceeds against the enemies of Jehovah and his own. Then Jehovah declares that the king is a priest also:

"The Lord hath sworn; and he will not repent;
Thou art a priest forever
According to the order of Melchisedech."

After drinking of the torrent in the way, the king proceeds and destroys his enemies. According to Le Hir, this psalm can be divided into three parts: the words of Jehovah, address to the king, address to Jehovah. In the second number it is shown that David is the author of the psalm. In the third number we are treated to a summary of all the opinions which take away from the psalm its Messianic character. The arguments adduced by those who hold them are fairly stated, but easily disposed of. Then the new objections of Driver are brought forward. Here we give the text in full, because it is a very fair sample of the manner in which Father Maas meets the difficulties of his opponents.

Driver in his "Literature of the Old Testament" [p. 362, note] has added the following difficulties: 4. Adoni [my lord] is commonly used in addressing the Israelite king. But the learned author surely cannot deny that the Messiah was eminently the theocratic king. 5. Messianic prophecies have regularly as their point of departure some institution of the Jewish theocracy—the king, the prophet, the people [Is. xlii., i, etc.], the high-priest, the temple [Is. xxviii., 16]; the supposition that David is here speaking and addressing a superior who stands in no relation to existing institutions, is not indeed impossible [for we have no right to limit absolutely the range of prophetic vision], but it is contrary to the analogy of prophecy. We have noticed already that at the time of David prophetic writings existed or came into existence in which the Messiah is exhibited under nearly the same aspect under which we see him in the present psalm. As to the principle enounced by Driver, the leading Messianic characteristics of the psalm are the priesthood and the royal dignity; now both existed at David's time so that the prophet could take his point of departure from them. 6. The correctness of this reasoning, Professor Driver says, is strongly confirmed by vv. 3, 5-7, where the subject of the psalm is actually depicted, not as a spiritual superior, but as a victorious Israelite monarch, triumphing through Jehovah's help over earthly foes. It is strange, indeed, that the professor can almost in the same breath advance two objections, one of which answers the other. Have we not been told a moment ago by the learned author that the prophets commonly take their point of departure from some existing theocratic institution? and must they not in the same manner take their departure from some tangible fact of sense in order to be understood by their readers or hearers? The psalmist, therefore, taking his starting point from the semblance of a successful warrior, depicts the Messianic hero in all the glory of his spiritual conquests. 7. To do justice to Prof. Driver, we must add, that he continues his dissertation by telling his hearers that "the psalm is Messianic in the same sense that Ps. ii. is; it depicts the ideal glory of the theocratic king who receives from a prophet . . . the twofold solemn promise of victory over his foes [and] of a perpetual priesthood. . . ." Prof. Cheyne [p. 301] speaks in the same manner: "Its [the psalm's] historical interpretation is correspondingly difficult; nor have I space to discuss rival hypotheses. To me it appears like an imitation of Ps. ii.; but I am not positive that we can follow the analogy of that psalm in our interpretation.

Father Maas, according to his wont, has begun by stating the objections; like St. Thomas he says first, "*Videtur quod non.*" In the fourth number we have the "*sed contra est.*" This proves the Mes-

sianic character of the psalm. 1. By many passages of the New Testament; 2. By the intrinsic evidence supplied by the text itself; 3. By the Christian tradition; 4. By the Jewish traditions, and by numerous quotations from the Talmud. He gives the Jewish commentaries for each verse, then he gives a literal translation of the whole psalm, verse for verse, and discusses the meaning of every word. It is only after this exhaustive examination that he draws the following corollaries:

1. "The psalm clearly represents the Messiah as both king and priest, and as overcoming his enemies in that double capacity. The Messianic victory is, therefore, different from that of other warlike princes.

2. "The nature of the Messianic priesthood is described as resembling that of Melchisedech rather than that of Aaron.

3. "The Messiah is king in such a manner as to share the power and dignity of Jehovah himself, hence, he must be God, since God's attributes can be applied to no one besides God."

But this is not enough, the Messiah is a priest *according to the manner of Melchisedech*. To fully realize the meaning of these words, it is necessary to refer to Gen. xiv., 14-20. In n. 1 the connection of the passage of Genesis with its context is fully established. In n. 2 Father Maas proves by the Assyrian and Chaldaic inscriptions that the Biblical narrative is not an allegory, but a historical fact. Then follows in n. 3 the proof that Melchisedech was a figure of Christ, and that his sacrifice was a type of the perpetual sacrifice of the New Testament. A translation of the passage is given, and the meaning of each part of it is fully discussed. The conclusion is irresistible, and must be given in the author's own words:

"Hence we must conclude that the sacrifice of Melchisedech was a type of the unbloody sacrifice of the New Testament.

"This conclusion may be further confirmed by the following considerations: According to St. Paul, Melchisedech was the type of Christ in as far as he was priest. Hence the sacrifice of Melchisedech must have been a type of Christ's sacrifice. But we know only one sacrifice offered by Melchisedech—that of bread and wine; and we know only of one occasion on which Christ offered sacrificially bread and wine—at the Last Supper. Hence Melchisedech's sacrifice was the type of the sacrifice offered by Christ at the Last Supper. On the other hand, Christ is a priest forever according to the order of Melchisedech; hence he must have a victim forever, resembling that of Melchisedech. Therefore, as Christ's victim is his own body and blood, he must offer them forever under the appearances of bread and wine. But he does not do this personally; hence it must be done through his ministers."

The author adds that his conclusion is confirmed not only by the practice of the Church, by the consent of the Fathers, and by a constant Christian condition, but by the Jewish traditions themselves; and he quotes the following astounding saying of a Jewish master:

Rabbi Phinees in Num., xxviii., says: "At the time of the Messiah all sacrifices shall cease; as it is said, Gen., xiv., 'Melchisedech, the King of Salem, brought forth bread and wine.' For Melchisedech, *i.e.*, the king Messiah, shall exempt from the ceasing of the sacrifices, the sacrifice of bread and wine, as it is said [Ps., cx.]: 'Thou art a priest forever, according to the order of Melchisedech.'"

This is but a sample of the skill with which Father Maas expounds a scriptural text, brings out its full meaning, and draws his conclusions. With the same thoroughness, he shows in type and prophecy every circumstance of the Passion. It is impossible to read one after another, these sorrow-laden articles, to see them discussed, analyzed, coherently indeed, but with a calmness more impressive than fast flowing tears, and

not to feel awe struck at the divine character of the drama in which Justice and Mercy united in eternal embrace.

One of the last prophecies on which Father Maas has turned his searchlight, is that referring to the conversion of Israel. It is peculiarly consoling in these days of strong anti-Semitic excitement. We shall give it in the literal translation of the author, and it shall bring to an end this unduly lengthened notice.

"On that day, saith the Lord, I will gather up her that halteth, and her that I had cast out, I will gather up, her whom I had afflicted. I will make her that halted a remnant, and her that had been afflicted a mighty nation, and the Lord will reign over them in Mount Zion, from the time now and forever. And thou O cloudy tower of the flock, of the daughter of Zion, unto thee shall it come; yea the first power shall come, the kingdom to the daughter of Jerusalem."

We hope that Father Maas may be prevailed upon to continue his work and give us a complete course of Sacred Scripture, written with the same erudition and fairmindedness that characterized his "Christ in Type and Prophecy."

FRACTIO PANIS. Die Aelteste Darstellung des Eucharistischen Opfers in der "Cappella Greca." Entdeckt und erläutert von *Joseph Wilpert*. Herder: Freiburg and St. Louis. 1895. Price \$6.25.

The spirit of de Rossi still lives in the band of able disciples with which the illustrious pioneer of scientific Christian Archæology took care to surround himself; who, having inherited their master's "doctrine, manner of life, purpose, faith, long-suffering, love, patience," are thoroughly equipped for the continuing of his great life-work in the sacred precincts of the Catacombs. Prominent among these scholars of the lamented de Rossi is Mgr. Wilpert, on whom the prophet's mantle seems to have especially fallen. We have already given expression to our admiration for his charming monograph on "Consecrated Virgins in the First Ages of the Church," in which the author's best qualities—his profound theological judgment, his thorough mastery of the entire field of patristical lore, his sincere Catholic faith and piety, his intimate acquaintance with every nook and corner of the catacombs, and his wonderful mechanical skill in drawing and photography—were given full scope in illustrating a phase of ancient Christian life which possesses a perennial attraction for Catholic hearts. "*Lei ha scelto per Suo studio il fiore dell' archeologia cristiana*," was the flattering encomium of his aged master upon the young disciple's choice of virginity as his subject, and the encomium was equally creditable to master and disciple, and served as a fitting prelude to the study.

Wilpert opens his present dissertation also with a compliment from de Rossi as gracious as it was deserved. We shall let him tell the story in his own words:

"Any one who visits the catacombs of St. Priscilla on the *Via Salara* will retain an enduring memory of the chamber which is known as the "Cappella Greca." The archæologist in particular will be struck by its architecture, and will be surprised to find in it paintings which compare favorably with good Pompeian productions. The chapel is situated within a few paces of the (modern) entrance of the catacomb, and has been accessible for a long time, as is evidenced by the names of visitors, accompanied with the dates, written on the wall. . . . The latest name inscribed is that of him whom we honor as the scientific founder of Christian archæology: *J. B. de Rossi*. The year, 1851, annexed to the name, marks the time when the master began his investiga-

tions in the catacomb of St. Priscilla. Forty-three years later, April 6, 1894, he was destined to visit it for the last time. He came for the purpose of viewing some paintings which I had recently uncovered in the 'Cappella Greca.' Although deprived by a paralytic stroke of the free use of his limbs, he dragged himself painfully along, leaning on the arm of his brother, *Michele Stefano*, to the paintings, which I showed him by the light of a taper. After a prolonged study of the principal piece, he said to me as we were leaving the chapel: 'Con questa scoperta Lei ha coronato gli scavi.' (With this discovery you have crowned the excavations.) It was his last journey to the catacombs. His malady increased in violence from day to day, and on September 20th, he was snatched away by death from the studies to which he had consecrated his entire life."

The Catacomb of Priscilla, the scene of Wilpert's latest labors, is probably the oldest of the Roman catacombs, it having been used for Christian burials and service in sub-apostolic times.

The *Cappella Greca*, so called from two Greek inscriptions therein found, enjoys the double distinction of being at the same time one of the very oldest of the Christian sepulchral chapels and of having remained intact to the present day; for at an early period it was walled up for the purpose of strengthening the galleries of the catacomb. The decorations and paintings on the walls are in strictly classical style, and according to the archæologists, were finished as we now find them, untouched by any hand save that of time, in the early years of the second century. The chapel already enjoyed the distinction of furnishing the first example of a Madonna and Child, and now, thanks to Mgr. Wilpert's skill and diligence, it presents antiquarians with "the oldest representation of the Eucharistic Sacrifice." This is that "crown of the excavations" which excited the admiration of de Rossi.

Space does not allow us to give the author's highly interesting narrative of the manner in which he liberated the important relic from its covering of mud and stalactite. The plate which he inserts from the original photograph shows it to have been an altar-piece representing the *Fractio panis*, or Breaking of Bread, and is a clear symbol of the sacrifice which took place on the altar beneath.

Mgr. Wilpert is no mere antiquarian. He is as much at home in history and theology as in archæology. Hence he is enabled to clothe any subject he treats with a great variety of interesting information drawn from allied branches. Taking his discovery as a starting-point, he goes into the whole subject of ancient Christian worship, fortifying every assertion with texts of the Fathers and illustrated views of ancient monuments. The course of his argument having led him to make frequent allusions to the famous Abercius inscription, he ends by devoting a long appendix to a discussion of its text and meaning. Altogether, he has given us a masterly work on the most important and timely of subjects. We cannot close our scanty notice without a warm congratulation to the distinguished publisher who has spared no pains to make this *édition de luxe* worthy alike of the author and of the subject. In looking at the magnificent illustrations, we seem to be standing on the sacred spot where our primitive fathers in the faith fortified themselves for martyrdom by eating the mystical bread of heaven.

FRA GIOVANNI ANGELICO DA FIESOLE. Sein Leben und seine Werke, von *Stephan Beissel S. J.*, Mit vier Tafeln und 40 Abbildungen im Text. Freiburg and St. Louis, Herder: Pp. 95. Price, net \$2.75.

This charming monograph of the learned Father Beissel, comes timely

to illustrate our remark made in noticing Dr. Pastor's great work, that the personal history of the Popes is by no means an adequate presentation of the manifold activities of Holy Church. The exciting period of the Great Schism and the Renaissance gave rise to all sorts of movements, good and bad, starting from a hundred independent centres. The Papacy originated very little in those stormy days, being engrossed by the effort to maintain its position in the Church and in society; nevertheless, the Popes of the fifteenth century deserve the gratitude of posterity for their solicitude, in spite of their grave embarrassments, to foster and turn to account the improvements initiated by others.

It was in the very midst of the gloomy disasters of the Schism that God raised up one of those great men, so numerous in the Church, whose benefactions are more brilliant and enduring than their name. Whilst the world resounded with theological strife, Brother Giovanni Dominici was quietly engaged in restoring a few Dominican convents to pristine vigor and discipline. Himself a man of extraordinary sanctity, solid learning and magnetic eloquence, he infused his own spirit, or rather the spirit of his saintly Founder into the gifted and pious youths who flocked about him. He it was who trained the future Archbishop of Florence and Father of the science of moral theology, St. Antoninus. To his feet came also the two brothers whom he named in religion Fra Giovanni and Fra Benedetto, the former a young miniaturist of excellent taste, and the latter giving promise of great literary ability. Under the experienced guidance of Dominici, the brothers rose to eminence, each in his particular sphere.

The first years of Fra Angelico's convent life were devoted to prayer, meditation and a careful study of the works of the early Italian painters, which abounded in the regions of Tuscany and Umbria. It is scarcely correct, however, to say that in the mind of this saintly religious, piety and painting were distinct subjects. His paintings have been aptly called "frescoed prayers and embodied meditations." It was his maxim that "Art demands quiet and freedom from all distracting thoughts"; and that "Whoever desires to depict the actions of Our Lord must live entirely absorbed in Our Lord." Never did he take his pencil in hand without a preparatory prayer; nor was he ever seen to paint the Crucified One without tears streaming from his eyes. Very touching is the anecdote told of him to illustrate how, even in old age, he retained the spirit of humble obedience which had distinguished his novitiate. "It chanced one day that Pope Nicholas V. came upon him as the artist was quite exhausted at his work, whereupon the Pontiff ordered some flesh meat to be brought to him. It was, however, a day on which the Dominicans of strict observance were not permitted the use of flesh meat. Fra Angelico, therefore, with childlike simplicity and forgetful that the Pope's order was equivalent to a dispensation, declined with thanks, 'as he could not eat without the permission of his Prior.'"

Our readers can easily imagine how fascinating the story of this lovely character becomes in the able hands of a veteran writer like Father Beissel. The simple record of his uneventful life is told in eight chapters, and in naming them we shall follow the artist's career in outline. I. Early Training and First Fruits in Cartona and Perugia (1387-1418). II. Sojourn and Activity in Fiesole (1418-1436). III. Sojourn in Florence (1436-1445). IV. External Influences, or the relations of the Dominicans of San Marco to Cosimo dei Medici, their patron. V. Fra Angelico's Last Judgment and its indebtedness to Dante's Poem. VI. Fra Giovanni's Madonnas. VII. His Labors in Rome and Orvieto (1445-1455). VIII. His Last Years and Death.

The volume is brought out with the taste and beauty characteristic of the distinguished publisher. In addition to the forty illustrations scattered through the text, there are four remarkably fine plates. For frontispiece we have Fra Angelico's Coronation of Mary, the original of which is at present in the Galleria degli Uffizi, in Florence. The other plates represent "The Descent from the Cross"; the "Last Judgment," and the sweet "Madonna and Child."

PRÆLECTIONES DOGMATICÆ QUAS IN COLLEGIO DITTON-HALL HABEBAT *Christ. Pesch*, S. J. Tom. II. De Deo Uno. De Deo Trino. Pp. xiii., 369. Price \$1.90. Tom. III. De Deo Creante De Peccato Orig. de Angelis. De Deo Fine Ult. De Actibus hum. Pp. xii., 370. Price, \$1.90. Herder, Friburgi (St. Louis, Mo.), 1895.

The first volume of Fr. Pesch's lectures on dogmatic theology, dealing with the sources of that science, was noticed in a preceding number of the REVIEW. The two volumes now before us cover the first four treatises of special dogmatics. The author's plan embraces five more volumes to complete the course. In the first of the two present volumes Fr. Pesch enters on the central object of theology—the unfolding of the content of revelation concerning God as One in nature and Triune in personality. The first half of the book presents a wide and a tempting field for philosophical speculation, but the author, faithful to the medium through which theology views its subject, keeps closely to the principles supplied by S. Scripture and ecclesiastical tradition, and on the whole calls in the subsidiary light of philosophy mainly in the direct development and illustration of those principles. In the question agitated within the Catholic schools of theology, philosophy of course receives the prominence required by those subjects, and let it be noted here in passing that Fr. Pesch, in these vexed questions, does not content himself with an historical statement of opinions, leaving the student to select which he may. There is no uncertain ring in his pronouncement in favor of the *scientia media* and against the *præmotio physica*.

The second half of the volume, treating as it does, of the mysteries of the B. Trinity, offers almost exclusive scope to purely theological principles. Philosophy must needs here take its ministerial position.

Thus far the author's plan has held him to the absolute side of his subject. With the second volume before us, the third in the entire series, he takes up its relative side, the relations of the Creator to His creation, or rather the relations of creatures to God as their Creator. As Creator, God must be the lord and master of His works, their end as well as their beginning. The scientific presentation of revealed truth in respect to the creative act and its objects or terms is completed only by being connected with the truths bearing on this final purpose of creation. On this ontological identity of the Alpha and Omega of things is based the logical conception of the matter set forth in the volume before us. God as Creator, God as the absolutely final end of His creative act and its effects: around these central thoughts hinge the two tracts herein contained.

Fr. Pesch has here made liberal as well as skillful use of the handmaid of his science especially in the first section on the nature of the creative act and, therefore, the after portions on man's nature, final end and on human acts in the free and moral aspects as means to the attainment of that end. On the other hand, the questions concerning the creative days, the origin of man, his elevation to the supernatural order, the fall with its consequences, the singular exemption of the Immaculate Virgin, the creation, nature, elevation and sin of the angels—all these must be primarily and

mainly seen through the media of revelation, through the Sacred Scriptures and the authoritative teaching of the Church. It is these subjects that call for manysidedness in the theologian, for his being at once an exegesist, a historian, sacred and profane, as well as a philosopher and a critic versed in the various theories of modern science. That the author of these profound, and at the same time erudite, tomes brings these qualities to his work, one realizes the longer and the more carefully one studies them. Studies them, we say, for the nature of their subjects renders the dipping or the skimming processes of little avail. At the same time they do not demand hard reading. Fr. Pesch's clear insight into his subject, his luminous definitions, his orderly arrangement, his straightforward transparent style, aided by the elegant typography of the book, all this, supplemented by the special importance and interest of the subjects themselves, draws one on without the strain of overtaxed attention.

F. P. S.

BIBLISCHE STUDIEN Unter Mit Wirkung, von *Prof. Dr. Fell*, in Münster; *Prof. Dr. Felton*, in Bonn, etc. Herausgegeben von Prof. Dr. O. Bardenhewer, in München. I. Band. I. Heft: Der Name Maria. Geschichte d. Deutung desselben von Prof. Dr. Bardenhewer. Herder. Freiburg im B. (St. Louis, Mo.). 1895. Pp. x., 160. Price, 67c. Unbound.

A number of the leading Catholic scriptural scholars of Germany, professors in the higher institutions of learning in Münster, Bonn, Prague, Freiburg, Paderborn, Breslau, Tübingen and Munich have combined to publish a series of monographs on Biblical studies. The impulse to the design has come from the memorable Encyclical of Leo XIII., *Providentissimus Deus*, and the studies are to follow the teaching and the spirit of the papal pronouncement. The most thorough scientific and historical investigation is to be united in the work with that reverence for the inspired record which genuine Christianity inculcates and safeguards. The field to be covered by these *studies* is extremely broad. It will embrace exegesis proper, introduction to S. Scripture. Biblical Philology, Hermeneutics, Biblical Criticism, History, Archæology and Geography, together with the history itself of these various branches of learning. Though the studies will all be loosely connected by the general bond of subject-matter, it being intended that from four to six numbers shall constitute a volume, yet each number will stand with a certain completeness and independence by itself. The first of these *studies* to appear is an essay on the history of the interpretation of the name of the Blessed Virgin *MARY*, by the chief editor of the undertaking, Dr. Bardenhewer, professor in the University of Munich. The author has devoted years of research to subjects akin to that of the present *study*. It is hardly necessary for us to say that the ripened fruit of his labor, exhibited in this monograph, deserves, by its scope and character, to take the place of honor in the projected series.

The name of the Mother of Our Redeemer has always had a charm for the rightly tempered Christian mind and to it has been devoted a vast amount of historical and philological criticism. That widely varying interpretations should have in the course of centuries been attached to the name does not appear strange in view of the fact that it is but recently that anything like certainty has been reached regarding the laws of Semitic, especially of Hebrew etymology. The older attempts at interpreting the name are of little hermeneutical value, yet they are not without their interest in other respects. In them are seen "the roots or seeds of those titles of honor, symbols or appellations with which the piety of the middle ages and the Liturgy of the Church has adorned the Mother

of God," and so they furnish material for the history of this veneration the ages have given to Mary.

The present brochure traces the history of the meanings given to her name. Beginning with the significance of the name in the Old Testament, the author follows it through the Greek lexica attributed to Philo and Origen, along the stream of early and mediæval Greek and Latin church history. He searches out its meanings in the Syriac lexicography, through the German literature of medieval times, as well as in the works of modern scholars who have thrown on it the newest lights from oriental philology. The various interpretations are hunted up to their beginnings and followed along their history. The work is a marvel of patient, critical research. It shows that wide and thorough acquaintance with eastern and western philology and with Christian archæology and history for which the German University professor is deservedly renowned. If the rest of these Biblical studies follow on the high plane of scholarship exhibited by this initial number, the learned Catholic world both in and out of Germany, will have reason to be proud of the solid and timely addition that shall be made to true scriptural science.

CHRISTUS ALS PROPHET. NACH D. EVANGELIEN DARGESTELLT. Von *Dr. F. Schmid*, Prof. d. Theologie Brixen, Buchandl. d. Kath. Politisch Press-vereins. 1892. Pp. iv., 186.

The conviction that true prophecy is of divine origin and is consequently a divine seal on the mission of the prophet, is ingrained into the human mind. The Christian religion, therefore, in pointing to the prophetic utterances of her Founder as to a motive of belief in His Divine nature and her divine mission, appeals to a natural intellectual tendency of man.

There are a number of works devoted to the special presentation of the prophecy argument, notably that of Fr. Maas on "Christ in Type and Prophecy," just completed. These works, however, are mainly restricted to the unfolding of the Messianic Prophecies of the Old Testament. Outside of works on general Apologetics, where the prophecies made by our Lord Himself are briefly exhibited as arguments for the Divinity of His person and His revelation, little has been written on His special prophetic office. The brochure before us by Dr. Schmid, Professor of Theology in the Ecclesiastical Seminary of Brixen, is devoted to this subject. It presents, therefore, a logical complement to the argument from the Messianic Prophecies by gathering from the four Gospels the prophetic utterances of Christ in testimony of His person and mission. These prophecies our author groups under four divisions; the first embraces those which our Lord made in close connection with His miracles and whose fulfilment followed at once or shortly afterwards, as, for instance, His predictions bearing upon the raising of Lazarus to life; the second including prophecies He uttered concerning His own future and that of His disciples, the fate of Jerusalem, Capharnaum, etc., the fulfilment of all of which is one of the best verified facts of history; the third group comprises Christ's prophecies in regard to the nature, progress, history of the Kingdom He established—prophecies which have been, still and shall yet be in course of fulfilment throughout the Christian ages; the fourth and last division contains His predictions as to the consummation of time, the signs that shall precede His last coming, the general resurrection, the final judgment, the eternal lot of the blessed and of the condemned.

Under these four heads Dr. Schmid collects the Gospel prophecies,

interprets their meaning and points to their fulfillment in the past, progressive present or future as the individual utterances demand.

His point of view is, as he says himself, that of a believing Catholic. At the same time the argument of his book appeals most strongly to the non-Catholic. The rationalist who rejects the inspiration for the entire genuineness of the Gospels, has an insoluble problem to confront. How could an intentional falsifier, or the myth-building fancy of the early Christian hit upon such prophecies as are contained in the Gospel record? On the Protestant who still accepts the inspiration of the Bible devolves the task of explaining the fact that the Catholic Church alone adequately answers to the picture of Christianity sketched in prophetic lines by its Founder.

To the earnest student of Apologetics, Dr. Schmid's monograph will be of great service by giving him a fairly complete survey and a satisfactory analysis of the prophetic argument for Christianity as presented by the Gospels, whilst the intelligent Catholic, layman as well as cleric, will gain from it a deeper knowledge and a better appreciation of that "Prophetic Word" to which the Apostle would have "his followers attend as to a light shining in a dark place, until the day dawn and the morning star rise in their hearts."

THE OXFORD MOVEMENT IN AMERICA; or Glimpses of Life in an Anglican Seminary. By *Rev. Clarence E. Walworth*. New York: The Catholic Book Exchange, 120 West Sixtieth street. Price, \$1.00.

These *Reminiscences* of the venerable Father Walworth, jotted down without any attempt at rhetorical effect, and with slight effort at preserving the "unities," make most fascinating reading. They plant us in the early forties, and place us amidst surroundings quite unfamiliar to the vast majority of us. The memories which crowd upon the aged convert are of the most varied kind; and notwithstanding the kindly feeling he retains for the professors and fellow-students of his youthful days, the humorous side of the situation in an Anglican Seminary, with its motley assortment of High and Low, Tractarian and Evangelical, all huddled as in a Noe's ark, forces from him and his readers a good-natured smile. We quote a typical instance:

"Americans who remember Barnum's museum or his manageries will understand what I mean when I say that the Anglican Church constitutes what Barnum would have called 'A Happy Family,' in religion. A happy family, according to Barnum's phraseology, was a group of various animals, by nature most hostile to each other, shut up in one cage and obliged *per force* to keep peace. A dog was made to dwell in apparent harmony with a cat, a cat with a mouse and bird. A monkey kept peace with a parrot. The parrot whistled to call the dog, who wagged his tail at the call while he playfully pretended to bite the cat, who showed no signs of fear." . . . p. 39.

But the General Theological Seminary drew the line at Romanism, or even misprision thereof. This, Arthur Carey found to his cost, and so did the facile Onderdonk himself. One of the most amusing incidents in the book is that of the evergreen cross: . . . p. 37.

"During the Christmas vacation at the close of the year 1843, several students remained at the seminary, including myself and Whicher, also a candidate from our western diocese. Some of us undertook to decorate the chapel for Christmas. We introduced evergreens after the usual manner, and as profusely as circumstances would allow, especially around the little chancel. Unfortunately, however, none of us being low-churchmen or evangelical, and none having any great fear of Rome before our eyes, we introduced a large evergreen cross at the centre of the chancel railing and directly in front of the desk. Professor Turner, who was also dean of the faculty,

having charge of the buildings and all the rooms, was either offended at this, or feared that others would take offence. He sent for Whicher, berated him roundly, and ordered that the cross should be taken down. Whicher was disposed to resist this order as being unfriendly to the very symbol of our salvation, and fanatically evangelical. He consulted with his co-partners in misdemeanor, who encouraged him to carry the case to Bishop Onderdonk, president of the seminary. This he did. Dr. Onderdonk expressed great surprise at the dean's order, which he considered very foolish and unnecessary. He advised, however, that we should submit promptly and quietly to the dean, who was acting strictly in the line of his office and ought to be obeyed. This ended the matter, but left us feeling very foolish."

After a futile attempt of "Prior Wadhams" and Walworth to found a "monastery" on the Wadhams' Farm in Essex County, the amateur ascetics, soon followed by their fellow-student, James A. McMaster, sought and found rest in the bosom of the Catholic Church.

CURSUS PHILOS. IN USUM SCHOLARUM, AUCT. PLUR. PHILOS. PROFESSORIBUS IN COLLEGIIS EXAETENSI ET STONYHURSTENSI S. J. THEOLOGIA NATURALIS. Auctore B. Boedder, S.J. Friburgi (St. Louis, Mo.). Herder. 1895. Pp. xii., 371. Price, \$1.40.

With this volume on Natural Theology the series of text-books of which it forms a part, edited by the exiled German Jesuits in England and Holland is brought to a close—the volume on Ethics, which forms the logical termination of a course of philosophy having been the first in point of time to appear in print. Regret has been felt and publicly expressed that the editors of the series did not contemplate, or as it may be, did not see their way to adding a volume on the History of Philosophy. The extreme meagreness of reliable literature on this important branch of philosophical culture renders such an addition most desirable. We have already quite a large number of books on scholastic philosophy just short of this completion, so that it seems a pity to leave another unfinished monument in the field.

However, let us examine the claims on our attention of the present closing (if so it must be) volume. Its subject-matter is evidently inexhaustible, but judging from the number of works that have been devoted to it it might seem that at least the possibilities of doing more than repeating over again the oft-repeated truths concerning it had been exhausted. Waiving, however, the profit there is in this very multiplied repetition, the claims of the present volume for acceptance lies in its being an essential part of a whole course, whose merit is undoubted. But aside from this relation its independently inner worth is very considerable. Its author wrote the volume on Natural Theology in the Stonyhurst series of English manuals of Catholic Philosophy. His familiarity, therefore, with the requirements of English-speaking students of philosophy invites the presumption that his present work will have for them a special interest. And this it has. Compared with its English companion this Latin manual is of quite another character. It appeals not to the general reader, it makes no claim or effort to be popular. It is essentially didactic, and addresses exclusively the professional student of philosophy. It has, therefore, all that method, arrangement, incisive terminology, technique of thesis and counter-thesis that characterize the text-book of the study-hall and class-room. At the same time, however, it evinces, as has been hinted, special regard for the English reading student.

Many of the illustrations of its thesis, as well as the counter-objections refer to authors familiar, some as friends, others otherwise, to the reader of English philosophical literature.

This feature—its literary timeliness—together with its other undoubted merits, its fuller development of its subject than is found in the average text-book of philosophy, the closely logical weaving out of its theses, the special attention it gives to the solution of objections, its lucid, simple style, the attractive appearance of the book—all this makes the work a worthy companion of the preceding excellent manuals in this series, which in its present state of completion stands in the very front line of kindred literature.

F. P. S.

SYNOPSIS THEOLOGIÆ DOGM. SPECIALIS AD MENTEM D. THOMÆ AQ. HODIERNIS MORIBUS ACCOMMODATA. Auctore *Ad. Tanqueray S.S.* Tom. I, pp. 618. Tom. II. Editio Altera aucta et emendata. Pp. 927. Tornaci, Desclee, Baltimore (St. Mary's Seminary). Benziger (New York). 1895.

One takes up these handsomely printed volumes quite biased in their favor. The presswork is done in the style for which the Desclee house is deservedly famed, and the whole mechanical make-up shows the hand of the experienced teacher who realizes how much the labor of his pupils is facilitated by a well-ordered text-book. Nor is it necessary to pore long over these attractive pages to be impressed with the fact that the mould but befits the matter.

There are those who look with eyes askance on synopses of theology. They fear the evil in the little book, and sigh for the folios of the schoolmen. Others there are who believe we must have compendia of theology as we have of every other science, and they have strong reasons to urge for their opinion. There are synopses and synopses. Some are indexes, catalogues, satchel-guides to continents of knowledge. Others are curtailed descriptions but full of suggestiveness, opening out views which the beholder can enlarge and complete by his own insight, and pointing the way to richer information from additional sources. Of the latter kind is the work before us. Its author has written it for the use of students in our seminaries, and his experience has taught him their special needs. He has not, therefore, indulged in lengthy speculation on abstruse questions of little practical import. His aim has been to inform the minds of young theologians for their work in the ministry of to-day—to enable them to preach the word with solid fruit, and to confute the prevailing errors of heresy and infidelity. With this in view he pays more than wonted attention to the scriptural arguments for his theses and to the statement and disproof of false views and theories of so-called modern science. It would be wrong, however, to class the author with those who have no taste but for the “practical,” the utilitarian aspect of theology. He evidently realizes that the theologian is formed only by deep and patient study of the master-minds of divine science. Hence his constantly recurring references to the work of the Angelic Doctor, to Suarez, Bellarmine, Lugo, Billuart, Franzlin and the other great theologians, as well as to modern writers both within and without the church, a knowledge of whose thought he sees to be of service in broadening and deepening the theological culture of his readers. The work as thus far completed covers the ground of special dogmatics. The author, we are informed, has in hand a separate volume on these foundations and principles of his science. With the addition of this volume the work will be a highly useful and timely addition to the literature of theological text-books.

A HISTORY OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES. By *Thomas O'Gorman*, Professor of Church History in the Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C. New York: The Christian Literature Co. 1895. Price, \$2.50.

This work of the learned professor of church history in our Catholic

University appears as vol. ix. in "The American Church History Series," published "under the auspices of the American Society of Church History." This fact ought to be kept in view in reading and passing judgment on the book. Being directly addressed to a non-Catholic, and, therefore, unsympathetic public, it cannot surprise us if it betrays a certain lack of that enthusiasm which would have welled up in the writer's mind, and have found a glowing expression on his pages, had he told the story of what he is too fond of calling our "National Church" to a distinctively Catholic audience. Moreover, he was seriously hampered by the necessity of compressing his narrative within the limits which might be quite sufficient to give a detailed account of the achievements of Baptists, Congregationalists, Lutherans, and other sects, but which were entirely too narrow to allow anything like "a thorough and scientific and psychological" presentation of the history of Catholicity in this nation. If, then, we find the narration at times vague and sketchy, the fault is rather in the nature of the undertaking than in the gifted author. To quote his own words:

"Bare and lifeless on this printed page are the statistics we have just given; but to the imagination of the historian, how eloquent they are. They tell of heroic feats of apostolic zeal, of hardships and perils by water and land, of lives spent and deaths incurred in the pursuit of souls; they tell of brave men and women crossing mountains and plains, floating down great rivers in search of homes; they tell of the settler's hut, of forests cleared, of all the weak beginnings and mighty struggles out of which was born our great western commonwealth."

The volume bears, furthermore, numerous marks, in style and inaccuracies as to name and dates, of having been written in haste. It will, nevertheless, accomplish a good work especially among the non-Catholics for whom it has been primarily compiled.

GESCHICHTE DES BREVIERS. Von *P. Suilbert Bäumer, O.S.B.*. Herder: Freiburg and St. Louis. 1805. Price, \$2.85, net. 8vo., pp. 637.

This admirable fruit of truly Benedictine industry possesses a melancholy interest from the fact that it is prefaced with an obituary notice of the author, who, if we may be permitted to say it, died in the parturition of his life-long labor. The deep regret with which the learned Catholic world parts with so able a successor to the Mabillons and D'Acherys of old, is tempered by the reflection that Divine Providence spared him long enough to complete the task which had chiefly engaged his thoughts throughout the whole of his priestly career. Though many another valuable work would have followed to enrich our scientific Catholic literature, yet one such volume as this "History of the Breviary" is sufficient to immortalize his name.

Bäumer divides his history of the development of the Breviary into three epochs. In the first division he gathers together all the information ascertainable regarding the public prayers of the Church during the early ages. Then follow the labors of Sts. Benedict and Gregory, of the bishops of the Carolingian era, and of Innocent III., and Gregory IX., the sum total of whose contributions towards the modelling of office, gave it the shape which it has substantially ever since retained. The labors of the Council of Trent, and of the Holy See in modern times, have been in the direction of improvements, curtailments, and additions to the *Proprium Sanctorum*. Everything in any way bearing upon the subject of the breviary is treated with diligence, and an apparatus of erudition which is truly bewildering. Experts may possibly discover

flaws, here and there, which ulterior investigations would have enabled the author to remove, but, as it stands, Bäumer's work is universally acknowledged one of the great masterpieces of Catholic learning, and an enduring monument to the theological science of the present age.

THE ROMAN COURT: Or, A Treatise on the Cardinals, Roman Congregations and Tribunals, Legates, Apostolic Vicars, Protonotaries, and other Prelates of the Holy Roman Church. By the Rev. Peter A. Baart, S.T.L. Milwaukee: Hoffmann Brothers Co. Received from Fr. Pustet & Co., New York. Price, \$1.25.

Every educated Catholic, and especially the clergy, ought to have some acquaintance with the methods employed by the Holy See in the administration of Holy Church. The Roman Court is the most venerable and the best organized in the world. Experience and organization enable the Supreme Pontiff, through the discipline of his army of officials, to transact the infinite variety of business involved in his divinely imposed task of governing the great Catholic Church.

We congratulate Father Baart on the skill with which he has condensed into his little volume the mass of information contained in the extensive works of canonists regarding the duties of the various Roman congregations. He has made it possible for the general American reading public to take a satisfactory mental survey of the vast field of activity summed up in the expression "The Curia Romana." The result must be, in every unprejudiced mind, an increased veneration for the venerable See of St. Peter.

No doubt, in a second edition, the author will correct several errors which have crept into his admirable little book, especially in the matter of Italian proper names.

S. THOMÆ AQUINATIS SUMMA THEOL. Diligenter Emendata Nicolai, Silvii, Billuart et C. J. Drioux Notis Ornata Ed. 16. Cadieux et Derome, Montreal.

Of the many reprints of St. Thomas' *Summa Theologica*, the present commends itself for general every-day service. Eight indexes enable the student to unlock the vast edifice of the *Summa* on every side. As to its Scriptural and other authoritative elements, its refutations of heresy and infidelity, its wealth of matter for the pulpit orator and catechist, its exposition of the *loci theologici*, an *index rerum* opens out the minutest details of the more than five thousand pages that make up its bulk. The notes in this edition are brief but sufficient for the average student. A not to be despised feature, by the impecunious at least, is its cheapness. In view of the latter excellence the paper and letter press are very good. Though coming from Paris, the fact that the names of different publishers appear on the title page of different copies of this reprint, warrants the inference that, like the insides of pianos and some newspapers, it is restricted exclusively to no individual firm. It is kept constantly in stock, we believe, by this enterprising firm in Montreal, who have done and are doing so much for the spread of good literature especially amongst the French reading world both in Canada and in the United States.

STUDIES IN CHURCH HISTORY. By Rev. Reuben Parsons, D.D. Vol. II. Centuries IX-XIV. Fr. Pustet & Co.: New York and Cincinnati, 1895. Price, \$2.50.

For many years, Dr. Parsons has done excellent service to the cause of Catholic truth by his charming essays on historical subjects, con-

tributed to this REVIEW, and to other Catholic magazines. His work, as our readers can testify, bears the invariable imprint of careful thought, accurate and impartial judgment, and extensive reading. A long experience has taught the editors of the REVIEW to value Dr. Parsons' judgment in matters pertaining to Church history very highly.

We extend, therefore, a hearty welcome to this collection of monographs, to which the author has given the unpretentious title of "Studies." They represent the mature fruit of long and earnest years of unintermittent research and meditation. Some of the essays are new, others none the less acceptable because they have already appeared in one or other periodical. The old and the new form together a valuable series of studies on nearly all the important topics connected with the history of Christianity during the Middle Ages. No better book could be put into the hands of those who wish to study the workings of mediæval Christianity.

A BRIEF TEXT-BOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. By *Rev. Charles Coppens, S. J.* New York: Catholic Book Company, 28 Barclay street.

This little treatise on Ethics is a companion volume to the learned author's "Brief Text-Book of Logic and Mental Philosophy," already favorably mentioned in our columns and extensively used in academies and other advanced Catholic institutions of learning. The aim of the series is to present the true and everlasting principles of Catholic philosophy in such a manner as to be intelligible and easily digestible to those who are not permitted to enjoy the advantages of a thorough scientific training. The evil of the day is that, as the author well puts it, "questions of ethics," and also of logic, and the abstrusest parts of metaphysics, "which in former times were left to the close scientific treatment of specialists, are at the present day freely discussed among all classes of society, in newspapers and popular magazines, in the workshop and in the parlor." Hence the imperative need of popular treatises like the one before us, which we heartily recommend to those who in various ways are laboring for the extension of sound learning among our young men and women.

INSTITUTIONES THEOL. DOGM. SPECIALIS. TRACT. DE GRATIA. Auctore *Bern. Jungmann, D.D.* Ratisbonæ, Pustet. (New York). 1896. Pp. vi., 312. Price, \$1.25.

The first edition of Dr. Jungmann's treatise, *de Gratia*, appeared in 1867. A slightly improved edition was published five years later. Since that time four other editions of the work have been called for, each, however, being but a reprint of the second edition. All the other dogmatic treatises by Dr. Jungmann have passed through three or four editions, but the present tract on Grace seems to be in special demand. The popularity, if we may use the word in connection with theology, of the author's works, is undoubtedly due to the singular clearness of exposition. Another noteworthy merit of his tracts is the brief analysis appended to each. These digests do great service to the student by enabling him to get a bird's-eye view of the field covered and to revive his memory by reviewing the fuller development of the theses.

HISTORY OF THE CHURCH IN ENGLAND FROM THE ACCESSION OF HENRY VIII. TO THE DEATH OF QUEEN ELIZABETH, A.D. 1509-1603. By *Mary H. Allies.* London: Burns & Oates. Received from Benziger Brothers. Price, \$1 net.

In this, the second volume of her popular "History of the Church in England," Miss Allies endeavors, within the compass of two hun-

dred and forty pages, to give a picture of the melancholy condition of religion under the Tudors. It is, of course, a story of the temporary triumph of fraud and violence over truth and piety, and, as such, is necessarily forbidding, being relieved only by the heroism of martyrs and confessors. The talented writer has brought great skill and extensive reading to bear upon her task, and we cordially recommend the book to those who, with little leisure, desire to become acquainted with the spirit and main facts of the "glorious Reformation."

ELEMENTS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE. By *Father Humphrey, S. J.* Received from Benziger Brothers.

Twelve years ago Father Humphrey had published a digest of Saurez' great treatise *De Statu Religionis*. "That work," says our author, "was, on account of the length of it, somewhat expensive. The present volume contains the marrow of the larger work, and is published at a price which places it within the reach of all whom the subject concerns." The bare statement of the character of the book will be a sufficient recommendation of it to all our religious communities.

PETRONILLA AND OTHER STORIES. By *Eleanor C. Donnelly*. New York, Cincinnati, Chicago: Benziger Brothers. 1896.

This, if we mistake not, is Miss Donnelly's first appearance as a novelist, though her charming verse has been for many years familiar to our ears. We are pleased to notice that the highly gifted lady's venture into the realm of fiction has been, in Catholic circles, pronounced a decided success.

WETZER UND WELTE'S KIRCHENLEXICON. Zweite Auflage. Freiburg and St. Louis: Herder. 1895.

It is with no ordinary satisfaction that we announce to our readers the publication of the ninth volume of the great Catholic Lexicon, the transcendent merits of which have been by us so often proclaimed that further laudation is quite unnecessary. The work is now complete as far as the word *Pignatelli*.

BREVIARUM ROMANUM EX DECRETO SS. CONC. TRIDENT RESTITUTUM, ETC. Editio Septima post typicam. 4 vols. 18mo. Ratisbon and New York. Pustet. 1895.

Our prophecy that this admirable little edition of the breviary would be universally popular, has been fully verified, as is evidenced by the call for a second edition within two years.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

MEMOIR OF MOTHER MARY ROSE COLUMBA ADAMS, O.P., First Prioress of St. Dominic's Convent and Foundress of the Perpetual Adoration at North Adelaide. By the *Rt. Rev. W. R. Brownlow, D.D.*, Bishop of Clifton. Burns & Oates. Received from Benziger Brothers.

A ROYAL AND CHRISTIAN SOUL. A Sketch of the Life and Death of The Comte de Paris. By *Monsieur D'Hulst*, Rector of the Institute of Paris. Benziger Brothers.

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